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1  A Guide to the Unified 
Approach to Truth, Modality, 
and Paradox 
Carlo Nicolai and Johannes Stern
 
The notion of truth, modal notions, and doxastic notions such as belief 
and knowledge play a crucial role in contemporary philosophy. From its 
very beginnings philosophy has sought to fully understand these notions. 
Following the linguistic turn and the rise of analytic philosophy, the 
study of the uses of the aforementioned notions in (natural) language 
has become an important part of the data against which a theory has 
to be tested and sharpened. Indeed research on truth within this tradition 
has focused on the role and uses of the truth predicate in language—be it 
in natural language or some more regimented theoretical language. 
Research on belief has been importantly influenced by how belief 
reports are to be best understood and similar remarks apply to modal 
notions and knowledge. 
In natural language we say 
(1) This apple is red. 
(2) Goldbach’s conjecture is true. 
(3) Goldbach’s conjecture is necessary. 
(4) Mary believes Goldbach’s conjecture. 
In light of these examples it seems, at least prima facie, that saying of 
Goldbach’s conjecture that it is true, possible, or believed is not funda­
mentally different from the claim made in (1): in both cases we seem to 
ascribe a particular characteristic, feature, or property to an object, that 
is, a specific apple in (1) but the denotatum of Goldbach’s conjecture in 
(2), (3), and (4). In other words ‘Goldbach’s conjecture’ occupies a 
subject position in (2), (3), and (4) that typically can be occupied by first-
order singular terms and can be bound by first-order quantification.1 
The objects of truth are not apples, however, but commonly thought to 
be sentences (types), utterances, or propositions.2 While sentences or 
propositions are, of course, objects of a very different kind from apples, 
they remain objects of the same semantic type on this view. In the 
context of Montague Grammar, they will all be objects of type e. As a  
consequence, the truth predicate enables generalization over sentences or 
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propositions by means of standard first-order quantification. Indeed this 
feature is widely acknowledged as one of the principal uses of the truth 
predicate in language (see, e.g., Quine, 1970). 
However, according to an alternative view generalization over sen­
tences or propositions does not arise via quantification into the argument 
position of a sentential predicate, but rather via some sort of higher-order 
quantification over sentence position. On this view, in sentences like (2), 
despite appearances to the contrary, we do not ascribe truth to some 
object of type e. Rather, on this alternative semantic picture the truth 
predicate will not occur in the logical form of the sentence. Instead the 
truth predicate will be eliminated and replaced by propositional quantifi­
cation, which is standardly analysed as quantification over objects of type 
hs, ti. Arguably this line of research originates with Ramsey’s Redundancy 
Theory of Truth (Ramsey, 1927, 1929) and finds more contemporary 
proponents in the form of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (Grover 
et al., 1975; Grover, 1992) and Mulligan (2010). 
In the literature on truth the idea that the quantifier in sentences such 
as 
(5) Every axiom of ZFC is either true or false 
is a propositional, i.e., a higher-order quantifier ranging over objects of 
type hs, ti remains a minority position and truth is usually formalized 
(and interpreted) by a first-order predicate constant. In contrast, and 
somewhat surprisingly, in philosophical logic it is customary to for­
malize attitude verbs such as ‘believe’, as well as, knowledge and various 
modal notions by means of sentential operators that apply to object of 
type hs, ti. Quantification into the argument position of attitude verbs, 
knowledge, and the modal notions then need to take the form of prop­
ositional quantification, that is, quantification over objects of type hs, ti 
(Bull, 1969; Fine, 1970).3 
The discrepancy in the formal treatment of truth, modality, and dox­
astic notions leads to the problem of cross-quantification: how is the 
quantifier in sentences like 
(6) Everything Mary believes is true 
best understood? Is it a first-order quantifier as required by the standard 
view on truth or is it a propositional quantifier that binds the argument 
position of the attitude verb if the latter is formalized as a doxastic 
operator? 
Unfortunately, sentences like (6) are abundant in natural language 
and, specifically, philosophical discourse, so the problem of quantifica­
tion cannot be put aside. To resolve the problem, some level of uniformi­
zation between the formal treatment of truth, doxastic notions, and 
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modal notions seems required. In other words, the notion of truth, dox­
astic notions, and modal notions as they appear in sentences like (6) need 
to be treated as expressions of the same logical category to allow for the 
type of cross-quantification displayed in (6).4 
If the grammatical form of sentences (2)–(6) is taken as a guide, attitude 
verbs, knowledge, and modal notions may be best conceived of as predi­
cates. This would facilitate interpreting quantification in these sentences 
along the lines of first-order quantification. Alternatively, one could 
take a revisionist stance towards the surface-level grammatical form 
and conceive of quantification in these sentences as propositional quanti­
fication: there is no singular term position that is bound by the quantifier 
expression in (5) and (6). The quantifier ranges over sentence position 
rather than their nominalizations. All else equal, taking the first-order 
route may seem advantageous. First-order quantification is well under­
stood and it comes with a fully developed semantics and proof theory. 
In contrast, while there exist attractive semantics for higher-order quanti­
fication and more specifically propositional quantification, these seman­
tics typically cripple the language’s expressive resources: self-reference is 
usually eliminated in favour of an open-ended hierarchy of types. As 
will become clear later, Bacon’s Opacity and Paradox highlights that 
this need not be the case, i.e., propositional quantification can accommo­
date self-reference without appealing to an open-ended hierarchy of types. 
However, the semantics and proof theory of non-hierarchical theories of 
propositional quantification is underdeveloped in comparison to the first­
order approach. 
Putting all of this together, there is a strong case to uniformly con­
ceive of the objects of truth, modality, knowledge, and attitudinal rela­
tions as first-order objects that can be quantified over via first-order 
quantification—call this the Unified Approach. However, grammatical 
form and a well developed proof theory and semantics do not amount 
to conclusive arguments for adopting the first-order approach. If convinc­
ing arguments in favour of a higher-order approach are available, the 
latter may well be preferable. Indeed, several philosophers and logicians 
pursue the higher-order approach. The chapters by Bacon and Studd in 
this volume contribute to the development of the higher-order approach. 
Independently of whether one prefers a first-order or higher-order 
approach, a uniform treatment of truth, modality, and attitudinal rela­
tion seems a prerequisite for an adequate semantics and proof theory 
of sentences which involve cross-quantification in the sense discussed 
above. However, unless special precautions are taken, such a uniform 
treatment of the notion of truth, modal notions, and propositional atti­
tudes will encounter paradoxes such as the liar paradox, Montague’s 
paradox (Myhill, 1960; Montague, 1963), and paradoxes of belief (Tho­
mason, 1980; Cross, 2001).5 A popular reaction to the paradox is to 
banish self-reference from the framework by introducing either syntactic 
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or semantic restriction (e.g., typing restrictions) that prevent expressing 
self-reference of any sort. Such approaches are hardly satisfactory, as 
has been convincingly argued by Kripke (1975) and others: they don’t 
provide an interpretation of fragments of natural language that fit the 
data. Rather than banishing self-reference from the framework, strate­
gies have to be put in place for handling vicious or infelicitous forms 
of self-reference. 
The paradoxes not only pose a challenge for any adequate formal 
account of truth and related notions, they also highlight the need of 
developing such an account in an unified way, that is, in a framework 
in which the various notions are allowed to freely interact. As has 
been stressed by Horsten and Leitgeb (2001), Halbach (2006, 2008), 
and Stern and Fischer (2015), the interaction of the various notions 
may trigger new and unexpected pathologies. This indicates that pro­
ceeding in a piecemeal fashion and tackling truth, modality, or the prop­
ositional attitudes individually rather than simultaneously is bound to 
lead to problems.6 
In the first-order framework, self-reference is usually achieved via the 
various forms of nominalizations available, e.g., via Gö del numbering 
or other means that enable one to talk about expressions of the language 
(alternatively, component parts of structured propositions). However, in 
the higher-order framework, that is, a framework that allows for quanti­
fication into sentence-position, the liar-like paradoxes arise directly via 
quantification into the argument position of the truth-like notions 
(or related means). In this form the paradoxes are known as paradoxes 
of indirect discourse, and have been discussed, e.g., by Prior (1961, 
1971).7 The paradoxes of indirect discourse are basically versions of 
the Epimenides paradox, but in contrast to the more standard liar-like 
paradoxes, require rethinking the logic and semantics of propositional 
quantification rather than the logic and semantics of the truth-like 
notions. An example to this effect is given by Bacon’s contribution but 
also Asher (1990), yet research on the semantics of propositional quanti­
fication in light of the paradoxes of indirect discourse is somewhat more 
scarce than the research on adequate semantics for the truth predicate and 
related notions. This volume aims to continue research on the advantages 
and limitations of the first-order framework. Addressing such challenges 
necessitates a closer look at the truth predicate, its role and function in 
language, and its semantics. And this is where the journey begins. 
1.1 Truth: Semantics and Disquotation 
Even if truth is best conceived as a predicate applying to first-order enti­
ties, this does not settle many other issues concerning the role of truth in 
language and reasoning. Theorizing about truth comes in different 
forms. 
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1.1.1 Truth and Semantics 
The standard semantic notion of truth lives in a metalanguage that is dis­
tinct from the fragment of natural language one wants to analyse, the 
object-language. This metalanguage comprises a rich ontology of math­
ematical objects and resources to talk about the semantic values of the 
linguistic components of the object-language. Semantic truth is typically 
defined in such a metalanguage, although it is possible to employ a direct 
axiomatization of one’s metatheoretic truth predicate. Semantic truth 
can be employed to study the object-linguistic truth predicate, whose 
properties may not coincide with the semantic one. 
Several theorists interpret natural language data as supporting the 
desideratum that the semantic value of a sentence A ought to be the 
same as the semantic value of ‘“A” is true’, where A is an arbitrary sen­
tence of the object-language. There are different ways to construct a 
formal semantics with this property. The liar paradox tells us that a 
formal semantics in which A and ‘“A” is true’ have the same semantic 
value cannot validate all principles of classical logic. Kripke (1975) is 
arguably the starting point of modern investigations on the semantics 
of self-applicable truth: the formal semantics proposed by Kripke does 
not validate some of the classical logical principles for negation (or, 
equivalently, the law of excluded middle). The sentences that generate 
paradox are, in Kripke’s semantics, truth-value gaps. 
Kripke’s approach is the basis for semantic frameworks that are math­
ematically very close to Kripke’s original semantics, but that are concep­
tually quite apart. By conceiving of the liar paradox as a datum 
supporting the inconsistency of truth, paraconsistent approaches to the 
semantics of the truth predicate are based on the idea that there are sen­
tences that are both true and false (Priest, 2006; Beall, 2009), that is, 
truth-value gluts. Such sentences crucially contain the object-linguistic 
truth predicate. The paraconsistent semantics developed in Priest 
(2006) also restrict some principles of negation (or, equivalently, the 
classical inference ex-falso quodlibet). 
A paraconsistent version of Kripke’s theory of truth can be constructed 
to yield models of the language with a self-applicable truth predicate that 
validate all classical inferences—including the ones involving negation— 
but that invalidate some classical meta-inferences (Ripley, 2012; 
Cobreros et al., 2013). Let’s restrict our attention to models with only 
three values f1; 1= ; 0g. Fixed-point models inspired by the non-transitive 2
approach do not validate the structural rule of cut. This is achieved by 
modifying the notion of logical consequence associated with Kripke 
fixed-point models. Assuming a fully structural notion of logical conse­
quence, φ follows from Γ precisely when designated truth-values are pre­
served. In the non-transitive approach, φ follows from Γ precisely when, 
if all sentences in Γ receive value 1, then φ cannot receive value 0. This is 
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the notion of strict-tolerant consequence. Since both the liar sentence λ 
and its negation ¬λ do not receive value 0 in any model, they are both 
valid. However, the non-transitive approach to truth does not lead to 
triviality, as the meta-inference of cut is not validated. 
Paul É gré’s Half Truths and Liars aims to refine the analysis of 
the semantics of the object-linguistic truth predicate given by the non-
transitive approach. According to the standard non-transitive theorist, 
sentences such as λ and ‘2 + 2 = 4’ do not differ in their strict semantic 
status: they are both valid. However, unlike what happens with 2 + 2 = 4,  
the negation of λ is also valid, but there is no sense in which the non­
transitivist can deem λ to be less true than ‘2 + 2 = 4’. In the standard 
non-transitive approach, λ and ‘2 + 2 = 4’ can be seen to diverge at the 
pragmatic level, in particular in  their  assertibility conditions.  ‘2  + 2 = 4’  
is strictly and tolerantly assertible, whereas λ is tolerantly but not strictly 
assertible. 
By reflecting on natural language data, É gré proposes a genuinely 
semantic analysis of ‘is true’ as a vague predicate. He analyses ‘is true’ 
as as an absolute gradable adjective. ‘Is true’ should be compatible 
with uses such as ‘true in some sense’, or ‘true in some respect’, but 
also faithful to absolute uses of ‘is true’ as ‘true simpliciter’ or ‘perfectly 
true’. E ´ gré defines a partial and a total meaning of ‘is true’, roughly cor­
responding to the semantic values of ‘true in some respects’ and ‘true in 
all respects’. The liar sentence λ cannot be true in all respects, but can 
only be half true. Crucially, E ´ gré’s analysis reconciles the non-transitive 
approach to truth with its original analysis of vagueness as an essentially 
semantic phenomenon. This shows that the pragmatic machinery of 
assertibility conditions applied to the analysis of truth ascriptions may 
not be intrinsic to the non-transitive approach. 
1.1.2 Truth and Logic 
Semantics is one theoretical context in which the notion of truth has been 
employed. Traditional truth-theoretic deflationism denies that it is an 
important one. Truth is best conceived of as a quasi-logical device that 
supports correct reasoning by enhancing the expressive capabilities of 
our language. This logical notion of truth holds firm some suitable for­
mulation of the T-schema: ‘“A” is true’ is equivalent to A.8 It investigates 
consistent (non-trivial) ways of characterizing truth by means of suitable 
quasi-logical principles. Such principles typically need to (i) support the 
expressive power afforded by the T-schema, and (ii) display theoretical 
virtues such as strength, unifying power, simplicity. 
It’s clear that traits (i) and (ii) of the logical notion of truth are not nec­
essarily incompatible with semantic theorizing. Such an incompatibility 
was argued for by traditional deflationism on independent metaphysical 
grounds. The present volume features attempts to articulate a compatibilist 
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approach to the relationships between semantic applications and the logical 
notion of truth. 
Disquotation, Compositionality, and Reflection. A hallmark of truth-
conditional semantics is compositionality. It’s useful to restrict our 
attention to sentences: compositionality requires that the truth-value 
of a sentence supervenes on the semantic values of its parts (e.g., a con­
junction is true if and only if both conjuncts are true). Lavinia Picollo and 
Thomas Schindler, in Is Deflationism Compatible with Compositional 
and Tarskian Truth Theories?, investigate to what extent compositional 
principles can be compatible with the logical notion of truth. They 
propose two desiderata for theories of the logical notion of truth. The 
first, Functionality, enforces a mimimal adequacy requirement for the 
logical truth predicate. Since the truth predicate is—among other 
things—a generalizing tool, it has to satisfy the (uniform) T-schema for 
the class of sentences one wants to generalize over. The second desider­
atum, Relative Insubstantiality, prescribes that the principles characteriz­
ing the logical truth predicate should be derivable from the instances of 
the T-schema and some additional non-truth-theoretic principles. But 
what are these additional principles? And in what sense are they compat­
ible with the logical truth predicate? Following recent developments in 
formal theories of truth, Picollo and Schindler consider proof-theoretic 
reflection principles and, in particular, Uniform Reflection Principles. 
In these recent developments, truth theorists investigate motivations 
and consequences of combining disquotational truth and proof-theoretic 
reflection. They show that Uniform Reflection can be used to derive 
compositional principles from disquotational ones (Horsten and Leigh, 
2017; Fischer et al., 2017). Such developments are carefully surveyed in 
Horsten and Zicchetti’s Truth, Reflection, and Commitment. Horsten  
and Zicchetti’s contribution is not limited to the interplay between disquo­
tation and reflection, but discusses also the mathematics of reflection prin­
ciples and some of their recent philosophical applications. 
Riki Heck’s Disquotationalism and Compositionality and Johannes 
Stern’s Belief, Truth, and Ways of Believing cast doubts on the compat­
ibility of disquotational and semantic truth. One core tenet of classical 
disquotationalism is that A and ‘“A” is true’ are fully cognitively equiv­
alent. Their equivalence is stricter than material and necessary equiva­
lence. Heck and Stern both argue that the strong equivalence required 
by disquotationalism overgenerates.9 In particular, they both present 
cases to doubt this equivalence between A and ‘“A” is true’ in non-exten­
sional contexts. 
Stern’s criticism focuses on the status of the equivalence between A 
and ‘“A” is true’ in belief contexts. He provides and discusses evidence 
supporting the claim that believing and believing-true need to be differ­
entiated at the semantic level: for instance, someone may believe that 
Goldbach’s conjecture is true, without believing Goldbach’s conjecture, 
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because they lack relevant information concerning the representational 
status of ‘Goldbach’s conjecture’. However, Stern also provides a 
formal semantics that isolates a class of belief reports for which the 
equivalence envisaged by disquotationalists holds. When one is aware 
of appropriate facts concerning the syntactic representation of the 
belief under considerations, the disquotationalist’s equivalence holds. 
We will come back to some aspects of Stern’s formal model shortly. 
Heck focuses on distinct kinds of overgeneration. The common theme 
of his criticism is the status of compositional principles in the disquota­
tionalist’s framework. First, compositional principles such as 
ð7Þ for all sentences A: ‘A’ is not true if and only if ‘:A’ is true 
should be taken to express—according to traditional disquotationalism— 
the trivial infinite conjunction of all the instances of the schema 
¬A $ ¬A. However, and this is the first case of overgeneration, it’s 
not clear why this infinite conjunction should not be expressed by 
ð8Þ for all sentences A: ‘:A if and only if :A’ is true: 
(7) and (8) have very different logical properties. Therefore, they cannot 
both be taken to express—in the strong sense required 
by disquotationalism—the infinite conjunction of all instances of 
¬A $ ¬A. 
Heck’s second overgeneration argument concerns directly the strate­
gies employed by disquotationalists to recover compositionality from 
disquotation defended in Picollo and Schindler’s contribution and 
surveyed by Horsten and Zicchetti. According to Heck, the same strategy 
that enables one to conclude (7) from the schema :Tr⌜A⌝ $ Tr⌜:A⌝, 
also enables one to infer more dubious ‘compositional’ principles for 
intensional and hyperintensional connectives such as ‘it’s necessary 
that’ and ‘because’. 
Compatibility and Contextualism. The purpose of the logical notion of 
truth consists in its expressive power. Above all, disquotationalists hold 
that the truth predicate is indispensable in blind ascriptions (‘What 
Francis said on Sunday is true’) and generalizations (‘All theorems of 
Euclidean Geometry are true’). In turn, blind ascriptions and generaliza­
tions are necessary to the expression of agreement and disagreement 
(Field, 2008). Hartry Field forcefully argued that such an expressive 
role requires the truth predicate to be transparent: A and ‘“A” is true’ 
should be intersubstitutable salva veritate. We have seen that transpar­
ency may be dubious in intensional and hyperintensional contexts, but 
disquotationalists maintain that it should at least be uncontroversial in 
extensional contexts. 
In The Expressive Power of Contextualist Truth, Julien Murzi and 
Lorenzo Rossi put this last claim into question. They argue that 
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transparency is not required to perform blind ascriptions and gene­
ralizations, and therefore to express agreement and disagreement. 
This leaves open whether weaker versions of the equivalence of A 
and ‘“A” is true’ may be required for these purposes. In particular, 
one might still require the truth predicate to be naı̈ve, in the sense 
that it satisfies the rule of inference ‘from A, infer “‘A’ is true” ’, and 
its converse. Murzi and Rossi also argue that naı̈veté is not required 
by the logico-linguistic tasks considered by disquotationalists. They 
propose to employ a contextualist approach, and associated contextu­
alist rules to model agreement and disagreement. In particular, they 
claim that the rules 
ð9Þ if ‘“A” is true’ is inferred at context α; infer A at context α 
ð10Þ if :A is inferred at context α; infer ‘it’s not the case that 
“A” is true’ at α 
suffice to adequately model the cases of agreement and disagreement 
that arise in the disquotationalist literature. 
Murzi and Rossi’s proposal can be seen as an alternative way of 
achieving some form of compatibility of the logical notion of truth 
with semantic truth. Contextualist approaches to truth and paradox 
draw much of their motivation from ideas in philosophy of language 
and linguistics. A central task for the contextualist is to determine con­
texts in which specific truth ascriptions have definite semantic values. 
In particular, according to the contextualist, there are contexts (such 
as paradoxical ones) in which a given truth ascription is semantically 
defective because it fails to express a proposition, but it may express a 
proposition in other contexts. In such an alternative context the truth 
ascription will have a definite semantic value. 
By arguing that this semantically loaded notion of truth can be recon­
ciled with some of the tasks intrinsic to the disquotationalist’s truth pred­
icate, Murzi and Rossi create a promising bridge between the two 
concepts of truth analysed in the first part of the volume. 
1.2 Unification: Formal Semantics 
Whatever principles of truth one chooses, a core tenet of the Unified 
Approach investigated in this volume is that truth should naturally interact 
with modal and doxastic notions. This interaction should then be modelled 
by a satisfactory formal semantics. These desiderata immediately raise 
problems. The standard semantic framework for modal and doxastic 
notions is possible worlds semantics. The prominence of possible worlds 
semantics can be easily explained by some of its theoretical virtues: it’s 
simple and widely adaptable to various domains, it fits strong pre-theoretic 
intuitions concerning alternative metaphysical and doxastic scenarios, and 
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it has proven to be successful in modelling phenomena in linguistics, phi­
losophy, and computer science. Possible worlds semantics is usually 
applied to languages in which modal and doxastic notions are formalized 
as sentential operators. As such, they apply to formulae that have a finite 
(well-founded) structure.10 The satisfaction of a formula φ at a world is 
defined there by a straightforward induction on φ’s finite syntactic struc­
ture. However, this strategy does not extend so easily to languages contain­
ing a truth predicate. Due to the possibility of self-referential constructions, 
objects to which the truth predicate applies may have an infinite syntactic 
structure. Therefore, one requires more involved strategies. The induc­
tive strategy of fixed-point models in the style of Kripke (1975) is one 
example; another is the class of models obtained by revision-theoretic 
strategies from Gupta and Belnap (1993). 
It’s however possible to combine semantic constructions for (self­
referential) truth predicates and possible worlds semantics. The basic 
idea is simple. For definiteness, let’s focus on the interaction of truth 
and necessity predicates. One can think of a frame F as given by a collec­
tion of standard interpretations of our basic language L (without truth nor 
necessity)—the collection of worlds—together with some binary accessi­
bility relation R on this collection. The interpretations of the truth and 
necessity predicates are given by a suitable function f that assigns (suita­
ble) sets of sentences to each world in the frame. Given a world w, the  
intended role played by the evaluation function is to provide both the 
extension f(w) of the truth predicate at w, and the extension \ 
f ðvÞ 
wRv 
of the necessity predicate at w, that is, the intersection of the extension of 
the truth predicate at all worlds accessible from w. 
To construct suitable evaluation functions, one can apply the strategies 
employed in the resolution of the liar paradox. For instance, as shown in 
Halbach and Welch (2009), one can generalize Kripke’s fixed-point 
semantics and define a suitable evaluation function as the fixed point of 
a positive inductive definition that is performed simultaneously at each 
world.11 This procedure will yield suitable evaluations for arbitrary 
frames. If one does not define the evaluation function via some positive 
inductive construction, one is not guaranteed that suitable evaluations 
will be found for arbitrary frames. However, as shown in Halbach 
et al. (2003), converse well-founded frames always admit evaluations. 
In the framework just outlined, many interesting philosophical princi­
ples can be validated in full generality. For instance, models based on 
generalized fixed points will satisfy the factivity of necessity: 
ð11Þ 8xðSentenceðxÞ ^NecðxÞ ! TrueðxÞÞ: 
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Claims such as (11) deal with sentences—or whatever objects of truth 
and modality one plausibly assumes instead of sentences. They are de 
dicto assertions. Even in expressive frameworks such as the semantics 
just sketched, de re ascriptions are more difficult to treat. In the 
models considered by Halbach and Welch (2009), Stern (2015), and 
Stern’s contribution to this volume, one has syntactic names for all 
objects in the domain of discourse. In those happy circumstances, a de 
re version of factivity can be readily formulated because the formal 
syntax is sufficiently rich to support quantifying into modal contexts: 
ð12Þ 8x; yðSentenceðxðyÞÞ ^ NecðxðyÞÞ ! TrueðxðyÞÞÞ: 
(12) expresses that if the predicate x is necessary of y, then it is also true 
of y. 
The assumption that our language can name all objects, especially 
when dealing with general claims involving logical and metaphysical 
necessity, is clearly too strong: our language does not contain names 
for all possible objects. Volker Halbach, in The Fourth Grade of 
Modal Involvement, investigates languages in which de re ascription 
can be formalized in full generality. The fundamental idea is to general­
ize Tarski’s (1956) treatment of satisfaction to modal predicates. De re 
factivity can now be captured by means of binary predicates for necessity 
and truth: 
ð13Þ 8x; yðFormulaðxÞ ^  Necðx; yÞ !  Trueðx; yÞÞ: 
(13) expresses that if the object y possesses the property expressed by x 
necessarily, then x is also true of y. Halbach outlines different alternatives 
for a possible worlds semantics for de re necessity, and discusses some 
metaphysical applications of the framework. In (13), the object y may 
stand for an arbitrary (finite) sequence of objects in the domain of dis­
course. One crucial aspect of the semantics sketched by Halbach is the 
strict link between object-linguistic sequences figuring in de re ascriptions 
and metalinguistic sequences of variable assignments. Halbach provides 
ingenious examples to show that, once the full power of the Fourth 
Grade of Modal Involvement is available, mathematical assumptions of 
the metatheory are reflected in one’s theorizing in the object-language: 
if one carelessly adopts the standard metatheory of quantified modal 
logic, strong theses such as actualism may follow. 
In Belief, Truth, and Ways of Believing, Johannes Stern considers the 
interaction of truth and belief. We have already seen how Stern’s con­
tribution can be seen as a reaction to some shortcomings of the disquo­
tationalist’s position. However, his work also contains a detailed 
formal semantics for a language with a truth predicate, an awareness 
predicate, and a belief operator. Stern’s model is based on the general­
ized fixed-point strategy outlined above, but extends it with a suitable 
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interpretation of the belief operator. The main ideas are to extend the 
notion of evaluation and the associated notion of satisfaction from 
worlds to pairs of worlds (w, v), and to parametrize the accessibility rela­
tion to the agents’ belief representation. The first component of the pair 
(w, v) is the one that provides the location in the possible worlds struc­
ture at which the basic vocabulary, the truth predicate, and the aware­
ness predicate are evaluated; the second component of the pair fixes 
the location of the agent’s awareness set at a world, which is the set to 
which the accessibility relation is parametrized. For instance, to evaluate 
a sentence of the form 
ð14Þ S believes that S believes that ‘snow is white’ is true 
at (w, v), one looks at all of S’s doxastic alternatives z with respect to w 
and at S’s awareness set at v to evaluate ‘S believes that “snow is white” 
is true’. However, to evaluate “‘snow is white” is true’ at all doxastic 
alternatives u to z, one will look at the pair (u, v): the location v of 
the awareness set is kept fixed. In Stern’s analysis, this yields a correct 
way of capturing the semantic resources that the agent has at her dispo­
sal in evaluating truth ascriptions: someone may in fact believe a propo­
sition p, but may not believe the truth ascription Tr⌜φp⌝, because she 
may not be aware that φp expresses the proposition p. 
The strategies employed to provide a semantics for expressive lan­
guages allowing for self-reference can also shed light on some puzzles 
of rationality. In her contribution Indeterminate Truth and Credences 
Catrin Campbell-Moore focuses on so-called self-undermining cre­
dences. A credence is called self-undermining if, in case a rational 
agent were to adopt it, they would immediately be compelled to revise 
their attitude. It turns out that in certain scenarios all precise credences 
will be self-undermining, just like all assignments of a classical truth-
value to the liar sentence would result in the opposite value. But one 
may then ask which attitude a rational agent ought to adopt, and it is 
at this point that the strategies for addressing the semantic and inten­
sional paradoxes considered above come into play. 
After developing a revision jump in the style of Gupta and Belnap 
(1993) for definite assignmements of truth values, Campbell-Moore 
defines a revision jump for sets of precise credences to model the relevant 
cases of self-undermining credences: the revision process in such cases 
does not reach a fixed point. To find non-self-undermining credences, 
Campbell-Moore then moves to imprecise credences (sets of precise 
credal functions) and develops a novel, generalized fixed-point semantics 
based on Kripke’s supervaluational jump. Similarly to what happens to 
the liar sentence in Kripkean fixed points, self-undermining credences 
are indeterminate, in the sense that no definite credence can be associ­
ated with them in this framework. Campbell-Moore’s semantics for 
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self-undermining credences provides a rich an interesting model of belief. 
The framework also stresses that self-reference is a phenomenon that 
needs to be taken seriously, as it arises in various and sometimes unex­
pected contexts. 
1.3 Unification and Higher-Order Resources 
As argued above, the Unified Approach draws from the analysis of quan­
tification in natural language. It appears that in natural language there is 
only one fundamental kind of quantification, that is quantification into 
singular-term position. We have seen that it is possible to quantify over 
nominalized properties and relations in suitable frameworks inspired by 
the Unified Approach, such as Halbach’s framework for de re necessity. 
Some authors forcefully argued that first-order quantification is not suf­
ficient to theorize at the level of generality required by some areas of 
philosophy. Instead one should adopt a new, irreducible form of quanti­
fication over higher-order entities (Williamson, 2003). 
Advocates of the higher-order perspective typically motivate their 
position by noting that a faithful semantics for absolutely general 
theses such as ‘Everything is self-identical’ cannot be given in standard 
(first-order) set theory. Instead, one should provide models that aren’t 
sets, but sui generis entities of an irreducibly higher-order type. This irre­
ducibility is typically motivated by higher-order versions of Cantor’s 
theorem, stating that such higher-order entities are also of a different 
size than first-order ones. 
A reaction from the point of view of the Unified Approach may focus 
on the inherent expressive limitations of the higher-order perspective. 
Entities are syntactically distinguished in a hierarchy of types: such 
types are metatheoretic objects that, despite their essential role in the cat­
egorization of the type-theorists’ ontology, are not part of the domain of 
higher-order quantifiers. Moreover, the type-theorist would hope that 
such commitment to types could be reduced to the minimum: namely, 
that one could resort to a coherent rationale to endorse only arbitrarily 
many finite types, as in Simple Type Theory. However, there are argu­
ments suggesting that such a rationale may be difficult to find. 
Linnebo and Rayo (2012) argue that the type-theorist is bound to coun­
tenance proper class-many types. 
James Studd’s Infinite Types and the Principle of Union reacts to 
Linnebo and Rayo’s argument. Their argument rests crucially on the 
claim that the type-theorist does not have at her disposal a principled 
way to stop ascending the hierarchy of types at any limit ordinal. 
Studd carefully examines this claim, the Principle of Union, and finds 
it wanting. In particular, he argues that the union language, say 
[n2o Ln with n a finite type, has a special semantic status. One could 
provide a semantics for each of its sublanguages, but this is not yet 
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sufficient ground to countenance a language of type ω + 1 without 
assuming the Principle of Union itself. This is no more justified than 
granting, without an Axiom of Infinity, a set of all finite sets on the 
basis of the acceptance of all finite sets. 
We have seen that higher-order resources, if not strictly regimented in a 
hierarchy of types, allow for great expressive power that lead to paradox­
ical phenomena akin to the semantic and modal paradoxes. Andrew 
Bacon’s Opacity and Paradox investigates the so-called Prior’s Paradox 
for Thought, which is one instance of the paradoxes of indirect discourse 
already encountered in this introduction. Prior’s Paradox is actually a 
theorem of propositionally quantified intensional logic and involves an 
arbitrary sentential operator, which can be interpreted as ‘Mary thought 
at time t that’. Prior’s Theorem then states that, if Mary thought at 
time t that all she thought at time t was false, then Mary thought a true 
and a false thing at t. The puzzling feature of this theorem comes from 
the fact that it’s plausible to think that Mary thought only one thing at 
t, namely that all she thought at time t was false. But in that case, she 
couldn’t have thought a true and a false thing. 
Bacon proposes a solution to Prior’s paradox based on the restriction of 
Universal Instantiation in opaque contexts such as ‘it is thought by Mary 
at t that’. The idea is familiar from the cluster of Frege’s puzzles and the 
puzzles of belief discussed in Stern’s contribution: given two semantically 
equivalent (possibly identical) expressions, this equivalence may fail to be 
reflected in opaque contexts. He also provides models that invalidate 
Prior’s Theorem (and Universal Instantiation), but preserve many other 
desirable principles of propositional quantification. Interestingly, such a 
framework enables him to suggest a resolution of the liar paradox akin 
to classical gap-theories proposed by Feferman (1991) and Maudlin 
(2004). Bacon defines a truth predicate on the basis of the (opaque) 
context ‘means that’. The liar sentence says that it is not true, but 
there’s nothing it says. So, the liar sentence conveys information that 
can be acted upon, and even known. However, due to the opacity phe­
nomenon, such information does not pick out semantic content: there’s 
no proposition corresponding to the liar. 
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Notes 
1. Throughout the Introduction we adopt a wide understanding of ‘first-order 
quantification’ that, e.g., includes the use of generalized quantifiers. The 
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relevant contrast is between (first-order) quantification, which, assuming 
some form of Montague Grammar, binds argument positions of type e, 
and higher-order quantification binding argument positions of higher 
types. See Heim and Kratzer (1998) or Gamut (1991) for an introduction 
to Montague Grammar. 
2. This may be an oversimplification. Perhaps one needs to accommodate a rich 
ontology of various attitudinal objects à la Moltmann (2017a, b). 
3. That is, unless these expressions are of flexible type. 
4. This does not imply that modality and modal notions need to be generally 
conceived to be of the same logical/grammatical category as truth. It is per­
fectly acceptable and perhaps desirable to, following Kratzer (1981), analyse 
modality, i.e., the modal aspect of sentences of natural language via a modal 
operator but truth as a predicate. The point is that in sentences like ‘Every­
thing necessary is true’, ‘is necessary’ needs to be conceived of as a predicate 
if truth is, i.e., ‘is necessary’ needs to be construed as a phrase of type he, ti. 
5. See Stern (2015) for an overview of the various paradoxes. 
6. See specifically Stern and Fischer (2015) for a discussion of this point. 
7. The paradoxes of indirect discourse have been re-discovered by Brandenbur­
ger and Keisler (2006) and are known under the label the Brandenburger-
Keisler paradox in the literature on epistemic game theory. 
8. How to understand this equivalence is a non-trivial matter. We will come 
back to this point below. 
9. Issues of overgeneration have been raised famously by Gupta (1993) and, 
more recently, by Nicolai (2020). 
10. Formulae are generally modelled after finite, well-founded trees or sequences 
that unravel their syntactic structure. 
11. For the frame ({w}, hw, wi), a suitable evaluation f consists simply in a func­
tion that assigns a Kripke-fixed point to w to both the truth of necessity pred­
icate. The interpretations of the two predicates will diverge in more complex 
frames, but it will always yield fixed points. 
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2 Half-Truths and the Liar 
Paul E ´ gré 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explore some philosophical implications of 
the fact that the adjective “true” is gradable in natural language, in par­
ticular concerning the strict-tolerant account of the Liar paradox (see 
Cobreros et al., 2013). In the literature on truth, “true” is sometimes 
viewed as a vague predicate, to mean that it admits borderline cases. 
The idea that “true” is vague features, famously, in Russell’s account 
of vagueness (Russell, 1923), and it is present in various accounts of 
the Liar paradox (viz. McGee, 1990), including the strict-tolerant 
account (Cobreros et al., 2015b). The observation that “true” and 
“false” are gradable adjectives looms large in the tradition of fuzzy 
logic (viz. Zadeh, 1975; Weatherson, 2005; Smith, 2008), but it was 
met with skepticism (see Haack, 1980), and it is generally given little 
philosophical importance (a recent exception is Henderson, 2021). It 
is, however, of particular interest in order to bridge linguistic and 
logical considerations about truth. 
To say that “true” is gradable means that it supports comparative 
morphology (“truer”, “less true”) and also adverbial modification by 
the intensifier “very” (“very true”) (viz. Sapir, 1944). The adjective 
“true” in English moreover appears to be a special kind of gradable 
adjective, namely an absolute gradable adjective in the sense of Unger 
(1975) (a feature briefly emphasized in my E ´ gré, 2019, which spurred 
this chapter). This view, endorsed by Unger himself, means that “true” 
patterns as a maximum-scale adjective (Kennedy and McNally, 2005; 
Kennedy, 2007). In particular, unlike relative adjectives such as “tall” 
or “rich”, but like other absolute adjectives such as “flat” or “full”, 
“true” supports modification by the adverbs “completely” and “per­
fectly” (compare “completely true”, “perfectly true”, with the ungram­
matical “*completely tall”, “*perfectly tall”). 
Independently, Jared Henderson makes the same observation in a 
paper in which the gradability of truth is discussed, and in which Hen­
derson questions deflationism about truth (see Henderson, 2021). Like 
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Henderson, in this chapter I elaborate on whether and in what sense 
“true” is gradable, but with a different objective in mind, mostly to 
focus on the specific issue of whether the Liar sentence can be considered 
a “half-truth”, namely a sentence that, albeit true to some extent, may be 
considered less than perfectly true. 
The view that the Liar is a half-truth is controversial. For a dialetheist, 
the Liar is both true and false, but to say this is to consider that the sen­
tence is both perfectly true and perfectly false. The sentence just fails to 
be only true or only false (Priest, 2019). Similarly, the strict-tolerant 
account of truth implies that both the Liar and its negation are true, 
but the account does not view the Liar as “less true” than more ordinary 
truths such as “London is in England” or “2 + 2 = 4”, but only as having 
a different assertability status (Cobreros et al., 2013). In what follows, I 
propose to reconsider this view. Basically, while the strict-tolerant 
account was initially conceived for vague predicates, its extension to 
the semantic paradoxes assumed that assertion, but not truth, comes in 
different degrees. My main argument in what follows is that we get a 
better explanation for the unified treatment of paradoxes of vagueness 
and truth offered by ST if we consider that “true” is a special kind of 
vague predicate indeed, namely an absolute gradable adjective exempli­
fying a systematic ambiguity between a total and partial interpretation. 
2.2 The Strict-Tolerant Account 
2.2.1 Vagueness 
The strict-tolerant account was originally put forward as an account of 
the semantics and pragmatics of vague predicates in natural language 
(Cobreros et al., 2012; van Rooij, 2012). The leading idea is that 
every vague predicate can be used either in a looser sense (its “tolerant” 
meaning) or in a stronger sense (its “strict” meaning). As originally laid 
out, the account is neutral on whether strict and tolerant meaning can 
vary from speaker to speaker, or even from context to context, though 
it is compatible with both hypotheses. Basically, a model of vague lan­
guage is a model of how the idealized, crisp meaning of a predicate 
(its “classical” meaning) can be tightened up or loosened up relative to 
relations of indifference that may be speaker-dependent. 
An example can help to illustrate this: for a vague predicate like “tall”, 
a speaker may not be able to reliably discriminate between heights below 
a certain threshold. For instance, assuming “tall” were to denote heights 
above a given standard (say above 185cm), and that heights that differ 
by less than 2cm cannot be reliably discriminated, the tolerant 
meaning of “tall” includes all heights that are indiscriminable from the 
standard (above 183cm), whereas the strict meaning of “tall” includes 
all and only heights that are discriminable from the standard (above 
Clear cases Borderline cases Clear non-cases 
Tall Classical not Tall 
Tall Strict not Tall 
Tall Tolerant not Tall 
Figure 2.1 Classical, strict and tolerant denotations for “tall” 
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187cm). The semantics for negation is defined in such a way that in order 
for an object to belong to the tolerant denotation of the negation of a 
predicate, it must fail to belong to its strict denotation, and conversely. 
The resulting relation between classical, strict and tolerant denotations is 
depicted in Figure 2.1.1 As shown in the figure, the strict denotation of 
“tall” is the narrowest, the tolerant denotation the widest and the classical 
denotation falls in between. Moreover, the strict denotation of “tall” under-
laps with the strict denotation of “not tall”, whereas the tolerant denotation 
of “tall” overlaps with the tolerant denotation of “not tall”. This gives an 
account of borderline status for vague predicates: borderline cases are those 
that fall in the overlap between tolerant denotations for a predicate and its 
negation, or dually, that fall in the underlap between strict denotations. The 
account moreover vindicates soritical reasoning without contradiction: by 
definition, an argument is ST-valid iff its conclusion holds tolerantly 
when its premises hold strictly. In agreement with that definition, note 
that at every point of a sorites series, if a is in the strict extension of P, 
then any indiscriminable object b from a is in the tolerant extension of P. 
2.2.2 Truth 
Instead of working with classical denotations, another way of presenting 
the strict-tolerant account is directly in terms of a trivalent Kleene 
semantics (see Ripley, 2012, Cobreros et al., 2015b). When a is a border­
line case of the predicate P, Pa is assigned the value 1
2
. By definition a sen­
tence A holds tolerantly if A takes a value 1 or 1
2
, and strictly it is takes 
the value 1. Using the strong Kleene rules, this implies that for a border­
line case a of P, the sentence Pa^ ¬Pa holds tolerantly, whereas Pa 
and ¬Pa each fails to hold strictly. 
This machinery was used by Dave Ripley to extend the account to 
a theory of transparent truth (Ripley, 2012), such that TruehAi and 
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A take the same value and are intersubstitutable in every context (see 
then Cobreros et al., 2013 for philosophical implications). On the 
strict-tolerant account, the Liar sentence is forced to take the value 1
2
, 
but so is its negation. This means that the Liar and its negation both 
hold tolerantly. Given the strict-tolerant definition of validity, this 
implies that both the Liar and its negation are ST-valid, although 
without contradiction, due to the relation of ST-validity being nontran­
sitive, an aspect also recruited in the treatment of the sorites paradox. 
2.2.3 Handling True as Vague 
As stressed in Cobreros et al. (2015b), the strict-tolerant account handles 
the sorites paradox and the Liar paradox in parallel and very similar 
ways. Philosophically, however, the treatment of vagueness and the 
treatment of truth my coauthors and I gave differ rather significantly. 
For vagueness, the theory admits that all vague predicates can be inter­
preted either strictly or tolerantly. For truth, however, the view put 
forward in Cobreros et al. (2013, 2015b) is that truth is a unitary 
notion, only governed by Tarski’s disquotation principle, but that asser­
tion comes in degrees. This difference was emphasized as follows: 
As far as we can see, then, there are at least two ways to understand 
the status paradoxical sentences have on a [strict-tolerant]-based 
theory like the one we have advanced here. Both ways take paradox­
ical sentences to fall in between strict and tolerant, but one way 
takes the distinction between strict and tolerant to be a pragmatic 
distinction, and the other to be a distinction in meaning. 
(Cobreros et al., 2013, p. 857) 
That is, for vague predicates, strict and tolerant qualify a difference in 
meaning; for truth, they qualify a speech act difference. In hindsight, I 
think this way of contrasting the two accounts is not quite adequate. 
First of all, the strict-tolerant account of vague predicates accepts that 
predicates can be used and interpreted in two different ways, the tolerant 
and the strict way. This means that the selection between strict and toler­
ant meaning is necessarily a pragmatic matter, even if the distinction 
between tolerant and strict pertains to the semantic content of predicates.2 
Secondly, an objection that I think can be made to the assertion-
oriented theory of the Liar is that the parallel between the two accounts 
appears somewhat like a coincidence. Alternatively, a way to maintain a 
closer link between the two accounts is to handle the predicate “true” as 
a vague predicate, and to admit that “true” can be interpreted either tol­
erantly or strictly. The main objection to that approach in Cobreros et al. 
(2013) was that the account of the Liar would immediately be subject to 
revenge problems. But as acknowledged in Cobreros et al. (2015b), even 
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an assertion-based account of the Liar cannot be completely immune to 
revenge paradoxes. 
Thirdly, a more fundamental argument to handle “true” as a vague 
predicate, susceptible to different interpretations, can be located precisely 
in the fact that “true” is a gradable adjective. Linguistic gradability is gen­
erally well-correlated with vagueness, here understood as the admission of 
borderline cases (a gradable expressions typically implies a non-degenerate 
degree scale, along which different positions can compete for the assign­
ment of a boundary). Whether gradability is necessary or even sufficient 
for vagueness is disputed, however. Raffman (2014) argues, against neces­
sity, that a word like “medium” is vague, but that “medium” is not grad­
able linguistically, due to the apparent oddity of expressions like “very 
medium” or “more medium”. Raffman remains agnostic on whether grad­
ability is sufficient for vagueness. Upon closer inspection, however, 
“medium” appears to be linguistically gradable. Expressions like “very 
medium” (“of very medium quality”) or “more medium” (“a tiny bit 
more medium than I wanted”) are attested, despite being infrequent. In 
fact, “medium” appears to pattern as an absolute adjective (“perfectly 
medium” is attested). For absolute adjectives, as we shall see in greater 
detail, modification by “very” or “more” can be marked due to absolute 
adjectives being semantically attached to a specific degree on the scale. But 
the admission of those modifiers is a reliable indicator of vagueness. 
“True” is very similar to “medium” in that regard: expressions like 
“more true” or “very true” are likely parasitic on an absolute meaning, 
but they indicate vagueness. 
The strict-tolerant account of vagueness used the gradable adjective 
“tall” as a paradigmatic example of vague predicate. Importantly, “tall” 
is a relative gradable adjective, whereas “true”, as we will review in 
greater detail in the next section, is an absolute gradable adjective. 
Hence we may expect to find differences. For example, whereas “tall” is 
sorites-susceptible, “true” is not obviously sorites-susceptible. If we 
follow Kennedy’s (2007) account of absolute gradable adjectives, 
Kennedy thinks of absolute gradable adjectives indeed as not being 
sorites-susceptible, due to the fact that the meaning of those adjectives is 
determined by a maximum or minimum standard along some degree 
scale. A different account can be found in Burnett’s typology of gradable 
adjectives (Burnett, 2017). According to Burnett, whether a gradable 
adjective is sorites-susceptible or not depends on the granularity of 
the scale that is contextually relevant, and also on the directionality of 
the sorites sequence. For her, however, even absolute adjectives are 
sorites-susceptible, although the sorites-susceptibility of absolute adjectives 
is indeed more constrained than for relative adjectives. 
In Cobreros et al. (2015b), our account did follow McGee in admit­
ting that “true” is vague, but mostly for lack of determinate rules in 
the language to adjudicate the status of the Liar sentence. Here, and 
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Figure 2.2 Classical, strict and tolerant denotations for “true” 
by analogy with the strict-tolerant account of borderline cases for “tall”, 
the view is that for “true” we ought to get a picture much like the pre­
vious one, where “true” can be interpreted tolerantly or strictly, and 
where the Liar stands as a borderline case (see Figure 2.2). As already 
mentioned, however, “true” and “tall” have different scale structures 
(not represented in either figure so far), and so we need to say more 
about the gradability of “true” proper. 
2.3 True as Absolute Gradable 
Typological work on adjectives indicates that they fall into three broad 
classes (viz. Kennedy, 2007 and Burnett, 2017): non-scalar (like “hexag­
onal”, “pregnant”, “prime”), relative gradable (like “tall”, “rich”) and 
absolute gradable (like “full”, “dangerous”). Basically, non-scalar adjec­
tives have a sharp and context-invariant meaning. The underlying scale 
for them is binary and degenerate. Relative adjectives are strongly 
context-sensitive: the scale is typically richer and their meaning is not 
attached to a fixed degree on it. Absolute adjectives on the other hand 
are only weakly context-sensitive: their meaning is relative to a 
maximum or minimum degree on the scale, though pragmatically they 
pattern like relative adjectives to some extent.3 
The question this section seeks to clarify is in which of those three 
classes “true” falls. Like Henderson (2021), I think the evidence weighs 
clearly in favor of Unger’s observation that “true” is an absolute adjective. 
This view is not uncontroversial. Soon after Unger introduced the distinc­
tion, Haack (1980) examined whether true is gradable, but her conclusion 
was that it is neither a relative nor an absolute gradable adjective; instead 
she put it in a different category (of “achievement predicates”). 
My view is that Haack was right to deny that “true” patterns anything 
like “tall”, namely as a relative adjective, but that she was wrong to 




Figure 2.3 Adjectival typology with antonym pairs 
reject Unger’s description of it as an absolute adjective. What I show in 
this section, following the extended typology of absolute adjectives pro­
posed by Cruse (1980) and Yoon (1996), is that while “true” and “false” 
typically pattern as total absolute adjectives, they can also pattern as 
partial absolute adjectives (see Figure 2.3). This behavior supports the 
idea that “true” can be attached a strict as well as a tolerant meaning. 
2.3.1 Is True Non-Scalar? 
“True” is a gradable adjective by the admission of the comparative form 
(“more true”, “less true”), and of the intensifier “very” (“very true”). 
Moreover, it is an absolute adjective given modification by the adverb 
“completely” (“completely true”). Haack’s (1980) main argument 
against “true” being an absolute gradable adjective is that “true” does 
not appear to support modification by “extremely”, unlike the absolute 
adjective “flat”. However, Haack concedes that “true” admits modifica­
tion by “completely”, and it is now widely considered that “completely” 
is a more reliable indicator of absoluteness than “extremely”. Indeed, 
“extremely” conveys an element of surprise, and can moreover be 
found combined with relative adjectives, as in “extremely tall”.4 
Another argument Haack uses against “true” being absolute is that 
“very flat” generally implicates “not (perfectly) flat”, whereas “very 
true” need not implicate “not (perfectly) true”. But that alleged asymme­
try too is fragile, since for both adjectives “very + ADJ” appears to trigger 
the same cancellable implicature to the negation of “perfectly + ADJ”. 
Despite Haack’s arguments being inconclusive, one should ask 
whether “true” is not like “pregnant” or “hexagonal”, namely funda­
mentally a non-scalar adjective, but which can be coerced in some con­
texts into a gradable adjective. Indeed, comparatives like “more 
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pregnant” and “more hexagonal” are attested, and likewise intensified 
expressions such as “very pregnant” and “very hexagonal” (Burnett, 
2017). As argued in (Burnett, 2017), however, those are better described 
as cases of coercion of non-scalar adjectives into gradable adjectives (for 
instance, “very pregnant” means “very advanced in pregnancy”, or 
“showing very clear signs of pregnancy”, but not “*being more fertil­
ized”). Couldn’t “more true” or “very true” be cases of coercion in 
the same way? 
“True” has “false” as a lexical antonym, whereas neither “pregnant” 
nor “hexagonal” appear to have one, compatibly with “true” and 
“false” denoting opposite regions on a degree scale. For “pregnant” 
and “hexagonal”, an explicit negation seems needed to denote the oppo­
site (“non-pregnant”, “non-hexagonal”). Unfortunately, the existence of 
a natural antonym seems neither necessary nor sufficient to conclude 
that an expression is gradable. Against necessity, color adjectives like 
“red” and “blue” are clearly gradable, but do not have obvious lexical 
antonyms. Moreover, whereas “non-hexagonal” could in principle 
refer to a variety of shapes, “non-pregnant” appears to denote a specific 
state, one for which a simple lexeme might exist in some languages. 
Against sufficiency, a counter-example is the pair “prime-composite” 
for numbers. “Prime” and “composite” are antonyms, but they remain 
non-gradable, for expressions like “more prime” or “very prime” have 
only very marginal uses, indicative of coercion. 
A better argument to conclude that “true” and “false” are scalar terms 
rather than non-scalar is the admission of adverbial modifiers ruled out 
by “prime” or “pregnant”. It is fine to say of a sentence that it is “not 
completely true”, but expressions like “not completely prime” or “not 
completely pregnant” sound inappropriate. “Hexagonal” is more 
tricky, because a figure may be described as “not completely hexagonal” 
or “not perfectly hexagonal”, in the same way in which a proposition 
may be described as “not completely true” or “not perfectly true”. 
Another test concerns modification by the adverbial “to some extent”. 
A number cannot be “prime to some extent” to mean that it is partly 
prime and partly non-prime. Likewise, “pregnant to some extent” or 
“hexagonal to some extent” sound degraded, whereas “true to some 
extent” and “false to some extent” seem to be very common expressions, 
not parasitic on a coerced use of “true” or “false”. Similar judgments are 
found with the adverb “partly”: a statement can be partly true, but a 
number cannot be partly prime, a figure partly hexagonal, or a woman 
partly pregnant. 
As admitted by Burnett (2017), the frontier between non-scalar and 
absolute adjectives is thin. Hence, even if “true” and “false” were 
better described as cases of non-scalar adjectives coerced into gradable 
adjectives, to describe them as absolute gradable is to admit an 
element of contextual invariance shared with non-scalar adjectives. 
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2.3.2 True Is Total and Partial 
Granting that “true” and “false” are absolute gradable adjectives, the 
next question concerns their associated scale structure. 
In the literature on gradable adjectives, two categories of absolute 
adjectives have been distinguished, following the typology of Cruse 
(1980) and Yoon (1996), reviewed in Rotstein and Winter (2004), 
namely total-total pairs (T-T pairs) and total-partial pairs (T-P pairs). 
A pair like “full-empty” is of type T-T, since both adjectives are modifi­
able by “completely”, in agreement with the fact that both are 
maximum-scale adjectives. A pair like “safe-dangerous” is of type T-P, 
for although the first adjective is modifiable by “completely”, the 
second is not (completely safe/*dangerous). The antonym, on the other 
hand, is modifiable by the adverb “slightly” (“slightly dangerous”), 
unlike the first (*slightly safe), and unlike relative adjectives (*slightly 
tall).5 We must therefore ask if the pair “true-false” is more similar to 
“full-empty”, or to “safe-dangerous”. 
Henderson describes “true” and “false” as closed-scale adjectives, each 
denoting opposite endpoints on the scale. In support of Henderson’s 
(2021) description, comparison suggests that the pair “true-false” comes 
closer to a T-T pair than to a T-P pair: like “true”, “false” is indeed mod­
ifiable by “completely” (viz. “those allegations are completely false”). A 
difficulty for that analysis is that some occurrences of “slightly false” 
appear felicitous, and similarly for “slightly true”. Admittedly, the expres­
sion “slightly false” can mean the same thing as “slightly insincere”, when 
applied to a specific kind of behavior (for instance a smile).6 “Slightly false” 
seems less common when predicated of an utterance, but is used to convey 
that the utterance is misleading or not completely accurate (“what John 
told you is slightly false”). Beside “false”, another antonym for “true” is 
“untrue”. In English, the expression “slightly untrue” is attested in that 
same sense, but “completely untrue” is used as well. For “untrue” as 
well as for “inexact”, modification by “slightly” and by “completely” 
thus appears permissible. “Slightly true” is much less common than 
“completely true”, but it is found in surveys that put it on a scale with 
“not at all true” and “completely true” at opposite ends.7 “Partly true” 
is quite common, on the other hand, but it suggests that “true” can 
behave like “filled”, or indeed like “full” when modified with “partly”. 
A possibility is that “true” and “false” show a pattern of systematic 
ambiguity. Basically, whereas “true” and “false” fundamentally denote 
endpoints of a top and bottom-closed scale, the complementary region 
may be described as a region of partial falsity or partial truth. The 
pattern comports with the strict-tolerant account of vague predicates, 
and can be depicted graphically (see Figure 2.4): the strict interpretation 
of “true” is the top of the scale, and the tolerant interpretation of the 
interval ruling out the bottom point. 
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Figure 2.4	 Strict representation and tolerant representation for scalar “true” and 
“false” 
The figure presents an analogy with the opposition between “empty” 
and “full”. For a container, “empty” strictly speaking denotes the 
minimum, zero degree of being filled, and “full” the maximum degree. 
However, “half-empty” implies that the container is not completely 
empty, and likewise “half-full” that it is not completely full. Both expres­
sions imply that the container is full to some extent, and empty to some 
extent. So one may understand the strict meaning of “empty” to mean 
that all of the container contains nothing (is empty simplirciter), 
whereas one may associate a tolerant meaning to “empty” to mean 
that some of its content contains nothing. For “full”, the strict 
meaning should be that all of its content is filled, and the tolerant 
meaning that some of its content is filled. 
Another case of absolute antonyms whose interpretation appears to 
vary more systematically between total and partial is given by Jeremy 
Zehr and is the pair “transparent/opaque”.8 A glass is completely 
opaque when no light goes through it. But it can also be described as 
slightly opaque when the light does not perfectly go through. Conversely, 
a glass is completely transparent when the light goes through with no sig­
nificant loss of luminosity. But when it is not perfectly opaque it may be 
described as slightly transparent, to mean that light goes through to some 
extent. 
Either way the meaning of “opaque” and “transparent” is relative to 
opposite endpoints on the associate scale. But more clearly than for “full’ 
and “empty”, the meaning of “opaque” can either denote the point of 
maximum opacity, or the region that excludes the point of maximum 
transparency. Zehr points out that when a container is described as 
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“full” simpliciter, we typically understand that it is filled near its 
maximum, not that it is “not perfectly empty”. By contrast, when we 
hear that a glass is “opaque”, we can hesitate between understanding 
“not perfectly transparent” or “perfectly opaque”. For “full-empty”, 
the default interpretation is therefore strict-strict, whereas for 
“opaque-transparent” the interpretation can vary more freely between 
strict and tolerant. 
What about “true” and “false”? When we hear or say that an utter­
ance is “true”, is the default interpretation that the utterance is perfectly 
true, or can it be that it is true to some extent? The answer to this ques­
tion is not as obvious as it might seem. Quite plausibly the strict interpre­
tation of “true” is the default interpretation, for we typically say “not 
false” to indicate that an utterance is not perfectly true. But “not 
false” does convey that the utterance is true to some extent, or contains 
some element of truth. 
2.4 True in Some Respects 
Further evidence can be given in favor of the alternation of “true” and 
“false” between a strict and a tolerant meaning. One concerns modifica­
tion of either adjective by “almost”. The other concerns quantification 
over respects. 
2.4.1 Almost 
Beside “completely” and “slightly”, another modifier studied by Rot-
stein and Winter (2004) in relation to total adjectives is “almost”, 
which can be found attached to both “true” and “false”. Here are two 
occurrences found on the web:9 
(1) As to “I can start or finish when I want”. False but almost true. Yes, 
technically, I can choose to start my day at 5am, and finish at 
2pm. . . . In reality, well . . . no: I don’t start or finish when I want.10 
(2) Keep this in mind as far as the size [of the organizer goes]: They claim 
it is 27 inches in height. Technically, this is true but almost false. The 
height for my closet between the shelf and the roof is 30 inches. For 
whatever reason they make you put the circular attachments at the 
top.11 
As mentioned by Rotstein and Winter, “almost” can be found with 
partial adjectives (“almost dangerous”), but according to them for a 
pair of type T-P, “almost P” seems generally to entail “not T” (viz. 
“almost dangerous” to “not safe”). In the previous examples, “almost 
false” does not entail “not true”, and likewise “almost true” does not 
Half-Truths and the Liar 29 
entail “not false”. In that regard, both examples would indicate that each 
adjective is a total adjective. 
However, “true but almost false” in the previous example conveys 
that the sentence, despite being true, is not completely or perfectly 
true, and similarly for “false but almost true”, which suggests that the 
sentence is not perfectly false. This is similar to saying that an activity 
is “safe but almost dangerous”, to convey that it is not perfectly safe. 
It sounds odd, by contrast, to assert: “this activity is perfectly safe, but 
almost dangerous”. 
2.4.2 Respects 
The previous two examples indicate that “true” and “false” also pass 
some of the tests put forward by Sassoon (2012) in relation to multidi­
mensionality. Sassoon points out that the (absolute) gradable adjective 
“healthy” allows modification by “with respect to”, as in “healthy with 
respect to blood pressure, but not with respect to glucose level”. In the 
same way, sentence (1) is presented as false with respect to “reality”, 
although as true with respect to what is technically or legally permissible. 
Likewise, that the organizer is 27 inches in height is presented as true 
without respect to the attachments, though as false with respect to 
them. That “true” and “false” pass Sassoon’s test can be independently 
confirmed by explicit modification by “in every/some respect”, as in: 
(3) The current belief that fact finders must come with a blank slate is 
false in every respect save one.12 
(4) Although this was written 14 years ago it is still true in every respect.13 
What does it mean to say that a sentence is “true in some but not all 
respects” then? I believe that a sentence will be called “true in some 
respect” or “false in some respect” only if that sentence contains some 
element of semantic or pragmatic indeterminacy, such that it could 
express different propositions depending on how the indeterminacy is 
resolved. “True in some respect” thus appears to mean the same thing 
as “true in some sense”, where the sense in question is a sense of the sen­
tence of which “true” is predicated. 
A case to see this concerns sentence (3), “fact finders must come with a 
blank slate”. Allen (1993) declares the sentence “false in every respect 
save one”. The author makes clear that he is in fact talking about the 
belief that “jurors must have no knowledge about the case”. He goes 
on to write (emphasis mine): 
The belief is false in the technical sense that . . . only knowledge that 
would qualify a person as a witness disqualifies the person as a juror. 
The conventional belief about the necessary ignorance of jurors is 
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false in a deeper sense. Juridical decisions makers come to trial with a 
vast storehouse of knowledge, beliefs and modes of reasoning that are 
necessary to permit communication to occur simply and efficiently. 
(p. 1157) 
That is, the sentence “jurors must have no knowledge about the case” 
fails to specify the type of knowledge in question. One precisification 
of this sentence is therefore “jurors must have no witness knowledge 
about the case”. That precisification would make the sentence true. 
But the precisification “jurors must have no knowledge whatsoever 
about the case” would make the sentence false. 
The same analysis can be given of sentence (2), “the organizer is 27 
inches tall”. One precisification of this sentence is “the organizer 
without the attachments is 27 inches tall”, which is true. Another is 
“the organizer with the attachments is 27 inches tall”, which is false. 
The sentence may be judged “technically true”, to mean “true in the 
respect that excludes the attachments”, but “practically false”, to 
mean “not true in the respect that includes the attachments”. A similar 
analysis can be produced for sentence (1) above, “I can finish work 
whenever I want”, depending on whether the latter is modified by “in 
practice” or by “in principle”. 
2.5 More True 
A (vague) sentence is true tolerantly if there is at least one context where the 
proposition expressed by the sentence is true simpliciter. This is what the 
expressions “true to some extent”, “true in some sense” and “true in 
some respect” all convey. Yet truth simpliciter must be a non-scalar, yes­
or-no matter. This does not prevent “true” from supporting the comparative 
form, but this apparent paradox concerns all absolute gradable adjectives.14 
For example, to say that a surface is flat is to have a standard of pre­
cision in mind, such that the degree of flatness of the surface falls within 
that standard. Let the meaning of “flat” be “with no bumps deeper than 
n mm from the same horizontal line”. Given a value for n, either a 
surface is flat, or it is not. As Lewis (1979) writes: 
on no delineation of the correlative vagueness of “flatter” and “flat” 
is it true that something is flatter than something that is flat. 
(p. 353) 
It is still possible to say that a surface is flatter than another, but on 
Lewis’s analysis to say so is to change the standard of precision. For­
mally, a surface is flatter than another if it remains flat simpliciter in 
all delineations of the meaning of “flat” in which the former is flat, 
and more. Equivalently, if it remains flat for smaller values of n. 
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The same account can be applied to the comparative “more true”. 
Adapting Lewis’s supervaluationist analysis, a sentence may be consid­
ered “more true” than another if it is true simpliciter in all delineations 
in which the former is true simpliciter, and more.15 For instance, con­
sider two ways of measuring organizers, one with and one without 
their circular attachments at the top. Suppose organizer A comes out 
taller than 27 inches irrespective of the measurement method, whereas 
organizer B comes out not taller than 27 inches without the attachment, 
but taller with the attachments. Can we say that the sentence “organizer 
A is taller than 27 inches” ismore true than “organizer B is taller than 27 
inches” in this case? 
Doubtless the sentence is more determinately true than the second, or 
more clearly true than the second. One can find several occurrences of 
“more true” in the expression “even more true” to back up such uses. 
An example is: 
(5) Mr. Speaker, what was true on day one is even more true now and 
that is that Canadians no longer trust the Conservatives to protect 
the environment.16 
The proportion of Canadians used to make that vague generalization is 
left unspecified by the speaker. One interpretation of this sentence is that 
the predicate “no longer trust the Conservatives to protect the environ­
ment” is true of more Canadians than it was before. As a result, every 
precisification (proportion of Canadians) that made the sentence true 
initially makes it true in the posterior context, but not conversely. 
If “more true” can be used to mean “more clearly true”, however, one 
may object that the underlying gradable property is “clearly true” instead 
of “true”. But this need not be the case. Also common is the expression 
“more true” followed by “to say” to compare the truth status of two 
vague statements, as in the following quote from F. W. Robertson: 
(6) It is	 more true to say that our opinions depend upon our lives 
and habits, than to say that our lives and habits depend on our 
opinions. 
The two generic sentences “opinions depend upon our lives and 
habits” and “our lives and habits depend on opinions” are both asserta­
ble in this context, and both may even be considered to have the same 
degree of clarity. Robertson appears to mean that the extent to which 
opinions depend on lives and habits is greater than the extent to which 
lives and habits depend on opinions. By way of consequence: the 
extent to which it is true that opinions depend upon lives and habits is 
greater than the extent to which it is true that lives and habits depend 
on opinions. 
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The Lewisian analysis of the vagueness of gradable adjectives therefore 
carries over to “true”. Lewis (1979) himself admitted that truth comes in 
different extents when he wrote: 
we treat a sentence more or less as if it is simply true, if it is true over 
a large enough part of the range of delineations of its vagueness. (For 
short: if it is true enough.) 
(p. 352) 
Lewis’s view here is fully compatible with the recognition that “true” 
admits a tolerant meaning beside its strict meaning. Granted, what 
Lewis calls “simply true” may be understood to mean “true over the 
whole range of delineations of its vagueness”, in agreement with the 
supervaluationist perspective. But Lewis’s view is more flexible. “Simply 
true” can mean “tolerantly true”, in agreement with the subvaluationist 
perspective, in cases in which truth over a proper part of the range still 
counts as enough.17 Half-truths are precisely cases of this kind. 
2.6 Half-Truths and the Liar 
2.6.1 Half-Truths 
In ordinary language, we talk of “half-truths” for utterances that fail to 
tell the whole truth (in violation of the Gricean Maxim of Quantity), or 
for utterances that are true in some respects, but not in every respect (in 
violation of the Gricean Maxim of Quality). Both properties often co­
occur, since using a sentence that is true in only one out of several 
senses can be a way to mislead or to hold back information (Engel, 
2016; E ´ gré and Icard, 2018). Hence what defines a half-truth is funda­
mentally the fact for a vague sentence to be true in only some of its rel­
evant senses.18 Moreover, a half-truth generally fails to be simply true 
because the senses in which it is false cannot be ignored. 
A good example of a half-truth concerns the biblical response made by 
Abraham to Abimelech concerning his wife Sarah (Augustine, ca. 420 
and Stokke, 2018 for a recent discussion). Abraham declares to the 
king “Sarah is my sister”. In one sense she is because Sarah is his half-
sister (his father’s daughter), but in another she is not, because Sarah 
is not Abraham’s full sister (his mother’s daughter). Another example 
is Bill Clinton’s statement “I never had sexual relations with Monica 
Lewinsky”. In one sense this utterance is true, namely the contrived 
and overly specific sense submitted by the judge who interrogated 
Clinton (see Tiersma, 2004; É gré and Icard, 2018). But in another 
sense this utterance is not true, namely the more mundane sense in 
which receiving oral sex is sufficient to have a sexual relation. 
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Both examples cohere with the discussion given earlier of the gradabil­
ity of “true”. Neither Abraham’s utterance nor Bill Clinton’s utterance 
are perfectly true, because for each of them there is a respect or sense 
in which the utterance is also not true.19 Importantly the utterances 
are not completely false either (they are not strictly false). Moreover, 
they are not sentences that would be ineligible for a judgment of truth 
of falsity, as happens in cases of presupposition failure. Instead they 
happen to be true in one sense, and false in another. 
2.6.2 The Liar 
The Liar is the sentence saying of itself that it is not true. The proposal 
here is that the Liar is a half-truth in the same way in which the previous 
examples are half-truths. In one sense, the Liar is true, in fact the tolerant 
sense of “true”; but in another it is not, in effect the strict sense of “true”. 
This view agrees with the dialetheist analysis, on which the Liar is both 
true and false, except that “true” and “false” need to be qualified. 
One way of substantiating this idea this is to define the semantics of 
“true” and “false” along the lines of the degree-theoretic analysis 
of scalar expressions proposed by Kennedy (2007). For a relative adjec­
tive like “tall”, the degree semantics says that “tall” denotes the property 
λx.fTall,M(x) . θTall,M, where fTall,M is a function mapping individuals to 
degrees (for instance heights), and where θTall,M is a threshold value for 
“tall”. Importantly, for “tall” the scale of heights is open-ended, and the 
threshold value is strongly context-sensitive, meaning that it can vary 
with comparison class and language-user. 
To capture the alternation between strict and tolerant meaning for all 
gradable adjectives Adj, it is natural to introduce a convex interval of 
admissible thresholds IAdj;M, to represent the range of values for which 
the adjective applies to some but not all extent. For “tall”, for instance, 
ITall;M may select all values between 183cm and 187cm included in M, 
but this could be a different interval in a different model. This serves 
to mimic the strict-tolerant semantics outlined in Section 2.2.1.20 The 
tolerant extension of “tall” in context M, [[Tall]]t,M, can be defined 
as fd 2 Mj 9y 2 ITall;M : fTall;MðdÞ . yg (tall to some extent), and its 
strict extension [[Tall]]s,M as fd 2 Mj 8y 2 ITall;M : fTall;MðdÞ . yg (tall 
to all extent). One may then apply the recursive machinery of Cobreros 
et al. (2012), so that for first-order sentences A, [[¬A]]t,M = 1  − [[A]]s,M , 
[[¬A]]s,M = 1  − [[A]]t,M; [[A ^ B]]t/s,M = min{[[A]]t/s,M, [[B]]t/s,M}, and [[8xA]]t/s,M = 
inf{[[A[d/x]]]t/s,M); d 2 M}.21 
The same semantics can be adapted to absolute adjectives. For those, 
the degree scale will need to be top-closed or bottom-closed, and more­
over the interval of admissible thresholds must be defined relative 
to a context-invariant value. For example, with the absolute adjective 
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“transparent”, the scale will represent degrees of transparency varying 
between 0 (the minimum) and 1 (the maximum), and fTransparent,M is a 
function mapping objects to their transparency degree on the scale. 
The total meaning of “transparent” is attached to the degree 1, and 
the partial meaning is given by the interval excluding 0. 
In the case of “true”, we let fTrue,M(x) be an interpretation function 
mapping sentences to their truth value in some closed set V. Given  our  
observations, V needs to be at least three-valued, and we may assume V 
to correspond to the real interval [0, 1]. To get the meaning of “true”, 
we start from the property λx.fTrue,M(x) . θ.22 In effect, this says that for 
a sentence to  be true,  the sentence needs to  be be true  enough,  namely  
to exceed a given threshold. In order to get the absolute meaning of 
“true” (see Figure 2.4), ITrue;M should include the top value 1 in every 
model M, and exclude the value 0 in every model M. We may therefore 
pick ITrue;M ¼ Vnf0g, to represent the maximum range of degrees for 
which a sentence is true to some extent.23 The partial meaning of 
“true”, [[True]]t,M can be defined as fAj 9y 2 ITrue;M : fTrue;MðAÞ . yg, 
and its total meaning [[True]]s,M as fAj 8y 2 ITrue;M : fTrue;MðAÞ . yg. The  
interpretation of complex sentences is defined recursively as before. 
Obviously, the strictly true sentences are those that take the value 1, 
and the tolerantly true sentences those that do not take the value 0. By 
saying of itself that it is not true, the Liar can only be tolerantly true, 
and it must express of itself that it is tolerantly not true. This holds if 
we assume that fTrue,M(¬A) = 1  − fTrue,M(A) (value-inverting negation), 
and that for every θ, fTrue,M(TruehAi) . θ iff fTrue,M(A) . θ (identity of 
truth). Under those assumptions, the Liar sentence λ, being equivalent 
to ¬Truehλi, can only take the value 0.5.24 Moreover, the semantics of 
“false”, being the antonym of “true”, can be defined in a dual way, 
from the property λx.fFalse,M(x) . θ, and assuming IFalse;M ¼ Vnf1g. Tol­
erant and strict meaning for “false” can be defined correspondingly, 
making the Liar sentence tolerantly true and tolerantly false. 
2.7 Comparisons 
The present account fundamentally agrees with dialetheism, and also 
with the strict-tolerant analysis of truth and the Liar presented in 
Cobreros et al. (2013). It differs in several ways, however. 
Regarding dialetheism, Priest (2019) recently contends that although 
the Liar isn’t “just true” or “just false”, it should not be viewed as less 
than perfectly true for that matter. Priest moreover doubts that truth is 
vague, and also that talk of degrees is relevant in this and similar 
cases.25 I agree with Priest on the latter point if, like Haack, what he 
means is that “true” is unlike “tall” and other relative gradable adjec­
tives. But by treating “true” as an absolute gradable adjective we are 
led to a different picture of “true” from the one entertained by the dia­
letheist, one on which “true” shows a pattern of systematic ambiguity 
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between strict and tolerant sense. The fact that “true” applies to the Liar 
in the tolerant sense also answers the objection about vagueness: the Liar 
is a borderline case of truth in the sense in which Cobreros et al. (2012) 
characterize borderline cases of vague predicates more generally (see 
Figure 2.2). 
Regarding the version of the strict-tolerant account of truth given in 
Cobreros et al. (2013), the difference concerns not the framework or 
the logic, but the semantics-pragmatics division attached to it. First of 
all, here we have a proper basis to distinguish strict truth and tolerant 
truth: the gradable predicate “true” is susceptible of distinct interpreta­
tions, which are grammatically visible; it is no longer a coincidence if 
“true” can be treated along the same lines as other vague predicates. 
Secondly, the difference between strict and tolerant interpretation is 
not just at the level of assertion; it supervenes on a difference in 
meaning. 
One way to probe this interpretation is to ask if failure of perfect truth 
for the Liar is visible in strict-tolerant logic. On the naive theory of truth, 
the truth predicate True satisfies the Tarskian disquotation principle 
whereby TruehAi$A for every sentence A. In relation to logical validity, 
moreover, logical truth classically satisfies the suppressibility property 
whereby ‘TruehCi implies: if C, A ‘ B then A ‘ B. That property may 
be called Fregean, by reference to what Frege calls the True.26 In terms 
of inference, it reflects the idea that a logical truth is uninformative, 
that it makes no difference when taken as a premise. 
Now, the strict-tolerant account defines validity as follows: when 
all premises are strictly true, the conclusion is tolerantly true. It 
follows from the semantic status of the Liar sentence λ that on the 
ST+ theory of validity applied to sentences involving the truth predicate, 
⊨ST+ Truehλi$λ, and that ⊨ST+ Truehλi. In other words, the Liar, like 
other sentences, satisfies the disquotation principle, but moreover it is 
a logical truth (an ST+-validity). However, λ,A⊨ST+ B fails to imply 
A⊨ST+ B in general. This is so because λ⊨ST+ ?, but ⊭ST+ ?. In other 
words, the Liar is not suppressible, despite being a logical truth. 
Of course, one may object that once we recognize “true” to be ambig­
uous between tolerant and strict, one should no longer expect logical 
truth to remain a simple notion, governed by universal principles. 
Maybe suppressibility is only a property of a subclass of logical truths, 
those that are strictly true. This is right, but this makes the point only 
more vivid: the Liar fails to be suppressible on the ST account precisely 
because it fails to ever be strictly or perfectly true. These considerations, 
possibly, may be used to foster Henderson’s claim that the absolute char­
acter of “true” is at odds with a purely deflationary view of truth (Hen­
derson, 2021). If perfect truth, that is strict truth, is fundamentally 
constraining the meaning of “true”, then it may be argued that there is 
more at bottom of the naive conception of truth than the transparency 
of truth. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
The main point of this chapter is that “true” should be considered in the 
same way in which other vague predicates have been considered on the 
strict-tolerant account, namely as showing a systematic difference in 
meaning between a weak and a strong interpretation. Pace Haack, and 
in agreement with Henderson, I have argued that “true” and “false” 
are absolute gradable adjectives with a closed-scale structure, but more­
over that they pattern as total or as partial adjectives depending on the 
context. When a sentence declares its own lack of truth, as the Liar 
does, it is therefore natural to question whether the sentence declares 
its lack of partial truth, or its lack of total truth, and whether it is to 
be evaluated according to the latter or the former notion of truth. 
From this I have drawn the consequence that the Liar sentence is a 
half-truth. One virtue of this classification is that it groups the Liar 
together with vague sentences that are recognizably truth-evaluable, 
but not fully true on account of their borderline status. Like the Liar 
such sentences are equivocal, they admit different interpretations and 
they are only partly true. In this regard, recognizing that “true” is vague 
comports with the role of the truth predicate in most theories, whether 
based on the idea of transparency or on the idea that truth ought to super­
vene on non-semantic facts. If truth is to apply not just to precise or 
context-insensitive  sentences  (like “2 + 2 = 4”),  but  also  to  vague  and  
context-sensitive sentences (like “John is tall”), then we can expect truth 
to reflect the vagueness of the sentence to which it is attributed. 
Several issues remain open. Consider again a vague sentence like 
“John is tall”. We may introduce an operator “tolerantly” in the lan­
guage, such that: “John is tall” is true tolerantly iff “John is tolerantly 
tall” is true (strictly). With such an operator, however, we can easily 
create a Strengthened Liar (see Cobreros et al., 2015b). One insight 
into this problem is that once we take seriously the idea that “true” is 
vague, we should take seriously the idea that “true” can be higher-
order vague, too. The mechanisms used to handle first-order vagueness 
would need to be iterated in order to deal with higher-order vagueness 
and revenge phenomena in a satisfactory way. 
Also, I have assumed that the degree scale for “true” and “false” is 
given. But for gradable adjectives at large, degrees are more plausibly 
a construction from the non-scalar meaning of those expressions (see 
Klein, 1980; Burnett, 2017). Similarly, the present account does not 
use the mechanism of indifference relations and classical extensions orig­
inally in play in Cobreros et al. (2012)’s account of vague predicates. It is 
also connected to the supervaluationist notion of precisification and to 
the idea of quantification over contexts in an indirect way only. Future 
work should seek to establish whether even tighter parallels can be 
built with each of these approaches. 
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Notes 
1. Thanks to Jeremy Zehr who created this figure. 
2. See Cobreros et al. (2015a) and E ´ gré and Zehr (2018) for more on mecha­
nisms of selection between strict and tolerant meanings. 
3. See in particular Burnett (2017, p. 89) for a summary. Note that the term 
“non-gradable” could be used instead of “non-scalar”, since the latter is 
meant to refer to whether an expression comes with a non-degenerate 
degree scale attached to it (that is, with a scale not reduced to two values). 
4. Besides, native speakers report to me that “extremely true” is acceptable in 
some contexts. 
5. Incidentally, the pair “flat/bumpy” constitutes a pair of T-P absolute adjec­
tives (viz. completely flat/slightly bumpy). When Haack asked whether truth 
is flat or bumpy, she inadvertently assumed “bumpy” to be a relative adjec­
tive. What she meant to ask in her paper was actually whether “true” is more 
like “flat” or more like “tall”. The point of this section may be summarized 
provocatively as follows: truth is flat and bumpy. 
6. An example is provided by the Cambridge Dictionary, which paraphrases 
“suavely” as “in a way that is polite, pleasant, and usually attractive, but 
often slightly false”. 
7. See for instance Redman (2003, p. 325). 
8. J. Zehr, private communication. 
9. Sentence (1) is translated from French, sentence (2) comes from a US cus­
tomer review. Both appear written by native speakers of their own language. 
10. See	 http://www.mariegraindesel.fr/?p=3460. The original French text is: 
“Quant au “je ferais les horaires que je veux”. Faux mais presque vrai. 
Oui, techniquement, je peux choisir de commencer ma journée à 5h du 
matin : et à 14h, fini . . . Mais dans la réalité euh . . . ben non : je ne fais 
pas les horaires que je veux.” 
11. From https://www.amazon.com/Park-Purse-Organizer-no-tools-assembly/ 
product-reviews/B06WVBXPWW. 
12. From Allen (1993). 
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13. From https://academic.oup.com/jof/article-abstract/46/4/282/4707959. 
14. See Burnett (2017) for an extended discussion of this problem. Here and else-
where, I restrict myself to “true” and “more true” applied to sentences. I set 
aside issues of truth and comparative truth pertaining to theories (sets of sen­
tences), which introduce further complications. 
15. Weatherson	 (2005) accepts that “true” is gradable, but he dismisses the 
supervaluationist view, though without much argument, essentially 
because according to him, “it assumes that we can independently define 
what is an admissible precisification, and this seems impossible”. As 
argued by Lewis (1979), however, the vagueness of what to count as an 
admissible precisification does not imply that the notion is not operative. 
16. From https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/39-1/house/sitting­
139/hansard. 
17. See Hyde (1997). 
18. The comparaison	 between “half-true” and “half-full” suggests a potential 
disanalogy. When we talk of a half-full glass, we have in mind a precise 
extent to which the glass needs to be filled, namely half of its capacity. 
When we talk of a “half-truth”, do we necessarily mean that the sentence 
is true in exactly half of its precisifications, or does it suffice that it be true 
in just some of them? The problem is that the class of respects may be 
open-ended. “True” might be closer to “healthy” in this regard: it is less 
natural to declare someone “half-healthy” than to declare a glass “half­
full” because quantifying the respects in which one can be healthy is more 
difficult than quantifying the extent to which a container can be filled. In 
the Abraham case and in the Clinton case, there turns out to be only two 
main precisifications of the predicates “sister” and “having sexual relations” 
in relation to either utterance, but this feature is probably inessential. The 
fact that the expression “half-true” is so common may indicate that the 
respects that make a sentence true roughly balance out the respects that 
make it not-true, and a single relevant respect for truth can sometimes 
suffice to offset multiple respects for untruth. 
19. Interestingly, Bill Clinton	 was also questioned by journalists as follows: “If 
she [Monica Lewinsky] told someone that she had a sexual affair with you 
beginning in November of 1995, would that be a lie?”. His response was: 
“It’s certainly not the truth. It would not be the truth”. By thus answering, 
Clinton avoids committing to the full falsity of the sentence expressed (he 
only implicates it), while denying that the sentence in question is perfectly 
true. 
20. See E ´ gré (2019). There, I distinguish quantification over respects and over 
degrees. What follows here is a simplified account where the mapping 
from respects to degrees is taken for granted, and where the degree scale is 
given (see the Conclusion). 
21. As in Cobreros et al. (2012), this presentation assumes for simplicity that all 
objects of the domain have a name in the language. 
22. More precisely, and using the notation of Heim and Kratzer (1998), we may 
define the basic meaning of “true” to be: λφ : φ is a sentence. fTrue,M(φ) . θ. 
This means that when φ is not a sentence, f would return a value ] separate 
from other values in V, to represent presupposition failure. 
23. One may	 narrow this interval, letting the strict extensions of “true” and 
“false” denote upsets and downsets excluding .5 and including 1 and 0, 
respectively. See Cobreros et al. (2019). 
24. See Rossi (2019) for a proof using equation systems. 
25. Priest (2019): “it is not clear that the truth predicate is a vague predicate”. 
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26. See Chemla and Egré (2019) for more on the connection between suppressi­
bility and the property Chemla and I call polarization for semantic values. 
This notion of polarization can be linked to Frege’s conception of truth 
values as specific objects. 
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3  Is Deflationism Compatible 
With Compositional and 
Tarskian Truth Theories? 
Lavinia Picollo and Thomas Schindler
 
3.1 Introduction 
For a number of reasons, deflationists about truth favour a formal treat­
ment of the notion. What requirements deflationary formal theories of 
truth must satisfy is, thus, an important issue for deflationism. It is 
widely believed that compositional and Tarskian theories convey sub­
stantial concepts of truth or are otherwise unacceptable for the deflation­
ist. Call this claim the ‘incompatibility thesis’. Since compositional and 
Tarskian theories are often seen as superior to purely disquotational the­
ories, the incompatibility thesis, if true, would provide support for sub­
stantial theories of truth over their deflationary rivals. Assessing whether 
the arguments for the incompatibility thesis are correct is therefore of 
great philosophical importance. 
Here is the plan of the chapter. After some preliminaries (Section 3.2), 
we will rehearse six arguments for the incompatibility thesis from the lit­
erature (Section 3.3). We contend that most of these arguments issue 
from an overly narrow understanding of what role formal theories of 
truth are supposed to play. In Section 3.4, we introduce an important 
but often overlooked distinction between theories that are intended for 
a descriptive purpose (roughly, a theory that provides a faithful 
account of the basic usage of ‘true’) and those that are intended for a 
logical purpose (roughly, a theory that characterises the correctness of 
inferences involving ‘true’). 
The notion of a logical purpose raises the question what the role of ‘true’ 
exactly consists in, and what truth principles are needed to carry it out. 
Drawing on earlier work (Picollo and Schindler, 2018a), we suggest 
(Section 3.5) that this role is best understood as enabling us to mimic sen­
tential and predicate quantification within a first-order framework, and 
extract a criterion of functionality from that. However, not any theory 
that allows the truth predicate to fulfil its function might be acceptable 
to a deflationist: among other things, such a theory must not convey a sub­
stantial notion of truth. What this is supposed to mean is of course a con­
troversial issue. We will not be able to provide an absolute criterion of 
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substantiality, though we will propose (Section 3.6) a relative one: under 
certain circumstances, adding certain truth-theoretic principles to a defla­
tionary theory will not inflate the notion of truth. In Section 3.7 we will 
defend this criterion against a popular objection. 
In concluding this chapter (Section 3.8), we will survey a variety of 
formal truth theories and assess them in light of our criteria. It will be 
seen that a number of compositional and Tarskian truth theories are, 
plausibly, acceptable from a deflationary point of view and, therefore, 
do not encapsulate a substantial notion of truth. We conclude that the 
incompatibility thesis is false. Interestingly, our account also suggests 
that some popular compositional truth theories on the market are in 
fact not acceptable from a deflationary point of view. As we will 
argue, this does not constitute an embarrassment for deflationism, as 
there are good reasons to reject these theories on independent grounds. 
3.2 Deflationism and the Orthodoxy 
The variant of deflationism that will be the focus of this chapter consists 
of two fundamental claims. Some of its proponents are Field, Horsten, 
and Horwich, although their views might differ from each other in 
other, more satellite aspects. 
The first core thesis of deflationism is that ‘true’, as it is deployed in 
theoretical contexts, is a primitive term governed by some form of equiv­
alence between each truth ascription and the sentence or proposition 
itself to which truth is attributed to, i.e. by a so-called transparency prin­
ciple. We will refer to this as the ‘equivalence thesis’. This thesis is taken 
to suggest that there is no need or possibility of further conceptual anal­
ysis, no point in the search for an explicit definition of truth in terms of 
simpler, fundamentally more basic concepts—i.e. a substantial account. 
This is what distinguishes (this version of) deflationism from robust or 
substantive approaches to truth, such as the correspondence and the 
coherence theories, according to which there is a hidden nature of 
truth to uncover by means of an explicit definition, in which truth is ana­
lysed in terms of simpler concepts. Thus, deflationists sometimes claim 
that truth is not an ordinary or substantive property. 
The second fundamental thesis of deflationism is that the sole reason 
for having a truth predicate in natural language is that it plays an indis­
pensable logico-linguistic role. We will refer to this claim as the ‘logico­
linguistic function thesis’. For instance, the truth predicate allows us to 
endorse a single statement without explicitly articulating it, as in ‘Gold­
bach’s conjecture is true’, or several, even infinitely many statements at 
once, as in ‘All theorems of arithmetic are true’. It is this second thesis 
that distinguishes modern deflationism from its predecessor, the redun­
dancy theory of truth. While in sentences such as ‘“Snow is white” is 
true’ the truth predicate is easily eliminable and, therefore, dispensable, 
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this is not so in the case of the two examples given above. For we may 
not know what Goldbach’s conjecture is or what the theorems of arith­
metic are. And in the latter case, even if we did, there are too many of 
them to assert them one by one. 
There are several reasons why the deflationary account of truth moti­
vates a formal treatment of the notion. Some authors outright assert that 
truth is a primitive undefinable notion that must be axiomatised (cf. 
Halbach and Horsten, 2005). Moreover, the so-called transparency prin­
ciple that, according to the equivalence thesis, governs the truth predi­
cate is simple, schematic, and reminiscent of those governing logical 
vocabulary. In addition, despite its simplicity, transparency is riddled 
with paradoxes when unrestricted and formulated over sufficiently 
strong logics and base theories. To successfully avoid contradictions, 
precise formulations are needed. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
the study of the logico-linguistic function which deflationists—and many 
non-deflationists as well—attribute to the truth predicate based on the 
inferential behaviour of truth obviously demands a formal treatment. 
Indeed, recent years have seen a proliferation of formal truth theories, 
both in connection with and independently of deflationism. There has 
been much subsequent discussion about which formal properties a defla­
tionary truth theory can and should have. Most agree that deflationists 
should opt for axiomatic systems, which thus will be the focus of this 
chapter. Although we don’t directly address semantic theories, some of 
the arguments below can be applied equally to them. 
Axiomatic truth theories consist of axioms for truth formulated over a 
base theory that contains a sufficient amount of syntax to provide the 
specific objects we will ascribe truth to, the truth-bearers, which, as is 
customary, we take to be sentences—or numbers that code sentences.1 
Let L be a first-order language, the language of the base theory, and 
let L T extend L with a monadic predicate T, for truth. We assume L 
contains enough vocabulary to express certain syntactic properties, rela­
tions, and functions of expressions of L T to be specified, and a quote 
name φ for each formula φ of L T. Let Σ, the base theory, be a recursively 
axiomatised system formulated in L T containing a syntax theory for L T 
itself, which we assume is strong enough to relatively interpret first-order 
Peano arithmetic. For simplicity, we assume L has a term for every 
object in the domain of its intended interpretation and that Σ proves 
this, although all of our claims can be easily generalised if a satisfaction 
predicate is adopted instead. We also assume that only logical or syntac­
tic principles containing T are derivable in Σ, but no truth principles. An 
axiomatic truth system Γ is then a recursive extension of Σ with axioms 
governing T. 
What formal theories of truth can and should deflationists endorse? 
What truth axioms can and should a theory Γ consist of? The orthodoxy 
dictates that Γ should extend the base theory Σ only with a transparency 
_ _ 
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principle. These are given by instances of so-called principles of (local) 
disquotation, that is, either the following schema: 
T⌜φ⌝$ φ ðT-schemaÞ 
or the inference rules 
φ ‘ T⌜φ⌝ ðT-IntroÞ 
T⌜φ⌝‘ φ ðT-ElimÞ 
possibly restricted to a class Δ of sentences of L T, which may but need 
not necessarily coincide with L T. 
Some philosophers have claimed that the deflationist’s truth axioms 
should consist of all instances of disquotation for sentences of L T, 
including those that contain the truth predicate. Due to the semantic 
paradoxes, this would preclude the use of classical logic and force 
the adoption of weaker systems instead, adding yet another entry to 
the long list of restrictions imposed on deflationary theories. In 
Picollo and Schindler (2018b) we have given some reasons for believing 
that this restriction cuts too deep. We will not rehearse these arguments 
here, but simply assume that deflationists can adhere to classical logic. 
Horwich, one of the most vocal deflationists, clearly shares our view on 
this matter. 
As anticipated in the introduction, it is usually maintained that compo­
sitional truth theories should be excluded from the deflationary picture. 
These theories get their name from their axioms, some of which are 
not instances of disquotation but compositional principles, such as 
8x8y ðSentDðxÞ ^ SentDðyÞ ^ SentDðx^yÞ ! ðTx^y $ Tx ^ TyÞÞ ðT^↾DÞ 
where SentΔ(x) is a predicate that holds only of sentences in Δ and ^ is a 
_ 
symbol for the function that maps every pair of formulae of L T to their 
conjunction (and similarly for the other logical connectives). T^↾Δ states 
that if x, y, and their conjunction belong to Δ, then the conjunction is true 
just in case both conjuncts are. Similar principles can be given for the 
other logical connectives and the quantifiers. 
The orthodox view also maintains that no Tarskian truth theory shall 
be endorsed by a deflationist. These theories extend Σ with an axiom of 
the form 
8x ðTx $ FðxÞÞ ðT↾DÞ 
where Φ(x) holds only of sentences in Δ and T occurs in Φ(x) only 
applied to expressions of less complexity than x—sometimes considered 
to be a recursive (or explicit, if T doesn’t occur in Φ at all) definition of 
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T. We will occasionally refer to principles of the form T↾Δ as ‘Tarskian 
principles’, or, if intended as definitions, as ‘Tarskian definitions’. 
Next we will consider and discuss a series or arguments in favour of 
the orthodoxy, and show that, at best, they have limited reach. 
3.3 Arguments for the Incompatibility Thesis 
In this section we will rehearse six arguments that have been given in 
favour of the incompatibility thesis. 
ARGUMENT 1. A reason often given for restricting the deflationist’s truth 
axioms to locally disquotational principles—of which Horwich (1998) is 
perhaps the most vocal promoter but many others have echoed him— 
stems from the equivalence thesis. According to the latter, the only 
basic facts about truth from a deflationist viewpoint are instances of trans­
parency; they are “the whole truth about truth” (Stoljar and Damnjano­
vic, 2014). Thus, many have concluded, the axioms of a deflationary 
formal truth theory should consist exclusively of these basic principles, 
and every other fact about truth should be explained by—i.e. follow 
from—them. In support of this conclusion, consider the following 
remark by Horwich (2005): “the minimalist thesis is that the basic facts 
(i.e. the axioms of the theory that explains every other fact about truth) 
will all be instances of the [equivalence] schema” (p. 76). 
ARGUMENT 2. A related argument often wielded against compositional 
and Tarskian truth theories qua definitions is also based on the equiva­
lence thesis, which suggests that a definition of ‘true’ is neither necessary 
nor possible: 
For ‘true’ is a primitive term; so the only interesting account that can 
be given of its meaning is one that identifies which underlying prop­
erty of the word (i.e. which aspect of our use of it) is responsible for 
its possessing that meaning. In particular, our truth predicate means 
what it does . . . in virtue of our underived commitment to the equiv­
alence schema. 
(Horwich, 2005, pp. 75–76) 
Thus, even if extensionally adequate, compositional and Tarskian truth 
theories cannot provide real definitions of truth. 
ARGUMENT 3. Another argument commonly offered against the com­
patibility between deflationism and Tarskian truth theories stems from 
the logico-linguistic function thesis. If our truth predicate could be 
given by a Tarskian definition, then the language would already have 
the resources to formulate a predicate satisfying the relevant transpar­
ency principles. In this case, truth would be eliminable via the definiens, 
and thus the truth predicate would be dispensable. But according to the 
logico-linguistic function thesis, ‘true’ plays an indispensable role in 
46 Lavinia Picollo and Thomas Schindler 
(theoretically informed) natural language. Thus, Halbach and Horsten 
(2005) write: “definable notions of truth are not of primary interest to 
the deflationist because they are always just notions of truth for at 
best a part of our ‘real’ language” (p. 204). 
ARGUMENT 4. Yet another reason given against compositional and 
Tarskian truth theories is that they only work for simple, formal lan­
guages. While Tarskian theories may be able to explain how the truth 
conditions of sentences of certain formal languages depend on the refer­
ents of their parts, it is not clear how they could deal with sentences of a 
natural language: “nobody has been able to show, for sentences involv­
ing ‘that’-clauses, probabilistic locutions, attributive adjectives, or mass 
terms, how their truth could be explained by as a consequence of the ref­
erents of their parts” (Horwich, 2005, p. 77). 
ARGUMENT 5. Following the line of thought of Argument 1, it has been 
argued that compositional and Tarskian truth theories are not available 
to the deflationist because they cannot be derived from what the defla­
tionist considers to be the basic facts about truth. A particularly forceful 
objection of this kind is due to Gupta (2000), and has generated much 
discussion in the literature. Of course, it was essentially for this reason 
that (Tarski, 1935, p. 257) rejected an axiomatisation of truth based 
purely on instances of T-schema. 
ARGUMENT 6. The sixth argument for the incompatibility thesis is an 
argument from substantiality. It has been claimed that compositional 
and Tarskian truth theories encapsulate substantial conceptions of 
truth because such theories are often non-conservative over their base 
theory, i.e. they allow us to prove claims in the language of the base 
theory that are not already provable in the base theory. In other 
words, Tarskian and compositional truth theories often allow us to 
gain more knowledge about the objects the base theory is about; thus, 
their truth predicate must be playing an explanatory role and, therefore, 
they must convey a substantial notion of truth. 
At first glance, these arguments look convincing. At any rate, it 
appears that they have been accepted by many opponents of deflation-
ism. Indeed, in light of the previous quotes by Horwich, one would 
think that (some) deflationists themselves have accepted the incompati­
bility thesis. However, there is a tension: there is a considerable 
amount of textual evidence that deflationists do in fact reject the incom­
patibility thesis. Field’s work is a clear example, as he systematically 
advocates truth theories that validate compositional principles,2 as 
does Horsten.3 Moreover, Field (1999) himself has offered a forceful 
response to Argument 6, defending compositional truth theories 
against the charge of substantiality. 
In addition, Horwich explicitly notes that the notions of truth, refer­
ence, and satisfaction actually do interact in the way indicated by 
Tarski, at least for certain fragments of English. He does not object to 
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Tarski’s theory on the ground that its axioms are incorrect. Rather,  he  
claims that these axioms “should not be treated as explanatorily basic, 
but should be explained in terms of simple, separate, minimal theories of 
truth, reference, and satisfaction” (Horwich, 1998, pp. 111–112). Similarly, 
Horwich explicitly endorses several compositional principles of truth, such 
as that a conjunction is true if and only if both conjuncts are true. Again, 
the reason that they do not feature among the axioms of his theory of 
truth is simply that he doesn’t consider them as explanatorily basic. 
In order to dissolve this tension and to show that the incompatibility 
thesis is incorrect, it will be helpful to have a closer look at the different 
purposes formal theories of truth can serve. 
3.4 What Is a Formal Truth Theory Good for? 
As many have pointed out, formal truth theories can serve various pur­
poses. Soames (1984), for instance, distinguishes between three things a 
truth theory can do. First, it can serve as a faithful account of the behav­
iour of our natural language truth predicate. Call this a ‘descriptive 
purpose’. As Soames points out, not many philosophers have attempted 
to provide a truth theory suited for descriptive purposes; rather, this is 
seen as the proper domain of linguistics. Philosophers, instead, have 
been mostly concerned with truth theories that put forward a new, 
precise, and consistent truth-like predicate intended as a replacement 
for our (possibly defective) natural language truth predicate. Soames 
gives the example of Tarskian truth theories as an illustration of theories 
of this kind. The third purpose he discusses involves cases where a notion 
of truth, taken to be antecedently understood, is deployed to explicate 
other related concepts such as meaning or knowledge or some general 
metaphysical view. A prominent example here is the use to which David-
son attempted to put Tarski-style truth theories in giving an account of 
natural language semantics. 
In addition to these three purposes that a truth theory can serve, 
we would like to propose a fourth, which should be very close to the 
deflationist’s heart. According to the deflationist’s logico-linguistic func­
tion thesis, the truth predicate serves a role akin to that of the logical 
connectives. If deflationism is right, the truth predicate—roughly like 
conjunction, the conditional, the universal quantifier, etc.—plays an im­
portant expressive or inferential role. For deflationists and other philoso­
phers who believe that truth plays such a role, it is only reasonable to 
want a formal truth theory capable of characterising the validity or cor­
rectness of inferences involving the notion of truth. As an analogy, it is 
helpful to compare the way in which, for instance, calculi for first-order 
logic play the role of characterising the validity or correctness of inferences 
involving negation, conjunction, quantifiers, etc. When a theory of truth 
plays this role, let us say that it serves a ‘logical purpose’.4 
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The language of a formal truth theory intended to serve a logical 
purpose should be extensive or extensible enough that we can formalise 
(most of) our arguments involving the truth predicate (and other logical 
terms), just as first-order languages do for their logical terms. The aim, 
then, is to provide a theory that diagnoses an argument (suitably formal­
ised and regimented) as valid just in case its premises entail the conclu­
sion against the background of the truth theory. 
In the remainder of this section we will argue that, while the first four 
arguments considered in the previous section have significant force when 
applied to formal truth theories intended to play a descriptive purpose, 
their force considerably diminishes when applied to formal theories 
intended to play a logical purpose instead. 
If one is working with a broadly descriptive goal in mind, it is natural 
to impose certain constraints on one’s formal truth theory Γ. Most signif­
icantly, it will be required that the truth-theoretic component of Γ closely 
reflects the actual usage or meaning of ‘true’. Of course, it is almost inev­
itable in practice that even a truth theory offered in a descriptive spirit 
will be idealised in various ways; but the point is that the main criterion 
of success is fidelity to established usage. Similarly, the theory should not 
lapse into oversimplification. As Argument 4 suggests, we should plausi­
bly expect that a descriptive theory Γ satisfactorily describes not only the 
behaviour of the truth predicate taken alone, but also within complex 
environments, e.g. within ‘that’-clauses, probabilistic locutions, environ­
ments containing attributive adjectives, mass terms, etc., as these 
constructions are prevalent in (even theoretically informed) natural 
language. 
Plausibly, given the emphasis that deflationism places on the equiva­
lence and the logico-linguistic function thesis, one’s deflationist commit­
ments will impose additional constraints on theories put forward to serve 
the descriptive project. One is that no real definition of truth is possible, 
as Argument 2 suggests. Another is that no descriptively adequate truth 
theory will put forward an even nominally definable and, therefore, elim­
inable truth predicate, as prescribed by Argument 3. Finally, given the 
basic and exhaustive role the equivalence thesis ascribes to formal trans­
parency principles in governing our usage of ‘true’, deflationists are com­
mitted to the claim that a broadly descriptively adequate truth theory 
will consist of instances (perhaps within a restricted class of sentences) 
of local disquotation. In particular, as Argument 1 suggests, all other 
truth-theoretic principles must then be derived from those instances; 
there seems to be no room for compositional or Tarskian axioma­
tisations within the descriptive project, at least as carried out by 
deflationists. 
It is this line of reasoning, we believe, that lends a spurious plausibility 
to Arguments 1–4 in the previous section. To the extent that deflationists 
are attempting to offer an axiomatic truth theory capable of playing a 
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descriptive role, these arguments can be endorsed and the constraints 
they propose can be taken as genuine ones. However, we believe that 
the plausibility of these arguments diminishes substantially when 
applied to a truth theory intended to serve a logical purpose, as we 
will now explain. 
Assume we are attempting to formulate a formal theory of truth 
capable of serving a logical purpose. Naturally, the first thing we 
require is that the theory contains or entails principles governing the 
truth predicate sufficient to allow it to serve its logico-linguistic role. 
At first, it may seem as if a truth theory of this kind must satisfy the 
same conditions that deflationists impose on their descriptive truth the­
ories. After all, if a formal truth theory adequate for logical purposes 
were not also descriptively adequate, it is not clear how one could prop­
erly formalise natural language arguments involving the truth predicate. 
Moreover, if deflationism is right about the role of the (theoretically 
informed) natural language truth predicate, it seems that the truth pred­
icate of a theory that is faithful to our usage should also be capable of 
serving that role. 
However compelling these points may seem, we will argue that they 
do not adequately take into account the fact that simplification and idea­
lisation are considerably more admissible in a theory intended for logical 
purposes than in a purportedly descriptive account. Moreover, for theo­
ries serving a logical purpose, it is less important to be faithful to the 
precise way that the meaning of the truth predicate is fixed in English. 
To make this point clear, we turn once again to the analogy with first-
order languages and calculi. 
Note first that first-order languages do not admit indexicals, ‘that’­
clauses, probabilistic locutions, attributive adjectives, mass terms, etc.; 
they work, as it were, with eternal or context-independent sentences 
only. For instance, if one wishes to formalise an English argument in a 
first-order language, one first needs to replace all indexicals with names 
referring to their referents (in the context of utterance) and make corre­
sponding amendments. Arguably, this is a small price to pay for perspicu­
ity and elegance, which is evidenced by how widely first-order logic is 
deployed in the analysis of the validity of arguments. It would seem 
equally reasonable for us to pay this price in the case of a formal truth 
theory we wish to adopt for logical purposes. Pace Argument 4, a 
theory of truth (be it a deflationary one or not) should not be expected 
to account for the interaction between truth and indexicals, ‘that’-clauses, 
and other natural language oddities. Simplification and idealisation 
are permissible to a larger degree if one’s purpose is not fundamentally 
descriptive. 
Second, note that for logical purposes, whether the axioms of our 
theory coincide with the most basic principles governing our usage of 
the truth predicate in natural language does not matter. Adverting 
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again to the analogy with logical constants, note that natural language 
usage is often ignored, just as e.g. Hilbert-style or sequent calculi for 
first-order logic make no pretence of capturing the most psychologically 
basic patterns of inference in their basic axioms and rules. All that 
matters is that, taken together, they provide us with an adequate 
account of validity for arguments involving truth (modulo simplification, 
and idealisation). Thus, whilst Arguments 1 and 2 might be compelling 
when considering formal truth theories intended for descriptive purposes, 
they aren’t so when we want our theories for logical purposes instead. 
Finally, if we are interested in making inferences involving only certain 
expressions, it would seem permissible to restrict our logical or truth-
theoretic principles in such a way that our logical terms or truth 
predicate interacts exclusively with the relevant class of expressions. 
Of course, as an account of validity for a more encompassing class of 
expressions, the resulting theories will not be satisfactory; their use 
would be limited. In the case of truth, this could amount, for instance, 
to restricting the sound instances of disquotation (whichever these are) 
to a proper subclass. As a result, the truth predicate of the theory could 
turn out to be nominally definable. However, this does not conflict with 
the fundamental tenets of deflationism, as Argument 3 suggests, provided 
that the truth predicate of certain extended truth theories is not definable. 
It is compatible with the indefinability of our natural language truth pred­
icate that when transparency is restricted to a subclass of expressions in 
our formal theories, the resulting predicate admits a nominal definition. 
Despite the fact that Arguments 1–4 of the previous section fail to 
apply to truth theories intended for a logical purpose, theories of this 
kind should nevertheless still be expected to satisfy certain other condi­
tions. We would like to mention two fundamental requirements: the 
functionality criterion and the insubstantiality criterion.5 
The functionality criterion, indicated a few paragraphs above, 
demands that the axioms of the theory allow the truth predicate to 
perform the logico-linguistic function of truth—at least to a reasonable 
extent. Of course, which axioms are sufficient to achieve this goal 
depends entirely on the precise nature of the logico-linguistic function 
of truth, so an account of the latter is needed. We have developed 
such an account in Picollo and Schindler (2018a). In Section 3.5 we 
briefly review it and extract a precise criterion of functionality from it. 
The insubstantiality criterion demands that truth theories do not convey 
a non-deflationary notion of truth, i.e. they should not entail that truth is a 
substantial property. What counts as a substantial truth property is natu­
rally a very controversial issue which we are not able to resolve here. 
However, in Section 3.6 we will argue that if one starts with a truth 
theory that is taken to be insubstantial, then adding certain principles 
which, in a sense to be explained, follow from the axioms of the theory 
does not render the relevant notion of truth substantial. 
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Taken together, these criteria will allow us to recognise certain compo­
sitional and Tarskian theories as being deflationary, and hence to refute 
the two remaining arguments—Arguments 5 (cf. Section 3.6) and 6 (cf. 
Section 3.7). Consequently, we will argue that the thesis that composi­
tional and Tarskian theories are necessarily committed to a substantial 
notion of truth can be put to rest, at least for now (cf. Section 3.8). 
3.5 The Functionality Criterion 
Our first criterion on an axiomatisation of truth intended for logical pur­
poses is that such a theory must enable the truth predicate to fulfil its 
logico-linguistic role. In the present section, we will provide a precise for­
mulation of this criterion. 
It is striking that the purported logico-linguistic function the truth pred­
icate is supposed to play has rarely been the subject of study in the liter­
ature, even by logicians or deflationists. One of the few articles providing 
a positive and formally precise account of the function is Halbach (1999). 
In Picollo and Schindler (2018b) we discussed this account and others that 
are hinted at in the literature, and argued they are unsuccessful; in Picollo 
and Schindler (2018a) we put forward our own positive account. Inspired 
by a tradition that originated in Ramsey, and to which Quine, Grover, and 
Azzouni, among others also belong,6 we argued that the function defla­
tionism ascribes to the truth predicate is best understood as enabling us 
to simulate sentential and predicate quantification within a first-order 
framework. In other words, the truth predicate lets us quantify into sen­
tence and predicate position in an indirect way, i.e. without introducing 
sentential or predicate quantifiers. In still other words, the truth predicate 
and sentential and predicate quantifiers serve the same purpose. 
For instance, to assert all theorems of first-order Peano arithmetic one 
could work with a monadic operator □ expressing provability in this 
theory plus sentential quantifiers, and write 8α (□α ! α). Alternatively, 
one could use a provability predicate Prov(x) and a truth predicate, and 
assert 8x ðProvðxÞ ! TxÞ. Similarly, one can generalise on φ(t) _ ¬φ(t) 
using second-order quantifiers, as in 8X(Xt _ ¬Xt), or one can turn to 
the truth predicate and say 
8x ðForm1ðxÞ ! ðTxð⌜t⌝Þ _ :Txð⌜t⌝ÞÞÞ 
where Form1(x) expresses the property of being a formula with only one 
free variable and x(y) is the result of substituting in x the free variable 
with the term denoted by y. 
In order to explain and substantiate our claims, in Picollo and Schin­
dler (2018a) we have offered a series of formal results that establish that 
every theory in a language with sentential or predicate quantifiers— 
second- or higher-order, predicative or impredicative—can be ‘naturally 
reformulated’ in a language containing a purely disquotational truth 
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predicate instead.7 We first indicated how to translate every formula of a 
higher-order language into a first-order language with a truth predicate 
in a natural and effective way, i.e. along the lines of our examples in the 
previous paragraph. Instances of sentential comprehension—be they 
predicative or impredicative—translate into instances of local disquota­
tion, provided the comprehension instances contain no free sentential 
variables, and into instances of uniform disquotation otherwise. On 
the other hand, instances of predicate comprehension always require 
uniform disquotation. The latter is a principle that generalises local dis-
quotation to formulae with free variables. For instance, the following 
does so for formulae with one free variable: 
8t ðT⌜φðtÞ⌝$ φðt.ÞÞ ðUniform T-schemaÞ 
_ 
Here, 8tψ abbreviates 8v (ClTerm(v) ! ψ) for a suitable variable v, 
where ClTerm(v) expresses the property of being a closed term; ⌜φðtÞ⌝ 
denotes the result of substituting t for the free variable in φ, and 
_ 
t. 
denotes the value of the term t. 
We then proved that the proposed translation is a relative interpreta­
tion of the higher-order calculus into a—classical and consistent— 
disquotational truth theory, as it maps every higher-order derivation 
into a derivation in the truth theory that extends first-order classical 
logic with a suitable syntax theory and all instances of the (Uniform) T-
schema for formulae in the range of our translation. This result is novel 
in so far as it establishes that (uniform) disquotation can even interpret 
full impredicative predicate comprehension, i.e. principles of the form 
9X 8v ðXv $ φÞ 
where φ itself may contain bound predicate variables. It shows that the 
proof-theoretic power of truth is much greater than previously thought. 
Moreover, we also showed that all inferences between translations that 
can be carried out in this truth theory are derivable in the calculus for 
higher-order logic. 
Sentential and predicate quantifiers allow us to directly generalise over 
all sentences and formulae in the higher-order language. The truth predi­
cate, we concluded, can bring about the same logical power: if (uniform) 
disquotation for translations of higher-order formulae is available, we can 
simulate quantification over the latter using their translations as proxies. 
More generally, one can use a truth predicate to simulate sentential and 
predicate quantification over a given class of expressions as long as 
the instances of disquotation for the expressions in this class—or their 
translations—are available. Our account of the function of truth confirms 
the common but rarely substantiated claim that (uniform) disquotation is 
both sufficient and necessary for the truth predicate to fulfil its role. 
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As a consequence, local disquotation for the class of sentences we 
wish to generalise over is desirable in our truth systems, and uniform 
disquotation even more so, especially if we wish to generalise into pred­
icate position. In general, we would like to put forward the following 
adequacy criterion for formal truth theories intended for logical 
purposes: 
Functionality A formal theory of truth intended for logical purposes 
should entail all instances of (uniform) disquotation for the class of 
expressions one wishes to generalise over. 
Note that this criterion implies that generalising over the whole class of 
expressions of the language of the theory itself is not possible if classical 
logic is assumed in the background. For that would require that all 
instances of disquotation for sentences containing the truth predicate 
are derived, and triviality would follow. If one wishes to generalise 
unrestrictedly over all expressions of the language, one should probably 
look into non-classical truth theories instead. However, this might turn 
out to be not as straightforward as it seems. It is not entirely clear to 
us what inferences the truth predicate should validate in that case, as 
our results only establish the relative interpretability of classical higher-
order theories in a disquotational truth theory. On the one hand, classical 
higher-order theories seem to be too strong to be relatively interpretable 
in a non-classical truth theory. On the other hand, very little is known 
about non-classical systems of higher-order quantification. In any case, 
the general lesson of our discussion should be clear: one first needs to 
determine what axioms and rules for truth are needed in a particular 
logic for it to fulfil its logico-linguistic function, and then derive a crite­
rion of functionality from that. 
3.6 The Insubstantiality Criterion 
In the previous section we formulated a criterion of functionality that 
any formal truth theory intended for logical purposes ought to satisfy. 
However, not any such theory will do—for example, inconsistent or 
trivial theories are excluded, as they would obviously fail to adequately 
characterise the validity or correctness of inferences involving the notion 
of truth. Moreover, as we anticipated towards the end of Section 3.4, 
truth theories that can be legitimately endorsed by deflationists for 
logical purposes should also satisfy the insubstantiality criterion: they 
must not encapsulate a substantial notion of truth. 
What encapsulating a substantial notion of truth amounts to is of 
course a matter of controversy, and we will not engage with the general 
metaphysical question of what a substantial property is. Instead, we will 
show that if one starts with an insubstantial theory, then the addition 
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of certain compositional and Tarskian principles will not inflate that 
notion of truth. This will be the case, for instance, if the latter principles 
generalise on a schematic consequence of the starting theory. Again, we 
will not say much about what constitutes an insubstantial theory of 
truth. However, if deflationism is correct, then there must be at least one 
such theory—e.g. the theory consisting of all correct instances of disquota­
tion. The purpose of this section is to show that if one starts from such an 
insubstantial and restricted truth theory, then adding certain compositional 
or Tarskian principles will not lead to an inflated notion of truth. 
Despite its aspirations for generality, the T-schema cannot be stated 
by a single, universally quantified claim of the form 8x ðTx $ . . .Þ, as  
each instance has a sentence φ occurring inside quotes on the left-hand 
side and outside them on the right-hand side. The fact that each φ is 
both used and mentioned in its corresponding instance of the T-
schema precludes a straightforward generalisation of the disquotational 
principle. 
However, there are salient schematic principles that follow from the T-
schema together with background syntactic assumptions, and which can 
easily be generalised. A simple warm-up example is given by the Uniform 
T-schema, which we already discussed in the previous section. Let Δ be 
the class of sentences for which an instance of local disquotation is avail­
able. Assume that, for some formula φ(x), the sentence φ(t) is in  Δ for 
every closed term t. Thus, all the instances of the following are available: 
T⌜φðtÞ⌝ $ φðtÞ 
Then it is easily seen that the relevant instance of uniform disquota­
tion, i.e. 
8t ðT⌜φðt:Þ⌝ $ φðt.ÞÞ 
is a straightforward generalisation of the schematic principle. 
Let us look at another example. Consider the set of sentences such that 
both they and their negations are in Δ. Then, for each such sentence φ we 
can prove: 
T :⌜φ⌝$ :T⌜φ⌝ 
_ 
Since ⌜φ⌝ is a singular term, we can generalise on this principle as 
follows: 
8x ðSentDðxÞ ^ SentDð:: xÞ ! ðT :: x $ :TxÞÞ ðT:↾DÞ 
Analogously, all the instances of the following principle (where φ, ψ, and 
φ ^ ψ are in Δ) follow from the T-schema as well: 
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Replacing all occurrences of ⌜φ⌝ with x and those of ⌜ψ⌝ with y we can 
generalise on this schema by the following: 
8x8y ðSentDðxÞ ^ SentDðyÞ ^ SentDðx^ yÞ ! ðTx ^ y $ Tx ^ TyÞÞ ðT ↾̂DÞ 
Analogous principles for the other propositional connectives can 
be obtained likewise. Similarly, compositional principles for the quanti­
fiers can be seen as generalisations of schematic consequences of local 
disquotation.8 
Provided that Δ is a T-free sublanguage of L T (i.e. Δ is closed under 
logical predicates and operators) containing finitely many predicate 
symbols, one can also generalise on the T-schema by means of a 
so-called Tarskian definition, T↾Δ. For instance, if all closed terms of 
L T occur in formulae in Δ, identity is the only predicate symbol, and 
¬, ^, and 8 are the only logical operators occurring in formulae in Δ, 
the following principle just ‘puts together’ the instance of uniform dis-
quotation for the identity predicate and the compositional principles 
for the logical terms: 
.8x ðTx $ SentDðxÞ ^ ð9s9t ðx ¼ ðs ¼ tÞ ^ s. ¼ t Þ _  
_ 
9y ðx ¼ :y ^ :TyÞ _  
_ 
9y9z ðx ¼ y^ z ^ Ty ^ TzÞ _  
_ 
9y9z ðx ¼ 8 y z ^ 8t ðTzðtÞÞÞÞ 
We have seen how uniform disquotation, as well as compositional and 
Tarskian principles, can be ‘extracted’ from the T-schema by generalising 
on certain schematic principles that follow from it. They are general prin­
ciples all of whose instances are already entailed by the latter. Arguably, 
these principles just provide more general ways of presenting the T-
schema itself or some of its schematic consequences. If this is on the 
right track, then it is hard to see why they should be more substantial 
than the principles we started with. In this context, it is interesting to 
note that the way in which uniform disquotation generalises on local dis-
quotation is not too different from the way the compositional principles 
do, so it is surprising that nobody has disputed the suitability of uniform 
disquotation as a deflationary truth principle. As we see things, if uniform 
disquotation is acceptable, then so are compositional principles. 
There is one obvious worry regarding our reasoning above. Composi­
tional, Tarskian, and uniform disquotation principles don’t follow 
logically from their corresponding instances, but are usually (proof­
theoretically) stronger than them, due to the compactness of the logical 
consequence relation. The possibility that this additional content inflates 
_ _ 
_ _ 
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the notion hasn’t been completely ruled out, despite the fact that these 
principles merely generalise schematic consequences of local disquotation. 
Horwich’s method for dealing with this objection is well known. Non-
basic facts about truth need to be explained in terms of transparency 
principles together with further explanatory factors, i.e. principles that 
have nothing specifically to do with the truth predicate (cf. Horwich, 
1998, p. 24; Horwich, 2005). We believe this strategy is essentially 
sound. Horwich himself appears to appeal to some form of ω-rule as 
an additional principle, which has provoked some criticism due to its 
infinitary character (cf. Raatikainen, 2005). Fortunately, there are 
other suitable principles. We will first describe what these principles 
are, and then discuss whether they are available to the deflationist. 
We can bridge the gap between generalisations such as compositional, 
Tarskian, and uniform disquotation principles and their instances by 
informing the truth theory we are working with that, whenever it sche­
matically proves all instances of a certain formula, the inference to the 
general claim that all instances of this formula hold is permissible (see 
Halbach, 2001a and Horsten and Leigh, 2017 for some formal 
results). Let ProvΓ(x) express in L that x is a theorem of the formal 
theory Γ. Our gap-bridging principles take then the following form: 
8t ProvGð⌜φðtÞ⌝Þ ! 8t φðt.Þ ðGBPðGÞÞ 
_ 
Principles of this kind—not provable in Γ for familiar Gödelian reasons— 
allow us to formalise the ‘extraction’ of a general claim from its instances 
into a proper derivation. For example, let Γ extend the base theory Σ with 
all instances of local disquotation for sentences in Δ. Since  Γ schematically 
derives all instances of 
SentDðtÞ ^ SentDð: tÞ ! ðT : t $ :TtÞ 
for every closed term t, adding GBP(Γ) to  Γ delivers 
8t ðSentDðt.Þ ^ SentDð: t.Þ ! ðT : t. $ :Tt.ÞÞ 
which, together with the fact—provable in Σ—that each sentence in Δ is 
denoted by a term in the language, entails the compositional principle 
T¬↾Δ. Applying a similar reasoning, we can derive the Uniform T-
schema and compositional principles restricted to Δ for the other proposi­
tional connectives in Γ extended with GBP(Γ). Finally, compositional 








A similar argument can be given in the case of so-called Tarskian 
definitions, T↾D. Let Γ be as before. If, additionally, Δ is a T-free sublan­
guage of L T as before, then T↾D follows in Γ from uniform disquotation 
_ _ 
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and the compositional principles for all logical terms, both restricted to 
Δ, plus the following: 
8x ðTx ! SentDðxÞÞ ðb↾DÞ 
Thus, T↾D follows in Γ from (iterated applications of) GBP(Γ) together 
with β↾Δ, which states that only sentences in Δ can be true. 
Does GBP(Γ) qualify as a suitable additional principle that the defla­
tionist can employ in explaining certain facts about truth? Suppose we 
work with classical logic, as Horwich does, and assume for a moment 
that we firmly endorse the deflationary acceptable truth theory Γ: 
when I learn that some sentence is provable in Γ, I have good reasons 
to believe it. Now let φ(x) be a formula of L T and consider the following 
instance of excluded middle: 
ð8t ProvGð⌜φðtÞ⌝Þ ! 8t φðt.ÞÞ _ : ð8t ProvGð⌜φðtÞ⌝Þ ! 8t φðt.ÞÞ 
Which of the two disjuncts should we endorse? Consider the second dis­
junct. Accepting it commits us to the claim that although φ(t) is provable 
in Γ for every closed term t, nonetheless there is a closed term t such that 
¬φ(t). This entails that we should not accept some consequences of Γ! Since  
we firmly endorse Γ, we should reject the second disjunct, and therefore 
accept the first disjunct. But the latter is just an instance of GBP(Γ). 
Let us clarify one point, before dealing with some objections. Given an 
instance of excluded middle, one can in general remain agnostic about 
which disjunct obtains. For example, a classical set theorist is committed 
to the claim that either the continuum hypothesis or its negation holds, 
but she may remain agnostic about which disjunct holds barring new evi­
dence. However, the present case is different. The second disjunct entails 
that some consequences of Γ don’t hold. Thus, if you firmly endorse Γ, 
you ought to reject it and accept the first disjunct, even if the statement 
is independent of Γ. Anything else would be incoherent. But now, once 
you have accepted GBP(Γ) as an additional (non-truth-theoretic) princi­
ple, other truth-theoretic principles follow. 
We cannot see any good reason why the truth-theoretic principles that 
follow from adding GBP(Γ) to our truth theory Γ should inflate the 
notion of truth. We have assumed that the truth-theoretic principles of 
Γ are insubstantial. In arguing for GBP(Γ), we have not appealed to 
the notion of truth, let alone a substantial notion of truth. Moreover, 
GBP(Γ) itself isn’t formulated in terms of truth. In what follows, we 
anticipate three possible objections. 
OBJECTION 1. The argument assumes that ProvΓ(x) ‘expresses’ the 
property of being provable in Γ. The standard explanation of why it 
does so involves the notion of truth in the standard model of the base 
theory Σ—e.g. the standard model of arithmetic. However, the latter is 
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not admissible to a deflationist, because on their account truth is charac­
terised through transparency. 
Our reply to this objection is essentially identical to that given by Cie­
śliń ski (2017, p. 153). Very roughly, ProvΓ(x) ‘expresses’ the property 
of being provable in Γ because the way the predicate is defined structur­
ally resembles the way how ‘provable in Γ’ is defined in the metalan­
guage of Γ. We find this response especially plausible in this context 
because deflationists usually rely on a use theory of meaning—rather 
than on truth-conditional semantics—according to which the meaning 
of ‘provable in Γ’ must be given through some rules for using that 
expression. 
OBJECTION 2. GBP(Γ) is a schematic principle, and according to defla­
tionists the sole purpose of the truth predicate is to generalise sentence 
places in our language. Thus, we ought to formulate GBP(Γ) as a single 
statement deploying the truth predicate. But then it becomes apparent 
that our additional principle is of a truth-theoretic nature after all. 
We do not find this objection very convincing. First, it is not gener­
ally the case that whenever we generalise a schema using the truth pred­
icate the resulting statement is a truth-theoretic statement. The claim 
that everything the Pope said is true or that all theorems of arithmetic 
are true is not a truth-theoretic statement, although it involves the 
notion of truth. According to the logico-linguistic function thesis (the 
second core tenet of deflationism), such generalisations do little more 
than express all papal assertions or all theorems of arithmetic in a 
compact way. 
Second, even if the truth predicate allows us to express the schema in a 
single statement, we are certainly not obliged to do so. At any rate, it is 
hard to see how the fact that we can derive compositional principles of 
truth using GBP(Γ)—which is not stated in terms of truth—could be 
undermined by the fact that we can generalise GBP(Γ) using the notion 
of truth. 
Third, we know that due to the paradoxes it is not possible to gener­
alise over all sentence places in our language (at least as long as we 
adhere to classical logic). We can only do so for a restricted class of sen­
tences. But GBP(Γ) is a schema that ranges over all sentences. Thus it is 
not even clear that we can generalise GBP(Γ) using the notion of truth. (It 
might be thought that all this shows is that the deflationary account of 
truth is incompatible with the use of classical logic. We have argued in 
Picollo and Schindler (2018b) that this is not the case.) 
OBJECTION 3. GBP(Γ) is unacceptable because it is inconsistent with 
certain unrestricted compositional axioms for truth. 
We are not particularly worried by this objection either. On our view, 
deflationists ought to reject unrestricted compositional axioms for truth 
on quite independent grounds already, so their inconsistency with GBP 
(Γ) cannot cast doubt on the latter. Very roughly, the reason why 
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deflationists ought to reject unrestricted compositional axioms for truth 
is precisely because not all of their instances are generally entailed by 
restricted disquotational principles of truth. If only instances of disquo­
tation for a given class of expressions Δ are available, it is hard to see 
how compositional or Tarskian principles whose instances go beyond 
Δ can be justified on the basis of the original theory, even if additional 
non-truth-theoretic principles are invoked.9 We return to this point in 
Section 3.8, at the end of the chapter. 
Our preceding argument for GBP(Γ) relies on the law of excluded 
middle and so might not be available to all deflationists. It is difficult 
to say something in general here, as the matter will depend on the 
details of the non-classical system. At any rate, since our goal is 
merely to show that deflationism is compatible with compositional 
and Tarskian truth theories, it is sufficient if we can make our point in 
the case where the deflationist account is based on classical logic. 
To sum up, we maintain that the addition of certain compositional, 
Tarskian, and uniform disquotation principles does not thicken the 
notion of truth conveyed by a deflationary adequate truth theory. 
First, we pointed out that certain compositional principles and Tarskian 
definitions are mere generalisations of schematic consequences of a class 
of instances of local disquotation, so it is hard to see how they could 
possibly inflate the notion of truth. We then pointed at the existence, 
under certain given conditions, of derivations of the more general prin­
ciples from local disquotation plus other non-truth theoretic claims 
deflationists may reasonably endorse. (Of course, if such proofs are 
not available—which will largely depend on the restrictions imposed 
on local disquotation and the background logic—there is no guarantee 
of the legitimacy of the general principles.) This motivates the following 
criterion: 
Relative Insubstantiality The (truth-theoretic) axioms of a formal truth 
theory are insubstantial if they are derivable in an insubstantial locally 
disquotational theory of truth together with additional non-truth­
theoretic principles a deflationist may reasonably endorse. 
The qualification ‘derivable in an insubstantial locally disquotational 
theory etc.’ is important: not every class of instances of local disquota­
tion is necessarily insubstantial. For example the class that comprises 
all the instances, being inconsistent, entails every truth principle whatso­
ever, even those one would readily call inflationary, e.g. that truth is cor­
respondence with fact (if expressible in the language). Other consistent 
subsets of this class will also be inadmissible for similar reasons, for 
although they will not entail every sentence of the language, some of 
them will entail substantial claims about truth, as will be seen in 
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Section 3.8. As we have said before, we won’t offer a definition of what 
constitutes an insubstantial disquotational theory of truth, but if defla­
tionism is correct, such theories do exist—the theory consisting of all 
correct instances of disquotation being one of them. 
3.7 The Argument From Conservativeness 
There is one objection that one could mount against our criterion of 
insubstantiality. This is the argument from conservativeness, mentioned 
in Section 3.3, namely, Argument 6. We will now deal with this objection. 
The equivalence thesis commits deflationism to the idea that any 
attempt to uncover the nature of truth beyond disquotation, the quest 
for a real definition of truth in terms of simpler notions is futile. Accord­
ing to deflationism, truth cannot be defined or further analysed; it is a sui 
generis property, if a property at all. This is often expressed by saying 
that truth has no nature, is metaphysically thin, or is otherwise insub­
stantial, but of course these are just metaphors. Many, however, have 
taken them to be a—and even the—defining feature of deflationism. 
Moreover, some understand the insubstantiality of truth to entail that 
truth cannot have any explanatory power. Shapiro (1998), for instance, 
claims that “[i]f truth/satisfaction is not substantial—as the deflationist 
contends—then we should not need to invoke truth in order to establish 
any results not involving truth explicitly” (p. 497). Formally, this trans­
lates in a natural way into what is known as the ‘conservativeness 
requirement’: deflationary truth theories should be conservative over 
their respective base theories—which should contain some amount of 
syntax (cf. Halbach, 2001b)—i.e. the addition of truth principles to a 
base theory should not allow us to prove new theorems in the language 
without the truth predicate. This requirement has been argued for by e.g. 
Horsten (1995), Shapiro (1998), and Ketland (1999). 
Another—related—road to conservativeness draws from the function 
deflationism assigns to truth. Its only purpose, as stated by the logico­
linguistic function thesis, is a logico-linguistic one. Thus, it has been 
argued, there is no room for an explanatory role of truth within defla­
tionism. In Horwich’s words: 
A deflationist attitude toward truth is inconsistent with the usual 
view of it as a deep and vital element of philosophical theory. Con­
sequently the many philosophers who are inclined to give the notion 
of truth a central role in their reflections in metaphysical, epistemo­
logical, and semantic problems must reject the minimalist account of 
its function. Conversely, those who sympathize with deflationary 
ideas about truth will not wish to place much theoretical weight 
on it. They will maintain that philosophy may employ the notion 
only in its minimalist capacity—that is, as something enabling the 
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formulation of certain generalizations—and that theoretical prob­
lems must be resolved without it. 
(Horwich, 1998, p. 52) 
Again, if deflationary truth must not play a role in the resolution of theoret­
ical issues, then the conservativeness requirement follows (or so it argued). 
Most compositional theories of truth on the market are, however, not 
conservative over their respective base theory (cf. Halbach, 2014; 
Horsten, 2011). Thus, if the conservativeness requirement is right, 
these theories are not deflationary. But also many untyped disquota­
tional theories aren’t conservative over their base theory either, some 
of which seem fairly attractive from a deflationary perspective, as the 
restriction they impose on the instances of disquotation can be justified 
from a philosophical point of view (cf. Picollo, 2019, for instance). 
On our view, however, the conservativeness requirement not only does 
not follow from the core theses of deflationism outlined in the introduc­
tion of this chapter but also is not a reasonable requirement to be 
imposed on deflationary truth theories. Indeed, we claim that the conser­
vativeness requirement is the result of (a) inferring too much from the 
metaphor of insubstantiality and (b) failing to see what the function of 
truth really amounts to. The analysis of this function, briefly sketched 
in Section 3.5, actually points (in many cases) in the opposite direction. 
Let us focus briefly on sentential and predicate quantifiers. While their 
role—whether logical or quasi-logical, we would not like to enter this 
dispute here—is merely expressive, their addition to a first-order base 
theory does not always yield a conservative extension. Now, in Picollo 
and Schindler (2018a) we’ve argued that the logico-liguistic function 
deflationism ascribes to the truth predicate is best understood as enabling 
us to simulate sentential and predicate quantification in a first-order 
setting, as mentioned in Section 3.5. In other words, from a deflationist per­
spective, the truth predicate—together with the first-order quantifiers—has 
the same function as sentential and predicate quantifiers. As a conse­
quence, we should not expect a formal truth theory well suited for func­
tional purposes to conservatively extend its base theory either. On the 
contrary, non-conservativeness is just a feature of the truth predicate ful­
filling its role. The conservativeness requirement cannot stem from the 
logico-linguistic function thesis; a ‘mere’ expressive role is compatible 
with the violation of conservativeness. 
Can the equivalence thesis support an argument for conservativeness? 
If so, it would be devastating for deflationism: while one of its core 
theses would point to conservative theories, the other points in the oppo­
site direction. Are the two fundamental theses of deflationism incompat­
ible with each other? We believe this is not the case. If we look closely at 
the equivalence thesis, there is good reason to believe that the insubstan­
tiality metaphor is just meant to indicate that the truth predicate, unlike 
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other predicates, does not play a descriptive role in our language; truth 
ascriptions are not descriptions of the truth-bearers involved. To quote 
Frege (1956), “nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it 
the property of truth” (p. 293), so the latter is not an ordinary or sub­
stantial property. As such, truth cannot play the explanatory role ordi­
nary properties play, i.e. to highlight an aspect of the object of study 
that would explain some of the characteristics of this object. But this 
doesn’t exclude the possibility that the truth predicate plays an explana­
tory role of a different kind, i.e. in proofs. Indeed, sentential and predi­
cate quantifiers can lead to new knowledge as well and therefore have 
explanatory value (assuming that proofs can have explanatory value), 
without being in any way descriptive. Their explanatory value derives 
solely from their role as a logico-linguistic device; the fact that they 
have explanatory value does not indicate in any way that they are ‘sub­
stantial’. Since the truth predicate plays the same function as these quan­
tifiers, similar considerations apply to it. Thus, we echo Field (1999) 
when he says that “any use of ‘true’ in explanations which derives 
solely from its role as a device of generalization should be perfectly 
acceptable” (p. 537). 
We therefore conclude that the conservativeness requirement should 
be given up; it cannot be used as an argument against the admissibility 
of certain truth-theoretic axioms for deflationism. 
3.8 Revisiting the Incompatibility Thesis 
It is time to take stock. We have looked at a number of arguments for the 
incompatibility of deflationism, on the one hand, and compositional and 
Tarskian truth theories, on the other. We have pointed out that 
the majority of these arguments ostensibly presuppose a particular 
purpose, i.e. to describe the basic usage of the truth predicate in 
natural language. This is a legitimate enterprise and we do not necessar­
ily disagree with some of the objections if judged against this purpose. 
However, we were quick to point out that the deflationist may want a 
formal theory of truth for a slightly different purpose, that is, to 
provide an account of the validity or correctness of arguments involving 
the truth predicate. 
We have formulated two constraints that any formal truth theory 
intended to serve a logical purpose ought to satisfy: functionality and 
insubstantiality. A formal truth theory intended for logical purposes 
should entail all instances of (uniform) disquotation for the class of 
expressions one wishes to generalise over and, moreover, its axioms 
should be insubstantial. Although we did not provide a general criterion 
of insubstantiality, we argued that a formal truth theory is insubstantial 
if its axioms are derivable in a locally disquotational truth theory which 
is itself insubstantial together with additional non-truth-theoretic 
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principles a deflationist may reasonably endorse. With these constraints 
at hand, let us now have a look at some of the classic formal truth the­
ories one can find in the literature and see whether they can be endorsed 
by a deflationist.10 
Let us start with what is probably the best-known and most simple 
formal truth theory: the theory that extends its base theory with all T-
free instances of the T-schema—usually known as TB, for ‘Tarski Bicon­
ditionals’. This theory satisfies our functionality criterion: if one merely 
wishes to quantify into sentence position over the class of T-free sen­
tences, TB will do. Moreover, it is widely believed to convey an insub­
stantial notion of truth. Based on this, the uniform version of TB, UTB 
(for ‘Uniform Tarski Biconditionals’), can also be seen to be deflationary 
because its axioms follow from TB together with additional non-truth­
theoretic principles an advocate of TB may reasonably endorse, e.g. 
GBP(TB). Since UTB entails all instances of uniform disquotation for 
T-free predicates, it improves on TB, as it also allows us to quantify 
into predicate position over this class of formulae. 
Similar considerations also apply to other locally disquotational theo­
ries: if the local theory is in good standing, so will be its uniform 
version. Note, however, that some locally disquotational theories might 
actually not be in good standing. This is obviously the case of the (classical) 
theory containing an instance of the T-schema for each sentence of L T, as  
it is inconsistent. But there are other purely disquotational theories that are 
consistent and yet violate some of our criteria. Assume φ expresses a sub­
stantial truth principle—e.g. that truth is essentially correspondence with 
the facts. Deploying a trick of McGee (1992), we know there is an instance 
of local disquotation that is provably equivalent (in the base theory) to φ. 
Hence, any theory containing that instance will be substantial. 
Let us now turn to compositional truth theories, i.e. systems in which 
instances of disquotation are only given for atomic expressions—or 
sometimes also negations of atomic expressions—whereas other truth 
axioms are compositional. As we have argued, the latter are admissible 
if they follow from Γ and suitable non-truth-theoretic principles. Such 
is the case of the axioms of CT, which extends the base theory with 
uniform disquotation for each primitive predicate in the T-free fragment 
of the language and compositional principles for the connectives and 
quantifiers, also restricted to sentences without T. CT is acceptable 
because it follows from GBP(UTB) (cf. Halbach, 2001a), which we 
already have seen to be acceptable. 
Still, one might wonder what the use of compositional theories like CT 
would be, given that they merely generalise on instances of disquotation, 
which are already sufficient for the function of truth. Since all these 
instances of disquotation are derivable in the compositional theory, 
there seems to be no reason not to endorse it. But are there any positive 
reasons? 
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There are at least two—intertwined—motives why compositional the­
ories could be preferable to corresponding disquotational systems. First, 
compositional principles allow us to reason more generally about truth. 
This can, in turn, provide us with simpler and shorter proofs (cf. Fischer, 
2014). Second, compositional principles can be used to provide us with a 
finite or more concise theory. If the T-free fragment of the language con­
tains finitely many primitive predicates, CT can be seen as a finite and 
more general way of “formulating” the truth-theoretic part of both TB 
and UTB. If there are infinitely many primitive predicates in the language 
instead, CT also contains infinitely many axioms, but is still more general 
and concise than its disquotational counterparts, as e.g. it doesn’t 
contain one instance of disquotation for each negated expression but 
all negations are dealt with by a single axiom in a general manner, 
and similarly for the other logical terms. 
For analogous reasons, Tarskian truth theories can be deflationary 
admissible for logical purposes and even preferable to local or uniform 
disquotational theories for the same class of expressions: they are more 
general and concise than the latter. Furthermore, since they have the 
form of a (recursive) definition, we know they do not introduce any incon­
sistencies to the base theory, which is clearly a theoretical advantage. 
This shows that the incompatibility thesis—i.e. that deflationism, on 
the one hand, and compositional and Tarskian theories, on the other, 
are not compatible—is mistaken after all. However, so far we have 
only given evidence of the admissibility of typed theories of truth. Let 
us therefore conclude the chapter by briefly surveying some untyped 
theories. 
Let us first consider the well-known system KF, Feferman’s axiomat­
isation of Kripke’s fixed-point theory of truth in classical logic. KF 
extends the base theory with uniform disquotation for atomic and nega­
tion of atomic formulae that don’t contain T, plus “positive” composi­
tional principles for every sentence of the language, including those 
containing T, and an axiom governing attributions of untruth. No 
axiom of the theory states that truth commutes with negation, but com­
positional axioms for double negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, uni­
versal claims, etc., and negated conjunctions, negated disjunctions, 
negated universal statements, etc. belong to KF. For instance, the compo­
sitional axiom for negated disjunctions is the following: 
8x8y ðSentL T ðxÞ ^ SentL T ðyÞ ! ðT :ðx _ yÞ $ ð:Tx ^ :TyÞÞÞ ðT:_Þ 
_ _ 
Let us now ask whether KF satisfies the criteria we set out. Is it func­
tional? KF implies instances of (uniform) disquotation for a certain class 
of expressions Δ (including all T-free sentences), so if one’s goal is to 
quantify over expressions in Δ, functionality is satisfied. Is it insubstan­
tial? We have not provided an absolute criterion of insubstantiality, 
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but one way to show it to be insubstantial would be to look for an insub­
stantial disquotational theory that implies the axioms of KF, given addi­
tional non-truth-theoretic principles a deflationist may reasonably 
endorse. 
Note that KF’s compositional axioms are unrestricted; that is, they 
govern the interaction of the truth predicate and the logical operators 
as they apply to every expression of the language. Thus, a natural 
theory of disquotation that implies them (given additional non-truth­
theoretic principles) would be the theory containing all instances of the 
T-schema. But this class of sentences is obviously not in good standing, 
for it leads to triviality. Could some other disquotational theory do the 
job? 
The short answer is yes, trivially. Recall that McGee’s trick entails 
that every sentence of L T is provably equivalent to an instance of the 
T-schema in the base theory. Thus, for every truth theory, whether com­
positional, Tarskian, disquotational, or else, there is a purely disquota­
tional theory that proves the same theorems. A fortiori, there is a 
disquotational theory that has exactly the same consequences as KF 
(even without any gap-bridging principles). However, since these theo­
ries are otherwise highly unmotivated, we have little reason to believe 
that they are themselves in good standing. 
Perhaps more interestingly, as Horsten and Leigh (2017) have shown, 
the axioms of KF can be derived by iterating GBP twice over the theory 
PTB, which extends the base theory with an instance of local disquota­
tion for each sentence of L T in which the truth predicate occurs only 
positively—i.e. under the scope of an even number of negations. 
However, whether this theory is in good standing is rather doubtful. 
Restricting the T-schema to positive instances is quite ad hoc. It isn’t 
based on any well-motivated criterion of what an acceptable instance 
is, but merely on the observation that the liar sentence and other para­
doxical expressions aren’t positive. Just like positive set theory, which 
avoids Russell’s paradox by restricting comprehension to positive 
instances, this leads to a mathematically interesting theory, but to a 
rather strange picture of truth (sets).11 Of course, one could justify 
PTB by pointing out that its axioms are derivable from KF, as  
Halbach (2014) observes, but this is of little use in the present context. 
Overall, we have little reason to believe that KF qualifies as a deflation­
ary theory of truth. 
Similar considerations apply to FS, though in this case one can actu­
ally give positive reasons to reject it. FS is the classical theory extending 
the base theory with uniform disquotation for T-free atomic expressions 
and compositional axioms for the connectives and the quantifiers just 
like CT’s, except the restriction to T-free sentences is lifted. Additionally, 
FS contains two ‘meta’-rules of inference that allow us to attach the 
truth predicate to and remove it from every theorem of the theory. As 
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is well known, FS is ω-inconsistent, i.e. it proves all instances φ(t) of a  
formula φ(x) but, at the same time, it also entails ¬8xφ(x). Thus, FS is 
in a sense unsound, as is every disquotational theory that entails the 
axioms of FS (with or without additional non-truth-theoretic principles). 
So no such disquotational theory appears to be in good standing. 
In general, we are suspicious that classical theories containing unre­
stricted compositional axioms—i.e. axioms applying to all sentences 
of the language, including those with the truth predicate—can be 
shown to follow from some insubstantial disquotational theory together 
with additional non-truth-theoretic principles. In most cases, the only 
disquotational theories that come to mind here are those obtained by 
McGee’s trick, for which it is quite doubtful that they are in good 
standing. Thus, as far as classical type-free theories are concerned, it 
would seem to be more promising to search for systems that restrict dis­
quotational or compositional principles to a proper subclass of sen­
tences of the language of truth, such as e.g. the grounded ones.12 It is 
no coincidence that the theories of truth proposed by the authors, e.g. 
Picollo (2019) or Schindler (2014), have gone in that direction. In this 
respect, non-classical theories might be at an advantage, insofar as 
they might have all instances of disquotation at their disposal, though 
this requires some further investigation. 
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Notes 
1. Should propositions be preferable to sentences, one could understand our 
truth predicate as applying not directly to the sentences but to what these 
sentences express. 
2. See, for instance, Field (2003, 2008). 
3. See, e.g. Horsten (2011). 
4. We use this terminology for lack of a better alternative: in particular, in using 
it we do not wish to suggest that truth is a distinctively logical notion; rather, 
we use it to emphasise the aim of laying down general principles governing 
the validity or correctness of inferences involving truth. 
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5. There have been several attempts to formulate general requirements on axi­
omatic theories of truth, e.g. Leitgeb (2007) and Sheard (2002); a list of 
desiderata specifically designed for deflationists has been proposed by 
Halbach and Horsten (2005). Although reasons of space prevent a direct 
comparison, it should be emphasised that our desiderata differ decidedly 
from theirs. 
6. See,	 for instance, Ramsey (1927, p. 158), Quine (1970), Grover (1972), 
Grover et al. (1975), and Azzouni (2001). 
7. This result relies on the assumption, mentioned in Section 3.2, that every 
object in the domain has a name. Again, that restriction can be lifted if we 
work with a satisfaction rather than a truth predicate. 
8. Recall that we assumed that we can prove in the base theory that for every 
object there is a term denoting this object. Again, if one wants to lift that 
restriction, one needs to work with a satisfaction predicate instead. 
9. A similar point was made by Armour-Garb and Beall (2005, Section 5.1). 
10. For an overview of axiomatic truth theories, see Halbach (2014) or Horsten 
(2011). 
11. See Schindler (2015, pp. 398–399) for further arguments against PTB. 
12. See Schindler (2020, sec. 3–4) for further discussion. 
References 
Armour-Garb, B. and Beall, J. C. (2005). Minimalism, epistemicism, and 
paradox. In Armour-Garb, B. and Beall, J. C., editors, Deflationism and 
Paradox, pages 85–96. Oxford University Press. 
Azzouni, J. (2001). Truth via anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers. Journal of 
Philosphical Logic, 30: 329–354. 
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4  Truth, Reflection, and 
Commitment 
Leon Horsten and Matteo Zicchetti 
4.1 Introduction 
Proof-theoretic reflection principles have been discussed in proof theory 
ever since Gö del’s discovery of the incompleteness theorems. But these 
reflection principles have not received much attention in the philosoph­
ical community. The aim of the present chapter is to survey some of the 
principal meta-mathematical results on the iteration of proof-theoretic 
reflection principles, and also to investigate these results from a logico­
philosophical perspective; we will concentrate on the epistemological sig­
nificance of these technical results and on the epistemic notions involved 
in the proofs. In particular, we will focus on the notions of commitment 
to and acceptance of a theory. Special attention is given to the connec­
tion between proof-theoretic reflection and axiomatic truth theories. 
After distinguishing between different types of proof-theoretic reflec­
tion principles, we review some proof-theoretic results concerning exten­
sions of formal theories by (iterated) reflection principles. As basis 
theories we concentrate on standard arithmetical and elementary axiom­
atic truth theories. We then go on to explore the epistemological signifi­
cance of these results. In this investigation we aim at showing that 
epistemic notion of acceptance of (or commitment to) a theory plays a 
crucial role in the philosophical argumentation for reflection principles 
and their iteration. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, iter­
ated reflection over arithmetical theories is discussed. In Section 4.4, we 
discuss reflection over axiomatic truth theories—here we concentrate on 
theories of disquotational and of compositional truth. The philosophical 
background for our discussion in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 is given by Fefer­
man’s theory of implicit commitment. However, as we will show, the 
epistemic notions involved in the investigation of reflection principles 
presented in Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 are never made explicit; they 
are employed only informally in the philosophical argumentation for 
reflection principles. In Section 4.5 we turn to Cieśliń ski’s formal analy­
sis of the process of reflection on implicit acceptance of a formal theory. 
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As we will show, in this approach the epistemic notion of acceptance of a 
theory is made fully explicit via the use of a modal predicate. We will 
analyse Cieśliń ski’s approach and indicate some problems and questions. 
We close this chapter with some general philosophical remarks on the 
nature and role of reflective processes in mathematics. 
We try to keep our notation as standard as possible. Concerning 
proof-theoretical background, we presuppose some familiarity with a 
few basic formal systems of arithmetic, such as Peano Arithmetic (PA, 
and its language LPA) and Elementary Arithmetic (EA). Moreover, 
although we will present some basic facts about Kleene’s notation 
system O, we will presuppose some familiarity with ordinal notations, 
the Veblen hierarchy, and related notions. Concerning truth theory, we 
assume a passing acquaintance with a handful of the main truth theories, 
such as the compositional theory CT, the Kripke-Feferman system KF, 
and the Partial Kripke-Feferman system PKF. Nevertheless, for the 
benefit of readers who are not familiar with these systems, we include 
footnote references to places where they are defined and discussed. 
4.2 Reflection Principles and Progressions of Theories 
We concentrate on theories that are formulated in the language of first-
order arithmetic or an extension thereof, and at least as strong as Elemen­
tary Arithmetic (EA). We are interested in the iteration of proof-theoretic 
reflection principles over these theories, where a proof-theoretic reflec­
tion principle for a given theory S is a formalised soundness statement 
for S: it expresses that everything provable in S is also true. 
By Tarski’s theorem of the undefinability of truth, the language of 
arithmetic does not contain its own truth predicate. So in the language 
of arithmetic this guiding idea can only be approximated to varying 
degrees. We can distinguish the following types of reflection principles 
(for a given theory S): 
(i) ConS (consistency) 
(ii) ProvS ⌜φ⌝ ! φ (local reflection) 
(iii) ProvS ⌜φðx_ Þ⌝ ! φðxÞ (uniform reflection) 
Here ProvS is a standard provability predicate for the given theory S. The  
formula ConS expresses the consistency of S in terms of ProvS: it can be 
taken to be the formula 
ProvS⌜0 ¼ 1⌝ ! 0 ¼ 1: 
Local reflection for a theory S is denoted as RfnS, and uniform reflec­
tion is denoted as RFNS. Restricted versions for these principles are also 
considered: one can consider RfnS (RFNS) for sentences (formulae) of a 
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specific syntactic complexity. P01 -RfnS, for instance, is local reflection for 
the P01 fragment of S and is equivalent to ConS. 
We can iterate the procedure of adding a reflection principle to a given 
theory S. For a given theory S and a given reflection principle R we let 
R½S. mean “the reflection principle R over S”. Then we can define the 
iteration of reflection in the following way by letting: 
R0½S. be S; 
for α a successor ordinal, Rαþ1½S. be R½Rα½S..; 
for λ a limit ordinal, Rl½S. be the union of all Rα½S. for α < λ. 
The first proof-theoretic results that we will discuss concern progressions of 
theories generated via iteration (into the transfinite) of reflection principles. 
However, before presenting the notion of a progression of theories and 
the results, we introduce a few notions concerning Kleene’s O. We call |a| 
the ordinal denoted by an ordinal notation a in Kleene’s notation system 
O, which is partially ordered by the relation <O. We have a <O b, for two 
ordinal notations a and b, if and only if |a| < |b|. 
A path P is a subset of O such that (i) for any a, b 2 P either a .O b 
or b .O a, (ii) if b 2 P and c .O b then c 2 P. For any a 2 O, a set 
P = f b j b <O ag is called a path within O. The length of a path P is 
the ordinal of the restriction of <O to P. For any path P within O, the 
order type of P, denoted as |P|, is less than oCK 1 . A path P is a path 
CK CKthrough O if jPj ¼  o , where o ¼ sup fjaj : a 2 Og. The relation1 1 
is not recursively enumerable; indeed, it is P1-complete. However, <O 1
for any a, the restriction of <O to f b j b <O ag is recursively enumerable. 
Now we introduce the notion of a progression of theories. A progression 
of a theory S is a primitive recursive mapping taking any ordinal notation a 
in some path in Kleene’s ordinal notation system O to a S01-formula φa that 
recursively enumerates the axioms of a theory Sa, such that 
1. S0 = S; 
2. SsucðaÞ ¼ Sa þ Ra½S.; S 
3. Slim(a) = b < a Sb. 
In words: the starting theory S0 is just S, the successor stage of the 
progression is, for any notation a, just the previous theory Sa plus a 
reflection principle Ra for Sa, and at limit stages we take unions. 
Any transfinite progression yields a progressive reflection sequence, 
which is a sequence of theories of the form 
S0; S1; . . .  So; So þ 1; . . .  Sα; . . . ; 
where Sα + 1  is an extension by reflection of Sα, and Sλ, for limit ordinals 
λ, has as axioms the union of the axioms of earlier theories. 
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In the following section we will survey two main results: Turing’s 
completeness theorem for consistency progressions and Feferman’s com­
pleteness theorem for uniform reflection progressions. Moreover, we will 
briefly touch upon Feferman’s results about autonomous progressions of 
formal theories. 
4.3 Mathematical Reflection 
Turing used consistency progressions in an attempt to reduce incom­
pleteness in arithmetic. He proved the following theorem: 
THEOREM 4.3.1 (Turing, 1939). For any true P01 sentence φ there is an a 2 O 
such that |a| =  ω + 1 and Sa ‘ φ. Moreover, there is a primitive recursive 
function that associates such an a with each true P1
0 sentence φ. 
Turing (1939) suggests that the transition from a theory Sa to Ssuc(a) 
invokes some sort of reflection: 
We were able, however, from a given system to obtain a more com­
plete one by the adjunction as axioms of formulae, seen intuitively to 
be correct, but which the Gö del theorem shows are unprovable in 
the original system; from this we obtained a yet more complete 
system by a repetition of the process, and so on. 
(p. 198) 
However, the epistemological import of Turing’s completeness theorem 
is limited. Theorem 4.3.1 only tells us that for any true P01 sentence φ 
there is a consistency progression with length ω + 1, such that Sω + 1  
proves φ. As Franzén (2004b, Section 6) already pointed out, Turing’s 
result does not provide us with a method of recognising, for any true 
P0 1 sentence φ, that it is true. Turing’s proof indeed associates with 
every true P1
0 sentence φ a consistency reflection sequence of length 
ω + 1 that ends in a theory Sω + 1  that proves φ. However, the axioms 
of Sω have a non-canonical definition; the trick of Turing’s proof consists 
in defining Sω in such a way that its consistency entails that φ is true. 
Even though Turing’s clever definition of ω and “canonical” definitions 
of ω extensionally coincide, no Sn proves that this is so.1 
Feferman realised that in order to strengthen Turing’s completeness 
result, uniform reflection progressions rather than consistency or local 
reflection progressions are needed. He proved: 
THEOREM 4.3.2 (Feferman, 1962). There is a uniform reflection progres­
sion based on PA such that for any true arithmetical sentence φ there is 
2an a 2 O such that jaj . ooo þ 1 with Sa ‘ φ. 
This is known as Feferman’s completeness theorem. His proof 
o þ 1 
generates a path P within O of length oo such that the union of 
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all theories associated with the notations in this path is arithmetically 
complete. 
As with Turing’s completeness theorem, and for the same reasons, the 
epistemological import of Feferman’s completeness proof is limited. Fol­
lowing Franzén, we can see that it would be wrong to say that Turing’s 
and Feferman’s results show that we will eventually obtain every arith­
metical truth by iterating reflection principles.3 
4.3.1 Autonomous Progressions 
The proof of Turing’s completeness theorem (and the proof of Feferman’s 
completeness theorem) shows that there is a sense in which progressions as 
defined in the previous section fail to capture how systems of a higher 
ordinal level are warranted “from below”. For this reason, Kreisel 
(1958) argued that progressions should satisfy an additional autonomy 
requirement: for every Sa that is in a progression, it should be provable 
in some Sb with b <O a that a is in O. A progression that satisfies this addi­
tional criterion is called an autonomous progression. Before surveying the 
results about the autonomous progressions, we will introduce briefly the 
notions of Veblen functions and Veblen hierarchy. 
Veblen functions are a hierarchy of normal functions (continuous strictly 
increasing functions from ordinals to ordinals). If φ0 is any normal function, 
then for any ordinal α > 0,  φα is the function enumerating the common fixed 
points of φβ for β < α. These functions are all normal. In the special case 
when φ0(α) =  ωα this family of functions is known as the Veblen hierarchy. 
The function φ1 is the same as the ε function: φ1(α) =  εα. The first ε ordinal 
number ε0 is sup f1; o; o2; . . . ; oo; . . . ; ooo
... g and is the least fixed point of 
φ0, so that  ωα = α. And  then  φ2(0) is the least ordinal α, such that εα = α. 
The Feferman–Schü tte ordinal Γ0 can be defined as the smallest ordinal 
that cannot be obtained by starting with 0 and using the operations of 
ordinal addition and the Veblen functions φα(β). That is, it is the smallest 
α such that φα(0) = α. Feferman (1964) and Schütte (1964, 1965) investi­
gated autonomous progressions of predicative theories of analysis. In par­
ticular, Feferman (1964) investigated autonomous progressions via uniform 
reflection based on the systems H and R,4 determining the limit of predica­
tive reasoning. In a nutshell, he showed that the ordinal Γ0 is the least 
ordinal that “cannot be reached” predicatively. Or in other words, it is 
the least ordinal greater than all autonomous a in the progression.5 
But one can also consider autonomous reflection progressions over 
first-order arithmetic. The following is a typical result, which is appar­
ently “folkore”:6 
THEOREM 4.3.3. The autonomous uniform reflection progression based 
on Peano Arithmetic is the first-order fragment of the system of Ramified 
Analysis up to (but not including) level ω, and the length of this progres­
sion is φ2(0). 
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These theorems are epistemologically more significant than the com­
pleteness theorems of Turing and Feferman. In contrast to the non-auton­
omous progressions, the autonomy condition assures that we recognise by 
means of a proof in a previous stage of the progression that for a limit a, 
a is an ordinal notation. In this sense, propositions such as Theorem 4.3.3 
show what we can come to know in reflection progressions. Of course a 
strong idealisation is involved here: we are only able to go through  a finite  
number of stages of an autonomous progression before we die.7 
In this chapter we are interested in the informal notions involved in the 
transition from a theory Sa to Ssuc(a), that is, in the addition of the reflec­
tion principles. Like Turing, Feferman (1962) claims that the transition 
from a theory Sa to Ssuc(a) is obtained via a process of reflection. He 
states that our acceptance of a reflection principle for our base theory 
(and iterating this procedure) rests on our pre-theoretic attitude: 
In contrast to an arbitrary procedure for moving from AK to AK+1, a  
reflection principle provides that the axioms of AK+1 shall express a 
certain trust [our emphasis] in the system of axioms AK. 
(p. 261) 
We observe that Feferman’s appeal to trust differs from Turing’s appeal 
to mathematical intuition; if we look at the previous quote by Feferman, 
we see that a reflection principle for a theory S does not only express the 
soundness of S, but has also an epistemic component. In later work, 
Feferman (1991) continued to emphasise in that reflection principles 
have an epistemic component: 
Gö del’s theorems show the inadequacy of single formal systems [for 
the purpose of formal analysis of mathematical thought]. However 
at the same time they point to the possibility of systematically gen­
erating larger and larger systems whose acceptability is implicit in 
acceptance of the starting theory. 
(p. 2, our emphasis) 
Feferman here sketches an epistemological route from knowledge of 
the axioms of a weaker system to knowledge of the axioms of a stronger 
system. One starts by believing the axioms of a system S. If one’s reasons 
for doing so are good and S is true, then these beliefs amount to knowl­
edge of the axioms of S. When one is in such a situation, one is implicitly 
committed to reflection principles for S, such as ConS. By explicitly 
endorsing such implicit commitments, one can come to accept, and 
perhaps even to know, the axioms of a stronger system S 
0 
. 
4.4 Reflecting on Truth 
We will now leave reflection over purely arithmetical theories behind, 
and concentrate on the iteration of reflection principles over theories 
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of truth (and falsity) that are formulated in an expansion of the language 
of PA or EA with a fresh truth (and falsity) predicate. 
4.4.1 Axiomatic Truth Theories 
Pioneers of the investigation of proof-theoretic reflection principles 
pointed out that the concept of truth is involved in the concept of 
reflection: 
By a “reflection principle” for a formal system S we mean, roughly, 
the formal assertion stating the soundness of S: 
If a statement φ (in the formalism S) is provable in S then φ is 
valid. 
(Kreisel and Lévy, 1968, p. 98) 
This was regarded as a problem: 
Literally speaking, the intended reflection principle cannot be formu­
lated in S itself by means of a single statement. This would require a 
truth definition TS, with a variable a over (Gö del numbers of, or, 
simply, over) formulas of S, and a definition of the proof relation 
ProvS(p, a) (read: p is (the Gö del number of) a proof of a in S). 
The reflection principle for S would be 
8p8a½ProvSðp; aÞ ! TSðaÞ.: 
Such a truth definition TS, does not exist. 
(Kreisel and Lévy, 1968, p. 98) 
This difficulty can be (and was) circumvented by approximating the 
intended reflection principle by means of the purely arithmetical princi­
ples RfnS and RFNS. But this is not the only possible way forward. 
Instead, a primitive truth predicate T can be added to the language of 
arithmetic, thus generating the language LT ¼ LPA [ fTg, and new 
axioms governing the behaviour of the truth predicate can be added to 
the background arithmetical theory. This is what some proof theorists 
started to do in the late 1970s. Moreover, the resulting formal systems 
were related to a philosophical discussion about the function or role of 
the concept of truth. 
One important role for the concept of truth is to express and reason 
with generalisations over statements. For this purpose, the use of the 
truth predicate as a device of quotation and of disquotation is 
essential. This means that Tarski-biconditionals, i.e., formulae of the 
form T ⌜φ⌝ $ φ, play a pivotal role in truth theory. 
A distinction is made between typed and untyped (or type-free) Tarski­
biconditionals. In the typed case, the truth predicate is not itself allowed 
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to occur in φ. If we start with PA as a base theory and add to PA the col­
lection of all typed Tarski-biconditionals T ⌜φ⌝ $ φ for φ 2 LPA, the 
resulting theory is called TB.8 If one wants to add to PA a collection 
of untyped Tarski-biconditionals, then, in order to avoid the liar 
paradox, one can either weaken the background logic, or restrict the 
collection of Tarski-biconditionals and preserve full classical reasoning. 
One consistent way of weakening the logic that keeps the full Tarski­
biconditionals is to work in Basic De Morgan  logic (BDM).9 
The untyped truth theory formulated in BDM, where the Tarski­
biconditionals are completely unrestricted, is called TS0 and is dis­
cussed in Fischer et al. (2017). 
If one wants to preserve classical logic, then there are different 
options for restricting the Tarski-biconditionals to avoid inconsistency. 
Here we discuss two such possible restrictions. One possibility is to 
restrict the Tarski-biconditional scheme to the sentences φ in which 
the truth predicate only occurs positively (i.e., in the scope of an even 
number of negation symbols). If we add this collection to PA, the  result­
ing truth theory is called PTB.10 A natural way of extending this theory 
is to expand the language of the truth theory (LT ) with a primitive 
falsity predicate, thus generating the language LT; F. We then consider 
the sublanguage LþT; F, which is obtained by allowing the negation 
symbol from LT; F only to prefix atomic arithmetical formulas. More­
over, we consider the truth biconditionals T ⌜φ⌝ $ φ with φ restricted 
to LþT; F, and the falsity biconditionals F ⌜φ⌝ $ φ-, where  φ- is the dual 
of φ. We can define duals recursively: the dual of an atomic arithmetical 
formula is its negation; the dual of an atomic formula of the form Tt is 
Ft, and vice versa, the dual of A ^ B is the disjunction of the dual of A 
and the dual of B, and so on.11 PA plus these two collections of bicon­
ditionals is called TFB. 
4.4.2 Compositionality and Implicit Commitment 
The philosophical question now arises whether the content of the concept 
of truth is given by some such collection of Tarski-biconditionals. An 
affirmative answer to this question is defended, for instance, in 
Horwich (1990), Halbach (2001), and Horsten and Leigh (2016). This 
position is called disquotationalism, as it asserts that the content of 
the concept of truth is captured by a relatively simple and natural 
collection of Tarski-biconditionals, i.e., by a disquotational theory of 
truth. If disquotationalism is correct, then the concept of truth really is 
at bottom merely a device for quotation and disquotation, as Quine 
maintained. 
A standard objection against this, which traces back to Davidson, is 
that truth is compositional. According to this view, truth theories 
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should be able to prove intuitive semantic principles, for instance that 
any conjunction is true if and only if its conjuncts are both true, and 
so forth. But these compositional truth clauses cannot be derived from 
a set of Tarski-biconditionals. In this way it seems that disquotationalist 
views fall short of capturing the content of the concept of truth. 
The standard typed compositional truth theory is called CT.12 The 
most popular compositional type-free truth theory in classical logic is 
KF; the most popular type-free compositional truth theory in non­
classical logic is PKF.13 The Davidsonian objection against disquota­
tional truth theories applies to all the theories mentioned above: 
the message is that compositional typed (type-free) truth outstrips 
disquotational typed (type-free) truth by proving core principles govern­
ing the concept of truth that disquotational theories cannot prove. 
Without further resources, it seems that there is no way out for the 
disquotationalist. 
At this point, reflection principles enter the philosophical debate. The 
idea is that the compositional principles might be implicit in some collec­
tion of Tarski-biconditionals and that reflection can bridge the gap 
between disquotational and compositional truth. 
This is indeed the case. In the typed context, Halbach observed that 
iterating uniform reflection over TB twice recovers typed compositional 
truth (Halbach, 2001, Section 4): 
THEOREM 4.4.1. RFN2[TB] ‘ CT. 
This phenomenon extends to the classical type-free context (Horsten 
and Leigh, 2016, Theorem 7): 
THEOREM 4.4.2. RFN2[TFB] ‘ KF. 
Theorem 4.4.2 has to be taken, however, with a grain of salt. Even 
though the version of KF that is used by Horsten and Leigh (2016) is 
closely related to the usual formulations of KF (for instance, the 
version given in Halbach, 2014, Definition 15.2), it is not outright equiv­
alent to them. In Pos(KF) (positive KF), the version of KF derivable via 
two iterations of reflection from TFB, the compositional axioms are 
restricted to the positive fragment of the language, whereas in the case 
of the usual KF the compositional axioms are completely unrestricted. 
Therefore, although these two versions of KF are equivalent for the arith­
metical part of the language, their truth predicate behaves somewhat dif­
ferently. In Zicchetti (2020) it has been shown that TFB and the version 
of KF adopted in Horsten and Leigh (2016), i.e., the version of KF that 
we obtain in Theorem 4.2.2 via reflection from the theory TFB, can be 
consistently closed under unrestricted rules of Necessitation and Cone­
cessitation for the truth and falsity predicates to the theory Pos(KF)*, 
whereas the version of KF given in Halbach (2014) is inconsistent with 
the addition of the two rules. 
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The recovery of compositionality through reflection also extends to 
the type-free non-classical context (Fischer et al., 2017, Corollary 1, 
Section 3.2): 
R2THEOREM 4.4.3. ½TS0. ‘ PKF; 
where the uniform reflection principle R is formulated as a rule instead 
of an axiom. The reflection principle used in the proof of Theorem 4.3.3 
is the following: 
)  Prov. ⌜Gðx_ Þ ) Dðx_ Þ; Fðx_ Þ ) Cðx_ Þ⌝ GðxÞ ) DðxÞTS0 Rð Þ  
FðxÞ ) CðxÞ 
where the Prov. expresses that the rule from Γ(x)) Δ(x) to  Φ(x)) Ψ(x)TS0 
is an admissible rule of TS0. 
Again, following the general idea that the acceptance of a theory gen­
erates the possibility to accept stronger theories of which the acceptabil­
ity is implicit in the acceptance of the weaker theory, we can see that, if 
we commit ourselves to disquotational typed (type-free) truth theories, 
then we implicitly commit ourselves to compositional typed (type-free) 
truth theories.14 
However, iterating reflection does not only recover compositional 
principles from disquotational ones. As it is shown in Leigh (2016, 
Theorem 1.4, Theorem 1.5, Section 1), iterating the process of reflection 
also increases the amount of provable transfinite induction. 
We fix a natural notation system for ordinals up to and not including 
Γ0 that can be presented as an elementary ordinal notation system in the 
sense of Rathjen (1997), and call it O. Then both O and the ordering 
relation . on ordinals defined by elements of O are definable in first-
order arithmetic. 
DEFINITION 4.4.4 [Transfinite induction]. Let A be a formula. 
1.	 Transfinite induction for A up to any α < Γ0, denoted as TI(A, α), is 
the formula 
Prog(λxA)!A(t), 
where t is a notation in O for α, and Prog(λxA) states that A is pro­
gressive along ., i.e., 
8x 2 O[8y . xA(y/x)!A(x)]. 
2.	 For a language L and ordinal α < Γ0, the schema of transfinite 
induction up to α, TILð< αÞ, is the collection of formulae 
fTIðA; bÞ j A 2 L ^ b < αg. 
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DEFINITION 4.4.5. For a theory S and an (elementary) ordinal κ, let Sκ 
denote the extension of S by TILð< kÞ. 
DEFINITION 4.4.6. For a theory S and (elementary) ordinal κ, let RFNκ[S] 
denote the theory EA + κ times iterated uniform reflection over S. 
Now suppose that we start from a disquotational theory that is based 
on the weak arithmetical theory EA instead of on full PA. In particular, 
let TB0, TFB0 be just like TB, TFB, respectively, except that they have EA 
instead of PA as their arithmetical background component. Then we 
have (Leigh, 2016, Theorem 1.4): 
THEOREM 4.4.7. For all κ 2 O with κ > 0:  
1.	 CTεk = RFN1+κ[TB0]; 
2.	 KFεk = RFN1+κ[TFB0]. 
Moreover, if we look at the consequences of these theories for the 
restricted language LPA, then we have the following result (Leigh, 2016, 
Theorem 6.24): 
THEOREM 4.4.8. For all κ 2 O with κ > 0:  
1.	 If A is an LPA-formula provable in RFN
1+κ[TB0], RFNκ[CT], or CT
εk , 
then A is a theorem of EA þ TIð< εεk Þ. 
2.	 If A is an LPA-formula provable in RFN
1+κ[TFB0], RFNκ[KF], or 
KFεk , then A is a theorem of EA þ TIð< φεk ð0ÞÞ. 
The situation in the non-classical settings is similar. In Fischer et al. 
(2017, Proposition 3.3.3) it is shown that two acts of uniform reflection 
over the theory called Basic, which is EA formulated in the language 
with the truth predicate LT with an induction rule for D
0
0-formulae and 
in BDM logic,15 proves the principle of transfinite induction for the lan­
guage LT for all ordinals up to and including ωω: 
THEOREM 4.4.9. R2½Basic. ‘ TILT ðooÞ: 
Iterating reflection into the transfinite proves even more transfinite induc­
tion, as it is shown in Fischer et al. (2017, Corollary 3, Subsection 3.3): 
ðo2ÞÞTHEOREM 4.4.10. Ro½Basic. ‘ TILT ð< o . 
In other words, transfinitely many iterations of uniform reflection over a 
non-classical truth theory still proves much less transfinite induction 
than just two iterations of uniform reflection over classical logic. This is 
because Basic is formulated in the non-classical logic BDM. Some interpret  
this as a defect of (truth) theories in non-classical logic: they cannot repro­
duce (possibly not even with reflection) the same mathematical reasoning 
that classical theories offer (Halbach and Nicolai, 2018). 
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4.4.3 Global Reflection 
The reflection principles involved in the theorems that have been dis­
cussed so far merely approximate the correct way of formalising sound­
ness. This correct way of formalising soundness was already articulated 
by Kreisel and Lévy (1968):16 it is the Global Reflection Principle 
(GRP), which can be defined as follows: 
DEFINITION 4.4.11. The global reflection principle for a theory S, denoted 
as GRPS, is the formula 
8x½SentSðxÞ ^ ProvSðxÞ ! TðxÞ.: 
From a “typed” perspective on truth, one mark against global reflec­
tion is the fact that already one iteration of global reflection over a typed 
truth theory violates typing. But from a “type-free” perspective, GRPS 
may be a plausible way of making the commitment that is implicit in 
accepting type-free truth theory S explicit. 
If we look at theories formulated in non-classical logic such as TS0, 
then we get (Fischer et al., 2017, Proposition 1): 
THEOREM 4.4.12. The uniform reflection principle and the global reflec­
tion principle are provably equivalent over TS0. 
Since TS0 is arithmetically sound when uniform reflection is added, 
global reflection over TS0 is likewise sound. Moreover, this procedure 
can then consistently be repeated. In other words, TS0 is coherent with 
its implicit commitment. 
The situation in classical logic is different. The closure of classical truth 
theories under GRP for the whole language often forces some kind of 
inconsistency. This can either be outright inconsistency, or what is 
called internal inconsistency, i.e., the existence of a sentence φ, such  
that it is provable that Tφ ^ ¬φ. In Halbach (2014) it is shown that FS 
is inconsistent with GRPFS[FS]; in Fischer et al. (forthcoming, p. 8) it is 
observed that the standard axiomatisation of KF is internally inconsistent 
with GRPKF[KF].17 Indeed, KF is internally inconsistent even with 
GRPFOL, where  FOL is first-order logic formulated in L. This phenome­
non has been interpreted by some to indicate that standard theories of 
type-free truth in classical logic are implicitly incoherent. 
In our discussion so far, we have taken the implicit acceptance of 
or commitment to a theory S to be made explicit via the addition 
(and iteration) of reflection principles. However, in the previous 
approaches the epistemic notion of acceptance had been only made indi­
rectly explicit via the notions of provability and truth. In what follows, 
we will discuss a different procedure to make the implicit acceptance of a 
theory explicit. 
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4.5 Reflecting on Acceptance 
Instead of taking for granted the idea that proof-theoretic reflection prin­
ciples express trust or acceptance, one might decide to investigate 
the notion of acceptance of a given theory T directly, with the aim of 
spelling it out without the help of reflection principles or the concept of 
truth. In this case, the concept of accepting a theory T should be made 
precise. 
An attempt at doing this was made by Galinon (2014), who focusses 
on the weakest reflection principle: consistency. In his explication of 
the reflection process, Galinon uses two key principles. The first of 
these is the Principle of (first-person) Responsibility: 
If a rational agent accepts a collection T of propositions, then she 
must accept “T is acceptable”. 
(Galinon, 2014, p. 328) 
Second, he endorses the following principle: 
A rational agent must accept that if a collection propositions is 
acceptable, then that collection is coherent. 
(Galinon, 2014, p. 325) 
Using these principles, Galinon (2014) develops the following argu­
ment for the acceptance of consistency statements. Suppose a rational 
agent unconditionally accepts a mathematical theory T. Then, using 
the Principle of Responsibility, she must accept “T is acceptable”. And 
from this, using the second principle, the agent is rationally obliged to 
infer that T is consistent (p. 329). 
In this chapter we cannot do justice to the philosophical complexity 
of the issues that are relevant here, so we restrict ourselves to a brief 
discussion of one of Galinon’s key principles.18 The Principle of 
Responsibility seems a demanding requirement. One might wonder if 
reflecting on one’s acceptance of T might not, in some cases, lead one 
to abandon rather than to accept one’s acceptance of T. Of course 
this does not exclude that there are cases where we reflect on our accep­
tance of a theory T and legitimately conclude that T is acceptable. If 
that is so, then maybe Galinon and Feferman go too far when they 
claim that one is rationally obliged to accept reflection principles for 
theories that one accepts. Perhaps the claim should rather be that 
there are cases where an agent is rationally permitted to accept, on 
the basis of reflecting on a theory T that she already accepts, reflection 
principles for T.19 
Cieśliń ski (2018, 2017) provides an alternative analysis of reflection 
on one’s mathematical beliefs. He first spells out which informal 
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notion of acceptance of S is relevant, and then proposes the following 
informal understanding of acceptance of S: 
For any sentence φ, if I believed that φ has a proof in S and I had no 
independent reason to disbelieve φ, then I would be ready to accept φ. 
(Cieśliński, 2018, p. 1087, notation has been adapted to ours) 
Cieśliński (2018) provides an axiomatic theory of believability that 
employs the informal notion of acceptance presented in the quote 
above. He makes this notion of acceptance of S explicit by extending S 
to a new theory S+, which captures the informal notion expressed 
above. He does this by presenting a theory of believability, which 
extends the theory S that we accept with a fresh predicate B(x) for believ­
ability and with axioms that govern its behaviour. 
The thought is that when a person reflects on the implicit commit­
ments involved in her acceptance of a theory K, she comes to accept a 
theory of believability Bel(K)− over K.20 Cieśliń ski explains how this 
process is structured, and he spells out Bel[K]− as an axiomatic theory 
(Cieśliń ski, 2018, p. 254). 
Suppose we start with a theory K, formulated in a language LK. Let 
LK;B ¼ LK [ fBg. And let KB be the theory which is just like K except 
that its schemata range over all formulas of LK;B. The theory of believ­
ability Bel[K]− is an extension of KB with the following axioms and 
rules (Cieśliń ski, 2018, Definition 13.4.1):21 
(Ax1) 8c 2 LK;B½ProvKBðcÞ !  BðcÞ.;  
(Ax2) 8φ; c 2 LK;B½ðBðφÞ ^  Bðφ ! cÞÞ ! BðcÞ.;  
‘ φ ‘ 8n : BðφðnÞÞ ðNECÞ ðGENÞ ‘ BðφÞ ‘ Bð8xφðxÞÞ 
Let us now apply Cieśliński’s general theory to a concrete example. 
Consider the “weak” typed disquotational truth theory TB−, which  is  
like the disquotational theory TB except that the truth predicate is not 
allowed to occur in the induction schema. Suppose that we accept TB− . 
Then if we make the acceptance of TB− explicit via Bel[TB−]−, we  
recover compositional principles for typed truth (Cieśliński, 2018, p. 264): 
THEOREM 4.5.1. Bel [TB−]− ‘ B(CT), 
where B(CT) consists of all sentences B(φ) such that φ is an axiom of CT. 
In particular we obtain the believability of mathematical induction for 
LT from a situation where we only accepted induction for LPA. 
Analogous results hold in type-free settings. Consider the typed dis­
quotational truth theory TFB−, which is like TFB except that the truth 
predicate is not allowed to occur in the induction schema. Suppose 
that we accept TFB−. Then if we make the acceptance of TFB− explicit 
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via Bel[TFB−]−, we recover compositional principles for type-free truth 
(Cieśliń skip, 2018, p. 266): 
THEOREM 4.5.2. Bel [TFB−]− ‘ B(KF). 
So, taking stock: if we are committed to typed (type-free) disquotational 
truth and if this commitment is made explicit via a theory of believabil­
ity, then this theory proves that the compositional principles for typed 
(type-free) truth are indeed believable. 
The believability theory over the disquotational truth theory does not 
contain a factivity principle or rule (“B-Out”) for the believability pred­
icate B. Indeed, the inference from the believability of a statement to 
the statement itself is a defeasible rule. For this reason, we do not have 
Bel[TB−]− ‘ CT. Nonetheless, according to Cieśliń ski’s informal defini­
tion of acceptance of a theory, this then means that, in the absence of 
independent reasons for disbelieving compositional principles of typed 
(type-free) truth, we should be ready to accept them. In this sense Cie­
śliń ski’s results provide and argument for the thesis that our commitment 
to compositional truth principles is not greater than the commitment to 
disquotational truth principles. 
It would take us too far to give a detailed evaluation of Cieśliń ski’s 
position, so again we confine ourselves to a few cautiously critical 
remarks. Cieśliń ski argues that processes of reflection on one’s accep­
tance of a theory K can be described as proofs in a believability theory 
Bel[K]− for K. But it is not clear that all principles of Bel[K]− are in all 
circumstances correct. In particular, for the same reasons as why Gali­
non’s Principle of Responsibility might not in all cases be correct, it is 
not clear that axiom Ax1 of Bel[K]
− is always true. Might there not be 
circumstances where the agent starts out by accepting K, but by reflect­
ing on K comes to abandon parts of K—perhaps because in the reflective 
process she comes to realise that K is actually quite strong—rather than 
to judge that K is believable? It seems to us that a deeper phenomenolog­
ical analysis of reflection processes than has been given thus far is needed 
to decide this question.22 
4.6 Reflective Processes 
The reflection principles that we have discussed in the previous sections 
take the form of conditional statements. These conditional statements 
express the result of reflective processes, which have an argumentative 
structure. They aim systematically to draw out consequences from hypo­
thetical situations. The resulting formal reflection principles intend to 
express a necessary connection between the “input” of a reflection 
process and the “output” of that process. 
Because of this, reflection principles have played a role in debates in 
the foundations of mathematics about the justification of mathematical 
theories. However, the extent to which proof theoretic reflection 
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principles can play a justificatory role in this context, is contested. On 
the one hand, Horsten and Leigh (2016) argue that if accepting a 
theory S is justified, then accepting a proof-theoretic reflection principle 
for S is also epistemically warranted.23 On the other hand, Dean (2014) 
urges caution. He argues that even in a context where accepting a theory 
S is justified, justification for proof-theoretic reflection principles for S 
must be obtained before we are warranted to accept them. Getting to 
the bottom of this requires deeper philosophical reflection on the 
nature of proof-theoretic reflection than has been carried out so far. 
Indeed, we believe that reflection processes that underpin formal reflec­
tion principles deserve more attention from philosophers of mathematics 
than has hitherto been accorded to them. 
In this chapter we have concentrated on reflection principles that are 
connected with reflective processes that start from hypothetical facts 
about provability in a formal system. Some such reflective processes ter­
minate in propositions that attribute truth to statements (Section 4.4); 
others terminate in propositions about rational believability (Section 
4.5). However, there exists a class of reflection principles that are 
related to reflective processes that do not terminate in, but rather start 
from, hypothetical propositions that attribute truth to statements. Such 
principles are called set theoretic reflection principles.24 
It can be argued that proof-theoretic reflection principles are related 
to set theoretic reflection principles.25 Consider, for instance, local 
reflection for a theory S. For theories S that prove the completeness 
theorem, RfnS is equivalent to the scheme 
φ ! 9M : M . S þ φ; 
which is a set theoretic reflection principle.26 Of course this principle is so 
weak that it is hardly mentioned in discussions of set theoretic reflection. 
Indeed, the weakest set theoretic reflection principle that is widely dis­
cussed is Montague-Levy reflection. The Montague-Levy reflection princi­
ple is provable in ZFC. Nonetheless, the fact that it has proof-theoretic 
strength is shown by the fact that over the remaining axioms of ZFC, it  
is equivalent to the axiom of infinity plus the axiom of replacement. 
It is commonly assumed that “set theoretic reflection principles can be 
very strong, but proof-theoretic reflection principles are always weak”. 
But in an absolute sense, this is not quite correct, as can be seen as 
follows.27 The axiom MC, which expresses that there exists a measurable 
cardinal, can be expressed as an embedding principle (the existence of a 
non-trivial embedding from Gö del’s L to L). And such embedding prin­
ciples are often (but not always) informally described as set theoretic 
reflection principles. But even though ZFC + MC proves the consistency 
of ZFC, it is easy to see that ZFC + MC 6‘ ZFC + RfnZFC. So there is a 
sense in which even local reflection is strong. 
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The discussion of set theoretic reflection principles falls outside the 
scope of this chapter. The same holds for the discussion of the nature 
of our epistemic warrant for set theoretic reflection principles. We 
restrict ourselves here to observing that it should not automatically be 
assumed that our epistemic warrant for even moderately strong set the­
oretic reflection principles is of the same nature as our warrant for proof 
theoretic reflection principles. We have seen that our warrant for a proof 
theoretic reflection principle for a theory S is often taken somehow to be 
implicit in our warrant for S. But it is hard to see how something like this 
might be true for set theoretic reflection principles, since even the modest 
ones (such as Montague-Levy reflection) make no explicit reference to a 
background theory. 
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Notes 
1. For more on the philosophical significance of the use of non-canonical defi­
nitions, see Franzén (2004a,b). 
2. Feferman’s completeness theorem can be strengthened. Using the notion of 
smooth progression developed in Beklemishev (1995) it can be shown that 
the length of this path can be shortened to ωω
2+1. For an idea of the proof 
of this improvement, see Franzén (2004b). 
3. It is also known that completeness depends on the choice of the path in O. 
Feferman and Spector (1962) showed for instance that there are paths 
through O, such that corresponding uniform reflection progression does 
not even prove every true P01 sentence. 
4. H is the extension of first-order Peano Arithmetic, PA, with Kreisel’s hyper-
arithmetic comprehension rule (HCR): see Fererman (1964, p. 17) for Fefer­
man’s original formulation of the system H and of HCR. R is a system of 
Ramified analysis: see Feferman (1964, pp. 21–22). 
5. See Feferman (1964, p. 23, Theorem 6.10) for Feferman’s original formula­
tion of the theorem. 
6. The claim has been made in Feferman (1964). Thanks to Kentaro Fujimoto 
for pointing this out to us. 
7. For a discussion of the role of idealisation in the epistemological discussion 
of transfinite progressions of formal theories, see Antonutti Marfori and 
Horsten (2019). 
8. In TB the induction scheme is extended to allow also formulae that contain 
the truth predicate. 
9. Of course there are also other non-classical logics that one can opt for, such 
as Strong, Weak Kleene Logic, etc. For background on these non-classical 
logics, see for instance Priest (2008). 
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10. See Halbach (2014, Section 19.3). 
11. See Leigh (2016, Section 5). 
12. See Halbach (2014, chapter 8). 
13. See Halbach and Horsten (2006) and Halbach (2014, chapters 15, 16). 
14. Although, as we pointed out, in the classical case a restricted version of com­
positionality is obtained, starting with positive biconditionals. 
15. See Fischer et al. (2017, Section 2.2) for more details. 
16. See Section 4.4.1 above. 
17. No claim of originality for this result is made in this chapter. Indeed, this ele­
mentary observation is folklore. 
18. Galinon argues for the Principle of Responsibility on the basis of norms of 
rationality (Galinon, 2014, Section 7), and he argues for the second principle 
on the basis of a “Gödelian Dutch book argument” (Galinon, 2014, Section 5). 
19. This stance is taken in Fischer et al. (forthcoming). 
20. Cieśliński also considers a believability theory Bel(K) over K that is stronger 
than Bel(K)−. We do not discuss this stronger theory Bel(K) here. 
21. In the interest of readability	 we are sloppy with the Gö del coding in what 
follows. 
22. An attempt to provide such an analysis is given in (Horsten, forthcoming). 
23. In this connection, see also Fischer et al. (forthcoming). 
24. In the literature	 on predicativity, reflection principles are considered that 
take facts about definability as input: see Lorenzen (1958). Discussion of 
these principles falls outside the scope of this chapter. 
25. Kreisel	 and Levy are undecided whether proof theoretic and set theoretic 
reflection are related: see Kreisel and Lévy (1968, p. 101). 
26. Thanks to Kentaro Fujimoto for putting it this way. 
27. Thanks to Karl-Georg Niebergall for pointing this out to us. 
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Halbach, V. (2001). Disquotational truth and analyticity. Journal of Symbolic 
Logic, 66(4): 1959–1973. 
Halbach, V. (2014). Axiomatic Theories of Truth. Cambridge University Press. 
Halbach, V. and Horsten, L. (2006). Axiomatizing Kripke’s theory of truth. 
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 71(2): 677–712. 
Halbach, V. and Nicolai, C. (2018). On the costs of nonclassical logic. Journal of 
Philosophical Logic, 47: 227–257. 
Horsten, L. (forthcoming). On reflection. Philosophical Quarterly. 
Horsten, L. and Leigh, G. E. (2016). Truth is simple. Mind, 126(501): 195–232. 
Horwich, P. (1990). Truth. Clarendon Press. 
Kreisel, G. (1958). Ordinal logics and the characterization of informal concepts 
of proof. In Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians 
(1958), pages 289–299. J. A. Todd, editor, Cambridge University Press, 1960. 
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5  The Expressive Power 
of Contextualist Truth 
Julien Murzi and Lorenzo Rossi 
The truth predicate is often argued to be naı̈ve, in the sense a sentence φ 
and its truth-ascription ‘φ is true’, in symbols Trð⌜φ⌝Þ, are in some way 
equivalent (in all non-opaque contexts).1 Some authors require that φ 
and Trð⌜φ⌝Þ be interderivable (from possibly open assumptions), and 




Other authors go further and demand that the truth predicate obey the 
full T-Schema: 
Trð⌜φ⌝Þ $ φ 
or the so-called transparency requirement, according to which any sen­
tence φ is intersubstitutable salva veritate with Trð⌜φ⌝Þ, in all non-
opaque contexts. 
It has been forcefully argued that naı̈veté is required in order to 
account for crucial and non-eliminable uses of the truth predicate, 
involving blind ascriptions (such as ‘Everything Lois says is true’), infini­
tary generalizations (such as ‘All theorems of Peano Arithmetic are 
true’), and their combinations (Field, 2008; Beall, 2009; Horsten, 
2012). Call this argument the Argument for Naı̈veté. Since all forms of 
naı̈veté are incompatible with classical logic (given a modicum of 
syntax theory, the argument can be taken to establish that, in order 
to fulfil its inferential role, the truth predicate requires a suitable non­
classical logic. 
To be sure, the Argument for Naı̈veté does not settle which form of 
naı̈veté is best suited to underwrite the expressive role of ‘true’. Some 
authors (see e.g. Field, 2008 and Beall, 2009) argue that naı̈ve rules 
such as Tr-I and Tr-E do not suffice to model reasonings involving 
blind ascriptions and infinitary generalizations in certain embedded 
contexts, such as the antecedent of a conditional claim. For this 
reason, they propose stronger forms of naı̈veté, such as the T-Schema 
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(in the presence of a suitably strong logic of the conditional), or transpar­
ency. Call this the Argument for Transparency. 
In this chapter, we argue that both the Argument for Transparency and 
the Argument for Naı̈veté are fundamentally misguided. We first show, 
contra Field, that the expressive role of ‘true’ does not require transpar­
ency: principles such as Tr-I and Tr-E are indeed sufficient. However, 
we also argue, contra an argument offered by Picollo and Schindler 
(2018) that principles such as Tr-I and Tr-E are necessary: theories that 
do not validate similar principles irredeemably cripple the expressive 
role of ‘true’ (§5.1). We then point to some fully classical, non-naı̈ve the­
ories of truth featuring versions of Tr-I and Tr-E that are strong enough to 
validate arguments involving blind ascriptions and infinitary generaliza­
tions and yet weak enough to avoid paradox-driven triviality. In particu­
lar, we argue that contextualist theories of truth, despite being fully 
classical, feature expressively adequate, context-shifting versions of the 
naı̈ve truth introduction and elimination rules (§5.2). We conclude that 
the expressive role of the truth predicate requires neither transparency 
nor naı̈veté. 
5.1 The Inferential Role of Truth and Non-Classical Logic 
We begin by considering simple, unembedded cases of agreement and 
disagreement (§5.1.1) and then move to more complex, embedded 
such cases, and to Field’s Argument for Transparency (§5.1.2). We 
suggest that unembedded and embedded cases alike provide strong evi­
dence for the interderivability of φ and ‘φ is true’, at least for languages, 
such as English, that are rich enough to express so-called contingent 
liars. However, we also argue that, pace Field, embedded cases of agree­
ment and disagreement fail to establish that the truth predicate ought to 
be ‘transparent’—i.e. transparency is not necessary for the inferential 
role of ‘true’. 
5.1.1 Simple Agreement and Disagreement 
It is often argued that simple cases of agreement and disagreement moti­
vate the adoption of naı̈ve introduction and elimination rules for ‘true’ 
and, in turn, of a non-classical theory of truth. But this argument is 
itself naı̈ve, or so the classical theorist might argue. 
The Argument for Naı̈veté 
Consider the following argument—call it AGREEMENT: 
(1) All the theorems of Peano Arithmetic are true; 
(2) If ⌜φ⌝ is a theorem of Peano Arithmetic, then Trð⌜φ⌝Þ; 
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(3) ⌜φ⌝ is a theorem of Peano Arithmetic; 
(4) Trð⌜φ⌝Þ; 
(5) φ. 
Here, thanks to the truth-predicate, we move from an expression of 
agreement with a given set of claims to the actual assertion of one of 
these claims. The steps from (1) to (4) seem unassailable: (1) and (3) are 
assumptions, (2) follows from (1) by universal instantiation, and (4) 
follows from (2) and (3) by modus ponens. To be sure, principles such as 
universal instantiation and modus ponens might be called into question 
(see e.g. McGee, 1985). However, given our focus on truth, we bracket 
aside any non-truth-theoretic qualms one might have with classical rules. 
Then, the only potentially suspicious step is the one from (4) to (5), 
which employs Tr-E. 
A converse argument illustrates how one can move from an expression 
of disagreement with a given set of claims to the actual assertion of the 
negation of one of those claims—call this DISAGREEMENT: 
(6) Everything Lois said yesterday is not true; 
(7) If Lois said ⌜ψ⌝ yesterday, then :Trð⌜c⌝Þ; 
(8) Yesterday Lois said ⌜ψ⌝; 
(9) :Trð⌜c⌝Þ; 
(10) ¬ψ. 
As above, the steps from (6) to (9) appear completely unproblematic: 
(6) and (8) are assumptions, (7) follows from (6) by universal instanti­
ation, and (9) follows from (7) and (8) by modus ponens. Again, the only 
potentially controversial step is the one from (9) to (10), which employs 
Tr-I (given contraposition). 
Speeches such as AGREEMENT and DISAGREEMENT prima facie suggest 
that the expressive role of ‘true’ requires Tr-I and Tr-E. After all, the 
argument goes, it is difficult to see how these reasonings can be run 
without these principles. Without Tr-E, one can at best use AGREEMENT 
to establish Trð⌜φ⌝Þ from the premises that the theorems of Peano Arith­
metic are true and that φ is a theorem of Peano Arithmetic. But this falls 
short of establishing φ. Similar considerations hold for DISAGREEMENT. In  
order to fulfil its expressive role, the truth predicate must obey both Tr-I 
and Tr-E and, for this reason, any expressively adequate theory of truth 
must be non-classical, or so non-classical theorists argue (Field, 2008; 
Beall, 2009; Horsten, 2012). 
Contingent Liars 
It might be objected that the argument at best establishes the  validity  
of certain instances of Tr-E and Tr-I—namely, those occurring in 
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compelling instances of AGREEMENT and DISAGREEMENT. For instance, 
consider the following (non-schematic) instance of AGREEMENT: 
(1) All the theorems of Peano Arithmetic are true; 
(2?) If  ⌜2 þ 2 ¼ 4⌝ is a theorem of Peano Arithmetic, then 
Trð⌜2 þ 2 ¼ 4⌝Þ; 
(3?) ⌜2 þ 2 ¼ 4⌝ is a theorem of Peano Arithmetic; 
(4?) Trð⌜2 þ 2 ¼ 4⌝Þ; 
(5?) 2 þ 2 ¼ 4. 
And consider the following (non-schematic) instance of DISAGREEMENT: 
(6) Everything Lois said yesterday is not true;
 
(7?) If Lois said ⌜grass is red⌝ yesterday, then :Trð⌜grass is red⌝Þ;
 
(8?) Yesterday Lois said ⌜grass is red⌝;
 
(9?) :Trð⌜grass is red⌝Þ;
 
(10?) It is not the case that grass is red. 
Both of the above arguments arguably provide good evidence for the 
corresponding instances of Tr-E and Tr-I. However, the classical theorist 
might insist, such instances fall short of justifying the schematic argu­
ments AGREEMENT and DISAGREEMENT—and hence fall short of justifying 
full Tr-E and Tr-I and the consequent abandonment of classical logic. 
There are two related reasons for this. 
For one thing, virtually every classical theory of truth will allow one to 
infer 2 þ 2 ¼ 4 from Trð⌜2 þ 2 ¼ 4⌝Þ, or  ¬ð0 ¼ 1Þ from :Trð⌜0 ¼ 1⌝Þ.3,4 
For another, virtually every classical theory of truth will disallow appli­
cations of Tr-I and Tr-E to paradoxical sentences, such as Liar and Curry 
sentences. However, and this is the crucial point, instances of AGREEMENT 
and DISAGREEMENT involving such sentences do not constitute convincing 
evidence to accept Tr-I and Tr-E, or at least so the classical theorist might 
argue.5 To see this, let λ be a Liar sentence (that is, a sentence equivalent 
to its own negated truth-ascription :Trð⌜l⌝Þ), and consider the follow­
ing instance of DISAGREEMENT: 
(6) Everything Lois said yesterday is not true;
 
(7??) If Lois said ⌜λ⌝ yesterday, then :Trð⌜l⌝Þ;
 





Classical theorists might insist that is not at all clear whether it is 
desirable to infer ¬λ, that is Trð⌜l⌝Þ, from :Trð⌜l⌝Þ. As a result, it is not 
at all clear whether the corresponding instance of Tr-I (which is required 
to move from (9??) to (10??)) is justified. 
92 Julien Murzi and Lorenzo Rossi 
Putting the two halves of her argument together, the classical theorist 
can claim that she can recover all the uncontroversial instances of AGREE­
MENT and DISAGREEMENT while insisting that the ones involving paradox­
ical sentences fail to justify full Tr-I and Tr-E. For instance, the classical 
theorist might insist that she only accepts instances of argument forms 
such as Agreement and Disagreement that are clearly safe—e.g. instances 
involving sentences involving no semantic vocabulary, or truth iterations 
of such sentences. 
The foregoing rejoinder, though, presupposes that it is always clear 
whether an instance of Tr-E or Tr-I is paradoxical, or unsafe. But this 
is actually not the case. As Kripke (1975) famously pointed out, 
whether a sentence is paradoxical can depend on contingent facts. For 
instance, suppose Lois says that what the lady on TV with the red 
dress says is not true and that, as a matter of fact, she is the lady on 
TV with the red dress. Then, Lois’ utterance is paradoxical, but, one 
can persuasively argue, the corresponding versions of AGREEMENT and DIS-
AGREEMENT are perfectly acceptable, as is arguably shown by the following 
instance of DISAGREEMENT: 
(6) Everything Lois says is not true; 
(7???) If Lois says ⌜what the lady on TV with the red dress says is not 
true⌝, then ¬Tr(⌜what the lady on TV with the red dress says is 
not true⌝); 
(8???) Lois says ⌜what the lady on TV with the red dress says is not 
true⌝; 
(9???) ¬Tr(⌜what the lady on TV with the red dress says is not true⌝); 
(10???) It is not the case that what the lady on TV with the red dress says 
is not true. 
Now, whether ‘what the lady on TV with the red dress says is not true’ is 
paradoxical depends on the contingent facts, i.e. on whether the speaker 
is the lady on TV with the red dress. But, then, there are countless 
perfectly harmless instances of (6)–(10???). And, it seems plausible to 
maintain, it would be unduly restrictive to disallow them all. As Field 
puts it, this would irredeemably ‘cripple’ ordinary reasoning. It would 
seem, then, that the inferential role of the truth predicate indeed requires, 
just like non-classical theorists maintain, that ‘true’ satisfies principles 
that validate the interderivability of φ and the claim that φ is true, such as 
Tr-E and Tr-I. 
Field further argues that embedded uses of ‘true’ (as in the antecedent 
of conditionals) actually require that truth be transparent, i.e. that the 
truth predicate satisfies the intersubstitutivity of Trð⌜φ⌝Þ and φ in all 
non-opaque contexts. We disagree. Before we say why, we first review 
Field’s Argument for Transparency. 
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5.1.2 Embedded Truth-Ascriptions and the Argument 
for Transparency 
We present Field’s Argument for Transparency and argue that it 
misses its target: the embedded uses of ‘true’ Field points to can be ade­
quately modelled by Tr-E and Tr-I. We then consider a recent argument 
by Lavinia Picollo and Thomas Schindler, which can be interpreted as 
showing that Tr-E is sufficient to model the expressive uses of ‘true’, 
and find it wanting. 
Field’s Argument 
According to Field (2008), more complex arguments involving embed­
ded truth-ascriptions show that the truth predicate must obey full trans­
parency, and not merely Tr-E and Tr-I. He writes: 
Talk of truth isn’t just a means of expressing agreement and disagree­
ment, for the same reason that talk of goodness isn’t just a means of 
expressing approval and disapproval: ‘true’, like ‘good’, occurs in 
embedded contexts (contexts embedded more deeply than a negation). 
In particular, ‘true’ is used inside conditionals. And in order for it to 
serve its purpose, it needs to be well-behaved there: inside conditionals 
as in unembedded contexts, ‘true’ needs to serve as a device of infinite 
conjunction or disjunction. . . . Suppose I can’t remember exactly what 
was in the Conyers report on the 2004 election, but say. 
(11) If everything that the Conyers report says is true, then the 2004 
election was stolen. 
Suppose that what the Conyers report says is φ1,  . . .  ,  φn. Then 
relative to this last supposition, (11) better be equivalent to 
(12) If φ1,  . . .  ,  φn, then the 2004 election was stolen. 
And this requires True(⌜φ⌝) to be intersubstitutable with φ even 
when φ is the antecedent of a conditional. 
(Field, 2008, pp. 109–110; the original numbering 
has been adapted to ours) 
However, we argue, pace Field, embedded truth-ascriptions do not show 
that truth has to be fully transparent in order to fulfil its inferential role. 
Tr-E and Tr-I Suffice 
Let Cð⌜φ⌝Þ and σ be shorthand for, respectively, ‘The Conyers report 
says that φ’ and ‘The election was stolen’. Let χ be the conjunction of 
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all the claims in the Conyers report. Consider the following two 
sentences: 
(13) 8xðCðxÞ ! TrðxÞÞ ! s; 
(14) χ ! σ. 
We now show that (13) and (14) are interderivable via Tr-E and Tr-I, 
together with Cð⌜w⌝Þ and suitable assumptions on how to formalise the 
sentence concerning what the report says. 
We first show that (13) follows from (14) and Cð⌜w⌝Þ, given Tr-E: 
1 
∀ [C( ) → Tr( )] 
∀-E
C(. .) → Tr (. .) C (. .) 
→-E
Tr (. .) 
Tr-E → 
→-E 
→-I, 1  
∀ [C( ) → Tr ( )] → 
We then establish that (14) follows from (13), given Tr-I and 
8xðCðxÞ $ x ¼ ⌜φ1⌝ _ . . . _ x ¼ ⌜φn⌝Þ, which expresses the fact that 
the Conyers report says exactly that χ. Let z be a shorthand for 
CðxÞ $ x ¼ ⌜φ1⌝ _ . . . _ x ¼ ⌜φn⌝. We can then reason thus: 
3






x = φ1 ∨ · · · ∨ x = φn 
↔-E 









→-I, 2  
C(x) → Tr(x) ∀-I ∀x[C(x) → Tr(x)] → σ ∀x[C(x) → Tr(x)] 
σ →-E 
→-I, 3  
(φ1 ∧ . . . ∧φn) → σ 
The line labelled ‘_-E, 1’ is a condensed way to indicate n-many uses of 
the rule of disjunction elimination (and the corresponding assumption 
discharges). Writing this step in full, we should have first applied disjunc­
tion elimination to x = ⌜φ1⌝ _ . . .  _x = ⌜φn⌝, then to x = ⌜φ2⌝ _ . . .  _ x = 
⌜φn⌝, and so on, until we reach x = ⌜φn−1⌝ _x = ⌜φn⌝. We’ve omitted the 
full steps and abused notation in the manner indicated for readability’s 
sake. 
The situation is exactly parallel for cases of embedded disagreement. 
Letting υ be the disjunction of all the claims in the Conyers report (so 
that ¬υ amounts to the conjunction of all the negated claims in the 
report), consider the two following sentences:6 
(15) 8xðCðxÞ ! :TrðxÞÞ ! :s; 
(16) ¬υ ! ¬σ. 
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We first show that (15) follows from (16) and Cð⌜u⌝Þ, given Tr-I:7 
1 ¬ ¬ → ¬  
→-E2 ¬ ∀ [C( ) → ¬Tr ( )] 
3 
∀-E ⊥ CR, 1C(. .) → ¬Tr (. .) C(. .)  
¬Tr (. .)
→-E 







∀ [(C( ) → ¬Tr ( )] → ¬ 
We then show that (16) follows from (15) and 8x(z), given Tr-E. For 
every φi 2 {φ1,  . . . ,  φn}, call Di the derivation of :Trð⌜φi⌝Þ from the open 
assumption ¬φi via Tr-E:8 
( × k)




¬-I, ( × k) 
¬Tr (. .) 
We can now derive 
D1 D 
¬Tr (. 1.) . . .  ¬Tr (. .) ∀x(z) logic 
∀ [C( ) → ¬Tr ( )] → ¬ ∀ [C( ) → ¬Tr ( )] 
→-E ¬ 
→-I,
¬ → ¬  
→-I, − 1 
¬ −1 → (¬  → ¬  ) 
. . . 
→-I, 1 
¬ 1 → (. . . (¬ −1 → (¬  → ¬  )) . . .) logic
¬ → ¬  
which completes our proof. The upper inference line labelled ‘logic’ is  
established exactly as above, while the lower one corresponds to multiple 
uses of the import-export and De Morgan laws. 
It might be objected that our reconstruction of the interderivability 
between (13) and (14), plus auxiliary assumpions, is unacceptable 
because it uses Tr-E and Tr-I together with !-I and !-E, and these 
four rules, if taken unrestrictedly, yield triviality.9 On the other hand, 
the objection continues, showing (13) and (14) to be interderivable ‘via 
transparency’ does not risk triviality: there are transparent and non­
trivial theories of truth (such as Field’s own theory) where (13) and (14) 
are interderivabile, but where our reconstruction is not available, since 
one of !-I and !-E is not unrestrictedly valid. Therefore, the objection 
concludes, the Argument for Transparency still stands: we need transpar­
ency to non-trivially model the equivalence between (13) and (14). 
We find the objection mistaken, for at least two reasons. First, the fact 
that a natural piece of reasoning is classically inconsistent is not by itself 
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an objection against the principles employed in the reasoning (a fortiori 
for theorists who are in general open to revise classical logic). Consider 
again AGREEMENT and DISAGREEMENT. They, too, are pieces of reasoning 
which employ classical logic and naı̈ve truth-theoretical principles in 
order to motivate Tr-I and Tr-E, and hence the need for a theory 
which validates them. Entirely analogously, our reconstruction of the 
interderivability between (13) and (14) can be taken to motivate Tr-I 
and Tr-E, or relevantly similar principles, and the need for a suitable 
theory that validates those principles. Second, as we will see, contextual-
ism does provide a classical theory where versions of Tr-I and Tr-E are 
available, thus allowing us to recover our reconstruction of the equiva­
lence between (13) and (14). 
Summing up, the above arguments show that, pace Field, embedded 
cases of agreement and disagreement such as the above ones don’t 
require truth to be transparent. Pace Picollo and Schindler, however, 
such cases still require that the truth predicate obey both Tr-E and 
Tr-I, or suitably related principles. 
Picollo and Schindler on Tr-E 
In a recent paper, Picollo and Schindler (2018) offer arguments that can be 
interpreted as showing that truth-elimination principles such as Tr-E suffice 
for the truth predicate to serve its expressive purposes. One of their argu­
ments employs a result of Halbach (1999), to the effect that truth-theoret­
ical generalizations (that is sentences of the form 8xðφðxÞ !  TrðxÞÞ) have 
the same truth-free consequences as the collection of their instances (that is 
all the instances of the schema φ(⌜ψ⌝) ! ψ) in (suitably expressive) classi­
cal theories closed under Tr-I and Tr-E, where, crucially, the  application of  
the latter rules is restricted to truth-free sentences. Picollo and Schindler 
observe that Halbach’s result can also be proven if one only assumes 
closure under Tr-E alone (again, this principle needs to be restricted to 
truth-free sentences).10 They subsequently turn to Field’s argument con­
cerning embedded agreement and disagreement, and argue that truth-intro­
duction principles are not required. As they put it: 
there is an alternative and easy way to deal with the [embedded 
agreement and disagreement] case that only involves an elimination 
principle. For we can express (14) with a simple generalisation of the 
form 8xðφðxÞ !  TrðxÞÞ, instead of (13). Let φ(x) be the predicate ‘x 
is the unique sentence obtained by concatenating the conjunction of 
the CðxÞ with ! σ’. Then, we can choose [8xðφðxÞ !  TrðxÞÞ] to  
express (14): by [Picollo and Schindler’s strengthening of Halbach’s 
result], in any classical theory (that contains enough syntax theory to 
prove basic facts about concatenation) [closed under Tr-E restricted 
to sentences not containing the truth predicate] we can derive the 
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latter from the former, relative to the assumption that what [is 
written in the report] is exactly φ1,  . . .  ,  φn. 
(Picollo and Schindler, 2018, p. 913, numbering 
and notation have been adapted to ours) 
To exemplify, Picollo and Schindler suggest to interpret 
(11) If everything	 that the Conyers report says is true, then the 2004 
election was stolen. 
as follows. First, consider all the things that the Conyers report says, 
namely φ1,  . . . ,  φn. Then, consider the sentence φ1 ^ . . .  ^ φn ! σ, which 
says that if φ1 ^ . . .  ^ φn, then the election was stolen. Now consider 
the predicate ‘results from concatenating φ1 ^ . . .  ^ φn with !σ’. Of 
course, there is exactly one sentence satisfying such a predicate, namely 
φ1 ^ . . .  ^ φn ! σ. Such a sentence can now be used to express (11) as a 
truth-theoretical generalisation, namely 
(11+) Every sentence that results from concatenating φ1 ̂ . . .  ^ φn with 
!σ is true. 
Picollo and Schindler therefore suggest to express (11), a sentence 
of the form 8xðφðxÞ ! TrðxÞÞ ! c, as a sentence of the form 
8xðwðxÞ ! TrðxÞÞ. Crucially, the interderivability of sentences such as 
(11) and (11+) only requires Tr-E. 
Picollo and Schindler’s strategy fails to convince, however, for at least 
two reasons. First, the applicability of their argument is undermined by 
the restriction of Tr-E to truth-free sentences. To see this, notice that 
while it is consistent for (sufficiently expressive) classical base theories 
to be closed under the unrestricted rule Tr-E (for examples, see Friedman 
and Sheard, 1987 and Halbach, 2011, Ch. 14), no classical base theory 
can be closed under the unrestricted Tr-E together with the assumption 
8xðCðxÞ $ x ¼ ⌜φ1⌝ _ . . . _ x ¼ ⌜φn⌝Þ, for CðxÞ an arbitrary monadic 
formula of the language including the truth predicate. For one can 
then take the latter formula to be 8xðTrðxÞ $ x ¼ ⌜l⌝Þ, for λ a Liar sen­
tence, thus deriving Trð⌜l⌝Þ $ ⌜l⌝ ¼ ⌜l⌝ (by universal instantiation), 
and then Trð⌜l⌝Þ (by modus ponens and the logic of identity), and 
finally :Trð⌜l⌝Þ (by Tr-E and the definition of λ), thus proving a 
contradiction.11 
Second, it is not clear what, if not a covert use of Tr-I, can possibly 
justify the choice of φ(x) in the formula 8xðφðxÞ ! TrðxÞÞ in Picollo 
and Schindler’s argument. They suggest to use 8xðφðxÞ ! TrðxÞÞ in lieu 
of 8xðCðxÞ ! TrðxÞÞ !s, where φ(x) actually yields χ ! σ (relative to 
the assumption that what is written in the report is exactly φ1,  . . .  ,  φn). 
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More precisely, we need some device for replacing a truth-theoretical gen­
eralisation in the antecedent of a conditional with its instances. But what 
justifies such a replacement, i.e. Picollo and Schindler’s use of 
8xðφðxÞ !  TrðxÞÞ? Picollo and Schindler do not address this question. 
Yet, derivations such as the derivation of (14) from (13) strongly 
suggest that the obvious answer is: a use of Tr-I! But such an answer is 
clearly precluded to Picollo and Schindler, since it would contradict the 
claim that Tr-E is sufficient for reasoning about embedded truth-ascrip­
tions.12 It would seem, then, that Picollo and Schindler can maintain 
that Tr-E suffices to account for cases of embedded agreement and dis­
agreement only if Tr-I is already assumed to hold.13 
In conclusion, Field’s argument overshoots because transparency is 
not necessary for the expressive role of truth, even in cases of embedded 
truth-ascriptions, while Picollo and Schindler’s argument undershoots 
because Tr-E alone is not sufficient. We would rather suggest that in 
medio stat virtus: namely, the combination of both Tr-E and Tr-I is 
exactly what is required by the expressive role of ‘true’. To be sure, 
while this shows that the Argument for Transparency misses its target, 
our conclusion seemingly vindicates a version of the Argument for 
Naı̈veté—one according to which the expressive role of ‘true’ requires 
full Tr-E and Tr-I and, for this reason, is incompatible with classical the­
ories of truth. As a result, it would seem, the classical theorist is still left 
with an uncomfortable choice between classical logic, on the one hand, 
and the expressive role of ‘true’, on the other. In the next section, 
however, we argue that this is a false dilemma. There exist contextualist 
versions of Tr-E and Tr-I that fully underwrite the expressive role of 
‘true’ and that yet do not require one to adopt a non-classical theory 
of truth. 
5.2 Contextualist Agreement and Disagreement 
The problem, for most classical theories, is that they cannot validate 
both Tr-E and Tr-I. As the Knower Paradox shows (Kaplan and Monta­
gue, 1960; Myhill, 1960), they cannot simultaneously validate principles 
of truth introduction and truth elimination, even if one of the two is 
severely restricted (i.e. restricted to sentences that are proven from no 
assumptions). While non-hierarchical classical theories simply give up 
one between Tr-E and Tr-I, hierarchical theories typically still validate 
a certain version of Tr-I. In particular, contextualist theories feature ver­
sions of both Tr-E and Tr-I, where, crucially, the introduction rule is 
context-shifting. 
Our plan is as follows. We first introduce orthodox contextualist 
approaches and point to some of their limitations (§5.2.1). We then 
sketch our own preferred contextualist approach (§5.2.2) and argue 
that it is expressively adequate, in the sense of validating both 
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unembedded and embedded cases of agreement and disagreement 
(§5.2.3). We finally close by considering some objection and by offering 
some replies on the contextualist’s behalf (§5.2.4). 
5.2.1 An Overview of Orthodox Truth-Theoretic Contextualism 
Contextualist proposals (first advanced by Charles Parsons, 1974 and 
extensively developed by Michael Glanzberg, 2001, 2004a, 2015) offer 
a more sophisticated, and nuanced, interpretation of truth-theoretical 
statements. Contextualists typically assume that propositions are the 
primary bearers of truth and falsity. Accordingly, a sentence φ is true 
in a context α if and only if it expresses a true proposition in α 
(Kaplan, 1989, p. 522). Following Glanzberg (2001, 2004a), we formal­
ise the right-hand side of this biconditional as follows: 
9αpðExpð⌜φ⌝; p; αÞ ^  TrðpÞÞ; 
where Expð⌜φ⌝; p; αÞ reads ‘φ expresses p in α’, 9αp expresses existential 
quantification over a domain of propositions determined by the context 
α, and Tr expresses propositional truth. To further simplify notation, we 
write Trαð⌜φ⌝Þ for 9αpðExpð⌜φ⌝; p; αÞ ^  TrðpÞÞ (operating under the 
assumption that, in each given context, every sentence expresses at 
most one proposition). Still following Glanzberg, we assume that any 
adequate (naı̈ve) contextualist theory contains all the instances of the fol­
lowing schema: 
(CTS) 8αp½Expð⌜φ⌝; p; αÞ ! ðφ $ TrðpÞÞ.: 
In contextualist approaches, a Liar sentence λ is interpreted as the 
claim that λ doesn’t express a true proposition in a given context α. 
In these theories, λ doesn’t express a true proposition in α, but  
expresses a true proposition in a new, richer context β. On the  
further assumption that λ, thus understood, involves propositional 
quantifiers whose domains vary with context, the Liar reasoning is 
blocked. Since the Liar reasoning is now interpreted as showing that 
λ is not true in α but true in β, it is no longer paradoxical and its con­
clusion no longer contradictory. 
Here is, in more detail, the contextualist construal of the Liar reason­
ing (we informally follow Glanzberg, 2004a, pp. 33–34). Let γ be the 
initial context of reasoning and let λ be a sentence equivalent to ‘λ 
doesn’t express a true proposition in γ’: 
l $ :9gpðExpð⌜l⌝; p; gÞ ^  TrðpÞÞ  
ðthe latter can also be written as :Trgð⌜l⌝ÞÞ:  
One assumes that λ expresses a proposition in γ, and reasons (using CTS) 
that any such proposition p is true if and only if it is not true—a 
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contradiction. Hence, one must negate and discharge the initial supposi­
tion that λ expresses a proposition, and conclude that 
(17) λ does not express a proposition in γ. 
One can then reason as follows: 
(18) But, then, λ does not express a true proposition in γ [17, logic] 
(19) Then, λ  [Definition of λ] 
(20) Thus, λ expresses a true proposition in γ [19, Tr-I] 
Clearly, (18) and (20) contradict each other. 
Contextualists maintain that the foregoing argument is not valid.14 In 
particular, a context shift takes place between (18) and (20)—more spe­
cifically between (19) and (20) (Murzi and Rossi, 2018)—so that (20) 
should be interpreted as: 
(20?)	 λ expresses a true proposition in γ0 (for a context γ0 different 
from γ). 
Since (18) and (20?) are consistent, the Liar reasoning is blocked.15 
Contextualist theories have several advantages. To name but a few: 
they retain classical logic; they model paradoxical reasonings as intui­
tively correct arguments, making them consistent by uncovering a 
context-shift in them; finally, they improve on some of our best 
theories of truth. For example, contextualist theories à la Glanzberg val­
idate the truth-theoretical axioms of KF + Cons—that is, Feferman’s 
classical axiomatization (Feferman, 1991) of Kripke’s theory of truth 
(Kripke, 1975), plus the consistency axiom, ensuring that no sentence 
is both true and false.16 However, while KF þ Cons is incompatible 
with Tr-In, its contextualist version can be consistently closed under a 
context-shifting version of Tr-In, while retaining the virtues of the orig­
inal theory. 
On the other hand, on the orthodox contextualist view, quantification 
is always restricted to less than absolutely comprehensive domains. The 
reason, once again, is semantic paradox. In order to consistently inter­
pret the Liar reasoning, λ is interpreted twice: first, in the initial 
context γ in which it does not express a true proposition, then in γ0 
where it does (see (18) and (20?) above). More specifically, the truth-
introduction rule triggers a shift in the domain for the propositional 
quantifier—from a starting domain α to a domain β, where the proposi­
tions available for expressions in β strictly include those of α.17 And since 
one can run paradoxical reasonings in any given context, and paradox­
ical reasonings extend—on the contextualist construal—any given 
domain of quantification, it seemingly follows that quantifiers can 
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never range over absolutely everything. However, this feature of the 
approach clearly overshoots. Consider the following sentence: 
(21) Everything is self-identical. 
On an orthodox contextualist construal, even in sentences such as (21), 
the quantifiers range over less than absolutely everything. But this is 
unacceptable. Intuitively, the quantifier in (21) ranges over absolutely 
everything that there is, and a restricted reading of (21) would simply 
misconstrue it.18 
In order to overcome this problem, we adopt the bicontextualist 
theory developed in Rossi (2021). The theory provides an absolutely 
general interpretation of unproblematic sentences such as (21), while 
preserving the context-shifting interpretation of paradoxical sentences 
and the positive aspects of orthodox contextualism à la Glanzberg 
more generally.19 
5.2.2 Bicontextualism 
The basic bicontextualist idea is that whether quantification can be abso­
lutely general depends on the sentence in which the quantifiers appear: in 
some sentences (call them ‘unparadoxical’), quantifiers can be interpreted 
as absolutely unrestricted; in others (call them ‘paradoxical’), they cannot. 
Having distinguished between unparadoxical and paradoxical sentences, 
bicontextualist semantics provides an absolutist semantics for the former 
and a relativist semantics for the latter. In a slogan, bicontextualist seman­
tics recaptures absolute generality whenever possible, just like standard 
non-classical approaches recapture classical logic whenever possible.20 
In a bicontextualist semantics, we model context shift by moving from 
an interpretation for a given language to an interpretation for another, 
more expressive language. For this reason, we employ a proper class 
of first-order languages 
L :¼ L0; L1; . . . ; Lα; . . .  
where every Lα 2 L is expressive enough to admit the encoding of syntac­
tic notions and [α<bLα . Lb, for α < β. We write Trαð⌜φ⌝Þ for ‘φ is true 
in α’. For simplicity, we take sentences as truth-bearers: as pointed out by 
Parsons (1974, p. 391 and following), this reformulation is harmless, and 
the talk about propositions can always be recovered by replacing ‘⌜φ⌝ is 
true in α’ with ‘⌜φ⌝ expresses a true proposition in α’. 
Absolutist Semantics 
In order to construct second-order interpretations for unrestricted first-
order languages, we follow Rayo and Uzquiano (1999) and Rayo and 
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Williamson (2003), adapting their approach to the case in which such
languages contain a self-applicable truth predicate. We informally
work in second-order Zermelo-Frankel set theory (ZFC2). First, we
define a predicate ‘X is a model’ in LZFC2, MðXÞ. We skip the (lengthy)
definition of MðXÞ, but it can be paraphrased as follows: there is at
least one x s.t. Xx holds (models are non-empty), and Xx holds whenever
x specifies a domain, or the denotation of an individual constant, or the
extension of a relation. The notions of ‘domain’, ‘denotation’, and
‘extension’ are given second-order paraphrases in the official definition
of MðXÞ.
We similarly define in LZFC2 a second-order predicate Aðs;XÞ, for ‘s is a
variable assignment relative to X’, and Vðs; t; vi;XÞ for ‘t is a vi-variant of
s relative to X’. The three second-order predicates MðXÞ, Aðs;XÞ,
and Vðs; t; vi;XÞ are now used to define in LZFC2 an absolutist notion
of satisfaction the object-languages in L, patterned after the construction
of the least fixed point of Kripke’s theory of truth (1975).
Let x be a first-order variable, and X, Y, and Z be second-order vari-
ables. KSatαðx;X;Y;ZÞ holds just in case x is (the code of) a sentence
that is satisfied in the (second-order) model X whose (second-order ana-
logue of) domain is Y, relative to the accepted Z (note that, for simplicity
reasons, the definition combines the second-order notions of model and
variable assignment into one). The variable Z stands for the (codes of)
sentences that are assumed to be true in the construction of the Kripkean
model. We skip the (lenghty definition) of KSat for space reasons—the
interested reader can consult Rossi (2021).21
We can now use KSat to define the set of absolutely general truths of
each language Lα.
DEFINITION 5.5.2. For every Lα 2 L, the set of absolutely general truths of
Lα is defined as follows:
Absα :¼ fφ 2 Lα jKSatαðφ;X;Y;⌀Þg:
Absα contains the sentences that are in the least fixed point for the lan-
guage Lα whose quantifiers are interpreted as ranging over the domain
encoded by X, possibly absolutely everything.
Relativist Semantics
In order to obtain a relativist semantics for paradoxical sentences, we
adapt Glanzberg’s original treatment to the present setting. In Glanz-
berg’s approach, different (set-sized) ‘closed-off’ Kripkean fixed
points are used to interpret paradoxical sentences in different contexts
(the notion of ‘closing-off’ is sketched in what follows). However, in a
bicontextualist semantics, the relativist interpretation has to apply only
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to the paradoxical sentences. Therefore, the paradoxical sentences of Lα 
given by the closing off of a fixed point, minus that fixed point. 
We now outline how to construct a succession of Kripkean closed-off 
fixed points, and then explicitly define the relatively general truths, for 
each Lα. Let Ø be a predicate with an empty extension, Mα be a 
model of the non-semantic fragment of Lα, and Mα be its support. The 
relativistic closing off for L0 is: 
C‐Off0 :¼ fφ 2 SentL0 j hM0; fc 2 L0 j KSat0ð⌜φ⌝; M0; M0; ⌀Þgi . φg: 
For α > 0, the closing-off of Lα is: 
C‐Offα :¼ fφ 2 SentLα j [ [
hMα; fc 2 Lα j KSatαð⌜c⌝; Mα; Mα [ C‐OffbÞ; C‐OffbÞi . φg: 
b<α b<α 
This succession of closed-off fixed points treats paradoxical sentences 
exactly as in Glanzberg’s original approach. Consider a Liar in L0, call 
it λ0. λ0 is not in the extension of the fixed point defined by 
KSat0ð⌜φ⌝; M0; M0; ⌀Þ. Since  KSat0ð⌜φ⌝; M0; M0; ⌀Þ yields the extension 
of Tr0, λ0 is not in it. Therefore: 
hM0; fc 2 L0 j KSat0ð⌜φ⌝; M0; M0; ⌀Þgi ⊭Tr0ð⌜l0⌝Þ 
. :Tr0ð⌜l0⌝Þ 
. l0 
However, since l0 2 C‐Off0, when one builds a fixed point for L1 over 
C‐Off0, λ0 goes into the extension of Tr1. Therefore:  
hM1; KSat1ð⌜φ⌝; M1; M1 [ C‐Off0; C‐Off0Þi . Tr1ð⌜l0⌝Þ: 
That is, λ0 does not express a true proposition of L0, but it expresses a true 
proposition of L1, as sketched in the reasoning (18)–(20?). Other paradox­
ical sentences are treated in the very same way. 
Now that we have defined the closed-off fixed points, we can easily 
define the paradoxical sentences. 
DEFINITION 5.2.3. For every Lα 2 L, the set of relatively general truths of 
Lα, in  symbols  Relα, is defined as the set of sentences in C‐Offα, minus the 
sentences in Absα and the sentences φ s:t: φ 2 C‐Offα but ¬ φ 2 Absα or 
vice versa. 
The relatively general truths of Lα are exactly the truths of Lα’s closed-off 
fixed point minus Lα’s absolutely general truths. 
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Bicontextualism in Full 
We can now finally define a proper bicontextualist theory of truth. 
DEFINITION 5.2.4. For every Lα 2 L, and every fG; φg . Lα, the argument 
bcfrom Γ to φ is bicontextually valid, in symbols G .α φ, if and only if: 
all the sentences in Γ are in Absα [ Relα, so is  φ. 
For every Lα 2 L, the bicontextualist semantics for Lα interprets all the 
unparadoxical sentences over a possibly absolutely unrestricted domain, 
and the paradoxical ones over a restricted, set-sized domain. 
Bicontextualism delivers a strong theory of truth. Among other things, 
it validates all the axioms of KF þ Cons for every language Lα. More 
importantly for our present purposes, however, it validates forms of 
truth-introduction and elimination which can be used to recover talk 
about AGREEMENT and DISAGREEMENT, to which we now turn. 
5.2.3 Bicontextualism Agreement and Disagreement 
Both orthodox contextualist semantics and bicontextualism validate the 
following introduction rule for the the truth predicate (we formulate 
the rules as inferences from sequents to sequents to make fully clear 
the context in which each sentence occurs): 
bc bc(C-Tr-I) If G .α φ; then G .b Trbð⌜φ⌝Þ. 
Its contrapositive governs the elimination of the negated truth predicate: 
bc bc(C-¬Tr-E) If G .b :Trbð⌜φ⌝Þ; then G .α :φ, 
where β is strictly greater than α. While the latter two rules may require a 
shift of context, the corresponding converse rules are not context-
shifting: 
bc bc(C-Tr-E) If G .α Trαð⌜φ⌝Þ; then G .α φ; 
bc bc(C-¬Tr-I) If G .α :φ; then G .α :Trαð⌜φ⌝Þ. 
As we have seen in §5.1, naı̈ve principles such as Tr-E and Tr-I seem to be 
required in order to model speeches such as AGREEMENT and DISAGREE­
MENT. However, AGREEMENT and DISAGREEMENT can be equally modelled 
by means of a contextualist truth predicate. In particular, speeches 
requiring a truth introduction principle can be modelled using the con­
textualist rules C-Tr-I and C-¬Tr-E. For instance, contextualists may 
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interpret DISAGREEMENT as follows (letting ‘Bðx; yÞ’ formalise the claim ‘x 
said y’): 
∀ [ ( ) → ¬Tr ( )] 
∀-E 
( . .) → ¬Tr (. .) ( . .) 
→-E 
¬Tr (. .) 
C-¬-Tr-E ¬ 
where the first three lines occur in β, the fourth line occurs in α, and β is 
strictly greater than α. 
Contextualist approaches, then, can adequately model key uses of the 
truth predicate such as AGREEMENT and DISAGREEMENT, modulo the possi­
ble occurrence of context shifts. In addition—as shown in §5.1.2—cases 
of embedded agreement and disagreement can also be modelled by 
means of contextualist principles of truth introduction and elimination. 
However, orthodox contextualist theories and the bicontextualist theory 
we favour differ in one important respect. While the former theories 
always interpret C-¬Tr-I and C-¬Tr-E as context-shifting, in a bicontex­
tualist framework these rules are context-shifting only when applied to 
paradoxical sentences. By contrast, non-paradoxical sentences do not 
trigger context-shifts and are interpreted by the absolutist fragment of 
the semantics. Therefore, cases of (embedded or non-embedded) agree­
ment and disagreement involving non-paradoxical sentences are mod­
elled as if the truth predicate were naı̈ve, i.e. by means of perfectly 
symmetrical introduction and elimination rules. 
Let us now consider again the classical rejoinder given in §5.1.1. 
There, we argued that the classical truth-theorist might remain un­
convinced by the intuitive validity of schematic arguments such as AGREE­
MENT and DISAGREEMENT because they seem to have instances—e.g. those 
involving paradoxical sentences—that are not clearly compelling. Bicon­
textualist semantics seems to do justice to this intuition: instances of 
AGREEMENT and DISAGREEMENT that do not involve paradoxical sentences 
can be modelled naı̈vely (as in most classical approaches). In addition, 
however, instances involving paradoxical sentences can also be mod­
elled. However, in this case the introduction of the truth predicate and 
the elimination of the negated truth predicate semantically correspond 
to the articulation of a truth-theory for the sentences of a given language, 
and therefore require a stronger context in which they can be given. 
We now turn to some potential objections—in particular, objections 
concerning whether it is always possible to model agreement and dis­
agreement in a bipartite and hierarchical manner.22 
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5.2.4 Objections and Replies 
We consider three different kinds of objections: objections from seman­
tic blindness, Dean-Nixon cases, and objections from ineffability, to 
the effect that systematic domain restrictions cannot be coherently 
stated. 
Semantic Blindness 
Consider a blind ascription, such as 
(6) Everything Lois said yesterday is not true, 
and suppose we don’t know what Lois said yesterday. Kripke (1975, p. 
695 and ff.) famously argued, against Tarskian hierarchical approaches, 
that one may not be in a position to assign a ‘level’ to the truth predicate 
occurring in (6).23 In a contextualist framework, though, Kripke’s point 
is not well taken. The objection assumes that, in order to successfully use 
sentences such as (6), a speaker must know the interpretation of ‘true’ in 
a given context. In our framework, (6) is interpreted as 
(6?) Everything Lois said yesterday expresses a true proposition in some 
context α. 
More formally: 
(6??) 8xðBðLois; xÞ !  Trαð⌜φ⌝ÞÞ. 
Thus, in our framework, the objection postulates that a speaker must 
know in which context the truth ascription in (6??) must be interpreted. 
However, in general speakers need not know the features of context that 
are relevant for the interpretation of context-sensitive expressions. 
Consider the sentence 
(22) It’s cloudy now. 
Speakers utter sentences like these even if they don’t exactly know what 
time it is. Granted, in order to know what (22) says, speakers must first find 
out what time it is. But a speaker doesn’t need to know the time in order 
to successfully use sentences like (16). Similarly, even if we don’t know 
what Lois said yesterday, we are still able to use (6) to successfully attribute 
truth or untruth to what she says, even though we are not always in a 
position to know the content of what we have just agreed or disagreed on. 
All is required from a contextualist semantics for ‘true’ is that there be a 
context that provides a suitable interpretation of the context-sensitive 
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expressions in (6). And contextualist approaches standardly satisfy this 
requirement. 
Nixon-Dean Cases 
In less liberal hierarchical approaches, such as Tarski’s, certain everyday 
speeches cannot be coherently interpreted. Suppose Trump and Cohen 
only utter, respectively, the following sentences (cf. Kripke, 1975, pp. 
695–696): 
(23) Everything Cohen says about the hush payment is true; 
(24) Everything Trump says about the hush payment is not true. 
In a standard Tarskian framework, (23) and (24) cannot be interpreted, 
since each sentence would need to involve a truth predicate of higher 
level than that of the truth predicate occurring in the other sentence— 
which is of course impossible. However, as Glanzberg (2015, p. 233) 
points out, the objection doesn’t apply to more liberal hierarchical the­
ories. In particular, contextualist theories à la Glanzberg use iterations 
of Kripkean fixed points to interpret paradoxical sentences (and 
only those). Therefore, (23) and (24) can be interpreted exactly as in 
Kripke’s theory (and closed-off versions of the theory) in every such fixed 
point.24 
It might be insisted that if the speakers explicitly talk about the context 
they’re in, a version of Kripke’s objection can still be made to work 
(Field, 2008, pp. 217–218). For suppose Trump and Cohen only utter, 
respectively, in contexts δ and γ: 
(23?) Everything Cohen says in context γ about the hush payment is 
true; 
(24?) Everything Trump says in context δ about the hush payment is not 
true. 
Then, as Field (2008) put it, 
for one guy to succeed in saying what he intended he must pick a 
strictly higher subscript than the other. Because of this, there is pres­
sure for [Trump] and [Cohen] to get into a subscript contest. 
(p. 217) 
However, our treatment of (23?) and (24?) generalises to (23) and (24). 
The latter two utterances can be given a standard contextualist treat­
ment, interpreting them as a simple variant of the Liar reasoning. 
More precisely, since both sentences are paradoxical, they are inter­
preted by some Kripke fixed point in which neither of them expresses 
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a true proposition. Such Kripke fixed points corresponds to interpreting 
(23?) and (24?) in some suitable context α that extends the contexts over 
which both (23?) and (24?) quantify. As with the original Liar sentence λ, 
both (23?) and (24?) can then be shown to express propositions in a 
context β that extends α. 
Stating the View 
Field (2008, pp. 220–221) considers a further objection, to the effect that 
contextualist theories cannot coherently interpret a theorist’s disagree­
ment with the contextualist theory as a whole. For suppose one wishes 
to assert that the contextualist theory is not true. Then, it might seem 
that one needs to quantify over all the propositions that are expressed 
in all the contexts, which is something that contextualist theories 
cannot do (with the intended absolutely unrestricted interpretation). 
This is an instance of a more general objection, to the effect that hierar­
chical approaches to the paradoxes lack the expressive resources to talk 
about the whole hierarchy (in our case: the whole hierarchy of proposi­
tions in context).25 We now provide a quick sketch of how this objection 
can be addressed in a contextualist framework. 
Bicontextualists place some limits on absolutely unrestricted quantifi­
cation: the quantifiers of paradoxical sentences are necessarily restricted 
to less than absolutely general domains. Yet, in many contexts, they are 
able to quantify over absolutely everything. How to characterise, more 
precisely, such a view? This is an instance of a more general problem 
afflicting the two main views about generality: absolutism, according 
to which it is possible to quantify over absolutely everything, and relativ­
ism, according to which quantification is never absolutely general. On 
one hand, relativists face the objection that they cannot express their 
own view, if it is expressed as the thought that we cannot quantify 
over absolutely everything. After all, the objection goes, this very 
thought presupposes absolute generality.26 On the other, absolutists 
are accused of only being able to offer essentially meta-theoretic and 
hence, one might argue, unintelligible statements of their view. What 
is the status of bicontextualism in this landscape? The answer, in a nut­
shell, is that bicontextualism is essentially an absolutist view, with some 
restrictions. But it is neither incoherent nor unintelligible. 
The meta-theory of bicontextualism is absolutist, i.e. it has 
the resources to express absolutely general quantification. More speci­
fically, some open formulae are satisfied by everything, i.e. by a collec­
tion of things whose size exceeds that of any set, however large. 
Accordingly, the bicontextualist can express her view as a conjunction 
of two claims: 
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(25) There	 are open formulae that are satisfied by absolutely 
everything; 
(26) There are open formulae that are only satisfied by set-many 
things. 
Here ‘absolutely everything’ is shorthand for the satisfaction clause 
for universally quantified sentences, formulated in a higher-order 
language. Hence, both (25) and (26) are essentially meta-linguistic 
claims. 
It might be objected that this is deeply unsatisfactory, on the grounds 
that (25) and (26) look like perfectly ordinary object-language sentences 
that ought to be expressed in the object-language. Indeed, it might be 
insisted that English is not divided into English and meta-English and 
that, in principle, everything that is expressible in the meta-language 
ought to also be expressible in the object-language—including (25) and 
(26). After all, what is the point of having a type-free truth predicate, 
if not to formulate the interpretation (i.e. a traditionally meta-theoretical 
notion) for a theory S in S? 
One first point to notice here is that (25) and (26)’s meta-linguistic 
character isn’t specific to bicontextualism. For instance, (25) could be 
just as well taken to express the claim that it is possible to quantify 
over absolutely everything—a standard statement of the absolutist 
view (Williamson, 2003). If stating one’s view about the interpretation 
of quantifiers in the meta-language is problematic, then it is problematic 
for the absolutist and the relativist just as well. 
More importantly, the objection overshoots: it is false in general that 
everything that is the meta-language ought to be expressible in the 
object-language; only what is already expressible in English should. 
And, in this respect, there is an asymmetry between truth and higher-
order quantification. The reason why a type-free truth predicate ought 
to be part of the object-language is the simple existence of English 
speeches that make an essential use of it—speeches such as AGREEMENT, 
DISAGREEMENT, and the like. However, no parallel motivation for express­
ing higher-order quantification in the object-language is available. To see 
this, notice that a genuine higher-order quantification amounts to quanti­
fying into predicate position, i.e. quantifying over something that also 
figures as a predicate in the expression that follows the quantifier. For 
instance, a faithful reading of an expression of the form 8X8x(Xx) 
would amount to something like ‘Every X Xs every x’. That is, X 
would need to simultaneously be the syntactic object to which the quan­
tifier applies and the predicate in the expression following the quantifier. 
Yet this doesn’t seem to be possible in languages such as English. To be 
sure, plenty of English paraphrases of 8X8x(Xx) are available. For 
instance, ‘For every predicate, everything satisfies it’. These translations 
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are systematically misleading, though: they effectively treat X as a first-
order variable, because, in the paraphrases, X does not serve as a predi­
cate in the expression following the quantifier. 
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
It is usually thought that Tarski’s Theorem forces on us an uncomfortable 
dilemma: either adopt a non-classical theory of truth, or restrict some of 
the naı̈ve truth principles and ‘seriously cripple our ability to make gen­
eralizations’ (Field, 2008, p. 349). In turn, this has led many to adopt a 
non-classical theory of truth. However, there are good reasons for think­
ing that non-classical approaches are fundamentally misguided (Murzi 
and Rossi, 2020): they inevitably give rise to revenge paradoxes they 
are either unable to block, or they can only block at unacceptable 
costs. We hope to have shown that this is a false dilemma. The expressive 
role of truth doesn’t require naı̈veté: contextualist principles of truth (and 
untruth) introduction and elimination suffice. There are several possible 
reasons for adopting a non-classical theory of truth. But the legitimate 
desire to preserve, on the face of paradox, our ability to make generalisa­
tions is not one of them. 
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Notes 
1. Even if the truth-predicate is naı̈ve, certain instances of the naı̈ve principles 
for truth can plausibly fail in opaque contexts, quite independently 
of the paradoxes. For instance, ‘Anne believes that every even 
number greater than two is the sum of two primes’ may not imply ‘Anne 
believes that “every even number greater than two is the sum of two 
primes” is true’, for the simple reason that Anne may lack the concept of 
truth, or that she may systematically refuse to apply it to arithmetical 
sentences. 
2. Typically, we leave the formal system unspecified and assume that the argu­
ments we model are formalised in a theory featuring logical rules, a modicum 
of syntax theory (in order to have a well-behaved name-forming device ⌜.⌝), 
and semantic rules (governing the truth predicate). 
3. Even if they don’t contain all instances of Tr-I and Tr-E, classical theories 
allow applications of Tr-I and Tr-E to (more or less large) classes of sentences. 
These typically include non-semantic sentences, or sentences involving iterated 
applications of the truth predicate to non-semantic sentences. For instance, 
even classical typed theories of truth allow instances of Tr-I and Tr-E for sen­
tences not containing the truth predicate (see for example the theories TB and 
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UTB Halbach, 2011, Ch. 7), while strong classical theories allow instances of 
the naı̈ve principles for possibly very complex iterated applications of the 
truth predicate to non-semantic sentences (see for example Feferman, 1991, 
2008). 
4. Note that the foregoing considerations also apply to instances of AGREEMENT 
and DISAGREEMENT involving obviously false sentences, such as ‘Donald 
Trump is a theorem of Peano Arithmetic’. 
5. Classical theorists typically restrict naı̈ve principles to non-paradoxical sen­
tences, for some suitable understanding of the notion of paradoxicality. Sim­
ilarly, non-classical theorists restrict classical principles to non-paradoxical 
sentences. For a discussion of whether this in turn leads to certain revenge 
problems, see Bacon (2015), for the classical case, and Murzi and Rossi 
(2020), for the non-classical one. 
6. We consider a scenario in which one wishes to disagree with everything that 
was written in the report. The case of an embedded disagreement involving 
an antecedent of the form ‘something in the Conyers report is untrue’ is dealt 
with similarly. 
7. The line labelled ‘CR’ stands for the rule of classical reductio. Also, we use the 
assumption Cð⌜u⌝Þ, rather than Cð⌜w⌝Þ, for simplicity; however, if υ is the 
disjunction of the claims in the Conyers report and χ is their conjunction, 
then the former clearly follows from the latter, so we could have equally 
assumed Cð⌜w⌝Þ. 
8. We use the index (i × k) to make sure that it is sufficiently high not to clash 
with the indices of the open assumptions φ1, which are to be closed and dis­
carded later. 
9. There might be exceptions in some substructural settings. 
10. It should be noted that Picollo and Schindler do not endorse the claim that 
results such as the one above show that truth-theoretical generalisations 
‘express’ all their instances. 
11. It should be noted that a (sufficiently expressive) classical base theory S 
that features 8xðCðxÞ $ x ¼ ⌜φ1⌝ _ . . . _ x ¼ ⌜φn⌝Þ amongst its axioms 
can be consistently closed under all the instances of the inference from 
8xðCðxÞ ! TrðxÞÞ ! c to φ1 ^ . . .  ^ φn ! ψ. To see that the first inference 
goes through it is sufficient to consider any model of the form A :¼ hM; Ai, 
where M is a model of the truth-free part of the language of S and A is 
the set {x 2 M |x = ⌜φ1⌝ or . . . or x = ⌜φn⌝} which serves as the 
extension of Tr in M (the support of MÞ. The converse inference, i.e. 
from φ1 ^ . . .  ^ φn ! ψ to 8xðCðxÞ ! TrðxÞÞ ! c, impossibly requires 
closure under unrestricted Tr-E. 
12. We are indebted to Carlo Nicolai for bringing this point to our attention. 
13. Picollo and Schindler (2019) further discuss the expressive role of ‘true’. In 
this more recent paper, they too argue that both Tr-I and Tr-E are essential 
for the expressive role of ‘true’. 
14. See e.g. Parsons (1974) and Glanzberg (2001, 2004a). 
15. On why exactly context shifts in the course of the Liar reasoning, see Glanz­
berg (2004b, 2015), Gauker (2006), and Murzi and Rossi (2018). 
16. For more details on KF and its extensions, see Field (2008, Chapters 7 and 
13) and Halbach (2011, Chapter 15). 
17. To be sure, the question arises why truth-introduction principles induce 
a context shift. For instance, Glanzberg (2004b, 2015) argues that 
when we explicitly articulate our acceptance of a given theory S, we are  
committed to principles that determine the truth-conditions of S’s sen­





’s truth predicate cannot be defined in the theory S itself, on pain 
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of triviality, a more expressive theory is required, whence the context-shift­
ing properties of truth-theoretical reflection (see  also Murzi  and Rossi,  
2018). 
18. Williamson	 (2003) further argues that absolutely general quantification is 
crucial for philosophical and scientific theorizing and that, for this reason, 
any view on which quantification is necessarily restricted is at odds with 
the level of generality required by scientific reasoning. 
19. For reasons	 of space, we only offer a brief, informal outline of the theory. 
The following subsection draws extensively from the more detailed presenta­
tion in Rossi (2021). We also assume some familiarity with the models con­
structed in Kripke (1975). The reader uninterested in the outline of the 
theory can easily skip the next subsection. 
20. For simplicity,	 we present a theory in which the paradoxical sentences are 
exactly the sentences that are in the gap of a suitable minimal Kripkean 
fixed point (see Kripke, 1975). See Rossi (2019, 2021) for details on 
how to extend the theory to languages with richer vocabularies, in which 
further semantic notions, including revenge-breeding notions, can be 
formulated. 
21. The extension	 of Z is empty in the case of the least fixed point, and non-
empty for a non-minimal fixed point. 
22. In addressing the main objections faced by a bicontextualist treatment 
of agreement and disagreement, we also touch on more general 
issues regarding the theory of quantification adopted by bicontextualist 
semantics. For reasons of space, however, our discussion will be necessarily 
brief. 
23. Here we are not yet concerned with the possibility that (6) may be paradox­
ical. We consider paradoxical sentences when discussing Nixon-Dean cases 
below. 
24. We adopt in essence	 Glanzberg’s reply to the objection from Nixon-Dean 
cases. The crucial difference between Glanzberg’s theory and ours is that 
we limit the use of iterations of Kripke fixed-point models to paradoxical 
sentences. 
25. The	 general objection is familiar and has been pressed by a number of 
authors, including e.g. Priest (2006, §§1.6–7) and Linnebo (2006, §4). 
26. See e.g. Lewis (1991, pp. 61–68) and Williamson (2003, pp. 427–428). Rel­
ativists typically reject this objection, because it presupposes an absolutist 
interpretation of ‘everything’. They insist that, once ‘everything’ is inter­
preted relativistically, the sentence is simply false, and hence inadequate to 
express their view. 
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6  Disquotationalism and the 
Compositional Principles 
Richard Kimberly Heck 
[S]emantics . . . is a sober and modest discipline which has no pretensions 
of being a universal patent-medicine for all the diseases of mankind, 
whether imaginary or real. You will not find in semantics any remedy 
for decayed teeth or illusions of grandeur or class conflicts. Nor is seman­
tics a device for establishing that everyone except the speaker and his 
friends is speaking nonsense. 
(Tarski, 1944, p. 345) 
In their paper “The Use of Force Against Deflationism”, Dorit Bar-On 
and Keith Simmons (2007, p. 61) helpfully distinguish three sorts of defla­
tionary theses about truth. Metaphysical deflationism is a thesis about the 
property of truth, namely, that it is insubstantial, or that it has no essential 
nature, so that a theory of truth—a correspondence or coherence theory of 
truth, say—is both unnecessary and impossible. Linguistic deflationism is 
a thesis about the word “true”, namely, that its meaning is adequately 
explained by Alfred Tarski’s convention (T) or something along the 
same lines. Conceptual deflationism is a thesis about the role that the 
notion of truth may legitimately play in our theorizing, namely, that 
there are no interesting connections between truth and other concepts, 
such as meaning or belief. Rather, the notion of truth serves only an 
‘expressive’ function, allowing us to formulate certain claims that we 
could not state without it, but playing no essential explanatory role (see 
e.g. Field, 1994, §5; Williams, 1999, p. 547). 
Most deflationists seem to regard the linguistic thesis as fundamental. 
Exactly how the metaphysical thesis is supposed to follow from it has 
never been clear to me, probably because I do not understand what it is 
supposed to mean that truth is not a ‘substantial property’ (cf. Field, 
1994, p. 265, n. 19). But the real issue, in any event, concerns the concep­
tual thesis. Deflationists have generally regarded it as following from the 
linguistic thesis: Surely an expression that is explained in terms that make 
it all but redundant cannot play any essential explanatory role. In prac­
tice, the argument for this claim takes a form made familiar by Paul 
Horwich (1990). The work the notion of truth appears to do in various 
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settings, it is claimed, can in fact be done entirely by a notion of truth that 
is stipulatively introduced in accordance with the tenets of linguistic defla­
tionism. So the dialectic consists of the anti-deflationist’s identifying some 
theoretical setting in which the notion of truth seems to be doing impor­
tant explanatory work and the deflationist’s attempting to show that the 
role the truth-predicate is playing in that context is, in fact, purely expres­
sive. What it is for a use of the truth-predicate to be ‘purely expressive’ is a 
question to which we’ll return. 
Bar-On and Simmons’s main purpose in their paper is to show that 
conceptual deflationism does not follow from linguistic and metaphysical 
deflationism. In particular, they argue that Gottlob Frege, though he was 
a linguistic deflationist, is not a conceptual deflationist (Bar-On and 
Simmons, 2007, §II) and that Robert Brandom, though he is both a lin­
guistic and a metaphysical deflationist, is not a conceptual deflationist, 
either (Bar-On and Simmons, 2007, §III). More precisely, Bar-On and 
Simmons argue that the notion of truth plays an essential role both in 
Frege’s account of assertion and in Brandom’s account of ‘commitment’, 
and that in neither case is truth’s role merely expressive. They do not, 
however, actually defend Frege’s claim that assertion is the presentation 
of a thought as true,1 nor Brandom’s account of commitment in terms 
of taking to be true, so it is open to a deflationist simply to reject those 
accounts. Deflationists hold that truth’s only legitimate role is expressive. 
They need not deny that less enlightened philosophers have tried to make 
other uses of it. 
Frege’s own attitude toward truth is nonetheless instructive. On the 
one hand, Frege famously insists that “the sentence ‘The thought that 5 
is a prime number is true’ contains . . . the same thought as the simple 
‘5 is a prime number’” (Frege, 1984c, op. 34). On the other hand, 
truth plays an absolutely central role in Frege’s thought about language 
and, in particular, in the semantics that he develops for his formal lan­
guage in Part I of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Frege, 2013). For 
Frege, the most fundamental linguistic unit, from a logical point of 
view, is the sentence; the most basic semantic fact about a sentence is 
its being true or false; and the sense of a sentence—the thought it 
expresses—is its truth-condition. How can Frege hold all these views? 
What explains the apparent tension is the fact that Frege’s deflationary 
remarks always concern ascriptions of truth to what he called ‘thoughts’ 
(that is, to propositions, more or less).2 There is no reason to think that 
Frege was a linguistic deflationist about sentential truth. Frege never 
expresses a view about the meanings of sentences like “‘Snow is white’ 
is true”, probably because, as Sir Peter Strawson (1950, pp. 129–131) 
makes clear, attributions of truth to sentences (let alone to utterances) 
are extremely uncommon in ordinary language. In so far as Frege was 
a deflationist at all, then, he was a deflationist about propositional 
truth, not about sentential truth. And, in the context of Frege’s semantics, 
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the notion of truth that is in play is one that applies not to thoughts but to 
sentences. So Frege is no kind of deflationist about the notion of truth 
that plays a role in his semantic theory, that is, in the theory of truth 
he develops for his formal language. 
A semantic theory of the sort Frege was the first to develop is a theory 
of truth, however, only in Tarski’s sense, not in the sense in which the 
coherence theory is a theory of truth. But one need not think it is possi­
ble, or even desirable, to have a theory of truth in that sense—the sense 
relevant to metaphysical deflationism—to think that the notion of truth 
might do interesting and useful work (see e.g. Davidson, 1990).3 Truth-
conditional semantic theories are about truth just as they are about 
sentences and other linguistic items, and if the role truth plays in such 
theories cannot be revealed as purely expressive, then conceptual defla­
tionism is false. Now, questions about the role that truth plays in seman­
tic theory are, as we have already said, questions about the truth and 
falsity of sentences,4 so what we need to ask is whether linguistic defla­
tionism about sentential truth provides us with the resources to unmask 
the use of truth in semantics as purely expressive. To put it differently, 
the question is whether deflationism about sentential truth is consistent 
with taking semantics seriously.5 
I shall henceforth use the now common term ‘disquotationalism’ for 
deflationism about sentential truth. The term comes fromW. V. O. Quine: 
By calling [“snow is white”] true, we call snow white. The truth 
predicate is a device of disquotation. . . . We need it to restore the 
effect of objective reference when for the sake of some generalization 
we have resorted to semantic ascent. 
(Quine, 1986, p. 12) 
The linguistic part of the disquotationalist thesis is thus that the two 
sentences 
(1) Snow is white. 
(2) “Snow is white” is true. 
are not just materially equivalent but equivalent in some much stronger 
sense that makes the truth-predicate “dispensible when attributed to 
sentences that are explicitly before us” (Quine, 1987, p. 214).6 Quine 
would never call such pairs of sentences ‘synonymous’, of course, and he 
denies that (1) and (2) are necessarily equivalent (Quine, 1956, p. 187). 
What he says instead is that “[a]scription of truth just cancels the quo­
tation marks” (Quine, 1990, p. 80). Hartry Field (1994, p. 250) 
expresses a similar idea when he says that (1) and (2) are “fully cogni­
tively equivalent”, and, unlike Quine, Field (1994, p. 258) explicitly 
regards their equivalence as a “conceptual necessity”.7 
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This is an extremely strong claim, and one that has some very odd con­
sequences. As Field (1994, §9) both notes and emphasizes, for example, 
the following is true if the truth-predicate is read disquotationally:8 
(3) Even	 if “snow” had meant grass, the sentence “snow is white” 
would still have been true. 
That is because it is equivalent to: 
(4) Even if “snow” had meant grass, snow would still have been white. 
And that is because, as Field (1994, p. 266) remarks, echoing Quine, “to 
call ‘Snow is white’ disquotationally true is simply to call snow white,” 
whether or not we are inside a modal context. But surely (3) is false.9 
This is not a dispensible feature of the truth-predicate as a disquota­
tionalist understands it. It is, in fact, central to conceptual disquotation­
alism, that is, to how disquotationalists understand the ‘expressive’ 
function of the truth-predicate. Suppose, for example, that I were to say: 
(5) The axioms of Euclidean geometry are not all true, but they might 
have been. 
One might think that (5) is true for the boring reason that the sentences 
that express the axioms of Euclidean geometry might have meant 
something else. But, or so Field (1994, p. 265) argues, if “true” as it 
occurs in (5) is understood in accord with the tenets of disquotationalism, 
then (5) says that Euclidean geometry is contingently false. In particular, 
(5) is supposed to express exactly what: 
(6) It is not the case that EG, but it might have been the case that EG. 
expresses, where “EG” abbreviates the conjunction of the axioms of 
Euclidean geometry. As it happens, there are infinitely many such 
axioms,10 so we cannot actually write that conjunction down. But that, 
say disquotationalists, is precisely what makes the disquotational truth-
predicate so useful: It allows us to express what (6) does without having 
to write out an infinite conjunction (see e.g. Quine, 1970, pp. 11–13). 
Similarly, if I were to say: 
(7) It is sometimes	 possible to see objects behind the sun because the 
axioms of Euclidean geometry are not all true. 
then that is supposed to be a way for me to affirm that the non-Euclidean 
character of space is responsible for the somewhat surprising behavior of 
photons, not to make the absurd claim that optics is beholden to the 
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semantics of English. But if that is to be so, then “The axioms of 
Euclidean geometry are all true” must simply express what the axioms of 
Euclidean geometry jointly do and, in particular, must not have any 
extra, ‘semantic’ content (Field, 1994, p. 266). If ⌜“A” is true⌝ did have 
some content beyond that of A itself, then that extra content might figure 
in causal explanations that invoked the notion of truth. It would not yet 
follow that truth did have some explanatory role to play (i.e., that 
conceptual disquotationalism was false), but the usual strategy for 
showing that truth doesn’t play such a role would fail.11 
Consider, for example, the standard response to the so-called success 
argument. We often explain people’s ability to satisfy their desires in 
terms of the truth of their beliefs, so it looks as if truth is playing an 
explanatory role here. For example, we might explain how Alex 
managed to satisfy their desire for a beer in terms of the truth of their 
belief that there were beers in the cooler. Deflationists regard the 
mention of truth here as gratuitous: If what allowed Alex to satisfy 
their desire was the fact that their belief that there were beers in the 
cooler was true, then what allowed them to satisfy their desire was 
really just the fact there were beers in the cooler; the truth-involving 
explanation reduces to an object-level explanation. But if A and ⌜“A” 
is true⌝ are not intersubstitutable inside the scope of “because”, then 
this reduction fails.12 Of course, there might be other ways of resisting 
the success argument. But the most common strategy for doing so will 
have failed. 
To summarize, disquotationalists have generally regarded A and ⌜“A” 
is true⌝ (where “true” is read disquotationally) as equivalent in some 
sense strong enough to license intersubstitution in modal and causal con­
texts. That view flows from their commitment to conceptual disquota­
tionalism, since, if ⌜“A” is true⌝ had some content beyond that of A 
itself,13 that would open up the possibility that truth might have some 
important theoretical role to play. In that sense, disquotationalism is 
an heir to the redundancy theory: As we have already seen Quine put 
it, “true” would be dispensible were it not for our need to make 
certain kinds of generalizations. 
Now, one might have wanted to say instead that the reason (5) 
expresses the contingency of what the axioms express is because the 
‘axioms’ are not sentences but what those sentences express. That is, 
truth is being predicated not of sentences but of propositions (Heck, 
2004, §2). But this is not a line that a disquotationalist can take, since 
invoking propositions threatens to commit us to a substantial notion 
of representational content, which is part of what disquotationalism 
opposes (Field, 1994, pp. 266–267). A disquotationalist precisely does 
not want to understand attributions of truth to sentences in terms of 
the truth of the proposition the sentence expresses. Propositions (in any­
thing but a pleonastic sense) are anathema to disquotationalism. The 
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disquotationalist view, rather, is that attributions of truth to sentences 
are primitive, and they are to be understood in terms of disquotation.14 
Still, it is often useful, when one is trying to understand what a disquo­
tational truth-predicate is supposed to be, to compare it to a propositional 
truth-predicate. The claim that A and ⌜It is true that A⌝ are equivalent in 
some very strong sense seems reasonable.15 For that reason, this sentence: 
(8) Even if “snow” had meant grass, it would still have been true that 
snow was white. 
is unproblematically true. But the disquotationalist’s (3) is intended to be 
equivalent to (8), though it uses a sentential truth-predicate rather than a 
propositional one, so as to avoid the commitment to propositions. When 
“true” is read disquotationally, then, ⌜“A” is true⌝ is supposed to be just 
as obviously, and just as strongly, equivalent to A as ⌜It is true that A⌝ 
is.16 
As noted above, the underlying point is that, if ⌜“A” is true⌝ had some 
content beyond that of A itself, then that content could well be essential 
to putative explanations in which attributions of truth appeared. It 
would not follow that conceptual disquotationalism was false, but the 
typical strategy for establishing it would no longer be available. Uses 
of the truth-predicate could not simply be eliminated in the way disquo­
tationalists propose, even when truth was ascribed to a single, explicitly 
specified sentence, let alone when it was used in generalizations, as it is in 
semantics. 
A simple example of such a generalization is: 
(9) ⌜A and B⌝ is true iff A is true and B is true. 
Following Field (2005), I shall call such generalizations ‘compositional 
principles’. And the main question I want to discuss in the remainder of 
this chapter is how disquotationalists should understand the use of the 
truth-predicate in such principles, which are central to certain sorts of 
semantic theories.17 Even in (9), the use of the truth-predicate is sup­
posed to be ‘purely expressive’. The first question we shall consider 
below is: How so exactly? 
I shall argue in §6.1 that the truth-predicate is not being used in (9) to 
express an infinite conjunction, as is often suggested. I shall then turn, in 
§6.2, to a prior question, namely, what right disquotationalists even have 
to compositional principles. As we shall see, Field (2005) has offered an 
answer, one that also yields an answer to the question what expressive 
role a disquotationalist should regard truth as playing in those principles. 
I shall show in §6.3, however, that Field’s method for generating compo­
sitional principles over-generates and then argue, in §6.4, that this 
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reveals a deeper problem, which is that what Field’s method yields 
simply are not compositional principles as they are understood in seman­
tic theory. In particular, part of what (9) is typically understood to 
express is that conjunction is truth-functional, and Field’s account 
would apply whether or not “and” was truth-functional. 
Let me acknowledge something in advance. I shall be arguing that dis­
quotationalism is committed to claims that may seem so absurd that no 
one could possibly accept them. This is worrying. But they are no more 
absurd than (3), in the end, and they flow from exactly the same source: 
The insistence that the primary function of “is true” is simply to erase 
quotation marks. That, obviously, is the very core of disquotationalism. 
6.1 What Expressive Role Does “True” Play in Compositional 
Principles? 
As mentioned above, disquotationalists regard the truth-predicate as 
merely an ‘expressive’ device. People sometimes put this point by 
saying that the truth-predicate allows us to make generalizations we 
could not make without it. But the slogan can’t just mean that. Every 
predicate allows us to make generalizations we could not make 
without it. For example, the predicate “blue” allows us to express 
the generalization “All pigs are blue”, which we could not express if 
we did not have the word “blue” in our language (or a synonym). So 
the disquotationalist slogan must mean something else. Which, of 
course, it does. 
When disquotationalists characterize the truth-predicate as a ‘device 
of generalization’, what they mean is that it gives us a way to express 
generalizations all of whose instances we can already assert. It’s just 
the generalization that we can’t assert. That distinguishes the cases involv­
ing “true” from the case of “All pigs are blue”. Not even the instances of 
“All pigs are blue” can be asserted without the use of “blue”. More pre­
cisely still, the truth-predicate is supposed to act as a ‘device of infinite con­
junction’ (Field, 1994, §5; Halbach, 1999). In the cases of interest, we shall 
be able to assert the various instances of some generalization, but, because 
there are infinitely many such instances, we cannot actually assert them all, 
absent some mechanism for forming infinite conjunctions, which is exactly 
what the truth-predicate is supposed to give us—much as in the cases of 
(5) and (7) above. 
Consider, for example, the law of excluded middle: 
(10) Every sentence of the form A _ ¬A is true. 
The disquotationalist’s suggestion is that (10) means no more and no less 
than that either Bill smokes or Bill does not smoke, and either Fred runs 
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or Fred does not run, and so forth. The individual instances—“Either Bill 
smokes or Bill does not smoke”, “Either Fred runs or Fred does not 
run”—have nothing to do with truth. To express the generalization, of 
course, what we need to do is quantify over these instances. What we 
seem to want to say is thus something like: 
(11) For all S, if  S is of the form A _ ¬A, then S. 
But that, familiarly, is ill-formed, since S is occupying both term and 
sentence positions. What the truth-predicate does, according to dis­
quotationalists, is to solve this syntactic problem by converting the 
position occupied by a sentence into one occupied by a term: “Fred runs 
or Fred does not run” is replaced by “‘Fred runs or Fred does not run’ is 
true”, and our generalization can then expressed as: 
(12) For all S, if  S is of the form A _ ¬A, then S is true. 
All we’re trying to do here, or so disquotationalists say, is to wrap the 
instances of A _ ¬A into a neat package and affirm them, all at once. The 
role the truth-predicate is playing is thus purely grammatical, and (12) 
means no more than what (11) was supposed to mean: It simply 
expresses the infinite conjunction that either Bill smokes or Bill does not 
smoke, and either Fred runs or Fred does not run, and so forth. In 
particular, (12) has no more to do with truth, semantics, or logic than 
would that infinite conjunction, if only we could write it down. 
There are several difficulties with this idea. First of all, it is a delicate 
matter just how we should understand the claim that such sentences as 
(10) ‘express’ infinite conjunctions. As Anil Gupta (1993, §III) argues, 
“express” here has to be understood in a very strong sense—which 
makes it surprising that so little effort has been made to articulate 
what that sense is.18 The only serious attempt to do so, which is due 
to Volker Halbach (1999), cannot be regarded as successful (Heck, 
2004, §3). Worse, as Gupta also notes, this sort of proposal appears to 
conflate the truth of a generalization with the joint truth of its instances. 
The statement that all sentences of the form A _ ¬A are true has nothing 
to do with which instances of that form happen to be present in the lan­
guage. On the contrary, excluded middle is supposed to be a law: It is 
supposed to be, in the usual sense, ‘projectible’. Even if new sentences 
are added to our language, so that A _ ¬A comes to have new instances, 
those too are required to be true. 
I shall not pursue these complaints further here, however, as sympa­
thetic with them as I may be. There is a more important point in 
the vicinity: Compositional principles simply are not statements in 
which the truth-predicate is plausibly being used as a device of infinite 
conjunction.19 
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The problem is very simple. The only ‘infinite conjunction’ we might 
plausibly take (9) to express is far too weak to have any chance of 
being what it actually does express. Formalize (9) as: 
(13) 8x8y[T(⌜x ^ y⌝) . T(x) ^ T(y)] 
Which sentences not involving the truth-predicate are supposed to count 
as instances of the infinite conjunction allegedly expressed by (13)?20 It is 
hard to see what they might be if not sentences of the form: A ^ B . A ^ 
B, so that (13) expresses the infinite conjunction of such claims as “Fred 
runs and Bill walks iff Fred runs and Bill walks”, that is, the infinite 
conjunction of a bunch of instances of p . p. That might sound like 
music to the disquotationalist’s ears. But it should not. 
Consider these two generalizations:21 
(14) 8x8y[T(⌜x ^ y⌝) . T(⌜x ^ y⌝)] 
(15) 8x8y[T(⌜x ^ y . x ^ y⌝)] 
If (13) is supposed to express an infinite conjunction, then presumably 
these do, as well. And there appears to be no option but to take them, too, 
to express the conjunction of all sentences of the form: A ^ B. A ^ B. But  
these are all very different. For example, (14) is logically valid. And, while 
(15) is not itself logically valid, it follows from any set of principles 
entailing that all instances of a truth-functionally valid schema are true 
(for example, that very principle).22 But (13), together with similar prin­
ciples, at least, has significant logical strength (Heck, 2015, 2018a). 
The point, then, is that (13), (14), and (15) have very different logical 
properties. It follows, or so it seems to me, that they cannot all express 
the same infinite conjunction. On the contrary, at most one of them can 
express the infinite conjunction of sentences of the form: A ^ B . A ^ B. 
But if any of these expresses that infinite conjunction, then surely it is 
(15), which does so in precisely the sense in which 8x[T(⌜x _ ¬x⌝)] 
expresses the conjunction of instances of the law of excluded middle. 
But then (13) does not express that infinite conjunction, and there is 
no other infinite conjunction that it plausibly does express. 
The point applies to other compositional principles as well, such as: 
(16) 8x[T(⌜¬x⌝) . ¬T(x)] 
If (16) expresses an infinite conjunction, it can only be the conjunction of 
all sentences of the form: ¬A . ¬A. But, if so, then that infinite con­
junction seems equally to be what is expressed by these two 
generalizations: 
(17) 8x[T(⌜¬x⌝) . T(⌜¬x⌝)] 
(18) 8x[T(⌜¬x . ¬x⌝)] 
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Once again, (16), (17), and (18) have very different logical properties, 
and at most one of them can express the infinite conjunction of all 
sentences of the form: ¬A . ¬A. But (18) expresses that conjunction if 
anything does, so (16) does not express it. 
I have heard it said in conversation that disquotationalists do not 
really mean that “true” is always used to express infinite conjunctions, 
but that this is its ‘purpose’ or ‘role’ in our language. But I have no 
idea what to make of such teleological claims. Most words do not 
have ‘purposes’, except to allow us to express whatever concepts they 
are used to express, and I see no reason to regard “true” as different 
from other words in this respect.23 Moreover, even if the truth-predicate 
had been explicitly introduced so as to allow us to express infinite con­
junctions, it would not follow that, once we had it, we could not use it 
for quite different purposes, including ones that involved truth’s playing 
a significant explanatory role.24 The disquotationalist therefore owes 
us an answer to the question what ‘purely expressive’ role the truth-
predicate plays in compositional principles, if it is not to allow us to for­
mulate infinite conjunctions. 
6.2 Disquotationalist Derivations of Compositional 
Principles 
Disquotationalists often seem to be of two minds about compositional 
principles. On the one hand, for example, Field (1994, p. 269) insists 
that “compositional principles have no interest in their own right”. On 
the other hand, however, Field is of course aware that there are those 
who find such principles as: 
(9) ⌜A and B⌝ is true iff A is true and B is true. 
to be of substantial interest. So he wants to be able to explain both why 
such principles are true, when they are, and why they are nonetheless 
insubstantial and can do no explanatory work. 
There is a history here. In his book Truth, which helped launch contem­
porary deflationism, Horwich (1990) suggested that we can get everything 
we need to know about truth from the ‘minimal’ theory that consists just 
of the T-sentences.25 It is obvious, however, that a theory of truth contain­
ing just the T-sentences is very, very weak.26 Without such principles as 
(9), it’s hard to see how such a truth-predicate could be of much use at 
all. It certainly could not be used for the sorts of purposes for which 
the truth-predicate is typically used in logic.27 
One might well think, however, that the compositional principles can 
be derived from the T-sentences—or, better, from the ‘T-scheme’, 
thought of as an axiom scheme having the T-sentences themselves as 
instances. The argument proceeds as follows:28 
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(i) “A and B” is true iff A and B. 
(ii) “A” is true iff A. 
(iii) “B” is true iff B. 
(iv) “A and B” is true iff “A” is true and “B” is true. 
The first three steps are delivered by the T-scheme; the last then follows 
by simple propositional reasoning. 
Prima facie, this argument has two serious problems. First, it does not 
appear to be an argument at all. An argument consists of a sequence of 
claims allegedly related in some relevant way (e.g., deductively). But this 
‘argument’ does not consist of a sequence of claims, and it is not at all 
obvious how to interpret it. This leads to the second problem: In so 
far as one does have some idea how to interpret this argument, one 
wants to regard “A” and “B” as variables. But then these variables 
appear both inside and outside quotation marks, something that is 
usually regarded as problematic. 
One charitable way to interpret the ‘argument’ is to regard it not as an 
argument but as an argument schema. So understood, however, the argu­
ment fails to show what its proponents claim it shows. What the sche­
matic argument shows is that we can prove every instance of (9). That, 
as Gupta (1993, p. 67) emphasizes, is not at all the same thing as being 
able to prove (9) itself. Indeed, if our background logic is first-order 
logic, or some other logic for which the compactness theorem holds, the 
generalization (9) cannot follow from its infinitely many instances. Other­
wise, it would have to follow from finitely many of them, which it obvi­
ously does not (Shapiro, 1998, p. 496). 
One might think the disquotationalist can simply concede this point.29 
What the disquotationalist needs to show is that an ‘insubstantial’ theory 
of truth can do the work for which a ‘substantial’ theory of truth is sup­
posed to be needed. The suggestion, then, in response to the foregoing, 
would be that what needs amending is just the proposed content of 
that ‘insubstantial’ theory: It should not contain just the T-sentences, 
or something of the sort, but also the sorts of generalizations we’ve 
been discussing. That is: The disquotationalist should just claim the com­
positional principles as their own. 
This reply begs the question whether the disquotationalist actually has 
a right to the compositional principles. Worse, it is utterly ad hoc. The  
suggestion is that we should add generalizations like (9) to the 
‘minimal’ theory containing just the T-sentences. But which generaliza­
tions are ‘like’ (9)? Discussion of these issues tends to idealize by taking the 
language to which the truth-predicate applies to be a formal (usually first­
order) language. And, in that case, we know well enough which compo­
sitional principles will be needed to allow us to make the generalizations 
the truth-predicate typically allows us to make.30 But disquotationalism 
isn’t a view about truth as applied only to the sentences of formal 
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languages.31 Truth, at least as it is used in semantics, applies to sentences 
of natural language. But then there is no clear limit to the sorts of compo­
sitional principles we will need to add. Indeed, if we take the case of first­
order languages as our model, then, in that case, what we need to add to 
the minimal theory, to make it do the work we need it to do, is a full-
blown Tarski-style theory of truth, as Field (1999, pp. 534–535) himself 
has noted. That makes me suspect that, in the case of a natural language, 
what would be needed is what, from a different point of view, would be 
regarded as constituting a full semantic theory for the language in ques­
tion. That makes the question what right a disquotationalist has to com­
positional principles pressing once again.32 Compositional principles are 
the very principles that semantic theories articulate, and truth appears 
to play a substantial role in such theories. If so, then “Disquotationalism 
doesn’t work without the compositional principles, so we’d better add 
them” looks worryingly like another way of saying “Disquotationalism 
doesn’t work, so we shouldn’t be disquotationalists”. 
If something like the schematic argument rehearsed above could be 
resuscitated, however, then the problems we have been discussing 
would vanish. In light of our discussion in §6.1, however, the disquota­
tionalist must abandon the claim that the compositional principles 
express infinite conjunctions; in light of Gupta’s criticisms, they must 
also abandon the claim that compositional principles simply follow 
from their instances. But the possibility is still open, at least in principle, 
that the compositional principles should follow from certain general 
principles about truth that the disquotationalist anyway accepts. In par­
ticular, compositional principles might follow from the T-scheme, itself 
understood as having a certain kind of generality, rather than simply as a 
convenient way of summarizing the infinite list of its instances. And a 
form of this proposal has been developed by Field (2005). 
The contrast to which I have just alluded, between two ways of under­
standing the T-scheme, is one that has been of significant interest to phi­
losophers of logic and mathematics. Consider, for example, the 
induction scheme of Peano arithmetic: 
(19) A(0) ^ 8x(A(x) ! A(Sx)) ! 8xA(x) 
There are two ways of understanding this scheme. One is to take it as 
simply a convenient shorthand for the infinite list of ‘induction axioms’ 
of PA. The other is to regard it as having a kind of generality, so that the 
scheme itself is, in some sense, the real axiom. 
The contrast emerges when we consider what ought to happen when 
we expand the language of PA, say, by adding a function-symbol for 
exponentiation.33 If we understand the induction scheme in the first 
way, so that it is just a compact way of summarizing the real axioms, 
of which there are infinitely many, then it is of no significance that the 
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expansion of the language introduces new sentences of the same form as 
the induction axioms we already accept. That the axioms we accept have 
a common form is of no interest beyond the fact that it permits such a 
compact summary of them. We might call such a conception of the 
induction scheme static. 
On the other way of understanding the scheme, (19) is not just a 
compact way of listing a bunch of axioms. The common form of those 
axioms is precisely what is of interest. The fact that the expanded lan­
guage contains new sentences of that form then does provide us with 
new axioms. The scheme is thus dynamic or, as it is more often put, 
‘open-ended’. 
It is the static conception that is usually regarded as the ‘official’ one in 
mathematical logic, but Solomon Feferman (1996) has shown that the 
dynamic conception can be made to do mathematical work.34 The 
dynamic conception has also been put to philosophical work by Vann 
McGee (1997) and to joint philosophical and technical work by 
me (Heck, 2011, 2018b). It is probably fair to say that the dynamic con­
ception remains controversial. But it is also fair to say, or so it seems to 
me, that it is actually the more natural of the two. And it is, I think, 
pretty clearly what the founders of modern logic (e.g., Zermelo) had in 
mind. 
Moreover, it is the dynamic conception that articulates how a disquo­
tationalist should, and most disquotationalists do, understand the role of 
the T-scheme. The T-scheme is not supposed to be a static summary of a 
bunch of principles that apply only to our language as we now have it, so 
that the introduction of a new expression would give us no reason to 
accept the new instances of the T-scheme that then arise. On the 
contrary, disquotationalists understand the T-scheme as a general 
principle—indeed, as the general principle—that governs the use of the 
truth-predicate (Field, 1994, p. 266, n. 20). To put the point in terms 
of conceptual role semantics, which many disquotationalists seem 
happy to adopt,35 the T-scheme summarizes a disposition that competent 
users of the truth-predicate must have, namely, to infer a sentence from 
an attribution of truth to that sentence, and conversely (or, more 
strongly, to substitute one for the other). So the T-scheme, as disquota­
tionalists understand it, is ‘open-ended’, generating new instances of 
itself as the language evolves.36 
Given this understanding of the T-scheme itself as a general principle, 
it is natural to wonder if there isn’t some way of reasoning with it as a 
general principle so as to establish other general principles from it. 
Such reasoning is precisely what the schematic argument on behalf of 
(9) was attempting. As we saw, there are several problems one might 
have with that reasoning. But something like this reasoning is, in fact, 
quite common. I’ve come to realize, in fact, that I have sometimes 
given arguments of the same sort myself.37 
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The argument I have in mind is a well-known argument for the claim 
that the T-scheme fixes the extension of the truth-predicate. Here is the 
argument. Suppose that T(x) and τ(x) both satisfy the T-scheme. Then: 
(i) T(⌜A⌝) . A, since T(x) satisfies the T-scheme. 
(ii) τ(⌜A⌝) . A, since τ(x) satisfies the T-scheme. 
(iii) T(⌜A⌝) . τ(⌜A⌝), by propositional logic. 
Since this holds for any sentence A, T(x) and τ(x) have the same exten­
sion (on their common range). 
It’s a nice question how such arguments should be understood. One 
might suspect that the argument tacitly uses the notion of truth. I 
would not be unsympathetic. But, dialectically, I doubt this sort of 
worry will get much traction. The argument just rehearsed does not 
seem to employ the notion of truth, but to make perfectly good sense 
in its own right. And Field (2005, §3) offers a detailed account of the 
sorts of principles that might govern such arguments, principles that 
suffice, he claims, to allow for proofs of all the compositional principles 
comprising a full truth-theory for any first-order language. In the case of 
the schematic argument for (9), the thought is that the various steps of 
the argument are, as Field puts it, “part of the language”, in perfectly 
good order as they are. They just contain free schematic variables. 
And once we have reached the conclusion: 
(iv) “A and B” is true iff “A” is true and “B” is true. 
we may infer 
(v) For all sentences S and T, ⌜SandT⌝ is true iff S is true and T is true. 
by a principle allowing for the replacement of schematic letters that are 
everywhere within quotation marks by objectual variables ranging over 
sentences. The details are a little messy, but not that bad.38 
For our purposes, the more important point is that Field’s interpreta­
tion of such arguments also yields an answer to the question how disquo­
tationalists should understand the expressive role played by the truth-
predicate in compositional principles: It is ‘syntactic sugar’ that allows 
what is really substitutional quantification to appear as objectual quanti­
fication.39 Indeed, Field (1994, p. 259) suggests that the logic of schematic 
arguments “corresponds to a very weak fragment of a substitutional 
quantifier language”. 
The problem, then, is not that ‘schematic reasoning’ cannot be used to 
establish principles like (9). The problem, as we shall see in the next 
section, is that this kind of argument works too well. 
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6.3 Schematic Reasoning Over-Generates 
There is another argument that Field might have given for (9): 
(i) “A and B” is true iff A and B. 
(ii)	 “A and B” is true iff “A” is true and “B” is true. 
(iii)	 For all sentences S and T, ⌜S and T⌝ is true iff S is true and T is true. 
The first two steps are justified by the disquotational character of the 
truth-predicate; the last, by principles governing schematic reasoning. 
Once one notices this sort of argument, however, it becomes apparent 
that it can equally well be used to prove all sorts of other things, e.g.: 
(20) For all sentences S and T, ⌜S because T⌝ is true iff S is true because 
T is true. 
Thus: 
(i) “A because B” is true iff A because B. 
(ii)	 “A because B” is true iff “A” is true because “B” is true. 
(iii)	 For all sentences S and T, ⌜S because T⌝ is true iff S is true because 
T is true. 
Here again, the first two steps are justified by the disquotational char­
acter of the truth-predicate; the last, by principles governing schematic 
reasoning. 
One might think it obvious that this last argument should fail. Con­
sider the adaptation of the original schematic argument to the case of 
“because”: 
(i) “A because B” is true iff A because B. 
(ii) “A” is true iff A. 
(iii)	 “B” is true iff B. 
(iv)	 “A because B” is true iff “A” is true because “B” is true. 
That certainly does fail, since substitution of material equivalents is not 
permitted inside intensional contexts. Of course, for the disquotationalist, 
the first three biconditionals all hold “of conceptual necessity . . . in virtue 
of the cognitive equivalence of the left and right hand sides” (Field, 1994, 
p. 258). But conceptual necessity, by itself, would not necessarily justify 
the inference to (iv). It is not even clear whether cognitive equivalence 
would justify it.40 But, as we saw earlier, the whole point of a disquota­
tional truth-predicate is to allow us to make certain sorts of generaliza­
tions we could not make without it. This includes such cases as 
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(7) It is sometimes	 possible to see objects behind the sun because the 
axioms of Euclidean geometry are not all true. 
and related sentences that occur in the success argument. But (7) will not 
mean what the disquotationalist wants it to mean unless A and ⌜“A” is  
true⌝ are intersubstitutable within the scope of “because”. This inter­
substutability principle is what is driving the argument for (20), so it 
ought to be acceptable to a disquotationalist. 
This will no doubt seem odd, but it is a familiar oddity. One might 
equally well have thought that substitution of ⌜“A” is true⌝ for and 
by A itself should not be permitted in modal contexts. But, as we saw 
earlier, Field (1994, p. 265) is explicit that it must be, and for good 
reason. So we can also prove a compositional principle for necessity: 
(21) For all sentences S, ⌜Necessarily, S⌝ is true iff, necessarily, S is true. 
Thus: 
(i) “Necessarily, A” is true iff, necessarily, A. 
(ii) “Necessarily, A” is true iff, necessarily, “A” is true. 
(iii)	 For all sentences S, ⌜Necessarily, S⌝ is true iff, necessarily, S is 
true. 
Again, that the first step of this argument is legitimate, if “true” is read 
disquotationally, simply follows from what Field himself argues is 
required if “true” is to play the generalizing role he thinks it plays: ⌜“A” 
is true⌝ must be substitutable for and by A, even when it occurs in a 
modal context, lest 
(5) The axioms of Euclidean geometry are not all true, but they might 
have been. 
not mean what it is supposed to mean. 
The same point emerges if one reflects on the fact, mentioned at the 
end of the last section, that, for a disquotationalist, the truth-predicate 
functions essentially as syntactic sugar sprinkled over an underlying sub­
stitutional quantifier. On that interpretation, (9) amounts to 
PS PT PU½‘U’ ¼ ‘S and T’ ! U . ðS and TÞ. 
and (20) amounts to: 
PS PT PU½‘U’ ¼ ‘S because T’ ! U . ðS because TÞ. 
There is nothing whatsoever wrong with either of these—other than that 
they are trivialites, facts not of semantics but of orthography.41 
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Field (2005, pp. 23–24) discusses a closely related point in connection 
with the question whether his schematic treatment extends to belief attri­
butions. The particular question at issue there is whether schematic rea­
soning can be used to prove: 
(22) For all sentences S and names N, ⌜N believes that S⌝ is true iff N 
believes that S is true. 
Field offers various reasons to doubt that (22) can in fact be proven 
schematically and expresses some doubt about (22) itself. But, for the 
reasons already given, I find Field’s discussion hard to align with his 
disquotationalist commitments.42 From a semantic point of view, (22) is 
extremely dubious. But from the disquotational point of view, surely 
(22) ought to be correct. It has to be correct if the truth-predicate is to 
play the expressive role disquotationalists think it plays. Suppose I want 
to affirm John’s belief in the Euclidean character of space. Then I might 
say, “John believes that the axioms of Euclidean geometry are all true”. 
If that is not to be a comment on John’s beliefs about the semantics of 
English, then ⌜“A” is true⌝ has to be equivalent to A,43 even inside 
hyperintensional contexts (cf. Field, 1994, pp. 265–266). So (22) seems 
to be provable in the usual way: 
(i) “S believes that A” is true iff S believes that A. 
(ii)	 “S believes that A” is true iff S believes that “A” is true. 
(iii)	 For all sentences S and names N, ⌜N believes that S⌝ is true iff N 
believes that S is true. 
Obviously, this strategy is going to generalize. 
Field (2005, p. 24) also expresses concern about the last step of the 
argument, since it “seems to depend for its plausibility on the assumption 
that we can unproblematically quantify into” the appropriate sort of 
context. But there is nothing wrong with quantifying into intensional 
or even hyperintensional contexts. We do so all the time in ordinary lan­
guage.44 If ‘quantifying-in’ seems puzzling, it is because of other theoret­
ical commitments we have. Specifically, the problems connected with 
quantifying-in arise because of our commitments regarding the semantics 
of quantification: We want to regard the quantified variable as ranging 
in such cases over ordinary objects (people and planets) rather than 
intensions or modes of presentation. Even more fundamentally, the 
reason that quantifying-in is a problem is simply that we think of vari­
ables as having values. If one thought of the truth of a quantified state­
ment in terms of the truth of its instances, then, as Ruth Barcan Marcus 
(1972) was fond of pointing out, there would be no problem. Field 
cannot have it both ways. He cannot both suggest that we regard ques­
tions about the semantics of attitude attributions as “misguided” and 
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then invoke the very problems that motivate such questions when trying 
to avoid unwelcome consequences of his own view. 
But whatever the status of (22), it should be clear that few of 
Field’s worries about it carry over to (20) and (21). There is no obstacle 
whatsoever to quantifying into causal or modal statements. And the 
suggestion—which we did not discuss—that (22) might fail because N 
“may have peculiar beliefs about truth” (Field, 2005, pp. 23–24) has no 
analogue in those cases. While my own view, then, is that disquotational­
ists are committed to (22) as well as to (20) and (21), it is enough for what 
follows if they are committed only to the latter two. Indeed, it is enough if 
they are committed just to (21), though I shall focus in what follows on 
(20). 
6.4 Truth-Functionality 
6.4.1 Compositional Principles and Truth-Functionality 
Friends of semantics will have greeted 
(20) For all sentences S and T, ⌜S because T⌝ is true iff S is true because 
T is true. 
with bemusement. But what exactly is supposed to be wrong with it? 
Why does it feel so different from 
(9) ⌜A and B⌝ is true iff A is true and B is true. 
and related principles? As (9) is generally understood by friends of 
semantics, what it says, in part, is that the truth-value of a conjunction is 
entirely determined by the truth-values of its parts, i.e., that 
conjunction is truth-functional. It is the truth-value of the conjuncts that 
matters, but what the conjuncts contribute is just their truth-value and 
nothing else. Similarly, then, (20), as understood by friends of semantics, 
would tell us that the truth-value of “A because B” is wholly determined 
by the truth-values of A and B and the causal relationship between those 
truth-values (e.g., by whether the True because the False). That is barely 
coherent, but never mind. What the provability of (20) really shows us 
is that the proof of (9) goes through whether or not “and” is truth-
functional. So, if (9) is understood in the sense in which it is schemati­
cally provable, it does not affirm the truth-functionality of conjunction; 
so understood, then, it is not the compositional principle for “and” as 
friends of semantics would understand it; that principle is not schema­
tically provable. 
That went by pretty quickly. Let me fill in some details. 
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Strawson (1952, pp. 79–82) famously denied that “and” is truth-
functional, on the ground that there is a temporal aspect to its mean­
ing.45 A sentence like 
(23) They got married, and they had a baby. 
could be true, Strawson claimed, even though 
(24) They had a baby, and they got married. 
was false. But how this issue is decided has no effect whatsoever on 
whether (9) is true when the truth-predicate is read disquotationally. If 
truth is disquotational, then ⌜“A” is true and “B” is true⌝ just means 
what ⌜A and B⌝ means which is just what ⌜“A and B” is true⌝ means, 
and that is the end of it, no matter what “and” actually means. If that 
were not so, then the truth-predicate could not be used, in the context of 
a conjunction, for the expressive purposes for which the disquotationalist 
thinks we need it. It follows that the sorts of arguments we have been 
examining do not allow the disquotationalist to prove the compositional 
principles in the sense that friends of semantics understand them. In 
particular, this sort of reasoning cannot be used to demonstrate the truth-
functionality of conjunction, which I take to be one of the central 
semantic facts about it—if, indeed, it is a fact about it. 
I am assuming, of course, that whether “and” is truth-functional is an 
important semantic issue, one that will affect the form of the composi­
tional principle we accept for it. Foes of semantics might not agree, but 
my goal here is not to convince them of the virtues of semantics. My 
goal is to argue that the notion of truth, as it appears in semantics, 
is not playing the merely expressive role that a disquotational truth-
predicate plays: One cannot understand the use of the truth-predicate, in 
semantics, as purely disquotational, as just a tool of ‘semantic ascent’. 
Rather, the notion of truth is doing serious theoretical work, and that 
work is nowhere more visible than in disputes over truth-functionality. 
The fact that “and” is truth-functional (if, again, it is a fact) is supposed 
to explain certain aspects of the behavior of that word, and the fact that 
“because” is not truth-functional is supposed to explain some of the 
ways in which it is unlike “and”. So truth has a robust, explanatory 
role to play in semantics. 
A disquotationalist might respond that truth-functionality is, to be 
sure, an important phenomenon,46 but that it is not a semantic but a 
logical phenomenon, one that has to do with what sorts of inferences 
are valid, not with whether (9) is true. Presumably, the inferences in 
question would be something like: 
(i) A and B. 
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(ii) B if, and only if, C. 
(iii) Hence, A and C. 
Call these ‘inferences constitutive of truth-functionality’. 
Even at first sight, one ought to be suspicious of this sort of inferential 
characterization of truth-functionality. If the biconditional is not itself 
truth-functional, then it may license such substitutions in cases where 
the connective under discussion is not truth-functional.47 For example, 
if the biconditional expresses necessary equivalence, then it will license 
substitutions inside modal contexts. It is rarely held nowadays that the 
natural language conditional is truth-functional, so this sort of inference, 
formulated in natural language, almost certainly does not capture truth-
functionality. But, even if we set that worry aside, the offered condition 
is easily seen to be both too weak and too strong. 
To see that the condition is too weak, consider the conditional itself. 
Then the inference in question takes the form: 
(i) If A, then B. 
(ii) B if, and only if, C. 
(iii) Hence, if A, then C. 
This will be valid so long as the conditional is transitive, whether or not 
it is truth-functional, and the same goes for the case in which we sub­
stitute in the antecedent. The inferential conception would thus count 
any transitive conditional as truth-functional. 
One might suggest, in response, that the inference should not be stated 
in terms of “if and only if”, but in some other terms. One idea, for 
example, would be to take the second premise to be: 
(ii0) Either B and C, or it is not the case that B and it is not the case that 
C. 
which is disquotationally equivalent to: 
(ii@) Either “B” is true and “C” is true, or “B” is false and “C” is false. 
But this proposal has similar flaws. As mentioned earlier, it is contro­
versial whether “and” is truth-functional. If it is not, then (ii0) is not 
truth-functional, either, and the possibility will again arise that it will 
support inferences it should not.48 
But however the inference is formulated, requiring it to be valid if a 
connective is to be truth-functional is too strong a condition. I have men­
tioned several times now that it is controversial whether “and” is truth-
functional. That question is not, however, decided simply by considering 
the truth-values of such sentences as (23) and (24). Even if those two 
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sentences can have different truth-values, it does not follow that “and” is 
not truth-functional. The reason for the difference in truth-value might 
lie not in the meaning of “and” but in the interaction of the tenses on 
the verbs with each other and with other elements of the syntactic struc­
ture of the sentence. Such an account was developed by Barbara Partee 
(1984, §IV) in the context of Discourse Representation Theory, but 
similar accounts can be developed in other frameworks (see e.g. King 
and Stanley, 2004, §V). 
Ultimately, of course, it is an empirical question what accounts for the 
temporal reading of conjunctions; that is, it is an empirical question 
whether “and” is truth-functional. But the point here is conceptual: 
One cannot read off from the truth-values of sentences in which 
“and” occurs whether it is truth-functional. There is too much else 
going on in such sentences for such an inference to be legitimate. If 
so, however, no inferential test of the sort we are considering can 
work. To steal from Hilary Putnam: Truth-functionality just ain’t a 
matter of inference.49 
One might respond that, if Partee is right, then (23) and (24) aren’t, on 
the readings in question, actually conjunctions. They have some more 
complex structure. So, if we consider sentences that really are conjunc­
tions, then the inferential test will work. But then the question is how 
we are supposed to tell which sentences ‘really are’ conjunctions. The 
point is not just that it is hard to know. The point is that, in practice, 
claims about what the structure of a sentence ‘really is’ are evaluated 
by considering how that sentence’s having a given structure would 
affect its meaning. One can’t even discuss this sort of question unless 
one has some sort of idea how structure-facts affect meaning-facts.50 
But how structure affects meaning is what semantics is about—one of 
the things it is about, anyway. So the question whether (23) and (24) 
are ‘really conjunctions’ is one that makes no clear sense outside the 
semantic project. 
This sort of point is perhaps easiest to understand in connection with 
quantification. Consider, for example: 
(25) Most professors know some student who hates every class. 
There are several possible readings for this sentence, but it seems to me 
that (25) cannot mean that every class is hated by some student that most 
professors know.51 Why not? The familiar answer is that, while the three 
quantifiers in (25) can take different scopes, not every possible ordering 
of the scopes is available. And surely something along those lines must be 
right.52 But it is only a partial explanation, and it would be no expla­
nation at all if we did not understand how scope affects meaning: (25) 
has the readings it does, and not others, because certain scope rela­
tionships are possible, and a sentence in which the quantifiers take these 
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scopes has this meaning; one in which they take those scopes has that 
meaning; and to get this other (unavailable) meaning, the quantifiers 
would have to take these other scopes which, for some reason, they can’t. 
6.4.2 Schematic Reasoning and Compositional Principles 
Toward the end of his paper on schematic reasoning, Field makes two 
suggestions: 
First, it may simply be misguided to look for compositional truth or 
meaning principles for attitude constructions. Second . . . , the fact 
that compositional principles of truth or meaning are straightfor­
ward for some constructions but not others is not fundamentally a 
fact about the application of the notion of truth or meaning to dif­
ferent constructions, but is simply a fact about the underlying 
logic of those constructions. Facts about the logic of these construc­
tions explain the facts about how the notions of truth and meaning 
that apply to them, rather than the other way around. 
(Field, 2005, p. 24) 
The logic of “and” and “or” permits a simple derivation of the compo­
sitional principles for them, but the logic of attitude constructions, Field 
thinks, does not. Now, as I have said, if the truth-predicate is disquota­
tional, then that is wrong. But set that aside. Suppose we accept, as 
almost anyone would,53 that A and ⌜“A” is true⌝ are materially equiv­
alent. Then it looks as if schematic reasoning will permit the derivation 
of the compositional principle for “and”, if it is true (i.e., if “and” is 
truth-functional), though it will not then permit the derviation of the 
compositional principles for “because” and “necessarily”. That is, it 
looks as if (9) will be provable by schematic reasoning (if it is true), 
just given the very weak assumption just mentioned. How then can (9) 
be regarded, as friends of semantics want to regard it, as an empirical 
hypothesis? 
I do not mean to attribute this line of thought to Field, but it is natu­
rally suggested by his paper, and it took me a while to formulate an 
answer to it. So it seems worth considering, at least briefly. 
To see the response, consider: 
(26) “Alex swims and Tony runs” is true iff Alex swims and Tony runs. 
Friends of semantics would regard (26) as one of the empirical claims in 
whose explanation (9) figures. But (26) is just an instance of the T-
scheme. How can it need explaining at all? There seems to be a way of 
knowing that (26) is true that simply involves reflecting on the meaning 
of the word “true”. But even if (26) can, in this way, be known by 
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reflection, or even a priori, it does not follow that (26) is not empirical, 
nor that it does not stand in need of explanation. I can know by 
reflection that I am here now, but it is an empirical fact nonetheless, and 
one that can be explained. 
Moreover, my own view is that the full story about how one might 
come to know (26) on the basis of reflection is significantly more com­
plicated than: ‘true’ disquotes (Heck, 2004, §5). The complications 
matter. In particular, one cannot come to know (26) by this sort of 
reflection unless one already understands the embedded sentence “Alex 
swims and Tony runs”. That understanding, on my view (see Heck, 
2007), partially consists in knowledge of (26). That need not make the 
reflective knowledge circular. It just means that, once one has come to 
know (26) in one way—by learning to speak the fragment of English 
of which the sentence it mentions is a part—and one has also come to 
understand the word “true”, then another, more ‘reflective’ way to 
know (26) also becomes available (Heck, 2004, §3). 
Something similar is true of compositional principles. The semantical 
view is that principles like (9) are more fundamental than such T-sentences 
as (26): Part of the reason (26) is true is because a conjunction is true just 
in case both its conjuncts are, but it is no part of why (9) is true that (26) is 
true.54 It is no threat to this position if, once such T-sentences are in place, 
one can do ‘reverse semantics’ and derive the more fundamental composi­
tional principle for conjunction from the less fundamental T-sentences it 
partly explains by reflecting on the pattern exhibited by such T-sentences 
generally.55 
It is no doubt an interesting question why such schematic derivations 
seem to be available in some cases but not in others. But there is an 
obvious sense in which Field’s schematic arguments simply piggyback 
on genuine semantics: Field introduces deflated versions of whatever 
machinery is required by genuine semantics and then treats it schemati­
cally.56 I suspect that such mimicry is also possible in other sorts of cases. 
The difference is simply that, in those other cases, more sophisticated 
sorts of semantic machinery will be involved. In many cases, there is, 
as yet, no semantic theory to mimic. If there were, then I’m sure Field 
could mimic it, too. 
6.4.3 A Brief History of Truth-Functionality 
I argued in §6.4.1 that truth-functionality cannot be characterized in 
terms of the validity of inferences. It is, rather, a semantic phenomenon, 
one that can only be characterized in terms of the notion of truth, which 
thus plays a role in semantics that is not simply expressive. The history of 
the notion of truth-functionality teaches us the same lesson.57 
I used to think that the notion of truth-functionality was due to 
George Boole, but I was wrong. Boole does think of (what we would 
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call) sentence-letters as having ‘values’, and he thinks of conjunction and 
the like as corresponding to operations on those values, with the values 
and the operations together forming (what we now call) a Boolean 
algebra. So Boole does think of conjunction as a function. But he does 
not think of it as a truth-function, because he does not think of the 
values of sentence-letters as truth-values. They are, rather, classes, 
subsets of the ‘universe of discourse’, which he originally regards, in 
The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, as comprised of ‘cases’ or ‘circum­
stances’: The value of a sentence-letter is the set of circumstances in 
which it is true (Boole, 1847, pp. 48ff). 
By The Laws of Thought, Boole (1854, ch. XI, §16) had become dis­
satisfied with this view, because it requires “a definition of what is meant 
by a ‘case’”, which he thinks will involve us in matters beyond the 
bounds of logic. In this later book, then, he regards the universe of dis­
course as consisting of times—apparently, these are within the bounds of 
logic—and the value of a sentence-letter becomes the set of the times at 
which it is true. Other Booleans made yet other choices. But almost all 
the Booleans take the values of sentence-letters to be subsets of some uni­
verse of discourse.58 The crucial advantage of this view, as the early Boo-
leans saw it, is that hypothetical judgements can thereby be unmasked as 
universal affirmative propositions, relations between classes. Thus, we 
find Boole writing: 
Let us take, as an instance for examination, the conditional proposi­
tion “If the proposition X is true, the proposition Y is true”. An 
undoubted meaning of this proposition is, that the time in which 
the proposition X is true, is time in which the proposition Y is true. 
(Boole, 1854, ch. XI, §5, emphasis original) 
More generally, the ‘calculus of judgements’ (sentential logic) can, in this 
way, be reduced to the ‘calculus of classes’ (Aristotelian logic, more or 
less), thus unifying what might otherwise have looked like unrelated 
parts of logic. 
The question what comprises the universe of discourse has proved not 
to be the crucial point. Boole’s great insight was precisely that, no matter 
what we take the universe to comprise, if we treat the sentential connec­
tives as expressing set-theoretic operations on its power set, then the 
(Boolean) algebra so determined will validate the laws of classical logic. 
And the flexibility inherent in Boole’s approach has proven a great advan­
tage. His original view, that the universe comprises ‘cases’, inspired some 
of the earliest work on modal logic. His later view, that it comprises 
times, had a similar influence on tense logic. 
Boole does regard the case in which the universe contains just one 
element as special. Then we have a two-element Boolean algebra, with 
elements Boole would have denoted “1” and “0”. But, even in this 
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case, Boole does not interpret 1 and 0 as truth and falsity: They are the 
universe and the empty set, as they always are in his work. Boole regards 
this case as especially important because it makes the calculations in 
which he is interested especially easy.59 But—and this is the point— 
none of this affects Boole’s theory of those calculations, that is, his 
attempt to axiomatize the structure of a Boolean algebra, i.e., his 
attempt to formalize sentential logic. What I earlier called ‘inferences 
constitutive of truth-functionality’ were well-known to Boole. Identity, 
which functions like the biconditional, features prominently in Boole’s 
calcuations, as do the substitutions that it licenses. But the notion of 
truth-functionality simply is not present, because Boole does not, as 
we have seen, think in terms of truth-values. 
The notion of truth-functionality is not present in Frege’s Begriffss­
chrift, either, though Frege does there present a complete formalization 
of sentential logic, and ‘inferences constitutive of truth-functionality’ are 
frequently made. Indeed, one of the rules governing the sign for ‘identity 
of content’, which acts much like the biconditional (and is written: .), is 
proposition (52), which is a form of Leibniz’s Law and which permits pre­
cisely the substitutions embodied in the ‘inferences constitutive of truth-
functionality’. 
The striking fact, though, is that, in Begriffsschrift, Frege simply does 
not explain the conditional in terms of truth and falsity. His explanation 
reads, rather, as follows: 
If A and B stand for contents that can become judgements . . . , there 
are the following four possibilities: 
(i) A is affirmed and B is affirmed; 
(ii) A is affirmed and B is denied; 
(iii) A is denied and B is affirmed; 
(iv) A is denied and B is denied. 
Now 
stands for the judgement that the third of these possibilities does not 
take place, but one of the other three does. 
(Frege, 1967, §5, emphasis removed) 
Frege does not think of the conditional as expressing any kind of function 
in Begriffsschrift (Linnebo, 2003), let alone a truth-function. He seems to 
get the idea that it expresses a function a few years later, from Boole. The 
idea that it expresses a truth-function, however, is Frege’s own, and it 
does not appear until 1891, in his lecture Function and Concept (Frege, 
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1984b, opp. 20ff). The crucial innovation Frege has made at that point is 
to introduce the notion of a truth-value—and with it the idea that sen­
tences denote their truth-values. Then the way is open to regarding the 
conditional as, quite literally, expressing a truth-function: a function 
whose arguments and values are truth-values. 
The notion of truth-functionality did not emerge, then, either from the 
algebraic manipulations we find in Boole nor from the codification of 
inference presented in Begriffsschrift. Though these earlier efforts no 
doubt help prepare the way, truth-functionality appears only within, 
and as a central part of, the semantic perspective that Frege embraces 
in his later writings. 
I would suggest, in fact, not only that truth-functionality cannot be 
explained in terms of inference, but that even compositional principles 
like (9) do not really capture it. Properly to capture it, we need to 
follow Frege and think of sentences as having truth-values as their 
‘semantic values’ and of connectives like “and” as operating on those 
values.60 That, in fact, is often how things are done in developed presen­
tations of truth-theoretic semantics for natural languages (e.g., Larson 
and Segal, 1995). The possible semantic values for sentences, truth and 
falsity, form a two element Boolean algebra, and the semantic values 
of conjunction, disjunction, and the like are the operations of that 
algebra. In such a treatment, it is not just the particular clause for con­
junction that expresses its truth-functionality, but the semantic frame­
work in which that clause is stated. Semantic notions then play an 
even more fundamental role than they do if the theory is formulated 
simply using compositional principles.61 
6.5 Closing 
Donald Davidson (1984) famously takes the task of semantic theory to 
be the construction of a compositional theory of truth that delivers 
such theorems as: 
(27) “Snow is white” is true iff snow is white. 
Ironically, though, given how frequently (27) is used to illustrate the 
goals of semantic theory, we do not actually know how to formulate a 
theory that will generate it without getting a great deal else wrong. That 
is, we do not have a (widely accepted) semantics for mass terms. Field 
(1994, p. 269) thinks there may well be none to be had and so that it is a 
virtue of disquotationalism that it relieves us of the need to look for one. 
And Field (2005, p. 24) would further deny that any explanation of the 
truth of (27), of the sort that semantic theory purports to provide, is 
required, going so far as to suggest that “it may simply be misguided to 
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look for compositional truth or meaning principles” in such cases. After 
all, if disquotationalism is true, then (27) is just a verbose way of writing: 
(28) Snow is white iff snow is white. 
and surely no deep explanation is needed of the truth of (28). So, ulti­
mately, it seems unsurprising that disquotationalism cannot make good 
sense of such compositional principles as (9), or of semantic theory more 
generally. 
It is of course open to a disquotationalist simply to insist that the use 
that semantic theory makes of the concept of truth, since it is not 
‘merely expressive’, is illegitimate. And it is not my purpose here to con­
vince anyone of the interest of natural language semantics, nor of linguistic 
theory more generally. My goal has simply been to force a choice between 
conceptual disquotationalism and semantics by showing that the work 
that the notion of truth does in semantic theory cannot be regarded as 
‘merely expressive’, even in the simplest cases. As it happens, my own 
view is that the insights gained over the last few decades more than 
suffice to demonstrate the fruitfulness of the semantic enterprise and of 
the central role that the thesis of compositionality has played in shaping 
it. To be sure, there is no a priori guarantee that there are compositional 
principles to be found for mass terms, attitude constructions, and the like. 
But that is simply a reflection of the fact that the compositionality of 
natural language is an empirical hypothesis, and a strong one (which is 
part of why it has proven so fruitful).62 Quite generally, though, the diffi­
culty of formulating a semantic theory for mass terms, or attitude con­
structions, or generics, or what have you, should be no more surprising 
than is the difficulty of formulating conditions on the use of resultatives, 
in syntax. 
I choose, then, to embrace natural language semantics and to reject 
conceptual disquotationalism. But I have not argued for that choice here. 
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Notes 
1. For a nice historical discussion of this aspect of Frege’s position, see Textor 
(2010). My own view is that there is something profoundly right about that 
position but that, to understand it properly, we need to see it as expressed 
through Frege’s thesis that the reference of a sentence is its truth-value 
and, therefore, that the sense of a sentence—the thought it expresses—is 
its truth-condition (Heck and May, 2018, 2020). Which brings us to the 
next paragraph. 
2. It’s	 also important to appreciate the true purpose of Frege’s deflationary 
remarks: to undermine the view that the relationship between a thought 
and its truth-value is that of subject to predicate rather than, as Frege 
thinks, that of sense to reference. For discussion, see Heck (2010), Heck 
(2012, Part I), and Heck and May (2018, esp. §5). 
3. The opponent of deflationism also does not need an alternative to linguistic 
deflationism. If there is no simple explanation of what the word “true” 
means, then that simply shows that it is like most other words. That said, 
from a Davidsonian perspective, the correct axiom for sentential “true” 
would seem to be something along the lines of (see Heck, 2004, §4): 
“x is true” is true of S iff S is true. 
The case of propositional “true” is more complicated only because of the 
presence of intensional language. But that is a separate problem. 
4. Or, in a more developed setting, sentences and contexts, or utterances, or 
something of the sort. This complication will not be relevant here, so I 
will continue to speak of sentences. Indeed, disquotationalism famously 
has serious problems with context-dependence (Heck, 2004, §4), so ignoring 
it can only help my opponent. 
5. It seems clear that deflationism about propositional truth is consistent with 
taking semantics seriously. Soames (1988, 1999) holds precisely such a com­
bination of views. Semantics, as he sees it, assigns propositions to sentences 
(relative to contexts). Truth simply does not enter the picture. It’s a more 
interesting question whether propositional deflationism is compatible with 
truth-conditional semantics. 
6. Gupta (1993, esp. §IIII) spends a good deal of time emphasizing just how 
strong this equivalence needs to be. Much of what follows simply reinforces 
that point. 
7. Strictly speaking,	 as Field (1994, pp. 250–251) notes, the latter sentence 
seems committed to the existence of the sentence “Snow is white”, 
whereas the former sentence does not. So, officially, Field’s view is that 
they are fully cognitively equivalent modulo that commitment. But Field 
himself tends to disregard this aspect of the view, and I will tend to do so 
as well. That said, Marian David (2005, §IV) argues that it is a more 
serious problem than is usually acknowledged. 
8. If one is worried about the use of “means” in the antecedent, replace it by: 
Even if “snow” had been used the way “grass” is used, and conversely. 
9. Some philosophers think sentences have their meanings essentially (see e.g. 
Simchen, 2012). I find the conception of ‘sentence’ on which such views 
are based to be incompatible with any plausible theory of human language 
comprehension. But we can set that issue aside here and simply reformulate 
(3) in terms of a particular uttertance made by me at some fixed time of a 
sentence specified purely syntactially: The claim is then that that utterance 
would have been false had “snow” meant grass. 
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10. Assuming we are working in a first-order language. But, in the second-order 
case, the logic itself is not finitely axiomatizable. 
11. Here again, this point is essentially due to Gupta (1993). 
12. Gamester (2018) discusses this sort of strategy	 at length and argues that it 
fails even if the substitution is granted. 
13. As mentioned	 in note 7, ⌜“A” is true⌝ may have some additional content, 
but, if anything, that fact already poses problems for the disquotationalist’s 
favored reading of (5) and (7). But I’m setting that issue aside here. 
14. I do not wish to argue about labels here. If anyone does, then what I am arguing 
in this section is that the sort of view I am describing is particularly important, 
and it seems obvious that it is reasonably called ‘disquotationalism’. Why that 
view that is my focus here is part of what I am in the process of explaining. 
15. Modulo,	 as David (2005, p. 387) points out, following Moore (1953, p. 
276), the commitment to the existence of the proposition that A. Compare 
note 7, again. I’ll now stop pointing out this kind of caveat. Consider it 
included throughout in what follows. 
16. I hope it is clear that whether the verbal string “Snow is white is true” (or the 
written one, with or without extra quotation marks) can be understood, in 
colloquial English, as equivalent to “That snow is white is true” is wholly 
irrelevant. We are not doing ordinary language philosophy here but are dis­
cussing the status of “true” as a predicate specifically of sentences. 
17. I will focus here on truth-theoretic semantics, but it should be clear, I hope, 
that nothing depends upon this restriction. The disquotationalist’s task 
would only be harder if we were discussing a semantic theory that made 
use of more complex sorts of semantic values. 
18. Of course,	 if such generalizations as (10) are supposed to ‘express’ claims 
that do not really involve truth, then attributions of truth to single sentences 
must do so as well: I.e., ⌜“A” is true⌝ must really ‘express’ a claim that does 
not involve truth. The only candidate is what is expressed by A itself. Hence, 
again, the redundancy of disquotational truth. 
19. I have made this point before (Heck, 2004, pp. 331–332), but in a somewhat 
different context, and without sufficient emphasis. Halbach (2001, p. 192, 
fn. 26) seems to agree with it. 
20. One might think that (13) should express an infinite conjunction of infinite 
conjunctions, but this does not evade the problem, since the terms of that 
conjunction are the same as in the cases we shall discuss, and the difference 
is only one of grouping. 
21. A missing	 bracket in “Truth and Disquotation” may have obscured what 
formula (12) on p. 332 was meant to be. It was what is (15) here. 
22. The notion of a tautology is definable in PA, so we can interpret a theory con­
taining that principle in one with, say, just the T-sentences by reinterpreting 
T(x) to mean:  T(x), in the old sense, or x is a tautology. 
23. J. L. Austin (1950, p. 122) famously regarded “true”	 as an “extraordinary 
word”. But it has never been clear to me on what ground. Words are words. 
24. I owe this point to Jamie Tappenden, who remarked in 1995 or so that, even 
if the extension of the truth-predicate is fixed by something like convention 
(T), it does not follow that we cannot go on to theorize about the set of true 
sentences and formulate possibly significant generalizations about it. McGee 
(2005, p. 144) has since made essentially the same point. 
25. Horwich’s	 discussion proceeds in terms of propositional truth, and so his 
position in Truth is not obviously disquotationalist. But Horwich is, in 
fact, committed to disquotationalism, since he is also committed to a defla­
tionist view of meaning (Horwich, 1998). 
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26. Formally speaking, if we take	 a theory T and add to it all T-sentences for 
sentences in the language of T , then the resulting theory is locally interpret­
able in T (Heck, 2018a, Theorem 2.1). 
27. Here’s an example. Let T be a theory. Suppose we have a theory of truth for 
T that allows us to prove the T-sentences. Then, if T is finitely axiomatized, 
we will also be able to prove, pretty trivially, that all of T ’s axioms are true. 
But what if T is not finitely axiomatized or not even finitely axiomatizable? 
In that case, we cannot, in general, prove that all of T ’s axioms are true, 
though we can prove that each of them is. To prove the stronger claim, 
we typically need to appeal to compositional principles (Heck, 2015, §3.4). 
28. This sort of argument is outlined by Field (1994, pp. 258–259), who actually 
discusses the case of disjunction. I’ll discuss conjunction, for reasons that will 
become clear below. There are similar arguments to be found in the writings 
of many others. I learned of such arguments as a student from Sir Michael 
Dummett, who discusses something similar in The Logical Basis of Meta­
physics (Dummett, 1991, pp. 56ff). 
29. This sort of suggestion	 was made during the discussion period when I pre­
sented related material at Princeton in 2009. Cieśliński (2010, p. 412) 
comes close to making it in print in his discussion of the conservativeness 
argument against deflationism. He seems simply to assume, however, that 
the deflationist is entitled to the compositional principles when he adopts 
what he calls PAðSÞ. as his base theory. That entitlement is precisely what 
I am questioning here. 
30. Actually, it is not entirely clear that generalizations ‘like’ (9) would suffice, 
anyway. See, for example, the wide variety of truth-involving principles dis­
cussed by Friedman and Sheard (1987, 1988). 
31. It isn’t always clear whether disquotationalism is supposed to be a ‘revolu­
tionary’ or ‘hermeneutic’ view. The point to be made next makes that 
moot in the present context. Still, my sense is that many disquotationalists 
have overlooked the importance of the issues I am discussing here because 
they have tended to focus on formal languages. 
32. It is of course open to a disquotationalist to reply that semantics should be 
done in other terms, e.g., in terms of inference-rules. But surely it is an empir­
ical question how semantics should be done. It would be odd if disquotation­
alism, a view defended entirely on a priori grounds, had such empirical 
implications. 
33. The usual	 language of PA includes only function symbols for succession, 
addition, and multiplication, and exponentiation is then defined as a relation 
which can be proven (in PA, or in  IS1, but not in ID0) to satisfy existence and 
uniqueness conditions. 
34. Feferman introduces the notion as a ‘more natural’ way of developing ideas 
which with he was, in one form or another, concerned throughout his career 
(Feferman, 1962, 1991). 
35. Just to be clear: I have no interest in conceptual role semantics myself. 
36. Gupta (1993, §5) expresses some doubt about whether disquotationalists can 
understand the T-scheme as any kind of generalization. I think this is at best 
a stand-off and so shall not pursue the issue. 
37. There’s another interesting question in this	 same vicinity, namely, whether 
schematic reasoning might help explain what justification we have for 
regarding all the axioms of PA as true. There is no problem about why we 
regard each of the axioms as true: We accept the axiom, we accept the T-
sentence for it, and we make a simple inference. But it is much less obvious 
with what right we regard all the axioms as true. In the context of an axiomatic 
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theory of truth for the language of arithmetic, the proof is by induction, and 
the instance of induction we need necessarily involves semantic vocabulary. 
One might wonder if there is a different story to be told, however, along the 
lines we are discussing. 
38. Long	 after this paper was completed, Leon Horsten and Graham Leigh 
(2017) showed that the compositional principles can be derived from so-
called reflection principles. Unfortunately, I cannot consider their paper in 
any detail here. But many of the points to be made below apply mutatis 
mutandis. From the present point of view, what they observe is simply 
that reflection principles allow one to move from the observation that all 
instances of a scheme are provable to an assertion of that very scheme. (So 
their reflection principles are, in essence, an ω-rule for sentences, as the 
editors remarked to me.) The arguments below largely concern restrictions 
on and presuppositions of that sort of move. 
39. This is a fairly common idea in deflationist writing (see e.g. Hill, 2002), so it 
is no surprise that it should surface here. 
40. As Schnieder (2011, pp. 445–446) notes, if ‘cognitive equivalence’ means that 
“a speaker who understands [two sentences] normally has to adopt the same 
epistemic stance towards them”, then it may not support substitution within 
the scope of “because”. One might think, in particular, that “It is true that 
snow is white because snow is white” is true, but the converse false, even 
though “Snow is white” and “It is true that show is white” are cognitively 
equivalent. But we have already seen that disquotational truth-predicates 
behave in sometimes surprising ways. We are simply seeing that again. 
(Special thanks here to Johannes Stern.) 
41. Much the same point can be made about Horwich’s attempt to deflate com­
positionality for meaning (Heck, 2013). 
42. I am independently puzzled by this remark: 
[I]n order for [(22)] to be usable in a full compositional semantics, 
we’d also need other applications of substitutivity that are likewise 
dubious; e.g., we’d need that S believes that ‘p or q’ is true if and 
only if S believes that ‘p’ is true or S believes that ‘q’ is true (Field, 
2005, p. 24). 
I’m not sure what Field is thinking here—he doesn’t explain further—and I 
cannot think of any reason myself that one would need such a principle in 
a compositional semantics, whether it was based upon (22) or not. In any 
event, the issue is whether Field is committed to (22), not what work (if 
any) it might do. (Possibly, what Field meant to write was: . . . we’d need 
that S believes that ‘p or q’ is true if and only if S believes that ‘p’ is true 
or ‘q’ is true. But that is unproblematic.) 
43. As I mentioned	 in note 7, these are not entirely equivalent: The former 
commits one to the existence of the sentence A. But it is not obvious that 
this commitment has to be the believer’s, as opposed to the attributor’s. 
To assume it did would be to make strong assumptions about how the 
content of the complement clause has to be related to the content of the 
belief attributed. 
44. There is someone Superman knows can fly that Lois does not, because Super­
man knows that Clark Kent can fly, and Lois does not. But there may well 
not be anyone that Lois knows can fly that Jimmy does not, even though 
Lois knows that Superman can fly, and Jimmy does not know that Clark 
can fly. 
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45. The	 issue remains controversial. Relevance theorists, in particular, often 
deny that “and” is truth-functional (see e.g. Carston, 1988). 
46. More radically, one might deny that truth-functionality is an important phe­
nomenon at all. But, again, my claim, at present, is just that disquotational­
ism cannot make sense of compositional principles as friends of semantics 
understand them. So we are faced with a choice between semantic theory 
and disquotationalism. 
47. As is often noted, this sort of inference is valid in many logics in which the 
connectives are not truth-functional. For example, such inferences are valid 
in intuitionistic logic, in supervaluational systems, and so forth, and not just 
for conjunction but for the other connectives, as well, even though those con­
nectives are not truth-functional in such systems. 
48. Even	 an inference with premises B and C runs into similar problems, since 
“They had a baby. They got married.” can seem relevantly similar to (23). 
49. Note that the same	 point disposes of the suggestion that a connective * is 
truth functional just in case whether A * B is completely determined by 
whether A and whether B. Even if whether they got married and whether 
they had a baby does not completely determine whether they had a baby 
and they got married, it could yet be that “and” is truth-functional. 
50. This is true even in simple cases like “He saw John in the mirror”. The usual 
claim is that “He” cannot be bound by “John”. But that claim makes little 
sense absent the background assumption that facts about binding imply 
facts about meaning, in this case, that such binding implies de jure co­
reference. As is often pointed out, “He” can perfectly well be de facto 
co-referential with “John”. 
51. Whereas it can	 mean, I think, that every class is such that most professors 
know some student who hates it. (This reading is more natural if “every” 
is stressed.) Even the question why that reading is less natural wants answer­
ing, and the explanation also adverts to structure. 
52. Variable-free semantic theories would explain the phenomenon differ­
ently (see e.g. Jacobsen, 2014). But the remarks to follow also apply to 
them. Perhaps even more so, since syntax does so little work in such 
frameworks. 
53. Modulo	 concerns about the paradoxes, of course, though those will affect 
this entire discussion and so may be set aside for the moment. 
54. Indeed, (9) could be true	 even if (26) was not true: “Alex swims and Tony 
runs” might be an idiom. 
55. There	 is a program in the foundations of mathematics known as ‘reverse 
mathematics’ (Simpson, 2009). It is sometimes said to involve deriving 
axioms from theorems. 
56. See,	 for example, Field’s deflationary treatment of quantification (Field, 
2005, §5). 
57. For defense of the interpretive claims made here, and some caveats, see Heck 
and May (2018, 2020). 
58. Ernst Schrö der (1972, p. 224) expresses this sort of view in his review of 
Frege’s Begriffsschrift (1967). Hugh MacColl (1877, pp. 9–10) comes 
closest to the modern conception, but his official view is that the sentence-
letters denote ‘statements’. 
59. These are the calculations that would now be done with truth-tables. Boole 
does not have those, however. His calculations are, instead, manipulations of 
algebraic formulae. 
60. This	 point is argued in detail by Dummett in the early chapters of The 
Logical Basis of Metaphysics. He expresses it by saying that a “meaning­
theory must . . . incorporate a semantic theory” (Dummett, 1991, p. 63). 
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61. The history of quantification theory can be used to illustrate these sorts of 
points, as well. But, for reasons of space, I’ll have to defer that discussion 
to another time. 
62. Indeed, the precise formulation of the principle of compositionality is contro­
versial, and it is easy to find non-compositional treatments of various con­
structions in the literature (cf. Dever, 2006; Szabό, 2012). But these still 
make serious use of notions like reference and truth. 
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Philosophy without truth, knowledge, and belief would be a fairly boring 
discipline—there would only be the good and the beautiful left to 
discuss. Fortunately, philosophy is exciting and truth, knowledge, and 
belief are notions at the center of the discipline responsible for many 
important philosophical questions and puzzles. The three notions are 
intimately connected and, as a consequence, so will be the philosophical 
questions and puzzles of the respective notions. For example, knowledge 
guarantees truth, i.e., it is factive and, indeed, it is arguably at least in 
parts this characteristic that distinguishes knowledge from mere belief. 
Whether this means that knowledge can be defined on the basis of 
knowledge, truth and, possibly, some further condition has been the 
question shaping much of the recent debate in epistemology. With this 
observation in mind one would expect that most formal philosophizing 
is conducted in a formal framework in which truth, knowledge, and 
belief are treated simultaneously, so the formal and philosophical 
views regarding the connection of the different notions can be tested 
for their consequences. Surprisingly, no satisfactory such framework 
has—to our knowledge—been developed to date. Of course, starting 
with Hintikka (1962) there has been a lot of work on formal semantics 
and logics of knowledge and belief but unfortunately very little work on 
how to construct an adequate theory of truth in these contexts.1 The aim 
of this chapter is to take first steps in developing a satisfactory formal 
framework in which contemporary debates in epistemology can be 
aptly represented. To this end, we focus on the notion of truth in 
belief contexts—although a number of observations would also apply 
to the interaction of the notions of truth and knowledge—and start by 
examining a major hurdle or puzzle in way of a satisfactory semantics 
for truth in doxastic contexts. We then analyze the philosophical under­
pinnings of the puzzle and develop a semantics for the notion of truth in 
doxastic contexts, which is based on our analysis. We discuss some of its 
consequences and, before concluding, point to some limitations of the 
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semantics and outline some alternative strategies for developing ade­
quate semantics for truth in doxastic contexts. 
7.2 Semantics for Truth and Belief: Overgeneration 
As mentioned, Hintikka’s seminal Knowledge and Belief (Hintikka, 
1962) lays the foundation for formal philosophizing about knowledge 
and belief. Hintikka proposed a formal interpretation of belief and, 
respectively, knowledge within the framework of possible world 
semantics (henceforth PWS). According to Hintikka an agent believes 
(knows) that φ if and only if ‘φ’ is true at all of the agent’s doxastic (epi­
stemic) alternatives—worlds that are accessible via the doxastic (episte­
mic) accessibility relation—where the truth predicate is understood in a 
metalinguistic, that is, model-theoretic sense. Most subsequent work on 
formal semantics for belief has followed Hintikka’s footsteps in analyz­
ing belief in some form of possible world semantics broadly conceived, 
that is, as some form of quantifier over worlds, states, or situations.2 It 
seems only reasonable then to take the possible world analysis as a 
starting point for a combined formal framework for truth and belief. 
What we are after is a framework in which the notions of truth and 
belief figure in the object-language, that is, we want to formulate 
claims such as 
(1) Not everything Boris believes is true. 
As a consequence, standard PWS for epistemic notions will not be suf­
ficient because, as mentioned, the truth predicate at play in the semantics 
is the metalinguistic one.3 
If an object-linguistic truth predicate is introduced to the framework 
of PWS, its semantic interpretation needs to be specified, that is, the 
interpretation of the truth predicate at every possible world has to be 
determined. To this end, it is not sufficient to determine the interpreta­
tion of the object-linguistic truth predicate at a given world by fiat. 
Rather, if, following the outlines of a commonly accepted view on 
truth and paradox, semantic states of affairs supervene on non-semantic 
states of affairs (cf., e.g., Tarski, 1944; Kripke, 1975; Yablo, 1982; 
Leitgeb, 2005), the interpretation of the truth predicate at a given 
world should arguably depend on the interpretation of the non-semantic 
expressions at that world: a sentence φ will be in the interpretation of the 
truth predicate at a world only if the possible world models satisfies φ at 
a world w. If this idea is taken seriously, then an interpretation of the 
truth predicate f is adequate relative to a possible world model M and 
world w only if, where tφ is a name of φ, 
M; w ⊨ f Ttφ , M; w ⊨ f φ:4 ðTSWÞ 
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Fortunately, finding adequate interpretations of the truth predicate in 
PWS does not pose a major technical obstacle: one can simply relativize 
one’s favorite theory of truth to the possible world framework and 
simultaneously construct the interpretations of the truth predicate rela­
tive to every possible world of the modal frame (cf., e.g., Kripke,1975; 
Asher and Kamp, 1989; Gupta and Belnap, 1993; Halbach and Welch, 
2009; Stern, 2014a,b, 2016). 
The foregoing suggests that a semantics for truth in doxastic contexts 
can be obtained by supplementing standard doxastic PWS by an interpre­
tation of the object-linguistic truth predicate relative to each possible 
world following well-rehearsed strategies discussed in the relevant liter­
ature. Unfortunately, it turns out that things are not quite as simple as 
that: while combining possible world semantics with standard truth-
theoretic tools yields a powerful semantics for truth in belief contexts, 
the semantics turns out to be too powerful and to validate principles 
and inferences that ought not to be taken for granted. In particular, 
(TSW) implies that in every belief model M and world w whatever an 
agent believes at w, they also believe to be true and vice versa. Let’s 
call this the Original Sin (OS) of PWS: 
M; w ⊨ f Bφ , M; w ⊨ f BTtφ: ðOSÞ 
(OS) will hold independently of whether we consider worlds, states, or 
situations, as long as φ and Ttφ receive the same semantic value at 
these points of evaluation, that is, if (TSW) holds at every point of eval­
uation and the believe operator B is conceived of as a quantifier ranging 
over points of evaluation.5 Notice that abandoning (TSW) ought not to 
be taken lightly, since, at least prima facie, this would undermine the 
idea that semantic states of affairs ought to supervene on non-semantic 
states of affairs. In sum, (OS) is a consequence of the two fundamental 
assumptions underlying PWS for the belief operator and the semantic 
interpretation of the truth predicate, respectively. 
Let us now reflect on why we should be reluctant in accepting (OS), 
that is, why believing and believing-true ought to be semantically differ­
entiated. To this end, we shall present a number of cases, which, at least 
at the outset present counterexamples to (OS). One such case is based on 
the idea that the truth predicate may not be part of an agent’s conceptual 
resources. Meet Xaver: 
Xaver believes Bavaria is beautiful. But because his conceptual 
resources lack the truth predicate Xaver simply cannot form the 
belief that ‘Bavaria is beautiful’ is true. 
It seems hard to deny that it is impossible for Xaver to form an attitude 
towards that ‘Bavaria is beautiful’ is true, however, it is another question 
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altogether whether Xaver’s particular disposition amounts to a com­
pelling counterexample to (OS). First, we may simply stipulate PWS for 
truth in doxastic contexts to be concerned with a theory of the doxastic 
attitudes of agents that have the necessary conceptual resources, i.e., 
conceptual resources that comprise the truth predicate. Perhaps, one 
might think that this condition is overly demanding or restrictive, i.e., 
even rational agents should not be expected to have a truth predicate at 
their disposition. But the aim of the semantics is not to give a general 
theory of attitude reports.6 Rather the aim is to provide a semantics for 
truth in doxastic contexts and from this perspective it seems perfectly 
acceptable to focus on a semantics for agents with the necessary con­
ceptual resources. After all, a similar kind of argument could be applied 
against the plausibility of any general inference involving higher-order 
beliefs, e.g., introspection principles—an agent may simply lack the 
conceptual resources to form an higher-order belief: we would be forced 
to conclude that the wealth of research on the plausibility of such 
principles is an idle exercise. 
Second, even if Xaver’s conceptual resources were not to include a 
truth predicate, this does not imply that we cannot introduce the truth 
predicate to the language we employ for theorizing about, or reporting, 
the agent’s attitude. For example, meet Anne: 
Anne believes Euclidean geometry to be incorrect and by modus 
tollens infers that one of the axioms must be incorrect without 
settling on one specific axiom (she may not even know all the 
axioms). 
In this case it seems—or at least a disquotationalist would argue—that 
Anne’s belief is correctly reported by 
(2) Anne believes that not all axioms of Euclidean geometry are true; 
independently of whether Anne’s conceptual resources comprise the 
truth predicate. More importantly, at first glance it seems as if we require 
the truth predicate in our language to describe Anne’s belief correctly. 
Admittedly, the view comes with important theoretical costs, namely, 
that the truth predicate is transparent even in highly opaque contexts but 
the point still stands: the absence of the truth predicate from an agent’s 
conceptual resources is not sufficient to argue against (OS). 
In sum, we take it that the charge against (OS) based on the idea that 
an agent’s conceptual resources may lack the truth predicate to be 
unconvincing and will dismiss it for the purpose of our chapter. But 
there is more damning evidence against (OS). In particular, there are 
more convincing cases to the effect that an agent can believe something 
without believing it true. Meet Clara: 
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Clara believes that Clark Kent is strong. But she would never express 
her belief in this way because she only believes that ‘Superman is 
strong’ is true. She does not believe that ‘Clark Kent is strong’ is 
true. 
Clara’s beliefs are in plain contradiction with (OS): she believes something 
without believing it true. Moreover, an argument to the effect that despite 
appearances Clara does believe that ‘Clark Kent is strong’ is true and that 
our intuitions contradicting this assessment are down to pragmatic effects 
rather than a semantic distinction would seem hardly convincing in this 
case: at least prima facie by reporting that Clara believes that ‘Clark Kent 
is strong’ is true, we assert that Clara believes something true relative to a 
particular syntactic representation. The syntactic representation at stake is 
made explicit in the belief report and should therefore be part of the 
semantic content of the belief report. 
Admittedly, in reporting Clara’s belief we have assumed that the belief 
relation is merely a relation between an agent and semantic content where 
names are conceived as rigid designators, i.e., the syntactic or cognitive 
representations of the belief are not relevant for the semantic evaluation 
of the belief report. On alternative accounts of attitude reports, it 
would be incorrect to say that Clara believes that Clark Kent is strong. 
We take it that by constructing a semantics for truth in belief contexts, 
one should ideally remain neutral with respect to the particular theory 
of attitude reports assumed and, hence, not dismiss counterexamples to 
(OS) because they depend on a particular—rather popular—account of 
belief reports. Moreover, in general arguments against (OS) do not rely 
on  a  particular theory of attitude reports. Meet  Max:  
Max believes that Goldbach’s conjecture is true. His friend Philip 
told him so and Philip is a mathematical genius. Max has absolute 
faith in Philip and believes him even though he has no idea what 
Goldbach’s conjecture asserts. In fact, he does not believe that 
every even number > 2 is the sum of two prime numbers. 
Max believes Goldbach’s conjecture true without believing it. It seems 
undeniable that Max has not formed an attitude towards Goldbach’s 
conjecture; he does not believe it. It also seems clear that Max believes 
Goldbach’s conjecture is true. Perhaps one might be tempted to argue that 
one can only believe that Goldbach’s conjecture is true if one is aware of 
what Goldbach’s conjecture asserts. But this imposes too strict and indeed 
incorrect conditions on believing. We frequently believe claims, theories, 
etc. true without being fully aware what they assert. Moreover, we often 
form such beliefs simply due to (hopefully) expert testimony. In sum, we 
think that Max’s beliefs are a clear counterexample against (OS) and that, 
more generally, the evidence against the semantic equivalence of believing 
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and believing-true is damning: believing and believing-true need to be 
semantically differentiated. 
Having corroborated the claim that the combination of possible world 
semantics for belief and basic desiderata regarding the interpretation of 
the truth predicate, when combined, yield unintended results for truth in 
belief contexts, the question arises whether the unintended results of the 
semantics, i.e. (OS), are merely a case of a formal semantics having unin­
tended consequences or whether these results point to a deeper, philo­
sophical problem pertaining to the notion of truth in belief contexts. 
In the latter case, we may yield invaluable insights for developing an ade­
quate semantics by addressing the philosophical problem. Indeed, it 
turns our that the purported semantic equivalence of believing and 
believing-true is rooted in a philosophical puzzle about belief: if a dis­
quotational view of truth à la Field (1994) is assumed, then the semantic 
equivalence of believing and believing-true is but another Fregean puzzle 
about belief. 
7.3 Believing, Believing-True, and a Puzzle About Belief 
Traditionally, Fregean puzzles about belief employed the idea that if two 
names refer to the same object, they should be intersubstitutable salva 
veritate. But it is well known that the substitution of coreferential 
terms in belief contexts leads to counterintuitive consequences—indeed 
it were these counterintuitive consequences that led Frege (1892) to 
conclude that the referent of a name in oblique contexts such as belief, 
was not the actual referent but the sense associated with the name— 
and one might therefore be wary of appealing to the substitution of cor­
eferential terms when reasoning about belief contexts. Kripke (1979) 
argued that the appeal to the intersubstitutivity of coreferential terms 
was inessential in formulating Frege-style belief puzzles. Rather Kripke 
based the formulation of such puzzles on two so-called disquotational 
principles:7 
(DQ) If an agent A sincerely, reflectively, and competently accepts a 
sentence s (under circumstances properly related to a context c), 
then A believes, at the time of c, what s expresses in c. 
(CDQ) If an agent A sincerely, reflectively, and competently denies 
or withholds acceptance from a sentence s (in a context c), then A 
does not believe, at the time of c, what s expresses in c. 
At least, if agents are competent speakers of the language at stake, 
(DQ) and (CDQ) are prima facie plausible assumptions linking the 
acceptance of a sentence by an agent to the agent’s belief in the semantic 
content expressed by the sentence. But if (DQ) and (CDQ) are granted, 
this raises two puzzles about Clara’s beliefs: since, on the one hand, 
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Clara will accept the sentence ‘Superman is strong’, we can infer by (DQ) 
that 
(3) Clara believes that Clark Kent is strong. 
On the other hand, since Clara will withhold acceptance to ‘Clark Kent 
is strong’, we can infer 
(4) Clara does not believe that Clark Kent is strong. 
by (CDQ). Moreover, (DQ) does not only imply (3) but also 
(5) Clara believes that Clark Kent is not strong. 
since Clara would arguably accept the sentence ‘Clark Kent is not strong’. 
We are left with a dilemma, that is, a Fregean puzzle about belief: not 
only does Clara hold, in virtue of (3) and (5), mutually incompatible 
beliefs, but we also face the question whether Clara believes that Clark 
Kent is strong, as suggested by (3), or not, as claimed by (4). 
However, the disquotational principles (DQ) and (CDQ) do not only 
generate Frege-style puzzles about belief, they also immediately imply 
that believing and believing-true are semantically equivalent, if a disquo­
tational view of the truth predicate along the lines of Field (1994) is 
assumed. On such a disquotational perspective the sentence/utterance 
φ and the sentence/utterance Ttφ are not only thought to be semantically 
equivalent but cognitively equivalent.8 But if the sentences φ and Ttφ are 
cognitively equivalent, it seems that if a rational agent accepts the sen­
tence φ they will also accept the sentence Ttφ, and vice versa, that is, 
from the disquotational perspective we seem justified to assume the fol­
lowing principle: 
(TDQ) An agent A sincerely, reflectively, and competently accepts a 
sentence s (under circumstances properly related to a context c), 
if and only if, A sincerely, reflectively, and competently accepts 
the sentence T-s (under circumstances properly related to a 
context c).9 
Together (DQ), (CDQ), and (TDQ) imply (OS), i.e., the claim that 
believing and believing-true are semantically equivalent. This suggests 
that if Field’s disquotational perspective on truth is assumed, then the 
only way to resist (OS) is to reject either (DQ) or (CDQ). 
7.3.1 Rejecting Disquotational Belief Principles? 
In way of answering traditional puzzles about belief (CDQ) is frequently 
rejected. Unfortunately, whilst this may help with answering these 
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puzzles it does not really get us out of the fire in the present case. 
Although, strictly speaking, we can no longer derive (OS) without 
assuming (CDQ), (OS) will still be a consequence of (DQ) and (TDQ) 
for instances φ whenever we accept a sentence s expressing φ or accept 
that s is true. Now, Max clearly accepts ‘Goldbach’s conjecture is 
true’, and hence by appeal to (DQ) and (TDQ) we obtain that Max 
believes that Goldbach’s conjecture is true if and only if Max believes 
Goldbach’s conjecture, which, we have argued, is intuitively wrong.10 
The moral to draw, it seems, is that if the disquotational perspective is 
accepted in an unqualified way, then one ought to reject both (DQ) 
and (CDQ), if one wants to resist (OS). However, rejecting (DQ) 
would be at odds with standard semantics of attitude reports, as the prin­
ciple is widely accepted in the literature on belief reports. Accordingly, 
we will refrain from explicitly ruling out (DQ) as a plausible principle. 
For one, in developing our semantics we wish to remain as neutral as 
possible with respect to the various theories of attitude reports discussed 
in the literature: it is not the job of a general semantics to be the arbiter 
between different philosophical or semantic theories. Rather, such a 
semantics should make the semantic consequences of the different theo­
ries precise. For another, there is a more general reason why one should 
be wary of rejecting (DQ) in reaction to the derivation of (OS): the prin­
cipal example we used to argue against (OS) seem to also yield a straight­
forward argument against (TDQ). Recall the case of Max; for all we 
know Max would accept ‘Goldbach’s conjecture is true’ but reject 
‘Every even number > 2 is the sum of two prime numbers’, that is, 
Max’s acceptance patterns would not be conform with (TDQ). This sug­
gests that the right course of action is to rethink (TDQ) rather than to 
reject the disquotational belief principles. 
7.3.2 (TDQ) and the Disquotational Case for (OS) 
The disquotationalist seems to be left with two options. They can either 
reject (TDQ) or accept (OS) as a valid principle governing the interaction 
of truth and belief. Indeed we think that the disquotationalist who holds 
(TDQ) dear should accept (OS). Of course, this is at odds with Clara’s and 
Max’s beliefs, but disquotationalists frequently suggest that it is not their 
aim to capture all reasonable uses of the truth predicate in natural lan­
guage but only the theoretically useful ones, that is, the disquotational 
uses of truth.11 They wish to characterize a truth predicate that can 
fulfill its theoretical role, i.e. its disquotational function, and to this end 
it seems required that φ and Ttφ are intersubstitutable salva veritate in 
contexts like (2) for otherwise, it seems, that (2) would not correctly 
report Anne’s belief.12 On this view, Max’s use of the truth predicate 
would simply not qualify as a use of the disquotational notion of truth 
since, according to Field (1994), “a person can meaningfully apply 
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‘true’ in the pure disquotational sense only to utterances that he has 
some understanding of” (p. 250). A disquotationalist will hence simply 
dismiss cases like Max’s as irrelevant for their project.13 They are not 
legitimate counterexamples to (OS) save (TDQ). On this view, disquota­
tionalist should not flinch and accept (OS) . . . alas few do.14 
However, the disquotationalist’s dismissal of the counterexamples 
against (TDQ) and (OS) points to a different possible course of action. 
In contrast to the diquotationalist position sketched above, one may be 
more liberal and allow for non-disquotational uses of the truth predicate, 
that is, uses of the truth predicate for which (TDQ) and (OS) may fail. 
Arguably, this failure need not concern the disquotationalist, since it is 
limited to non-disquotational uses of ‘true’. The idea would conceive 
of (TDQ) and (OS) as principles pertaining only to “ideal” or “disquota­
tional” circumstances, that is, circumstances in which—according to the 
disquotationalist—an agent “has some understanding of” the utterance 
they deem true. More precisely, if an agent is aware, or understands, 
which belief is represented, directly or indirectly, by a term tφ, then a 
rational agent holds that particular belief, if and only if, they hold tφ 
true, that is, in this case they will believe Ttφ if and only if they believe 
φ. Another way of putting this idea is that (OS) should hold for an 
instance tφ, if and only if, the agent thinks about φ and Ttφ in the same 
way, that is, in this particular case the agent treats the truth predicate 
transparently. A semantics based on this idea will attribute independent 
truth-conditions to Bφ and BTtφ that only coincide in case of ideal, dis­
quotational circumstances. Such a semantics should be acceptable to 
both disquotationalists, and truth theorists that are neither disquotation­
alists nor deflationists:15 after all, Bφ and BTtφ are treated as semantically 
equivalent if the truth predicate is used disquotationally, but the seman­
tics also allows for non-disquotational uses of the truth predicate in 
which the semantic equivalence breaks down. 
7.3.3 Ways of Believing 
In the literature on attitude reports appealing to the way an agent thinks 
of a given belief, i.e. the way they believe, is a common strategy for 
explaining allegedly counterintuitive consequences of, roughly, Russellian 
theories of attitudes. For example, it has been argued that it is possible for 
a rational agent to believe that φ, while at the same time to believe that ¬φ 
as long as they do not believe φ and ¬φ in the same way. There is some 
disagreement whether the way of believing should be semantically or 
pragmatically encoded: Naive Russellians such as Soames (1987) typically 
argue that it should be merely pragmatically encoded, whilst contextual­
ists like Crimmins and Perry (1989) embrace the idea that the way of 
believing ought to be semantically encoded. For example, according to 
Crimmins and Perry (1989) depending on the way a proposition is 
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believed an agent stands in a different belief-relation to the proposition at 
stake.16 Moreover, an agent can believe a proposition φ in one way but 
believe its negation in another way and, in this case, both Bφ and B¬φ 
should receive the semantic value true. According to the standard contex­
tualist view the way of believing depends upon an unarticulated constitu­
ent of the attitude report and is provided by the context under 
consideration. In contrast, the semantic picture we are about to propose 
agrees with the contextualist that the way of believing impacts the seman­
tic evaluation of the attitude report but we do not conceive of it as an 
unarticulated constituent of the attitude report.17 Rather, the idea is 
that the way of believing BTtφ is determined by the specific representation 
tφ. Furthermore, in the absence of further information we are only guar­
anteed to believe Ttφ—assuming we believe it at all—in this specific way, 
i.e. under the representation tφ, and this idea will be hardwired into our 
semantics. In contrast, if no formula of the form Ttψ occurs in φ, then  
φ will be believed in an unspecific way, that is, a way of believing that 
does not depend on a particular representation of the belief. If we 
believe a proposition in such an unspecific way there is again no guaran­
tee that we also believe it under a specific representation: Bφ and BTtφ can 
only be assumed to be equivalent if we are guaranteed that φ and Ttφ are 
believed in the same way. On our semantics this will be the case, if an 
agent is aware that by believing that tφ is true, they commit themselves 
to believing that φ and vice versa, that is, if an agent is aware that tφ, 
directly or indirectly, represents the belief that φ. 
7.4 Semantics for Ways of Believing 
In the previous section we argued that the way of believing impacts the 
semantic value of a belief ascription and that the way of believing 
depends on the representation tφ, if Ttφ occurs in the belief context. But 
this leaves open two alternatives on how tφ can impact the  way of believ­
ing: it can either have an impact qua expression of the language or in virtue 
of what it denotes. Which of the two alternatives one ought to pick will 
depend on the objects one takes the truth predicate to apply to. Again 
there are two options: if, as in the case of disquotational truth, a sentential 
truth predicate is assumed, the objects of truth are sentences (or utterances) 
and, as a consequence, the objects of truth will arguably be of a different 
category than the objects of belief, which typically are thought to be prop­
ositions.18 However, if a propositional truth predicate is assumed, the 
objects of truth will be propositions, and the objects of truth and belief 
will coincide. Of course, depending on the view one opts for, a name tφ 
will denote different types of objects, that is, either sentences or proposi­
tions. In this chapter we makes the simplifying assumption that whether 
the denotatum of a name tφ is a sentence or a proposition is not reflected 
on the linguistic level, that is, we cannot distinguish between names of 
propositions and names of sentences on purely syntactic or linguistic 
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grounds. Rather we consider it to be a conceptual decision which type of 
denotata one opts for. More generally, we conceive of a “name” tφ to be 
any kind of nominalization that plausibly denotes a sentence or a propo­
sition, that is, tφ need not be a proper name but could, e.g., also be a defi­
nite description or a that-clause. Similarly, from the perspective of our 
formal language tφ will simply be a singular term that denotes the sentence 
‘φ’ or the proposition that φ. 
Let us return to the question of whether tφ impacts the way of believing 
qua name or in virtue of what it denotes and consider the case of the sen­
tential truth predicate. In this case a term tφ names a sentence, which, in 
turn, expresses a proposition. The term tφ does not represent a belief 
directly but only via the sentence it denotes. We arrive at a framework 
of two-level belief representation as displayed in Figure 7.1. On this 
view, it seems plausible to assume that the reason why an agent may 
believe, say, that snow is white whilst at the same time not believe that 
‘Snow is white’ is true, is that the agent is not aware that the sentence 
‘Snow is white’ expresses the proposition that snow is white. In other 
words, from perspective of sentential truth the way we believe is deter­
mined by the sentence rather than its name. 
We shall adopt the sentential, i.e. disquotational, perspective in formu­
lating our semantics but the view that conceives of the objects of truth as 
sentences (or utterances) is highly contested. Rather it is often thought that 
the natural language truth predicate applies to propositions. On this view, 
tφ denotes a proposition and believing that Ttφ is not mediated via a sen­
tence that expresses a proposition but depends only on the name tφ and 
the proposition itself. In this case we are working in a framework of 
one-level belief representation as displayed in Figure 7.2. Accordingly, if 
the objects of truth are conceived of as propositions and, at the same 
time, we wish to maintain the idea that tφ impacts the way we believe 
BTtφ, we are forced to accept that tφ impacts the way of believing qua 
expression of the language, i.e. qua name, rather than via its semantic con­
tribution. Of course, this idea could also be implemented within the 
expresses denotes PropositionName Sentence 
Figure 7.1 Two-level belief representation 
denotes PropositionName 
Figure 7.2 One-level belief representation 
162 Johannes Stern 
framework of two-level belief representation, but making the way of 
believing dependent on sentences rather than their names has the neat con­
sequence that the semantics remains fully referential. In contrast, if the 
name tφ is allowed to impact the semantics evaluation qua expression, 
the semantics will no longer be fully referential. So there seems to be at 
least a prima facie advantage of adopting a framework of two-level 
belief representation in which the way of believing depends on the denota­
tum of tφ rather than tφ itself. 
Independently of whether we opt for a sentential or a propositional 
truth predicate the question arises how the contribution of the way of 
believing should be spelled out within the framework of PWS. To this 
end, it is helpful to coerce the believe relation into the framework of 
PWS: in PWS an agent a believes the proposition that φ, denoted by 
kφk, at a world w iff 
8vðwRav ) v 2 kφkÞ; 
where kφk—the proposition that φ—is the set of possible worlds in 
which φ is true and Ra a doxastic accessibility relation. From this defini­
tion of the belief-relation one can easily see that the only parameter in 
the definition is the doxastic accessibility relation. Consequently, if the 
way of believing is supposed to depend upon tφ, the term needs to 
impact the accessibility relation. Indeed, the crucial point of departure 
of our semantics from standard PWS is that instead of assuming a prim­
itive accessibility relation for every agent we now consider a function 
that outputs accessibility relations and takes either finite sets of sentences 
(sentential truth predicate) or finite sets of names (propositional truth 
predicate) of the language as inputs. We appeal to sets of sentences 
(terms) rather than to the sentences or names themselves, since we 
might have several formulas of the form Tt in the belief-context. 
For example, the truth of B(Ttφ ^ Tsψ), that is, the way we believe 
Ttφ ^ Tsψ, should depend on both tφ and sψ, that is, on the set {tφ, sψ}. 
Before we spell out the formal semantics in some more detail, we need 
to reconsider the idea that (TDQ) and (OS) should hold in “ideal” circum­
stances. Following up on our remarks in Section 7.3 we take “ideal” or 
“disquotational” to be circumstances in which the agent is aware 
which proposition the sentence denoted by tφ expresses (the name tφ 
denotes). In this case their belief that Ttφ will be insensitive to the partic­
ular way of believing related to tφ and coincide with the way the agent 
believes that φ, that is, relative to tφ the truth predicate behaves transpar­
ently in the relevant belief-context. On our semantics, the information 
which sentences (names) an agent is aware of needs to be provided exter­
nally, i.e., it is not possible to compute the Awareness set on the basis of 
the information provided within the semantics. In this respect our seman­
tics resembles classical Awareness semantics (cf. Fagin et al., 1995, 
Chapter 9.5), where an externally provided Awareness set controls the 
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transition from idealized belief to non-idealized belief. It is perhaps best to 
view the Awareness set to be retrieved from the information provided by 
the common ground relevant to the particular belief report but we shall 
leave this issue open for the purpose of our formal semantics. 
7.4.1 Formal Semantics 
In this section we make our heuristic remarks precise and introduce a 
formal semantics for ways of believing for a language containing the 
belief operator B and the truth predicate T.19 As we remarked in the previ­
ous section we shall assume a sentential truth predicate, that is, we shall 
develop a semantics for two-level belief representation. We wish to keep 
our semantics as general as possible. For this reason we appeal to an 
inner/outer domain semantics (cf., e.g., Garson, 2001), that is, we allow 
for a universe of discourse U, which comprises the domain of quantifica­
tion, which is allowed to vary from world to world. We also allow for 
terms of the language to denote non-rigidly, as long as these terms are 
not expressions of the language of the syntax theory. The interpretation 
of the syntax theory, that is the syntactic vocabulary, will remain constant 
across worlds. In contrast to more customary formulations the syntax 
theory will not carry any explicit ontological commitments, as we shall 
not require the expressions of the language to be in the domain of quanti­
fication at each world. Rather, any potential commitment should be consid­
ered implicit and as a sine qua non condition of the theoretical framework; 
it is a different kind of commitment than the one we engage in when talking 
about, say, elephants. The question how this type of commitment is to be 
understood is left open but will obviously depend on one’s interpretation 
of the universe U. To avoid explicit commitment to an ontology of expres­
sions the language of syntax is conceived of as a quantifier-free language 
along the lines of certain formulations of PRA. However, our syntax 
theory and language need not be an arithmetical language where the syntac­
tic operations operate on codes of expressions, i.e., natural numbers, but 
could—perhaps preferably—be a syntax theory that operates directly over 
an ontology of expressions (see, e.g., Halbach and Leigh, 2021). 
DEFINITION 7.4.1 (Universe, Language). Let O ¼6 Ø be the set of non-
syntactic objects relevant to the discourse under consideration. Let LO 
be the language of a syntax theory such that LO 
. contains names o1, o2, . . . for all member of O; 
. contains the logical constants ¬ and ^ and the identity predicate but 
is quantifier free; 
. contains names for all expressions of LB (cf. below) and function 
symbols for all primitive recursive syntactic operations of LB. 
Let U :¼ O [ ExprLB be the universe of discourse for LB where ExprLB is 
the set of all expressions of LB. LB extends LO by a countable number of 
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individual constants c1, c2,  . . .  ;  n-ary predicate symbols P1
n; P2n; . . .  ; the 
belief operator B; the truth predicate T; (possibly) the Awareness pred­
icate A and the universal quantifier 8. Other logical symbols are used 
merely as abbreviations. The syntax of LB is given by 
φ ::¼ c j ti ¼ tj jPnt1; . . . ; tn jAt jTt j :φ jφ ^ φ jBφ j 8xφ 
with c 2 FrmlLO and t1; . . . ; tn; ti; tj 2 TermLB . FrmlLO (TermLB ) is the set 
of formulas (terms) of LB. 
The definition implies that the cardinality of the language will depend on 
the set of contingent objects O the language is intended to talk about. In 
particular, if O is uncountable, then LO and LB will also be uncountable. 
With the details of the languages LO and LB in place, we need to 
specify their semantic interpretation. To this end we introduce the 
notion of a belief frame. Models for LB will be defined relative to such 
a belief frame. 
DEFINITION 7.4.2 (Belief frame). A belief frame F is a tuple hU; W; H; Di 
where U is the universe of discourse, W 6¼ Ø is a set of worlds, and D : 
W ! PðUÞ for all w 2 W is a function that assigns the domain of quan-S 
tification relative to a world w such that O . w 2 WD(w). Finally, H : 
PðSentLB Þ ! W .W is a function that generates a serial (right­
unbounded) doxastic accessibility relation relative to a set of sentences.20 
It’s worth noting that every non-syntactic object needs to exist at some 
world. No condition of this kind is imposed on the syntactic objects, 
that is, the expressions of LO. These may live in U without “coming 
into existence” at any world. 
We now define an interpretation over a belief frame F. As mentioned 
at the beginning of this section the interpretation will act rigidly on LO 
but is allowed to vary from world to world for the remaining vocabulary 
of LB. As we shall see later, not every interpretation over F gives rise to a 
belief model since only specific interpretations will ultimately be deemed 
adequate. 
DEFINITION 7.4.3 (Interpretation). Let F be a belief-frame. An interpreta­
tion I is a function that assigns an interpretation to the non-logical 
vocabulary of L. B (LB without the truth predicate) relative to a possible 
world such that for all w, v 2 W 
(i) for all individual constants k 2 LO, I(k, w) =  I(k, v) 2 U; for all 
individual constants k 2 ðLB . LOÞ; Iðk; wÞ 2  O; 
(ii) for all function symbols fn of LO, I(f, w) :  Un ! U and for all u1, . . . ,  
un 2 U 
Iðf n; wÞðu1; . . . ; unÞ ¼ Iðf n; vÞðu1; . . . ; unÞ; 
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(iii)	 U . SentLB . IðA; wÞ . U; 
(iv) If	 Pn is a predicate constant of LB, then IðPn; wÞ . Un . Un; for 
Pn 2 ðLB . LOÞ 
. if  ui 2 ExprLB , for some 1 . i . n, then for all e 2 ExprLB 
; wÞðþ=.Þ , hhu1; . . . ; ui; . . . ; uni 2 IðPn u1; . . . ; e; . . . ; uni 
; wÞðþ=.Þ2 IðPn ; 
for Pn 2 LO, 
. I(Pn , w) =  I(Pn , v) =  hX,Yi with Y = U − X. 
The definition guarantees that the vocabulary of LO is interpreted rigidly 
and that the expressions of LB . LO do not discriminate between syntactic 
objects but only objects of O. It is worth highlighting that Definition 7.4.3 
does not guarantee that sentence denoting singular terms will always be 
rigid designators: we only know that if the term is an LO-expression, 
then it will be a rigid designator.21 We will examine the issue more 
closely in Section 7.6.1 but until then, to keep things as simple as possible, 
we conceive of all sentence denoting singular terms as rigid designators. 
Finally, condition (iii) of Definition 7.4.3 specifies that all objects in U 
that are not sentences will always be in the extension of the Awareness 
predicate; that is, the interpretation of the Awareness predicate at a 
world can only vary with respect to the sentences in its extension. This 
may seem awkward for one might wonder what it means to be aware 
of some non-syntactic object. However, the point is that we intend the 
Awareness predicate to discriminate only between different sentences 
rather than arbitrary objects.22 As explained at the beginning of Section 
7.4, in the semantics of two-level belief representation we adopted the dox­
astic accessibility relation under consideration will depend on which sen­
tences an agent is aware of. As laid out in Remark 7.4.13 below, if we 
were to work in a system of one-level belief representation instead, the 
interpretation of the Awareness predicate should discriminate between 
names of sentences, or more correctly, names of propositions. 
Definition 7.4.3 does not guarantee that the syntactic operations and 
expressions are interpreted in a desirable way, that is, that they are inter­
preted as the syntactic operations and the expressions they intend to 
denote. Interpretations that guarantee such an intended interpretation 
will be called adequate and give rise to a belief model. 
DEFINITION 7.4.4 (Adequate Interpretation, Belief Model, Assignment). Let 
ðU; JÞ be the standard model (of the syntax theory of) of LO. We call an  
interpretation function I adequate iff for all non-logical constants (individ­
ual, function, predicate constants) z 2 LO and all w 2 W, JðzÞ ¼ Iðz; wÞ. If  
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I is an adequate interpretation, then M = (F,I) is called a belief model. An 
assignment b : VarLO ! U assigns to each variable an object in U. 
We now turn to the interpretation of the truth predicate, which is pro­
vided by an evaluation function. 
DEFINITION 7.4.5 (Evaluation function). Let F be a belief frame. An eval­
uation function relative to F is a function f : W .W ! PðSentLB Þ that 
assigns to each pair of worlds a set of sentences—the interpretation of 
the truth predicate. The set of all evaluation functions relative to a 
frame F is denoted by ValF. 
Next we introduce the index set of a formula φ, which serves as 
the input to the H function that outputs an accessibility relation. Intui­
tively the index set of φ consists of all sentences ψ such that Ttψ is a sub-
formula of φ and where the agent is not aware which proposition the 
sentence ψ expresses, i.e., the set of all those representations occurring 
(explicitly and implicitly) in φ which are not transparent to the agent. It 
is in the definition of the index set where the differences between 
systems of one-level and two-level belief representation become most 
apparent. While in the present case of two-level belief representation the 
index set will consist of a set of sentences, it will be a set of names (of 
propositions) in the case of one-level belief representation, namely, the 
set of those names tψ such that the agent is not aware of the proposition 
tψ denotes. 
DEFINITION 7.4.6 (Index set). Let φ be a formula of LB, tM,w[β] be the 
interpretation of a term t in M at w relative to a variable assignment 
β. Then the index set φb of φ relative to a belief model M, a world w w 
and an assignment function β is defined by the following recursion: 
. :
∅; if φ 2 L. or ðφ ¼ Tt & tM;w½b. 2= SentLB Þ;> B >  > :  > fcg; if φ ¼ Tt & tM;w½b. ¼ c 2 L.; > B  >  b : > cw; if φ ¼ Tt & tM;w½b. ¼ c 2 Iðw; AÞ; > < 
φb fcg [ cb ; if φ ¼: Tt & tM;w½b. ¼ c 2= Iðw; AÞ; w :¼ w>  b : : >  c ; if φ ¼ :c or φ ¼ Bc;> w >  b b : >  c [ w ; if φ ¼ c ^ w;> w w > : bðv:dÞ :[ cðvÞ ; if φ ¼ 8vc:d2DðwÞ w 
We now define truth in a model at a world in a belief-model relative to 
an evaluation function f. Indeed, as already implicit in Definition 7.4.5 we 
define truth in a model relative to a pair of worlds (w, v) where w is the 
world in which we evaluate the given formula and v is the world relative 
to which the index set of the formula is defined. The reason for the two-
dimensional interpretation is that we want to evaluate a formula relative 
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to the interpretation of the Awareness predicate at the initial world of eval-
uation rather than one of its doxastic alternatives which may be relevant 
for evaluating one of its subformulae at a later stage of the semantic com-
putation. For example, consider the formula BBTtφ. In evaluating the 
formula at w, that is (w, w), we first check whether BTtφ is true in all dox-
astic alternatives v of w given the accessibility relation generated by the 
index set of BTtφ at w. In the next step, we wish to consider whether 
Ttφ is true at all doxastic alternatives of v relative to the index set of Ttφ 
at w—rather than the index set of Ttφ at v—but without appealing to a 
two-dimensional interpretation there is no way we can retrieve the starting 
point of our semantic computation. Again, the point is that what matters 
in the semantic evaluation of the BBTtφ is what the agent is aware of at 
world w rather than at a doxastic alternative v. Moreover, the index set 
of Ttφ relative to w may be different to the index set of Ttφ relative v to 
since the interpretation of the Awareness predicate may change and, as 
a consequence, BTtφ may be true at v, say, relative to  the  index set of  
Ttφ at w but false relative to its index set at v. 
DEFINITION 7.4.7 (Strong Kleene truth in a belief model). Let F be a belief 
frame, f 2 ValF and β a variable assignment. We define the notion of 
truth in a belief model M relative to the evaluation function f and the 
assignment β at a world-pair (w, v) according to the strong Kleene 
scheme for formulas φ of LB (M; ðw; vÞ⊨ f φ½b]) by an induction on thesk 
positive complexity of φ: 
i  M; w; v ⊨ f s t b sM;w b tM;wð Þ ð Þ sk ¼ ½ ] , ½ ] ¼ ½b] 
ðii fÞ M; ðw; vÞ⊨  sk :s ¼ t M½b] , s ;w½b ;6¼ tM w ] ½b]   
iii  M  w  v ⊨ f ð Þ ; ð ; Þ sk Pnt1; . . . ; tns ¼ t½b] ,
D




2 IðP ; wÞ ; 
f M;ww -
D E
t  ðivÞ M; ðw; vÞ⊨ :Pnt1; . . . ; tn½b] ,  ½b]; . . . ; tM n ;w½b] 2 IðPn; wÞ ;sk 1 
ðvÞ M; ðw; vÞ⊨ f At½b] , tM;w½b] 2 IðA; wÞsk 
ðviÞ M; ðw; vÞ⊨ f :At½b] , tM;w½b]2= IðA; wÞsk 
ðviiÞ M; ðw; vÞ⊨ f Tt½b] , tM;w½b] 2 f ðw; vÞsk 
ðviiiÞ M; ðw; vÞ⊨ f Tt½b] , ð: tÞM;w½b] 2 f ðw; vÞ or tM;w½b]2= SentLB ;sk : 
ðixÞ M; ðw; vÞ⊨ f ::c½b] , M 
_ 
; ðw; vÞ⊨ f sk sk c½b] 
ðxÞ M; ðw; vÞ⊨ sk f c ^ w½b] , ðM; ðw; vÞ⊨ sk f c½b] and M; ðw; vÞ⊨ sk f w½b]Þ 
ðxiÞ M; ðw; vÞ⊨ f :ðc ^ wÞ½b] , ðM; ðw; vÞ⊨ f :c½b] or M; ðw; vÞ⊨ f :w½b]Þsk sk sk 
ðxiiÞ M; ðw; vÞ⊨ sk f 8xc½b] , for all d 2 DðwÞðM; ðw; vÞ⊨ sk f c½bðx : dÞ]Þ 
ðxiiiÞ M; ðw; vÞ⊨ f :8xc½b] , there is an d 2 DðwÞðM; ðw; vÞ⊨ f :c½bðx : dÞ]Þsk sk 
ðxivÞ M; ðw; vÞ⊨ sk f Bc½b] , 8zðH c wz ) M; ðz; vÞ⊨ sk f c½b]Þb v 
ðxvÞ M; ðw; vÞ⊨ f Bc½b] , 9zðH b wz & M; ðz; vÞ⊨ sk f :c½b]Þ:sk : cv 
If a formula φ is true in the belief model M at (w, w) relative to the evaluation 
function f and assignment β, we write  M; w ⊨ f φ½b] and say that φ is true in sk 
168 Johannes Stern 
the belief model M at w relative to the evaluation function f an assignment 
β; if  φ is true in M relative to the evaluation function f and the assignment β 
for all w 2 WðM; w ⊨ f φ½b.Þ, we write  M ⊨ f φ and say that φ is true in Msk sk 
relative to the evaluation function f and the assignment β. We say that φ is 
true in F under a given evaluation function f and assignment β (F ⊨ f φ½b.Þ)sk
iff for all belief-models M on F, M ⊨ f φ½b.. In general, we drop reference to sk 
an assignment β if the formula is true relative to all assignments. 
This concludes the specifications of the semantics for truth and belief. 
However, it remains to be shown that adequate interpretations of the 
truth predicate can be constructed over arbitrary belief models, that is, 
that there are evaluation functions f such that (TSW) holds at each 
world. Fortunately, this can be shown by running a standard Kripkean 
construction. To this end, we first define an ordering on ValF. 
DEFINITION 7.4.8 (Ordering). Let f ; g 2 ValF. We set  f. g iff f(w, v). g(w, v) 
for all w, v 2 W. 
It is not difficult to see that ⊨ sk is a monotone evaluation scheme rel­
ative to the ordering .. 
FACT 7.4.9 (Monotonicity). For f ; g 2 ValF and for all φ 2 LB 
f . g ) 8w; v 2 WðM; ðw; vÞ ⊨ f φ ) M; ðw; vÞ ⊨ g φÞ:sk sk 
Fact 7.4.9 guarantees the existence of fixed points for arbitrary belief 
frames F, that is, evaluation functions f such that for all φ 2 SentLB 
and all w, v 2 W 
F; ðw; vÞ ⊨ f φ , φ 2 f ðw; vÞ:sk 
To construct such a fixed point we define a Kripke jump in the cus­
tomary fashion: 
DEFINITION 7.4.10 (Kripke jump). Let F be a frame and ValF the set of 
evaluation functions relative to F and M a belief model. Then SKB : 
ValF ! ValF is an operation such that 
½SKBðf Þ.ðw; vÞ :¼ fφ j M; ðw; vÞ ⊨ f φg:sk
The existence of fixed points of SKB then follows by the usual argu­
ments (see, e.g., Kripke, 1975; Visser, 1989). 
PROPOSITION 7.4.11 (Fixed points). Let F be a frame and M a belief model 
on F. Then there exists an evaluation function f 2 ValF such that 
SKBðf Þ¼  f : 
As an immediate corollary of Proposition 7.4.11, f provides an ade­
quate interpretation of the truth predicate relative to every world w 2 W: 
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COROLLARY 7.4.12 (Truth model). Let F be a frame and f 2 ValF a fixed 
point of SKB. Then for all w, v 2 W and φ 2 LB 
M; ðw; vÞ⊨ f Ttφ , M; ðw; vÞ⊨ f sk skφ: 
This concludes out presentation of our semantics of truth and belief 
within the framework of two-level belief representation. Before we 
turn to some of the consequences of the semantics we sketch out a 
semantics for one-level belief representation, 
REMARK 7.4.13 (One-level belief representation). The present semantics 
was developed with a two-level belief representation in mind, that is, 
the language contains names of sentences, which in turn express propo­
sitions (or some other attidunal object). A semantics of one-level belief 
representation can be obtained by implementing the following changes: 
. the syntax theory needs to be conceived of as, or replaced by, a 
theory of structured propositions;23 
. the arguments of H need to be sets of names of propositions rather 
than propositions; 
. the interpretation of A will be a set of names rather than a set of their 
denotata; 
. the set φb will also be a set of names; moreover when φ ¼: Tt, where  t w 
denotes a proposition ψ relative to β and tðbðxÞ=xÞ2=I ðw; AÞ one 
should probably set φb :¼ ftðbðxÞ=xÞg rather than cb w [ ftðbðxÞ=xÞgw 
as suggested by Definition 7.4.6. The reason is that in this case if 
tðbðxÞ=xÞ2= Iðw; AÞ the agent will have no grasp of the proposition 
denoted by t and, in particular, they will not be aware of the belief­
representation, i.e. names of propositions, the proposition appeals to. 
In contrast, in the case of two-level belief representations the agent is 
under no illusion what sentence a particular name refers to: they are 
only not aware which particular proposition the sentence expresses. 
7.4.2 Formal Consequences 
The semantics behaves as intended in the sense that (OS) is not generally 
true at a world w in a belief model, indeed both directions of (OS) fail: 
ð⇏Þ M; w ⊨ f Bφ ⇏ M; w ⊨ f BTtφ:sk sk 
ð⇍Þ M; w ⊨ f Bφ ⇍ M; w ⊨ f BTtφ:sk sk 
However, as intended, (OS) holds under idealization conditions; that is, 
if tφ 
M;w½b. 2 IðA; wÞ; then 
M; w ⊨ f Bφ½b., M; w ⊨ f BTtφ½b.:sk sk
This follows from the fact that if tφ 
M;w½b. 2 Iðw; AÞ, φb ¼ ðTtφÞb . w w 
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For the T-free fragment of the language the B-operator behaves like a 
standard modal operator in possible world semantics, that is, for the T-
free fragment B is a modal operator of a normal modal logic. This is in 
stark contrast to the behavior of B if applied to sentences in which T 
occurs. In this case B is a non-normal and indeed a hyperintensional 
and non-algebraic operator, that is, let kφkfM :¼ fw 2 W jM; w ⊨ f sk φg, 
then 
f f f fkφkM ¼ kckM ) kBφkM ¼ kBckM 
does not generally hold if the truth predicate occurs in either φ or ψ. In  
this respect our semantics is similar to semantics of non-idealized belief 
such as classical Awareness semantics or Impossible worlds semantics. 
But while in these semantics whether a formula Bφ or BTtφ is satisfied 
at some world would depend solely on the Awareness operator or the 
Impossible world, our semantics provides independent truth conditions 
for the two formulas, which happen to coincide if tφ is in the interpreta­
tion of the Awareness predicate in the world under consideration. 
One consequence of the non-normality of B is that the operator does 
not generally commute with conjunction at a world w if either of the 
conjuncts has a subformula of the form Tt such that tM;w½b.2= IðA; wÞ: 
M; w ⊨ f Bðc ^ wÞ $ M; w ⊨ f Bc ^ Bw:24 sk sk
The reason is that while we may believe ψ and φ in some way we might 
not believe them in the same way. It is precisely for this reason that it is 
possible for both Bφ and B¬Ttφ to be true at a world w. However, it is 
impossible for B(φ^ ¬Ttφ) to be true at any world w since this would 
imply that we believe φ and ¬Ttφ in the same world, which contradicts 
Corollary 7.4.12. This kind of phenomena also arises in contextualist 
theories of belief, where it is possible for Clara to believe that Superman 
is strong and to believe that Clark Kent is not strong but impossible for 
her to believe that Superman is strong and that Clark Kent is not strong 
in the same way. 
Moreover, due to the same phenomenon an agent will believe the T-
scheme for grounded sentences despite the fact that (OS) will not 
generally hold at a world even for such sentences; that is, if 
F ⊨ f T : tφ $ :Ttφ, then sk _ 
F ⊨ f B ðTtφ $ φÞ: 25 sk
At first glance the semantics seems to get a lot of things right, but how 
does it apply to the case of Max and Clara, respectively? Does it yield the 
correct semantic explanations and predictions? 
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7.5 Taking Stock: Anne, Clara, and Max 
We started the chapter by observing that standard PWS for belief com­
bined with the idea that semantic states-of-affairs supervene on non-
semantic states of affairs leads to the undesirable consequence that 
believing and believing-true are semantically equivalent. Such a seman­
tics, we argued, yields counterintuitive accounts and predictions in the 
case of Clara and Max, respectively. The moral we drew from this obser­
vation was that the semantic value of a belief report depends on the way 
an agent believes—akin to an idea prominent in contextualist theories of 
belief reports. In particular, we argued that the way we believe φ will 
depend on the syntactic representations of beliefs occurring in φ and 
that unless an agent is aware of tφ, an agent will believe φ and Ttφ in dif­
ferent ways: they may believe a proposition in one way but fail to believe 
it in another way. On this semantic picture, believing and believing-true 
are no longer semantically equivalent and we obtain a neat semantic 
explanation of this fact. But what precisely happens in the cases of 
Max and Clara, respectively? Does the new semantics yield correct 
semantic predications? 
Let us start with Clara and assume (DQ) is correct, that is, that Clara 
believes that Clark Kent is strong. In this case, it seems, we are compelled 
to accepting that Clara is not fully aware of the sentence ‘Clark Kent is 
strong’ for it is part of the story that Clara does not believe the proposi­
tion in a ‘Clark Kent is strong’-way, indeed Clara does not seem fully 
aware of what proposition ‘Clark Kent is strong’ expresses. (OS) 
cannot be applied, that is, Clara does not believe that ‘Clark Kent is 
strong’ is true. Notice, however, that our semantics does not commit 
us to accepting (DQ), i.e., to accept that Clara believes that Clark 
Kent is strong because Clara accepts the sentence ‘Superman is strong’ 
and, according to our story, also believes that ‘Superman is strong’ is 
true: it is perfectly acceptable according to our semantics for Clara to 
believe that Clark Kent is strong in a ‘Superman is strong’-way but not 
in a representation independent way, indeed, this seems to be a rather 
plausible view. But no matter one’s position in this respect, the semantics 
provides the flexibility of reporting Clara’s beliefs appropriately. 
What about Max? We have already seen that Max’s use of the truth 
predicate does not qualify as a disquotational use and (OS) should not 
be applicable in this context. Admittedly, even though we have 
assumed a two-level belief representation, in Max’s case it would seem 
more appropriate to make the way of believing dependent on the 
name ‘Goldbach’s conjecture’ rather than the sentence it denotes. After 
all, Max may be in no doubt about which proposition is expressed by 
a particular sentence expressing Goldbach’s conjecture but, according 
to our story, he does not seem to be aware of the sentence the 
term ‘Goldbach’s conjecture’ denotes.26 Now, independently of the 
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particulars of our semantics it seems clear that Max is not aware of the 
proposition represented, be it directly or indirectly, by the name ‘Gold­
bach’s conjecture’. Max does not believe that every even number > 2 is 
the sum of two primes in a representation-independent way. Rather 
the only way Max believes the proposition is in a ‘Goldbach’s 
conjecture’-way of believing—(OS) cannot be applied, that is, our 
semantics gives the correct semantic assessment: ‘Max believes that 
Goldbachs conjecture is true’ and ‘Max believes that every even 
number > 2 is the sum of two primes’ are not semantically equivalent. 
It seems that our semantics yields the right outcome in Clara’s and 
Max’s cases where believing and believing-true are not semantically 
equivalent. But what about disquotational uses of the truth predicate: 
can our semantics accommodate such uses as we have claimed at the 
beginning of Section 7.4? We have seen that the disquotationalist will 
argue that (2) correctly reports Anne’s beliefs but that this requires 
(OS). In our semantics, application of (OS) is only licensed if Anne is, 
for every axiom of Euclidean geometry, aware of at least one sentence 
expressing the axiom qua proposition. From the disquotational perspec­
tive this is arguably an acceptable assumption: the disquotationalist’s 
claim is not that Anne would necessarily report her belief in this way. 
Rather, the claim is that Anne’s belief is correctly reported by (2) if an 
external, observational perspective is assumed. In reporting Anne’s 
belief by (2) the disquotationalist stipulates the transparency of the 
truth predicate, that is, they stipulate Anne’s awareness of the relevant 
sentences, and it is precisely against the background of this stipulation 
that the disquotationalist’s report of Anne’s beliefs is acceptable. 
Summing up, our semantics provides an intuitive explanation of why 
believing and believing-true ought to be semantically differentiated, 
which neatly applies to the cases of Max and Clara. Moreover, it is suffi­
ciently flexible to accommodate disquotational uses of the truth predicate, 
that is, uses that treat the truth predicate in a transparent way and for 
which believing and believing-true turn out to be semantically equivalent. 
In this respect our semantics should be acceptable to the disquotationalist, 
although the disquotationalist will need to grant that there may also be 
non-disquotational uses of ‘true’. However, as for every semantics our 
semantics also produces some—arguably—counterintuitive consequences 
and faces certain limitations. To conclude the chapter, we discuss some 
of these limitations and point toward some alternative semantic explana­
tions for distinguishing between believing and believing-true. 
7.6 Limitations and Alternative Semantic Explanations 
The semantics we presented provides a greater amount of flexibility than 
standard PWS, which enables the semantics to differentiate between 
believing and believing-true. But the flexibility of the semantics has its 
limitations. In this section, we flag two such limitations before outlining 
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some alternative explanations of the semantic difference between believ­
ing and believing-true. The first limitation stems from the fact that the 
way of believing is fully governed by the syntactic information provided 
by the formula in the scope of the B-operator and the Awareness set; all 
other contextual information is discarded as irrelevant. The second lim­
itation is inherited from PWS semantics: propositions are still conceived 
of as sets of possible worlds (or states), which has some at least prima 
facie undesirable side effects. 
To illustrate the first problem recall that in discussing some of the 
formal consequences of our semantics we noted that B was a non-
normal modal operator, if applied to a formula which has a subformula 
of the form Tt. As a consequence, virtually all logical reasoning will 
break down in such cases. But frequently agents are perfectly capable 
of reasoning logically and the semantics should be able to accommodate 
logical reasoning in such cases. For example, at least at the outset, dis­
junction introduction in the scope of B seems fine in many cases, i.e., 
Bφ 27:
Bðφ _ cÞ 
But the inference breaks down because the way of believing may 
change in course of our logical reasoning. While this may happen in 
some cases, surely, in most circumstances if an agent is engaged in reflec­
tive, logical thinking, we should expect the way of believing to remain 
constant throughout the reasoning. This suggests that the way of believ­
ing is not fully determined by the syntactic information available, but 
depends more directly on the context of the belief report. More gener­
ally, it seems reasonable to assume that the way of believing will fre­
quently be determined by previous discourse and its common 
ground.28 Perhaps then a semantics that explicitly appeals to the way 
of believing needs to embrace a contextualist approach to attitude 
reports more fully than we acknowledged in Section 7.3. 
Let’s turn to the second limitation. In our semantics a formula φ is true 
at a world w if and only if Ttφ is true at w. As a consequence, the (pos­
sibly) diverging semantic values of Bφ and BTtφ are due to the different 
range of quantification of the (interpretation of the) B-operator in the 
two cases rather than the semantic value of the formulas in the scope 
of B. But this also means that if a formula φ is true (false) in all 
worlds, then (OS) will be true for φ and every name tφ of φ: indepen­
dently of the range of quantification of B, there will simply be no 
worlds to falsify (verify) φ. Bφ and Btφ will be semantically equivalent. 
For example, let χ: =  ψ _ ¬ψ where ψ is a sentence of the language of 
syntax LO, then (OS) holds, i.e., let M be a belief model on an arbitrary 
frame F, then for all w 2 W and names tχ of χ 
M; w ⊨ f Bw , M; w ⊨ f BT tw:sk sk 
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This feature clearly highlights the limited flexibility of our semantics and 
that the semantics inherits some of the conceptual limitations of standard 
PWS: it is not possible to distinguish between “different” necessarily true 
(false) propositions. 
In devising semantics there is always a trade-off between the flexibility 
of the semantics and the availability of systematic, i.e. non ad hoc, seman­
tic explanations. The question then arises whether we can increase the flex­
ibility of the semantics, that is, to allow for the possibility to block all 
instances of (OS) whilst at the same time providing or retaining principled 
semantic explanations. Of course, there is hardly a clear-cut answer to the 
question, and where one theorists will push for a more flexible semantics 
another theorists will invoke pragmatic strategies to account for allegedly 
counterintuitive consequences. In this chapter we shall not enter this kind 
of debate but point to two alternative strategies for blocking (OS), which 
may allow for a greater amount of semantic flexibility. 
7.6.1 Non-Rigid Terms and Scope Distinctions 
Throughout this paper we have tacitly assumed that names of expres­
sions of LB refer rigidly to these expressions, that is, a name tφ refers 
to φ in all possible worlds. But this assumption may be questioned, 
even if one conceives of proper names as rigid designators because we 
frequently designate sentences or propositions via definite descriptions 
rather than proper names viz ‘the sentence “. . .”’ or ‘the proposition 
that . . .’. Even if definite description are treated as full-fledged singular 
terms of the language, rather than incomplete symbols à la Russell 
(1905), they are generally thought to be flaccid designators and to 
denote different objects at different worlds. Indeed, as we have men­
tioned in passing, under certain circumstances our semantics allows for 
non-rigid sentence denoting singular terms even though we have 
ignored this aspect of the semantics up to this point. But if non-rigid sen­
tence denoting singular terms are envisaged (OS) would fail because a 
term tφ can fail to denote the sentence (proposition) φ in all worlds 
but the actual world—for all we know it could also denote the sentence 
(proposition) ψ.29 Of course, (TSW) would then fail likewise, that is, we 
would only be guaranteed that Ttφ and φ receive the same semantic value 
in the actual world but not in any other world. However, this would not 
imply that semantic states-of-affairs do not supervene on non-semantic 
states of affairs, since (TSW) no longer asserts that ‘φ’ holds at a 
world w, if and only if ‘the sentence ‘φ’ (the proposition that φ) is  
true’ holds at w, but possibly, using our previous example, that ‘‘φ’ 
holds at w, if and only if, ‘the sentence ψ’ (the proposition that φ) is  
true’ holds at w. So, at least prima facie, treating sentence/proposition­
denoting singular terms as flaccid designators does not seem to clash 
with any fundamental semantic principle. 
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This opens up the possibility of semantically distinguishing between 
believing and believing-true without appealing to different ways of 
believing. Rather the distinction arises due to non-rigid designation. 
However, if sentence/proposition-denoting singular terms are treated 
as non-rigid designators, the question arises how we are to deal with 
cases like Anne’s, i.e., belief reports like (2) where, at least from a dis­
quotational perspective, appealing to (OS) seems to be legitimate and 
to yield the correct semantic predictions. The most immediate and plau­
sible strategy to accommodate such cases is to appeal to scope distinc­
tions triggered by the definite description and to distinguish between 
believing of the denotatum of tφ that it is true and believing that tφ is 
true, that is to distinguish between believing-true de re and de dicto. 
While (OS) fails on the de dicto-reading, it seems, or so the argument 
would go, acceptable on the de re-reading, that is, we would obtain 
the following version of (OS): 
M; w ⊨ f Bφ , M; w ⊨ f hlx:BTxitφ: ðOSRÞ 
In Section 7.5 we argued that the disquotationalist assumes an external, 
observational position in reporting Anne’s belief and that their report 
need not match the way Anne would report her beliefs. This position 
goes neatly with the strategy of accommodating belief reports like (2) 
by focusing on the de re reading of believing-true. 
Still one may wonder whether understanding sentence/proposition­
denoting singular terms to be flaccid designators is the correct analysis 
of the cases of Max and Clara. First, if one subscribes to the Millean/ 
Kripkean-doctrine that names are rigid designators, then names of 
sentences/propositions such as Goldbach’s conjecture should be taken 
to rigidly designate their referent.30 As a consequence, theorists would 
need to provide an alternative explanation for why (OS) fails in Max’s 
case, which suggests that alluding to non-rigid designation cannot fully 
replace the appeal to ways of believing in semantic explanations. 
Second, and more generally, it is not clear that in the cases of Clara 
and Max the failure of (OS) is due to a de dicto-reading of believing-
true. Arguably, in Max’s case the equivalence between believing and 
believing-true seems to break down on the de re-reading likewise. Simi­
larly, at least focusing on the sentential truth predicate, Clara’s case also 
remains puzzling under a de re-reading of believing-true. Treating 
sentence-denoting singular terms as flaccid designator then does not 
seem to resolve the original puzzle: the puzzle seems to be a puzzle 
about believing-true de re and the cases brought forward against (OS) 
appear to undermine (OSR) likewise. Of course, allowing for sentences 
and propositions to be denoted non-rigidly in the semantics—not all 
sentence/proposition-denoting expressions should be treated uniformly— 
may be interesting for other reasons, but, as mentioned, these non-rigid 
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terms will not be helpful in semantically distinguishing believing from 
believing-true de re. 
7.6.2 More Syntax Strategies 
The aim of the chapter was to provide an adequate semantics for truth and 
belief. To this end, we appealed to PWS for belief, which, as we have seen, 
yields counterintuitive consequences unless special precautions are taken. 
However, many theorists working on the semantics of attitude reports 
will deem such an approach a non-starter, as it is well-known that PWS 
provides a very coarse grained-arguably too coarse-grained—analysis of 
attitude reports and semantic content.31 According to these views, seman­
tic content, i.e. propositions, should not be conceived as sets of worlds or 
“truth supporting circumstances” (cf. Soames, 1987) but as structured 
propositions: whilst in PWS the proposition that Mary is smart is con­
ceived of as the set of all those worlds in which Mary is smart, on the 
structured proposition account it would be, roughly put, the tuple consist­
ing of Mary and the property of being smart, i.e, hMary, Smartnessi. In  
other words, on the structured proposition account a proposition 
conveys structural or syntactic information that has been extracted or 
retained from the sentences that express it. On this view, if belief is con­
ceived as a relation between an agent and a proposition or, possibly, 
the constituents of the proposition, we should not expect (OS) to be 
true: ‘the proposition that it is true that Mary is smart’ will express a prop­
osition along the lines of hTrue, hMary, Smartnessii. While hMary, 
Smartnessi and hTrue, hMary, Smartnessii will be true at exactly the 
same worlds, there is no guarantee that an agent will be aware of this 
fact—they may believe the one without believing the other. 
If one agrees with the idea that belief should not be a relation between 
an agent and a set of possible worlds but rather a relation between an 
agent and structured propositions, there is no puzzle: an agent may 
believe φ and not believe Ttφ and vice versa despite the fact that φ and 
Ttφ have the same truth value in every world. In light of this one may 
be tempted to abandon PWS. However, upon closer inspection explicit 
appeal to structured proposition seems inessential for producing correct 
semantic predictions, as the belief relation of the structured proposition 
theorist can be recovered in the PWS framework. On this view a structured 
proposition is just a set of worlds represented in a way that conforms to 
specific structural constraints. Accordingly, a formula Bφ will be true at 
a world  w iff φ is true at all doxastic alternatives of w and the agent 
believes the proposition that φ qua set of possible worlds under the repre­
sentation φ. To make this idea precise on would need to say when a 
formula is true at a world under a specific representation. To this end, let 
Rep : PðWÞ .  W ! PðFrmlLB Þ 
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be a function that selects the available representations of a proposition qua 
set of possible worlds relative to each world. This could, e.g., be a class of 
sentences that are intensionally isomorphic in the sense of Carnap (1947) 
or Lewis (1970). A formula of the form Bφ will then be true in a belief 
model M and world w, iff  
8vðwRv ) M; v ⊨ φ &φ 2 Repv ðkφkÞÞ:32 
On this view, Bφ and BTtφ will not always be semantically equivalent at w 
even though (TSW) will hold at every world, that is, kφk = kTtφk, because 
there is no guarantee that 
φ 2 RepvðkφkÞÞ , Ttφ 2 RepvðkφkÞÞ: 
In principle, such a semantics can individuate beliefs as finely as the sen­
tences of the language but it can also allow for a much coarser individua­
tion of beliefs. However, whereas the formal semantics thus settles the 
formal puzzle, that is, (OS) is no longer valid on such a semantics, there 
still remains the need for a principled philosophical explanation of why 
an agent may stand in the believing relation to hMary, Smartnessi 
without also standing in the believing relation to hTrue, hMary, 
Smartnessii. Perhaps appealing to the way of believing may be useful to 
this effect and, in this case, the sketched semantics could potentially be 
combined with the semantics for one-level belief representation we out­
lined in Section 7.4. 
7.7 Conclusion 
The aim of the chapter was to provide a more adequate semantics for 
belief and truth, that is, a semantics in which one can semantically dis­
tinguish between believing and believing-true. The main novelty of the 
semantics proposed in this paper is to explicitly appeal to the way of 
believing in the semantic evaluation of a formula of the form Bφ 
where the way of believing is extracted from the syntactic information 
provided by φ. We argued that this provides a neat semantic explanation 
of why believing and believing-true are not semantically equivalent. We 
take it that our semantics provides, at the very least, an interesting first 
step towards an adequate semantics for belief and truth.33 
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Notes 
1. Caie	 (2012), Jerzak (2019), and, arguably, Halbach and Welch (2009), 
Campbell-Moore (2015), and Stern (2016), are notable exceptions to this 
claim. Yet, the semantics presented by all these authors produce the type 
of unintended consequence discussed in Section 7.2. 
2. This is not supposed to be a controversial statement. Of course, the work by 
theorists working with structured propositions (see Section 7.6) or within 
certain forms of truth-maker semantics may not subscribe to such an analy­
sis. But as far as developed formal semantics go PWS is, by far, still the dom­
inating approach. 
3. Arguably, to formulate (1) one would need to formalize belief as a predicate 
rather than a sentential operator as customary in PWS. We shall not discuss 
this issue but assume that a belief predicate can be retrieved in the language 
via some sort of “Kripke-reduction” (cf. Halbach and Welch, 2009; Stern, 
2016, Chapter 4). 
4. We do not assume that ⊨ is a classical satisfaction relation, that is, (TSW) is 
not necessarily equivalent to 
M; w ⊨ f Ttφ $ φ:  ðTSÞ 
Indeed in the semantics for belief and type-free truth we shall construct ⊨ 
will be a non-classical satisfaction relation according to which (TS) and 
(TSW) are not equivalent. 
5. In particular (OS) holds in the semantics for belief and truth proposed by 
Caie (2012) and Jerzak (2019). 
6. In contrast	 to the Quinean analysis of attitude reports (Quine, 1956), in 
studying a semantics for truth in doxastic contexts there is no presupposition 
that all attitudinal relations implicitly appeal to the truth predicate, e.g. we 
do not assume the ‘believes that “φ”’ ought to be always reconstructed as 
‘believes-true “φ”’. 
7. Here, we employ the slightly more explicit formulation given in, e.g., Nelson 
(2019). Kripke (1979) originally formulated the disquotational principles 
using ‘assents to’ instead of ‘accepts’. Kripke also lists a number of qualifica­
tions that are intended to rule out unusual or atypical circumstances that 
would interfere with the agent assenting or expressing dissent with a sentence 
s. We implicitly adopt these qualifications. 
8. Cf. Field (1994, pp. 251–252). Field makes a number of qualifications to 
which we will come back to in due course. See also Kü nne (2003) and 
Heck (2020) for a discussion of cognitive equivalence. 
9. -s is a name of the sentence s. 
10. Admittedly, Max does not accept ‘Every even number > 2 is the sum of two 
prime numbers.’ and, as we shall discuss below, this yields an argument 
against (TDQ). 
11. See, e.g., Picollo and Schindler (2020) for an endorsement of this view. 
12. A similar point is made by Heck (2020). 
13. The case of Clara is somewhat different. Arguably, the use of the truth pred­
icate is a disquotationally legitimate use. But the disquotationalist would pre­
sumable say that ‘Superman is strong’ does not express that Clark Kent is 
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strong. Rather it expresses whatever Clara qua competent speaker under­
stands ‘Superman is strong’ to say, or something along these lines. 
14. Indeed,	 we are not aware of a single disquotationalist who defends (OS). 
Field (2006) seems to explicitly reject the conclusion. Heck (2020) agrees 
with our assessment that disquotationalist like Field are committed to (OS). 
15. We take disquotationalists	 in contrast to other deflationists to conceive of 
‘true’ as a predicate of sentences or utterances rather than of propositions 
(cf. Kü nne, 2003). 
16. Of course,	 Crimmins and Perry (1989), like other Russellians, conceive of 
propositions as structured entities, which is at odds with conceiving propo­
sitions as sets of possible worlds, states, or situations as customary in 
PWS. At this point, our comparison only pertains to the idea that the way 
of believing impacts the attitudinal relation. See Section 7.6.2 for a discus­
sion of the structured propositions approach. 
17. Or rather we remain neutral whether the way of believing has an impact on 
the semantic evaluation of the attitude report, if it is not explicitly conveyed 
in reporting the attitude. 
18. It is not important for our purpose whether the objects of belief are propo­
sitions or some other sort of attitudinal object. The relevant issue is whether 
the objects of truth and belief coincide or not. 
19. To keep the presentation as concise as possible we only allow for one agent— 
this allows us to omit an index for B and simplifies some of our definitions, 
yet nothing hinges on this simplifying assumption. 
20. Of course,	 further properties of the doxastic accessibility relation could be 
imposed. Here, we take seriality to be a minimal condition of a doxastic 
accessibility relation. However, nothing we say in this chapter will depend 
on the properties of the doxastic accessibility relation. 
21. Suppose the function symbol q represents a function on U that, similar to the 
num-function, if applied to some element of U outputs the “standard” name 
_ : _
of the object. Then qðc1 Þ ¼ qðc2 Þ is a name of a sentence. But since the 
interpretation of c1 and c2 may change from world to world, 
_ : _ 
qðc1Þ ¼ qðc2Þ may denote, say, the sentence o1 = o2 at world w but the sen­
tence o3 = o5 at world v. 
22. Indeed we could have also defined the interpretation of the Awareness pred­
icate to be a set of sentences only and modify Definition 7.4.6 below 
accordingly. 
23. Admittedly, this sits ill with PWS where propositions are conceived of as sets 
of possible worlds. We shall ignore this issue for the purpose of the formal 
semantics but see Section 7.6.2. 
24. Similarly, disjunction introduction in the scope of B fails, i.e., 
M; w ⊨ f Bc ⇏ M; w ⊨ f Bðc _ wÞ:sk sk 
25. We take this to be a neat feature of	 our semantics but, to be sure, it is not 
unproblematic. Because of basically the same phenomenon B(Ttφ_φ) and  
BTtφ will be equivalent on our semantics, which seems problematic if you 
think of a case like Max’s. Thanks to Ollie Tatton-Brown for raising this issue. 
26. This suggests that the uniform treatment of sentence-denoting singular terms 
in our semantics may be too coarse-grained and that we should treat differ­
ent types of singular terms differently. 
27. It seems particularly unfortunate that disjunction introduction is valid iff ψ 
does not contain a subformula of the form Tt but invalid otherwise. The 
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reason for this asymmetry is that in the former case ψ does not affect the way 
of believing while in the latter case it does. 
28. To some extent this can be accommodated by the fact that the Awareness set 
is contextually controlled but arguably this will only suffice in cases where 
the syntactic information remains constant throughout the discourse. 
29. Without special restrictions in place a term tφ could denote, e.g., the symbol 
‘(’ or some arbitrary other object in the domain. In our semantics sentence 
denoting singular terms will always denote sentences but the philosophical 
question remains of whether this is a plausible assumption once we have 
allowed for non-rigid designators: what guarantees that non-rigid designa­
tors always designate objects of right (syntactic) category? 
30. Arguably, Goldbach’s conjecture is a descriptive	 name but even descriptive 
names are typically thought to rigidly designate their denotatum. Moreover, 
the failure of (OS) in Max case does not seem due to the descriptive property 
conveyed by ‘Goldbach’s conjecture’. 
31. See, Soames (1987), King (2013) or Nelson (2019) for discussion. 
32. Again, kφk is is the set of worlds in which φ is true, i.e., 
kφk :¼ fw 2 W jM; w ⊨ φg 
We can assume kφk to be defined at this stage of the semantic evaluation 
since φ is of lower complexity than Bφ. Ultimately, the semantics would 
amount to a variant of Awareness semantics in the sense of Fagin et al. 
(1995) in which the Awareness set is constrained by a number of specific 
rules. 
33. It is perhaps worth noting that our proposal is not committed to the notion 
of full belief, as opposed to the notion partial belief or credences. The prin­
cipal strategy underlying our semantics, that is, the idea of making the acces­
sibility relation dependent on the way of believing can also be used to 
provide a semantics for truth and partial belief. 
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Suppose you find yourself in the following unfortunate situation: 
PASSPORT 
If you have credence . 0.5 that you’ll remember your passport, then 
when the time comes you’ll end up forgetting it (you’ll get on with 
other things). 
And if you do not have credence . 0.5, then you will end up 
remembering it (you’ll spend your time worrying about it). 
And you know this about yourself. What should your credence be? 
(Closely related to the Archer case from Joyce, 2018, 
or Basketball from Caie, 2013) 
Suppose you adopt credence 0.2 that you’ll remember your passport. 
Then you’ll get on with other things and will forget your passport. And 
you know this. So then you should be certain that you’ll forget your pass-
port, i.e., adopt credence 1. But were you to adopt credence 1 that you’ll 
forget your passport, you would spend all your time worrying about it, 
and thus would remember it. And since you know this about yourself, 
this would recommend adopting credence value 0. More generally, any 
credence value you assign will undermine itself in this sort of way. 
Such scenarios have recently been discussed as a challenge for rational­
ity.1 A rational opinion state should not undermine its own adoption. If 
it does, it cannot be relied on. And in a case like PASSPORT, every credence 
value is undermining so there seems to be no rational options. 
We propose to parallel the kind of underminingness found in PASSPORT 
to that due to the liar sentence: 
Liar: Liar is not true. 
We might naturally reason about the liar sentence as follows: Is it true or 
not? Suppose it were true. Then since it says “Liar is not true”, and Liar is 
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true, we can conclude that it is false. Suppose it were not true. Then since 
it says “Liar is not true”, we can conclude it is true. Reflecting on its 
truth value always results in a contradictory truth value; we might 
describe this as truth value assignments undermining themselves. 
McGee (1989, 1990) argues that one should consider definite truth. 
Some sentences are definitely true, others are definitely false, but some, 
such as Liar, are indefinite. Inspired by the influential construction of 
Kripke (1975), in its supervaluational form, one can obtain an account 
of revision of definite truth value verdicts which allows for “fixed 
points”. We might describe such fixed points as accounts of indefinite 
truth which are not undermining. 
In this chapter, we propose to apply similar considerations to rational 
credence. The chapter starts with a summary of the account of truth in 
Section 8.2, and a presentation the classical account of credences and 
cases like PASSPORT in Section 8.3. 
To account for these kinds of cases we propose allowing the notion of 
credence to be indeterminate, in particular, allowing that no definite cre­
dence value is assigned to PASSPORT. Our first question is how to model 
this (Section 8.4). One could just focus on questions such as whether 
one’s credence in φ is definitely equal to r or definitely not equal to r, 
or neither. But we will suggest that it’s more natural to directly consider 
the indeterminate credal state as a set of precise credence functions: its 
set of precisifications. So instead of focusing on definite judgements 
and considering the collection of precisifications as derivative, we 
directly work with the set of precisifications. This is a model of belief 
which is of independent interest in formal epistemology. Moreover, we 
can understand other supervaluational models by considerations of the 
precisifications, so by directly working with the set of precisifications, 
we can then also apply the results to other proposed models. 
We then need to consider how to revise one’s indeterminate credences, 
i.e., describe a supervaluational Kripkean jump. Section 8.5 proposes a 
very natural supervaluational jump, which revises a set of precisifications 
simply by revising each of the individual precisifications, we call this R. 
But we will see that this can sometimes result in triviality. 
To see how we might avoid this triviality, Section 8.6 returns to consid­
ering the supervaluational Kripkean jump for truth. For truth, one typically 
focuses simply on whether sentences are definitely true, definitely not true, 
or indefinite instead of focusing on the sets of precisifications themselves, 
even though it’s this resultant set of precisifications that’s important for 
defining the supervaluational Kripkean jump. We might also ask what 
happens when we focus on the set of precisifications themselves in the 
case of truth, and revise it by simply revising each of its members (R). It 
too leads to triviality due to the McGee sentence. But the usual supervalua­
tional Kripkean jump for truth (thought of as applying to an assignment of 
definite truth value verdicts) does not correspond to R, but instead 
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additional precisifications are added: those that agree on any definite truth 
value verdicts. This is what allows the usual account to avoid triviality. 
We propose to apply this idea when we focus on sets of precisifcations 
themselves, as we did in the case of credences. Section 8.7 considers 
an alternative jump, closure .R, which explicitly adds additional 
precisifications that are ‘limits’ of the precisifications obtained by revis­
ing each member of the set (R). Formally, we take a topological closure. 
This will allow triviality to be avoided. It is moreover important to note 
that any focus on particular definite judgements for credences will not 
allow the triviality to be avoided in the way that it did for truth. 
Section 8.8 proposes an account of when an imprecise credal state 
is non-undermining: when RðCÞ . C . closureðRðCÞÞ. Since there is 
always some credal state which is a fixed-point of closure .R, there  
is always some credal state which is non-undermining in this sense. 
We thus propose that such credal states are candidates for being ratio­
nal attitudes to adopt. 
Section 8.9 demonstrates that the account we have provided is in fact 
very general and could apply to a whole range of target notions, one just 
needs to spell out a range of objects that play the role of the precisifica­
tions, and to describe how to revise each of these. 
8.2 Truth 
We first briefly present the usual account for truth. 
8.2.1 Classical, Precise Truth 
SETUP 8.2.1. Let L be a base language in which we have the ability to 
code sentences, for ease we might take this to be the language of 
Peano Arithmetic. Let LT extend this with the addition of a unary pred­
icate, T. SentT denotes the sentences of this language. We will assume we 
have a fixed model of our base language, which we assume is the stan­
dard model of arithmetic, denoted N. 
DEFINITION 8.2.2. A precise interpretation of truth, Q, is given by a col­
lection of sentences, i.e., Q 2 PðSentT Þ. The collection of all precise 
interpretations of truth is AllPrecsT ¼ PðSentT Þ. 
The collection Q gives the collection of true sentences. We could 
equivalently think of it as assigning a truth value, true or not-true, to  
each sentence. 
SETUP 8.2.3. ðN; QÞ refers to the classical model of LT resulting from 
expanding the standard model of arithmetic for the base language, N, 
with Q providing the sentences whose codes are in the extension of 
the truth predicate. So we have ðN; QÞ . T⌜φ⌝ iff φ 2 Q. 
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DEFINITION 8.2.4. The Tarskian revision jump, τ, is a function t: 
AllPrecsT ! AllPrecsT with τ(Q) given by 
φ 2 τ(Q) iff ðN; QÞ . φ. 
Note that we have φ 2 Q iff T⌜φ⌝ 2 τ(Q). 
The function τ can be understood as a stage of reflecting on the sup­
posed truth values. To be materially adequate, an interpretation of 
truth should be a fixed point of τ, i.e., Q such that Q = τ(Q). But the 
liar paradox shows us that this is not possible because for the liar sen­
tence, Liar, which is equivalent to ¬T⌜Liar⌝, we have that Liar 2 Q 
iff Liar 2= τ(Q). For an analogy with credences, we might say that 
every precise interpretation of truth is thus undermining. 
8.2.2 Definite Truth 
We now consider (in)definite truth (McGee, 1989, 1990). Some sen­
tences are definitely true, for example ‘0 = 0’, some definitely not true, 
for example ‘0 6¼ 0’, and some neither, for example Liar. A specification 
of which sentences are which is given by a definite verdict assignment: 
DEFINITION 8.2.5. A definite verdict assignment, S, is given by two sets of 
sentences, S+ and S− . 
S+ contains the sentences that are definitely true, and S− the sentences 
that are definitely not true.2 Some sentences may be neither definitely 
true nor definitely not true.3 
Associated with any definite verdict assignment is a collection of 
precise interpretations of truth, its “precisifications”: 
DEFINITION 8.2.6. Q 2 AllPrecsT is a precisification of S = (S+, S−) iff 
. If  φ 2 S+ then φ 2 Q. 
. If  φ 2 S− then φ 2= Q. 
We call the collection of precisifications of S, PrecsðSÞ. 
That is, Q is a precisification if it agrees with the definite verdicts 
given by S: any sentence that S assigns as definitely true should be true in 
Q, and any sentence assigned as definitely not true should be not true in Q. 
One might also consider adding “admissibility conditions” which 
restrict the precisifications to, for example, those that are maximally 
consistent. A more natural implementation of this in our framework is 
just to restrict AllPrecsT to such interpretations. For the purposes of 
this chapter, we will not consider such restrictions but it is easy to 
apply all our considerations with such restrictions, as we will mention 
in Section 8.9. 
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We can also consider a set of precisifications giving rise to a definite 
verdict assignment: 
DEFINITION 8.2.7. Given a set of precisifications, Q . AllPrecsT, DefðQÞ 
is a definite verdict assignment given by: 
þ
. φ 2 DefðQÞ iff φ 2 Q for all Q 2 Q. 
. φ 2 DefðQÞ. iff φ 2= Q for all Q 2 Q. 
That is, if φ is determinately true in Q, then it is assigned as definitely 
true by DefðQÞ, and if it is determinately not true in Q it is assigned as 
definitely not true by DefðQÞ. 
The supervaluational Kripke jump revises a definite verdict assignment 
as follows: 
DEFINITION 8.2.8. Δ(S) is the definite verdict assignment given by: 
. φ 2 Δ(S)+ iff ðN; QÞ ⊨ φ for all Q 2 PrecsðSÞ. 
. φ 2 Δ(S)− iff ðN; QÞ ⊨ φ for all Q 2 PrecsðSÞ. 
Since ðN; QÞ ⊨ φ iff φ 2 τ(Q), we can give an alternative description of 
this: Δ(S) is the definite verdict assignment given by looking at the deter­
minate judgements of the collection of precisifications τ(Q) for 
Q 2 PrecsðSÞ. That’s exactly what Def allowed us to state, so: 
DðSÞ ¼  DefðftðQÞjQ 2 PrecsðSÞgÞ: 
We can further simplify this by making another definition. 
DEFINITION 8.2.9. For a set of precisifications Q . AllPrecsT, 
RtðQÞ :¼ ftðQÞjQ 2 Qg: 
The operation Rt just revises each member of the set in accordance with 
τ, so  ftðQÞ j  Q 2 PrecsðSÞg ¼ RðPrecsðSÞÞ. We then immediately have: 
DðSÞ ¼  DefðRtðPrecsðSÞÞÞ: 
We can use . to denote concatenation, so write this as 
DðSÞ¼  Def . Rt . PrecsðSÞ: 
We can describe this by the following procedure for obtaining Δ(S): 
(i) Starting with a definite verdict assignment, use Precs to move to the 
corresponding set of precisifications. 
(ii) Revise each of the precise interpretations in the set according to	 τ 
(i.e., apply Rt). 
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(iii)	 Use Def to move from the resultant collection of revised precise 
interpretations to the definite verdicts. 
There are fixed points of Δ: accounts of definite truth that are non-
undermining. Moreover, there are non-trivial such fixed points. 
8.3 Precise Credences 
We now move to developing the analogous tools for the case of cre­
dences. We start with the classical, precise setting. 
8.3.1 Credence Functions 
We first start just by specifying the notion of credence function that 
we’re working with in the classical setting. 
SETUP 8.3.1. We start with a non-empty set of sentences, A, which we call 
our agenda.4 
This could be all sentences of a given language, but it can also be more 
restrictive, for example we might consider cases where we are only 
looking at your credence in a single sentence, so where A is a singleton. 
For example we might just be interested in the credence that you’ll forget 
your passport, so A might just contain the sentence saying that you’ll 
forget your passport.5 
DEFINITION 8.3.2. A credence function on an agenda A is a function, c, 
from A to [0, 1]; i.e., it associates with each sentence in A a degree of 
belief, which is a real number between 0 and 1 inclusive. CredsA is the 
set of all credence functions, i.e., all functions from A to [0, 1]. If A 
just contains a single sentence, a credence function can be thought of 
simply as a value in [0, 1] and we will call this a credence value. 
It wouldn’t affect our account if we restrict CredsA to just those functions 
that are finitely-additive probabilities (or, more carefully, which are extend­
able to functions on a Boolean algebra which satisfy the axioms of finitely­
additive probability theory6), as this is still a compact space. However, we 
could not restrict attention to countably-additive probabilities.7 
8.3.2 Revision of Precise Credences 
The Tarskian revision jump, τ, was a way of revising precise interpreta­
tions of truth. For credences, we will suppose we have a revision function 
as given, and our supervaluational account will be a general one that can 
apply to any given revision function.8 Formally: 
DEFINITION 8.3.3. A revision function is a function, ρ, from CredsA to 
CredsA. 
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A precise credence function is undermining if ρ(c)6 c.¼
PASSPORT is a story which directly describes how one should revise one’s 
credence in the target-proposition, that you’ll remember your passport, 
under a step of reflection on the proposed credence value. If we let A 
simply contain this one proposition, then credence functions are just 
values x 2 [0, 1], and the revision function that PASSPORT gives rise to is: . 
1 x < 0:5 
rPASSPORT ðxÞ ¼  
0 x . 0:5 
One can see that there are no fixed points of rPASSPORT. That is, every precise 
credence function undermines its own adoption. In this sense PASSPORT can 
be related to the liar sentence: in both cases, all precise options are 
undermining. 
There are other cases that also give rise to the same revision function 
as PASSPORT, for example: 
BAD NAVIGATOR 
You’ve come to a crossroads and are wondering whether you need to 
turn left or right to get to your hotel. You know you’re a really bad 
navigator. In particular, you believe that if you have credence . 0.5 
that left is the way to your hotel, then it’s actually right; and if not, 
then it’s actually to the left. What should your credence be that it’s 
actually right? 
(Extremal version of an example in Egan and Elga, 2005) 
In this case, the change in one’s credence isn’t due to the causal struc­
ture, but instead simply that the credence that one adopts affects the evi­
dence that one has about the situation. But the same revision function 
describes this case. The same revision function would also arise when 
considering the following self-referential sentence: 
CredLiar: Your credence in CredLiar is not . 0.5. 
In this case, the revision is due to semantic features of the sentence. 
You might also be uncertain about whether you are in a PASSPORT-like 
case: 
GOLF 
You think there’s a small chance, 1%, that whether you’ll be able to suc­
cessfully get this hole-in-one is dependent on the credence you adopt in 
it in a PASSPORT-style way, i.e., where if you have credence . 0.5 then 
you’ll fail, and if not then you’ll succeed. But you’re 99% sure that 
it’s just a normal case and you have a 50% chance of success. 
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This leads to the revision function . 
0:01 . 1 þ 0:99 . 0:5 ¼ 0:505 x . 0:5 
rGOLF ðxÞ ¼  
0:01 . 0 þ 0:99 . 0:5 ¼ 0:495 x < 0:5 
It also might be that one’s credence doesn’t directly provide evidence 
about the truth of the sentence, but instead it affects the chances. Con­
sider, for example, the following scenario discussed by Greaves (2013): 
PROMOTION 
“Alice is up for promotion. Her boss, however, is a deeply insecure 
type: he is more likely to promote Alice if she comes across as 
lacking in confidence. Furthermore, Alice is useless at play-acting, so 
she will come across that way iff she really does have a low degree 
of belief that she’s going to get the promotion. Specifically, the 
chance of her getting the promotion will be 1 − x, where x is whatever 
degree of belief she chooses to have in the proposition P that she will 
be promoted. What credence in P is it epistemically rational for Alice 
to have?” 
(Greaves, 2013, pp. 1–2) 
(Moreover Greaves assumes “that the agent is aware of the specification 
of . . . her case”.) If Alice considers adopting credence 0.2 in P; then the 
chance of P would be 0.8, and she knows that, so that would recommend 
adopting credence 0.8. More generally, the description of this case 
directly provides us with the revision function 
rPROMOTIONðxÞ ¼ 1 . x: 
Unlike for the PASSPORT revision function, this function does have a fixed 
point, 0.5. 
All the cases we’ve seen so far are unusual cases. In normal cases, the 
credence one adopts provides no additional evidence about the situation 
at hand. 
RAIN 
The credence that you adopt that it is going to rain tomorrow provides 
no additional evidence about the likelihood of rain. 
In this case, ρ(x) =  x. More generally, in normal cases ρ(c) =  c for all c, 
or at least all c which are probabilistic.9 And most theorising about ratio­
nality has focused on these “safe” cases. 
This same revision function might also arise in a case where the cre­
dence one adopts does provide additional information: 
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LEAP 
The chance you’ll successfully leap across this chasm is identical to 
your credence. 
(Greaves, 2013, see also James, 1897) 
We do not assume any further modelling of this revision function, we 
simply assume that any scenario gives rise to such a revision function. 
Any further modelling of ρ would have allow for the range of cases men­
tioned so far. It has to allow for logical, causal and evidential impact (as in 
CredLiar, PASSPORT, and BAD NAVIGATOR), and this might go via chance 
(like PROMOTION) or be directly about the proposition (as in PASSPORT), 
or be associated with further uncertainty. Our account does not depend 
on any further specifics of the revision function, we can simply take it 
as an input to our account. The revision function should encode the 
idea of reflecting on one’s credences, and we are adopting the idea that 
to be rational, a precise credence function should be a fixed point of 
this revision function.10 Otherwise a credence function is undermining. 
There are two suggestions for how one could include further model­
ling or explanation of the revision function. 
Firstly, one might simply take ρ(c) to be  c conditionalised on “c is my 
credence function”. If we assume that one’s initial credence function sat­
isfies certain other constraints of rationality such as deferring to chances 
(by satisfying the so-called Principal Principle) this should lead to the 
revision functions proposed. The idea of this is to result in notions like 
those of Joyce (2018) or Konek and Levinstein (2019), as opposed to 
the “consequentialist” recommendation notions of, for example, Petti­
grew (2018) and Caie (2013).11 
Alternatively, one might want to explicitly include a possible worlds 
structure in the modelling and then define ρ using this. This is particu­
larly natural for accounting for a language with sentences that can talk 
about the credence one has in that very sentence, i.e., cases like PrLiar. 
This kind of picture has commonly been used when developing accounts 
for languages with modal predicates (Halbach et al., 2003; Stern, 2015; 
Campbell-Moore, 2015; Halbach and Welch, 2009; Nicolai, 2018). 
Given a fixed possible world structure, with various worlds and proba­
bilistic accessibility relations between them, we consider a precise inter­
pretation to be given by an assignment of a credence function at each 
world: a credal-evaluation-function. We can then directly define the 
revision of a credal-evaluation-function by taking the weighted propor­
tion of the accessible worlds where the sentence is evaluated as true 
when the initial credal-evaluation-function provides the interpretation 
of the credence function symbol at the various worlds.12 
There are two reasons to focus simply on credence functions rather 
than using a possible world structure. Firstly, it is simpler and all our con­
siderations will immediately apply to the more general setting (Section 8.9). 
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Secondly, it is not directly obvious how to provide a possible worlds 
model for the cases like PROMOTION where the impact goes via chances. 
And insofar as it deals with PASSPORT or BAD NAVIGATOR it just treats 
them like CredLiar, for example, we wouldn’t represent ‘the hotel is to 
the left’ as an atomic sentence, as would be most natural, but instead as 
a sentence that refers to itself. Whilst this leads to the right revision func­
tion, it does not seem to be the right analysis of the sentence itself. We thus 
find it valuable to not encode further modelling such as this, but to simply 
provide the account for any specified revision function; though in section 
8.9 we note how our account immediately applies to the possible worlds 
setting. 
8.4 How to Model Indeterminate Credences 
In the case of truth we focused on definite truth value verdicts. When 
considering indeterminate credences, what should we think about? We 
suggest that we directly work with a set of precise credence functions, 
that is, we consider one’s indeterminate credal state to be given by a 
non-empty set C . CredsA. The precise credence functions in the set 
will be called the ‘precisifications’ of the indeterminate credal state. 
So, for example, if our agenda contains a single proposition, a precise 
credence function is some real number between 0 and 1, whereas an 
indeterminate credal state is given by a set of numbers, e.g., {0.2, 0.3}, 
or [0.2, 0.3]. It remains indefinite which of the credence values in the 
set it is, but it is, for example, definitely not 0.9. 
This model of belief is closely related to one that is familiar in formal 
epistemology under the term ‘imprecise probabilities’, ‘indeterminate prob­
abilities’, or ‘mushy credences’.13 It has been proposed for a range of 
reasons, including being able to represent incomparability as distinct 
from indifference, distinguishing between lack of evidence and symmetric 
evidence, allowing for suspension of judgement, and rationalising intuitively 
rational responses to certain decision problems (Joyce, 2010; Bradley, 2015; 
Levi, 1978; Jeffrey, 1984). Its interpretation is debated. 
To more closely match the application to truth, we might instead iden­
tify some particular judgements and ask whether they definitely hold, def­
initely don’t hold, or neither. For example, we might only care about 
whether one’s credence in φ is definitely equal to r, definitely not equal 
to r, or neither. But the account will be then be very weak. For 
example, a case like GOLF would not get assigned a credence value at 
all. This thus doesn’t respect the fact that your credence should definitely 
be . 0.3, which we would get out of the more expressive framework 
when we look directly at the set of precisifications. Furthermore, this is 
a difference that might be used in decision making. One might instead 
then try to be more expansive about the kinds of definite verdicts that 
are being considered. We might consider whether your credence is defi­
nitely . r or definitely not . r. Again, this can be criticised for leaving 
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out potentially definite judgements such as that φ is more likely than ψ, or  
that φ is evidence for ψ, or that I’m certain in at least one of φ1, φ2,  . . . .  
By focusing on sets of precisifications themselves, however, every 
definite judgement is encoded. Any B . Creds can be thought of 
as a property of one’s credences, for example, B ¼ fc j cðφÞ > cðcÞg
is the property that you think φ is more likely than ψ; B ¼ 
fc j cðφ j cÞ > cðφÞg is the property that you take ψ to be evidence for 
φ; and B ¼ fc j cðφkÞ ¼ 1 for some kÞg is the property that you are 
certain of at least one of φ1, φ2, . . . . For any set of precisifications C, 
we can say whether it definitely satisfies that property, definitely 
doesn’t, or neither, by considering whether C . B, C \B ¼ ;, or  
neither. Focusing on the set of precisifications, C, itself is equivalent to 
focusing on definite judgements on all properties, at least when we 
ignore any differences in definite judgement assignments that don’t cor­
respond to differences in resultant precisifications.14 And since differ­
ences that don’t constitute differences in precisifications will not affect 
the supervaluational jump, considering sets of precisifications themselves 
is the most general model available for our purposes. Focusing on any 
particular definite judgements can then be considered as special cases 
of our general account. Unlike for truth, though, the kinds of triviality 
issues we face when working with sets of precise credences will often 
arise for these other models, at least whenever one is interested both in 
whether a property is definitely satisfied and whether it is definitely 
not satisfied. (See Section 8.9 for further discussion.) 
8.5 The Jump R Revising Indeterminate Credence 
8.5.1 R Applied to Credences 
We now turn to revision of one’s indeterminate credences. Recall our 
presentation of the supervaluational Kripkean jump for truth as: 
DðSÞ ¼ Def .Rt . Precs ðSÞ: 
We described this with the following procedure: (i) use Precs to move 
from a definite verdict assignment to the corresponding set of precisifica­
tions; (ii) use the Tarskian revision function, τ, to revise each of these 
(Rt); and (iii) use Def to move from the resultant set of revised precise 
interpretations back to the define verdicts assignment. 
I suggest that what motivates this definition of Δ is just the revision of 
each of the members of the set, Rt, but since Δ is defined on the definite 
verdicts model rather than sets of precisifications, we have to also intro­
duce stages (i) and (iii) to find Rt’s treatment of definite verdicts. 
In the case of credences, however, we have suggested working directly 
with a set of precisifications, and want to know how to revise that. So 
stages (i) and (iii) aren’t needed and we might suggest that the analogous 
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way to revise a set of precisifications is just to revise each of the precisi­
fications, i.e., just apply stage (ii). We defined Rt for the case of truth as 
RtðQÞ :¼ ftðQÞ jQ 2 Qg. We now simply present this as a more general 
definition that can apply to any revision function: 
DEFINITION 8.5.1. For a given (fixed) revision function ρ, 
RrðCÞ :¼ frðcÞ j c 2 Cg: 
We will generally drop the subscript as it’s typically clear which revi­
sion function is used. 
This simply takes the collection of revised individuals. It is a very intu­
itive notion of revision applied to a indeterminate credence, understood 
as a set of precisifications. It also seems to follow naturally from the 
supervaluationist idea that what happens on the supervaluational-side 
supervenes on what happens on the precise side. 
Consider PASSPORT, BAD NAVIGATOR or CredLiar. We simply focus on 
an agenda consisting of the single sentence at stake in each of these sce­
narios, so credence functions are given by real numbers between 0 and 1. 
Supervaluational credences are given by sets of precise credences, so 
this will be a set of real numbers between 0 and 1. Consider adopting 
the set consisting just of the two extremal credences, f0; 1g. Revision 
of precise credences is spelled out by ρPASSPORT. In particular, credence 0 
recommends adopting credence 1; and 1 recommends 0. When we 
apply R to the set f0; 1g we just revise each member, so we have 
Rðf0; 1gÞ ¼ frð0Þ; rð1Þg ¼ f1; 0g ¼ f0; 1g. The indeterminate credal 
state {0, 1} is a fixed point of R. Whilst each precisification is undermin­
ing, the set, as a whole, is a non-undermining attitude to adopt in these 
cases. 
We might consider in general saying that an imprecise credal state is 
non-undermining iff it’s a fixed point of R. However, there is a 
formal issue facing this proposal: R may not have any (non-trivial) 
fixed points. Thus, if our notion of underminingness is spelled out just 
with R, we still might end up with a situation where every credal 
state, precise or imprecise, is undermining, and thus not a candidate 
for the rational response to the situation. Ultimately, we will suggest 
an alternative notion of underminingness which will always allow for 
a non-undermining response. 
8.5.2 R Doesn’t Always Have a Fixed Point 
Consider the following kind of scenario: 
SPRING 
You know that you’re always overconfident in this type of situation. 
Except you also know that a credence value of 0 would be wrong. 
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0 1/8 1/4 1/2 1 
. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .... 
1/8 1/4 1/20 1 
Figure 8.1 Illustration of rSpring 
What revision function does this lead to? It will have that ρ(0) > 0, and 
for all x > 0,  ρ(x)< x. To say more about it, though, we need further 
details about this case: ‘how overconfident?’ ‘how wrong?’. In fact, I 
think natural ways of adding to this story will not guarantee a notion 
of a particular credence value being recommended, instead it might 
allow for ties. But for simplicity, this chapter focuses on the case 
where we have a fully specified revision function.15 In fact it doesn’t 
matter how we spell it out, any revision function with these properties 
leads to a R which has no fixed points. To work with a concrete 
example, we suppose that additional details are added to the case so 
that we obtain the following revision function:16 
. 
1 x ¼ 0 
rSpringðxÞ ¼  x x > 0 
2 
See Figure 8.1 for an illustration. 
As in the cases like PASSPORT, every credence value is undermining. 
But, unlike in PASSPORT, there is also no indeterminate credal state 
which is a fixed point of R. Even though R is monotone, we result in 
the empty set of precisifications, which is not a legitimate imprecise 
opinion state. 
PROPOSITION 8.5.2. There is no (non-empty) fixed point of RSpring. 
Proof. We will first observe that for any C and n . 1, any x 2 RnðCÞ has 
0 < x .
2n
1 
. (See Figure 8.2.) Recall that x 2 RnðCÞ iff there is y 21 . 
Rn.1ðCÞ with x ¼ rðyÞ. So we equivalently need to show that any x 2 
RnðCÞ has 0 < rðxÞ . 1= 2 .n 
Base case: For any x > 0, rðxÞ ¼ x= 2 > 0 (and ρ(x) . 1). Also ρ(0) ¼ 
1 > 0. Thus, any x 2 C . ½0; 1. has 0 < ρ(x) . 1, as required. 
Inductive step: For any x 2 RnðCÞ, 0 < x . 1= 2n.1 . So  ρ(x), which ¼ x= 2 
1
nhas 0 < rðxÞ .  = 2n
2 
.1 ¼ 1= , as required. 2 
x x x x
x x x
x x
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0 x x x x x
Figure 8.2	 Illustration of R with SPRING. x can lie only in the gap between the 
crosses 
Now, suppose C ¼ RðCÞ. Then C ¼ RnðCÞ for all n. So any  x 2 C has 
x . 1= 2n.1 for all n. But the only such x is 0, and we also require that x > 0.  
So C ¼ ∅. □ 
So, this supervaluational jump does not guarantee that undermining 
credal states can be avoided. So we shouldn’t use this alone to character­
ise underminingness. 
8.6 Supervaluational Kripkean Jump for Truth as It Applies to 
Sets of Precisifications 
In order to develop a notion of underminingness which will always allow 
for non-undermining credal states, we first consider how the supervalua­
tional Kripkean jump for truth avoids triviality. This will lead us to con­
sider an alternative jump, closure .R. Both jumps, R and closure .R, 
will be used in the characterisation of underminingness. 
8.6.1 Rt Has No Fixed Points 
Some revision functions, such as that for PASSPORT, do lead to fixed points 
of R, whereas the revision function for Spring rules them out. What 
about the Tarskian revision function for truth, τ? Does just revising a 
set of precise interpretations of truth by revising each according to τ 
(Rt) have fixed point? It does not.17 To show this, we note that the 
McGee sentence leads to SPRING-style phenomena. The McGee sentence, 
McGee, is given by: 
McGee: Some truth iteration of McGee is not true. 
Or, more formally, where 
k z-------}|-------{
McGee is equivalent to :8k > 0T⌜T . . .⌜T ⌜McGee⌝⌝ . . .⌝: 
2 
3 
196 Catrin Campbell-Moore 
in R(Q) in R2 (Q) in R3 (Q) in R4 (Q) · · · 
































Figure 8.3 Illustration of R with the McGee sentence. 
One can then use this to show: 
PROPOSITION 8.6.1 (See also Halbach, 2014, Theorem 14.11). There is no 
(non-empty) fixed point of Rt. 
Proof. We will first observe that for any Q and n . 1, any Q 2 RnðQÞ 
has Ti⌜McGee⌝ 2 Q for all 0 . i < n − 1, but also has some k with 
Tk⌜McGee⌝ 2= Q. (See Figure 8.3.) That is, any Q 2RnðQÞ has 
Ti⌜McGee⌝ 2 τ(Q) for all 0 . i < n, but also some Tk⌜McGee⌝ 2= τ(Q). 
Base case: We just need to show that for any Q 2 Q, some 
Tk⌜McGee⌝ 2= τ(Q). Since we always have φ 2 Q iff T⌜φ⌝ 2 τ(Q), if 
Tk⌜McGee⌝ 2= Q, then Tk+1⌜McGee⌝ 2= τ(Q). So we just need to con­
sider Q where there is no such k. For such Q, ðN; QÞ ⊭ McGee, so  
McGee 2= τ(Q) giving us our k = 0. 
Inductive step: by our inductive hypothesis we have that any Q 2 RnðQÞ 
has Ti⌜McGee⌝ 2 Q for all 0 . i < n − 1, but also has some Tk⌜McGee⌝ 
2= Q. So, since T⌜φ⌝ 2 τ(Q) iff  φ 2 Q, we have  Ti+1⌜McGee⌝ 2 Q for all 
0 . i < n − 1 and Tk+1 ⌜McGee⌝ 2= Q. Thus Ti⌜McGee⌝ 2 τ(Q) for all 
1 . i < n and some Tk⌜McGee⌝ 2= τ(Q). Also ðN; QÞ⊭McGee, so  
McGee 2 τ(Q) as required for i = 0. 
Now, suppose Q ¼ RðQÞ. Then also  Q ¼ RnðQÞ for all n. So any  Q 2 Q 
has Tn⌜McGee⌝ 2 Q for all n. But also Tk⌜McGee⌝ 2= Q for some k. So  
Q ¼ ∅. □ 
8.6.2 How Δ Acts on Sets of Precisifications 
We have thus seen that like for our revision function for the SPRING case, 
the Tarskian revision function for truth means that revising a set of 
precisifications by just revising each of the members leads to 
triviality. However, the usual supervaluational Kripke jump for truth, 
Δ, does not act on sets of precisifications simply by revising 
each member of the set (i.e., R) instead it acts in accordance with 
Precs . Def .R: If  PrecsðSÞ ¼ Q, then DðSÞ ¼ Def .R ðQÞ, so  
PrecsðDðSÞÞ ¼ Precs . Def .R ðQÞ. See Figure 8.4. 







Precs ◦ Def ◦ R  (Q) 
Adds further interpretations 
which agree with determinate 
truth value verdicts of R(Q). 
Includes all-true. 
Figure 8.4	 Revising a definite verdict assignment and revising the set of 
precisifications 
By applying Precs . Def to RðQÞ, additional precisifications are 
added. In particular any additional precisifications that agree with any 
of the determinate truth value verdicts, i.e., those truth value verdicts 
which are unanimously agreed on. More carefully: Q. 2 Precs . 
Def ðQÞ iff for any φ, 
.  if  φ 2 Q for all Q 2 Q then φ 2 Q*, and 
.  if  φ 2= Q for all Q 2 Q then φ 2= Q*. 
Any further relationships between sentences do not need to be respected 
by all Q* in Precs . Def ðQÞ. For example, even if every Q 2 Q has 
at least one of φ or ψ true, if both are indeterminate we can have 
some Q. 2 Precs . Def ðQÞ with both φ and ψ not true. This means, 
for example, that even though RðQÞ only contains maximally consistent 
precise interpretations, Precs . Def . R ðQÞ can contain inconsistent 
precise interpretations. 
Similarly, each Q 2 RðQÞ puts at least one of Tk⌜McGee⌝ as not-true. 
However, since each Tk⌜McGee⌝ is indeterminate according to RðQÞ, so  
we can find some Qall-true in Precs . Def . R ðQÞ which agrees with any 
determinate truth value verdicts of RðQÞ but which puts all Tk⌜McGee⌝ 
as true. This is what allows Δ to have fixed points, where R does not. 
PROPOSITION 8.6.2. There is some Qall-true in Precs . Def . R ðAllPrecsTÞ 
such that we have Tk⌜McGee⌝ 2 Qall‐true for all k. There is no such Qall­
true in RðAllPrecsTÞ. 
Proof. We argued in 8.6.1 that there is no such Qall-true in 
RðAllPrecsTÞ. We need to show there is some such in 
Precs . Def . R ðAllPrecsTÞ. 
Consider any Q0 2 AllPrecsT. Set Qn = τn(Q0). Note that 
Qn 2 RnðAllPrecsTÞ, and also that Qn 2 RðAllPrecsTÞ. 
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Define Qall-true by φ 2 Qall‐true iff φ is stably true in hQni, that is there is 
some k with φ 2 Qn for all n > k. Since every Tn ⌜McGee⌝ is stable true, 
it is in Qall-true.
18 
We can then show that 2 Precs . Def . R ðAllPrecsTÞ. NoteQall‐true 
that we have fQ1; Q2; . . .g .  RðAllPrecsTÞ. If  φ 2 Q for all 
Q 2 RðAllPrecsTÞ, then φ 2 Qn for all n > 0, so  φ 2 Qall‐true. If  φ 2= Q 
for all Q 2 RðAllPrecsTÞ, then φ 2= Qn for any n > 0, so  φ = :2 Qall‐true
Thus, since Qall-true agrees with any determinate truth value verdicts of 
RðAllPrecsTÞ, it is in  Precs . Def . R ðAllPrecsTÞ (this is an immediate 
consequence of the definitions of Precs and Def). □ 
8.7 An Alternative Jump for Indeterminate Credence 
How can we take these insights and apply them to credence, where we are 
working directly with the set of precisifications model? When viewed 
through the lenses of sets of precisifications, the usual supervaluational 
jump for truth, Δ, adds additional precisifications: it corresponds to 
Precs . Def . R rather than R. We similarly propose an alternative 
jump for imprecise credences, closure . R, which also adds additional pre­
cisifications. Which ones? For truth, Precs . Def . R adds to R any 
precise interpretations which agree on any truth value verdicts that are 
unanimously agreed on by all Q 2 RðQÞ. For example, in the case of 
McGee it adds some Qall-true. For credences, we will instead directly use 
underlying structure of the real numbers, and take a topological closure. 
That is, we will directly consider the jump given by first revising each 
member of the set, and then taking the closure of the resultant set, where 
the notion of closure is given as follows: 
DEFINITION 8.7.1. c. 2 closureðCÞ iff there is a sequence, hcαi, (not neces­
sarily following the revision function) with each cα 2 C and where hcαi 
converges to c *, i.e., where for all φ 2 A and for all . > 0, there is 
some β such that for all α > β, |cα(φ)−c *(φ)| < ..19 
To see how these definitions work, consider how they apply in the case 
of SPRING (see Figure 8.5). 
R just revises each member of the set, so recalling the revision function 
for this case as spelled out in Section 8.5.2, we have 
1 1 1 1 1Rðf0; 1; = 2; = 4; . . .  gÞ ¼ f1; = 2; = 4; = 8; . . .g: 
The sequence h1; 1= 2; 1= 4; . . .i converges to 0, and each member of the 
sequence is a member of Rðf0; 1; 1= ; . . .  gÞ. So when we take the2
closure of this set we will add 0, resulting in: 
; 1 1 1 1closure . R ðf0; 1; 1= 2 = 4; . . .gÞ ¼  closureðf1; = ; = 4; = 8; . . .gÞ2
1 1 1¼ f0; 1; = ; = ; = ; . . .g;2 4 8






closure ◦ R  (C) 
Figure 8.5	 By including the additional credence, 0, we find a fixed point in the 
case of SPRING 
This set is a fixed point of closure . R in the SPRING case. 
In order to show our general result that closure . R always has fixed 
points, we need to say a bit more about this notion of closure. 
A space, in this case CredsA, with a notion of closure gives us a topol­
ogy.20 In fact, the notion of closure defined in Definition 8.7.1 gives us 
the so-called topology of pointwise convergence, with the underlying 
topology on the real numbers being the standard one. There is an impor­
tant property of this topology: it is compact. This is the property that 
allows us to show that closure . R has fixed points. 
We can now move to defining compactness (which we state in the 
form that we need for our main result21). 
DEFINITION 8.7.2. C is closed if C ¼ closureðCÞ. 
DEFINITION 8.7.3. A space with a notion of closure is compact iff when­
ever C is a collection of closed sets which has the finite intersection 
property, 
i.e., for any finite sub-collection C1; . . . ; Ck 2 C, C1\ . . .  \Ck 6¼ ∅ 
then \ C ¼6 ∅. 
PROPOSITION 8.7.4. CredsA (with the specified notion of closure) is 
compact. 
Proof Idea. Note that [0, 1] is compact as it is a closed and bounded 
subset of R. Tychonoff’s theorem (see, e.g., Willard, 1970, Theorem 
17.8) says that the product of compact spaces is compact. We gave 
the notion of closure which corresponds to the topology of pointwise con­
vergence, which is just the product topology ½0; 1. A, and is therefore 
compact. □ 
200 Catrin Campbell-Moore 
There are some other properties that are equivalent to compactness: 
that every convergent sequence has a limit point, or that every sequence 
whatsoever has a cluster point.22 If we call a collection of sets consistent 
if it has some common member, i.e., has non-empty intersection, then we 
can describe this as: any collection of closed sets which is finitely consis­
tent is consistent. Since we are looking for fixed points of closure .R 
rather than R we can focus just on closed properties, as is done in the 
topological definition of compactness. 
This allows us to show our main result: 
THEOREM 8.7.5. For any ρ, there is a non-empty fixed point of 
closure .R. 
Proof. Define a sequence 
. C0 :¼ CredsA, 
. Cαþ1 :¼ closure .R ðCαÞ, 
. Cm :¼ \α<m Cα. 
closure .R is monotone, that is: 
SUBLEMMA 8.7.5.1. If C . C 0 then closure .R ðCÞ . closure .R ðC 0 Þ. 
Proof. It is easy to observe that R is monotone, that is, if C . C 0 then 
RðCÞ . RðC 0 Þ. 
Also, closure is monotone: Suppose C . C 0 . For any, c. 2 closureðC 0 Þ, 
there is a sequence hcαi in C 0 which convergs to c *. This sequence is also a 
0 
sequence in any C . C . So  c. 2 closureðCÞ. 
And thus, closure .R, which is the result of composing these, is also 
monotone. □ 
So, by starting with C0 ¼ CredsA, where we have C0 . 
closure .R ðC0Þ, we have that for α < β, Cα . Cb; and there must be a 
(possibly empty) fixed point of closure .R. 
We need to check that this fixed point is non-empty, which we do by 
induction.23 
. Base case: C0 6¼ CredsA ¼ ∅. 
. Successor case: For any c 2 Cα, rðcÞ 2 RðCαÞ, and since 
0 0 0 
closureðC Þ . C for any C (as the constant sequence hc 0 , c 0 ,  . . .i 
converges to c 
0 
), also rðcÞ 2 closureðRðCαÞÞ ¼ Cαþ1. 
. Limit case: Suppose each Cα 6 fCα j α < mg is a col­¼ ∅ for α < μ. 
lection of closed subsets of Creds. For α < β, Cα . Cb, so any finite 
subcollection has a non-empty intersection. Thus, by definition 
8.7.3, Cm 6 □¼ ∅. 
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We will now spell out a notion of underminingness applied to impre­
cise credences, and use this result to show that there are always some 
non-undermining credal states. 
8.8 Characterising Underminingness 
We had originally considered suggesting that an imprecise credal state is 
non-undermining iff it is a fixed point of R. But with this definition, in 
the case of SPRING, not only are all precise credence functions undermin­
ing, also all the imprecise credences are too. However, we have now con­
sidered also taking the closure of R, and seen that closure .R will 
always have fixed point imprecise credences. 
We propose to characterise undermining imprecise credal states by:24 
DEFINITION 8.8.1. C is non-undermining iff RðCÞ . C . closure ðRðCÞÞ: 
This says that every c 2 C should have its recommended credence in 
the set, i.e., RðCÞ . C, and that every credence function in the set 
should either be recommended by some member of the set or be the 
limit of a sequence of such recommended functions, i.e., C . 
closureðRðCÞÞ. 
This definition allows that any C which is a fixed point of R is non­
undermining.25 So are any fixed points of closure .R, and thus by 
Theorem 8.7.5 there is always some non-undermining credal state. A 
state can also be non-undermining without being a fixed point of 
either of these if it contain some but not all members of the closure.26 
What credal states are non-undermining in the cases mentioned? 
(Most of these were introduced in Section 8.3.) 
. For the PASSPORT case, {0, 1} is the only credal state which is non-
undermining. The same revision function is used for BAD NAVIGATOR 
and CredLiar, so the same holds for these cases too. 
. GOLF is similar, and the only non-undermining credal state is {0.495, 
0.505}. 
. For normal cases, like RAIN, where ρ(c) =  c for all c, every imprecise 
credal state, C, is a fixed point of R, and thus is non-undermining. 
Note that if we required states to be fixed points of closure .R, then 
a set which is not closed, such as ð0:2; 0:8Þ ¼ fx j 0:2 < x < 0:8g
would be undermining as it doesn’t contain its limit points of 0.2 and 
0.8. But we would like to say that it is non-undermining, and our 
definition allows this. 
. Since the revision function of LEAP is identical to that of RAIN, it too 
says that any C is non-undermining. 
. For an extremal version of LEAP where ρ(x) = 1 if  x . 0.5 and ρ(x) = 0  
if x < 0.5, the non-undermining options are 0, 1 and {0, 1}.27 
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. For PROMOTION, the precise credence 0.5 is non-undermining. But so 
is any imprecise credence with x 2 C iff 1. x 2 C, e.g., {0.2, 0.8}, or 
(0.2, 0.8).28 
. For SPRING, 0; 1; 1 2; 1 4; . . .  = g=f is a fixed point of closure .R; it is the 
only non-undermining state. 
8.9 Other Applications and General Considerations 
We have here considered the notions of truth and rational credence. But 
the considerations and construction we give here is very general. It could 
fruitfully apply to a whole range of target domains, for example: refer­
ence or satisfaction; membership or exemplification; necessity or knowl­
edge; or decision theoretic or game theoretic rationality.29 All one needs 
in order to apply it to a target domain is to specify the collection of all 
potential precisifications, AllPrecs, and how to revise each of them, 
i.e., specify a revision function, r : AllPrecs ! AllPrecs. The revision 
function should be such that one would like to find fixed points of it, 
though this may not be possible. This can be done for all the domains 
mentioned. 
For truth, AllPrecs was given by PðSentT Þ and the revision function 
was spelled out with Tarskian truth revision jump, τ. But we could 
also consider variations of this setup, for example, we might consider 
restricting to just certain kinds of precise interpretations, for example 
those that are maximally consistent. 
For credences, AllPrecs was given by CredsA ¼ ½0; 1. A and we just 
took the revision function to be (externally) given. We could also 
modify this setup. We could restrict it to just the functions that are 
(finitely additive) probability functions. We could also consider cre­
dence, or probability, as spelled out over possible world structures. 
(See Section 8.3.2 for a brief description of this and the associated revi­
sion function.) We can thus obtain a supervaluational variant of a Krip­
kean account of probability paralleling the strong Kleene version 
developed in Campbell-Moore (2015), or a probabilistic variant of 
the supervaluational Kripkean account of necessity as in Nicolai 
(2018).30 There are some advantages of the supervaluational approach 
over the strong Kleene one, especially as understood as giving sets of 
credal-evaluation-functions. For example, we can immediately read off 
a whole range of definite facts, for example about conditional probabil­
ity, whereas it’s not immediately clear how to consider conditional prob­
ability in a strong Kleene framework. We might also consider joint 
theories of credence and truth. 
Once one has a collection of potential precisifications, we can then 
consider the indeterminate variant of one’s target notion to be given 
by sets of precisifications. And we can define an operator R which 
applies to a set of precisifications just by revising each precise 
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interpretation in accordance with the specified revision function. Whilst 
very natural, this will also typically not guarantee fixed points. 
Having further investigated the usual supervaluational account for 
truth as it applies to sets of precisifications, we proposed allowing one 
to add additional precisifications which are not individually recom­
mended, but are in the closure of the set of recommended precisifica­
tions. To apply this in general, one also needs to define an appropriate 
notion of closure, which should be monotone and increasing. Many 
domains come along with natural notions of closure.31 Often this will 
be compact, as for example our topology on Creds was. There are 
some limitations, for example, if we restrict the precise interpretations 
of truth to those that are ω-consistent, or the credence functions to 
those that are countably-additive, compactness is lost. Whenever the 
space it is compact, fixed points of closure . R can be found. 
We then proposed a notion of when indeterminate credal states are 
non-undermining: when RðCÞ .  C . closureðRðCÞÞ. And we observed 
that since closure . R has non-trivial fixed points, there are always 
some non-undermining credal states. The analogous definition could 
be applied to other domains and further investigated. Or one might 
explicitly focus on closure . R.32 
Our main focus has been on sets of precisifications, but one might be 
interested some independently specified supervaluational models. For 
example, just focusing on certain definite judgements as is usually 
done for truth. Again, the general account we have developed here can 
immediately apply. To apply it, one should spell out operators analogous 
to Precs and Def, which we used for truth, that allow us to associate sets 
of precisifications with one’s independently specified models. One can 
then consider two jumps on these supervaluational models, one which 
tracks the action of R on one’s supervaluational models 
(Def . R . Precs), and the other that tracks the action of closure . R 
(Def . closure . R . Precs). Usually, the jump of one’s supervaluational 
models corresponding to closure . R will obtain fixed points whereas 
that corresponding to R often does not. 
However sometimes the action of R on one’s supervaluational models 
does lead to fixed points even though R itself does not. This is what we 
observed in the case of truth where the action of R on definite verdict 
assignments was given by Δ and had non-trivial fixed points even 
though R did not. This is because in this special case, the jumps R 
and closure . R are identical insofar as they act on definite verdict 
assignments. The formal reason for this is that any Q. 2 closureðQÞ is 
in Precs . Def ðQÞ. 
But this typically won’t be the case, especially for a notion like credence. 
For example, if we work with definite judgements regarding one’s cre­
dences, R and closure . R will act differently. Consider focusing on defi­
nite judgements as to whether one’s credence in φ is > r or not. In the case of 
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SPRING, for example, every c 2 RðCredsÞ has cðSpringÞ > 0, so this is  a  
definite judgement, but when we consider closure . R ðCredsÞ we find 
that c(φ) > 0 is no longer definitely satisfied as some member of the 
closure has c(φ) = 0. This means that even once we consider definite judge­
ments in the case of credences, we have to work with the jump analogous to 
closure . R rather than R to ensure there are fixed points. 
It would not help to focus on definite judgements regarding different 
properties. For example, regarding whether one’s credence is . r, or  
equal to r, at least if one is interested both in whether it definitely 
holds and whether it definitely doesn’t hold. This is because for either 
the positive or negative component, taking a closure can make a differ­
ence, and thus the jumps corresponding to R and closure . R will differ, 
and it’s only closure . R that will guarantee fixed points. Formally, this 
is because, for the case of credences, a set and its complement won’t both 
be closed (unless one of them is empty). It was a special feature of truth-
values (they’re discrete) that meant that focussing on definite truth value 
verdicts allowed triviality to be avoided.33 
There are still ways to avoid such worries. Consider modelling one’s 
supervaluational credences with a partial function, where to to some sen­
tences you do not form any attitude whatsoever, and to the others, you 
assign normal precise values. This is essentially caring about whether 
one’s credence is definitely equal to r without caring about whether it is 
definitely not equal to r. Since taking a closure of a set cannot reject any 
definite credence value assignments, R and closure . R act identically 
on these definite credence value assignments, and thus there will be 
fixed points of the jump associated with R (as there are fixed points of 
the jump associated with closure . R). This will be the case whenever 
we only consider positive definite judgements on closed properties. But 
one very legitimately might be interested in other properties, such as 
whether one’s credence is definitely > r, or if  it’s definitely  not  equal to  
r, in which  case  closure . R needs to be considered. 
In summary: We have proposed an account of underminingness 
applying to indeterminate credal states where there are always non-
undermining indeterminate credal states even in the face of certain sce­
narios which have recently been considered as a challenge to rationality, 
and which bear a close relationship to the liar paradox. Along the way, 
we have obtained a deeper understanding of the supervaluational Krip­
kean account of truth, especially as it applies to sets of precisifications, 
and offered a very general account that could be applied to a whole 
range of target domains. 
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Notes 
1. Recent discussion of such cases was initiated by Caie (2013) and Greaves 
(2013). However they both consider rationality considerations to apply to 
these cases in a consequentialist manner, which is not the way I am working 
with them. Instead, I am following Konek and Levinstein (2019) and Joyce 
(2018). See also Carr (2017) and Pettigrew (2018) for further discussion. 
2. We have chosen to follow McGee (1989, 1990) in thinking about this as defi­
nite truth rather than a partial interpretation of truth as Kripke (1975) did. All 
the formal work would equally well apply to the partial interpretations picture. 
3. Whilst we officially allow that sentences may be both in S+ and S−, such defi­
nite verdict assignments will have no precisifications, and thus will be trivial. 
4. It would not affect our account if we took them to be propositions under­
stood in a different way, e.g., they could be sets of possible worlds. 
5. We may need to ensure that A contains all relevant sentences to obtain the revi­
sion notion; that is, the rationally recommended credence value of a sentence in 
A is settled by a hypothesis about the credence value of sentences in A. See the 
notion of self-ref agenda from Campbell-Moore (2016, section 6.2). 
6. See, e.g., Pettigrew (2016, Definition 1.0.1). 
7. To see	 that this is not compact, observe that the limit of a convergent 
sequence of countably additive probabilities might be merely finitely addi­
tive. This is not the case for finite additivity. 
8. In fact, many situations will not give rise to a recommendation function. Instead,  
maybe there are ties. Our whole account can be expanded to deal with ties, see 
note 23. However, this would complicate the presentation and the parallel to the 
truth case, so I assume that the notion of revision is functional. 
9. In fact, one might want to specify ρ so that we only have ρ(c) =  c if c satisfies 
further principles of rationality, for example the Principal Principle. 
10. For arguments for this in our “unusual” cases see especially (Joyce, 2018). For 
this argument in “safe” cases, see discussions of immodesty, e.g., Joyce (2009) 
and Lewis (1971). Someone like Pettigrew (2018) who disagrees with Joyce on 
these “unusual” cases might be thought of as agreeing with the idea that one’s 
credence should be a fixed point of ρ, but instead works with an implementa­
tion of ρ which is consequentialist. It turns out then that ρ does not depend on 
the input value at all, and thus it always has a fixed point. 
11. Joyce in fact proposes that ρ(c) is the function that minimises expected inac­
curacy, given that c is chosen (Joyce, 2018, p. 257), but this will typically 
simply be the c thus conditionalised. 
12. See Campbell-Moore (2016, Section 5.3). In Section 4.1, I also extended this 
to the imprecise setting and considered R. However, it is there claimed that 
R will guarantee fixed points, but these might be empty due to consider­
ations in this chapter. 
13. There is in fact a whole range of models of belief that are discussed. Many of 
these are weaker than arbitrary sets of probabilities, e.g., upper-lower prob­
ability models. However, especially under the term “imprecise probabilities”, 
some models are stronger as they can encode opinions that would only be 
captured by non-Archimedean probability functions. Campbell-Moore and 
Konek (2019) present a model of belief that is more general than all 
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those considered in the imprecise probability literature, and where consid­
erations such as those in this chapter might also be able to be applied. 
Moreover, some of the issues we find of ensuring fixed points may be 
more easily avoided and will be presented in a future article. 
14. For example if two definite judgement assignments both have no precisifica­
tions, they are treated as identical. 
15. See also note 23. 
16. Our choice of ρ(0) = 1 is an extreme way to spell out the details of the story: 
if you assign credence 0, you think it’s definitely true. We have made this 
choice as it is then parallel the McGee sentence which we will discuss in 
Section 8.6.1. 
17. When we conceive of it as apply to the whole language, which includes, for 
example, the McGee sentence. It does have fixed points when applied, e.g., 
just to Liar. 
18. This style of argument can directly be used to show that closure . R has non­
trivial fixed points, see note 22. 
19. If A is countable, we just need to look at ω-length sequences. 
20. See Willard (1970, Theorem 3.7). To apply these considerations	 in general 
one does not need the notion of closure to satisfy all the usual properties, 
it suffices to assume that closure is monotone and increasing. 
21. This is equivalent to the usual definition of compactness, see Willard (1970, 
Theorem 17.4). 
22. See, e.g., Willard (1970, Theorem 17.4). See also notes 22 and 25 for use of 
this alternative picture and a comment that it then offers a close relationship 
to the revision theory. 
23. Alternative arguments are possible: Firstly, we could observe that what com­
pactness shows us is that the non-empty closed subsets of C forms a ccpo in 
the sense of Visser (1984). And since we can restrict attention to the closed 
subsets for the purposes of closure . R, there must be a fixed point. Sec­
ondly, we can define a revision sequence: c0 2 CredsA , cα+1 = ρ(cα), and let 
cμ be a cluster point of the preceding sequence (in Campbell-Moore, 2019 
we proposed using this as the limit criterion in the revision theory), and 
observe that cα 2 Cα. This relies on the ability to always find a cluster 
point, which is equivalent to compactness. 
24. To extend this to the case where ρ doesn’t pick out a unique credence func­
tion but can allow for ties, we will say that C is non-undermining iff each c 2 
C has at least one of their maximally recommended credences in C, and 
everything in C is in the closure of recommended credences. 
25. This is a key reason to give our definition rather than saying that it has to be 
a fixed point of closure . R. I would like to say the further thing that they 
are preferable: if they exist then they are required, but the criterion does 
not do this. To account for this intuition, we might also define a notion of 
recommendation for imprecise credences as: C recommends RðCÞ and say 
that ideally one’s credal state should be self-recommending, but if it 
cannot be, it should at least be non-undermining. 
26. A further advantage of this definition is it leads to a nice relationship with the 
revision theory of Gupta and Belnap (1993). If one has a revision sequence, 
following ρ as the revision step and using the limit criterion that the limit be a 
cluster point of the preceding sequence, then the collection of members of the 
looping part of the sequence is non-undermining. So are any unions of such 
revision loops. (However, there are non-undermining states which are not 
unions of such revision loops.) 
27. This could be described as a “truth-teller” variant of CredLiar. 
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28. In fact we can find further non-undermining states such as (0.2,0.8). 
29. The first three of these collections of examples are taken from Gupta and 
Belnap (1993, Section 7.2), game theory is another place where revision 
theory has been applied (Bruni and Sillari, 2018), and decision theoretic 
cases such as Death in Damascus (Gibbard and Harper, 1978) where every 
action is undermining would be another natural application. 
30. Nicolai, along with all the other work on predicate approaches to modality, 
does not consider sets of precisifications but rather, in our terms, whether a 
sentence is definitely necessary (at world w) or definitely not necessary (at w). 
31. Often one has an underlying domain of “values”, such as {true, not-true} or  
[0, 1], and the space of precisifications is the collection of functions from 
some other objects such as sentences, or pairs of worlds and sentences, to 
these values. One then just needs to impose a topology (or notion of 
closure) on the underlying values and then can use the topology of pointwise 
convergence (the product topology) to obtain a notion of closure on the col­
lection of all possible precisifications. By Tychonoff’s theorem this will be 
compact so long as the topology on the underlying values is compact (as 
{true, not-true} or [0, 1] is). One might also consider only special kinds of 
functions (for example those that are maximally consistent), in which case 
one should also check that the set of all such functions is closed in the full 
function space. See a text on general topology such as Willard (1970). See 
also Campbell-Moore (2019) where we used this topology for truth and 
probability to take limits in the revision theory. 
One could also work with alternatives, such as simply defining closureðQÞ 
as Precs . Def ðQÞ itself. This would suffice, but this will generally be more 
permissive than closure defined by the topology of pointwise convergence. 
An interesting exception is if we restrict AllPrecsT to those that are maxi­
mally consistent where then these are identical. 
32. For credences, this seems unmotivated, but perhaps it is appropriate for other 
domains. 
33. As both the property of a sentence being true and being not-true are closed 
properties. 
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9  The Fourth Grade of Modal 
Involvement 
Volker Halbach 
9.1 Four Grades of Modal Involvement 
Modalities are at the centre of many philosophical debates. They include 
apriority, analyticity, metaphysical, as well as logical and physical neces­
sity, future and past truth, and being knowable or known. In philosoph­
ical logic the main tool for analyzing modal discourse is modal or 
intensional logic in the wide sense that includes temporal, epistemic, 
and deontic logic. The expressive weaknesses of modal logic have been 
known for a long time, and it is somewhat of an embarrassment of phil­
osophical logic that the standard formalization of modality in its straight­
forward forms does not suffice as a framework for many well-known 
philosophical debates. 
In this chapter I give some hints for developing formal languages with 
possible worlds semantics that can analyze modal discourse in its full 
force. Much of what I am going to say is tentative and experimental. 
This is because the project is huge: There is at least as much scope for 
work on this approach than on quantified modal logic. Therefore, I 
can only sketch some basic considerations. There are many aspects 
that will not be addressed at all. In particular, I will not say anything 
about extensions such as actuality operator, two-dimensional semantics, 
and so on. 
I focus on metaphysical necessity as my main example of a modality; 
but the machinery sketched below is also adaptable to other modalities. 
Future and past truth should be straightforward, but epistemic modali­
ties may be more difficult. 
As a starting point, I revisit Quine’s “Three grades of modal involve­
ment” (1976, first published 1953). The three grades are three ways to 
view necessity, namely as a semantical predicate, a  statement operator, 
or a sentence operator. 
In modal logic modalities are conceived as operators: An operator □ is 
combined with a formula φ to obtain a new formula □φ. The difference 
between statement and sentence operators is that the latter allow quan­
tification into the scope of the modal operator. Thus a sentence operator 
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□ can be combined with a formula φ containing free variables into a 
formula □φ that contains the same free variables as φ itself. Quine’s ter­
minology is somewhat misleading, because sentences are understood 
here as open sentences with free variables. A statement operator does 
not permit quantification into its scope. De re modalities can be analyzed 
with sentence, but not with statement operators. 
According to Quine, the lowest grade of modal involvement permits 
only ‘semantic predicates’: A semantic predicate Nec for necessity is 
combined with a singular term into a formula.1 Quine thinks of semantic 
predicates as applying to sentences, not propositions or other objects that 
Quine called ‘creatures of darkness’ elsewhere; but this is not the point 
here. It is rather that a semantic predicate can be applied to a variable: 
Nec x is a formula with x free. 
Quine thought of semantic predicates as a light grade of modal in­
volvement, but in another sense they are expressively richer than opera­
tors. Using modal predicates one can express quantifications. Quantified 
statements such as ‘There are synthetic judgements a priori’, ‘All theo­
rems of arithmetic are analytic’, or ‘There are necessary a posteriori 
truths’ cannot be expressed using only an operator □, at least not in a 
straightforward way. However, if modalities are conceived as predicates, 
quantified statements can be easily expressed: Kant’s rejection ‘There 
are synthetic judgements a priori’ of empiricism, becomes the sentence 
9x (Syn(x) ^ Apriori(x)) (omitting the restriction to judgements).2 
For these reasons we require modal predicates. They are required to 
analyze the full force of modal discourse, especially in philosophy. 
With a semantic predicate for a modality comes the expressive power 
of what Quine called a ‘statement operator’. That is, under fairly general 
assumptions everything that can be expressed using a statement operator 
□ can be expressed also with a semantic predicate. As long as φ does not 
contain □, a sentence □φ can be replaced with Nec⌜φ⌝ where ⌜φ⌝ is a 
quotation or structurally descriptive name for the sentence φ. This  
induces a translation from the entire language with a statement operator 
to a language with a modal predicate only. However, this reduction or 
translation does not work for what Quine called ‘sentence operators’. 
When a formula □φ with free variables is replaced with Nec⌜φ⌝, the 
free variables disappear; they are only mentioned, not used in Nec⌜φ⌝. 
In other words, Quine’s semantic predicates do not permit de re 
modality. 
Famously, Quine argued against de re modalities and sentence opera­
tors that apply to formulae with free variables—and failed completely at 
convincing the philosophical community to reject them. De re modalities 
are nowadays used without qualms almost everywhere; and it is hard to 
imagine many discussions in contemporary philosophy without the addi­
tional expressive strength gained from using de re modalities. Among the 
de re modalities analyzed in modal or intensional logics are temporal 
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modalities (future and past truth), different epistemic modalities such as 
knowledge, and several varieties of necessity, especially metaphysical 
necessity. However, semantic predicates in Quine’s sense do not suffice 
for analyzing de re modality; in particular, sentence operators are not 
reducible to semantic predicates. 
I would not like to miss the expressive power of quantifying over the 
bearers of necessity or of quantifying into modal contexts. The full 
strength of modal discourse requires both: a predicate conception of 
modality and de re modality. None of Quine’s three grades of modal 
involvement offers the strength of modal predicates and that of sentence 
operators. There is a conspicuous omission from Quine’s list of grades of 
modal involvement: There are no predicates expressing de re modalities.3 
One could hope that nevertheless semantic predicates together with 
sentential operators in Quine’s sense would suffice: For quantified state­
ments of the kind mentioned above a predicate, and for de re modality an 
operator that allows quantifying-in could be used. This is in itself unsat­
isfactory, because we need to switch between quantified modal logic for 
dealing with de re modalities and modal predicates for dealing with 
general quantified claims. But there is a class of statements for which 
both, an operator or de dicto predicate are insufficient. For this kind 
of statement the fourth grade of modal involvement is required. An 
example is the following claim: 
(E) There is an object o and there is a P such that P is necessary for o. 
This claim may be taken as a statement of some kind of essentialism. Of 
course metaphysicians will disagree what kind of object P can be: The 
traditional answer will be that P must be a universal or property, while 
Quine and others might view P as a formula. 
The point is that neither a semantic predicate nor a sentential operator 
suffice to express (E) without further assumptions or additional devices. 
This can be seen as follows. If we use an operator as in modal logic, 
9x □Px fails as a formalization of (E), because it only claims that the spe­
cific property P is necessary for some object. In order to quantify over P 
we need a modal predicate (or higher-order quantification or the like). A 
unary predicate Nec for de dicto necessity may also be insufficient, but 
for a different reason: With a semantic predicate we cannot quantify 
any longer easily ‘into the modal context’, that is, over the objects that 
may have a property necessarily, at least if the semantic predicates 
apply to sentences. We may be able to express that some sentence of 
the form Pt is necessary, where t is some closed term; but, of course, 
the claim (E) just says that P is necessary for some o, whether o has a 
name or not.4 Quine’s semantic predicates cannot capture this higher 
kind of modal involvement. Discussions on various versions of essential­
ism, ante rem and in rebus conceptions of universals, and so on require 
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de re modalities as predicates. Nothing should keep us from quantifying 
at the same time into modal contexts and over properties or predicates. 
Only the fourth grade of modal involvement affords this in a straightfor­
ward way. 
In the following diagram the four grades of modal involvement are 
ordered by their strength. An arrow from one grade to another means 
that the grade at the origin of the arrow is stronger than that at the 
target, that is, the grade at the end of an arrow is reducible to that at 
its origin. 
de re semantic predicate 
semantic predicate sentence operator 
statement operator 
At the bottom, as the lowest form of modal involvement, is the concep­
tion of operator modal logic without any quantifying-in.5 As expla­
ined above, treating a modality as a semantic predicate or permitting 
quantifying-in increases the expressive strength. Neither is a semantic 
predicate for a modality reducible to the corresponding sentence opera­
tor nor vice versa: Semantic predicates and sentence operators add differ­
ent kinds of expressive strength. The latter add de re modality, the 
former the possibility of quantifying over objects to which the modality 
is ascribed. At the top sits the highest, the fourth grade of modal involve­
ment under which all others can be subsumed, a device that gives both 
kinds of expressive strength. 
A formal framework for this fourth grade of modal involvement will 
need to deal not only with the traditional problems of modal predicates 
and de re modality as in quantified modal logic; there are also a few 
additional puzzles. There is not much literature on modal de re predi­
cates. George Bealer’s contributions (1982, 1993, 1998) are probably 
the most sophisticated. 
9.2 De Re Semantic Predicates 
Different strategies have been tried to reach the fourth grade of modal 
involvement. One option is to use a sentence operator for necessity (per­
mitting quantifying-in) and to expand the language with second-order 
order, substitutional, or propositional quantification. To emulate propo­
sitional quantification, quantifiers ranging over sets of possible worlds 
can be used, as suggested by Kripke (1959). Bull (1969), Fine (1970), 
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Kaplan (1970), and subsequently many others elaborated on Kripke’s 
suggestion. The simple approaches formulated over propositional logic 
have to be generalized to quantified modal logic to recover the strength 
of the fourth grade of modal involvement. This will yield some kind of 
second-order quantified modal logic as in Williamson (2013). I cannot 
provide a discussion of these approaches here. I refer the reader to 
Halbach and Leigh (2021) for a sketch of reasons why this approach 
is less promising than the strategy pursued here. One worry is that it 
will be difficult to express quantification over predicates of arbitrary 
arity: In higher-order logic one can quantify over propositions (0-place 
predicates), unary predicates, binary predicates, and so on; but simulta­
neously quantifying over all predicates of arbitrary arity is not easily pos­
sible without further resources. 
Another option, with a similar problem, is the use of modal predicates 
of different arities: There would be a binary predicate that expresses that 
a single object has a necessary property or that a formula with one free 
variable is necessary for that object. A ternary predicate would be 
required for binary relations or formulae with two free variables, and 
so on. This becomes very clumsy, because there will be a necessity pred­
icate for each arity (or one with variable arity). Moreover, we cannot 
easily express quantification over predicates with arbitrary arity. Exam­
ples of such quantifications will be given below. 
The obvious solution consists in adapting Tarski’s (1935) trick for 
truth to modalities. Tarski used a satisfaction predicate applying to for­
mulae and variable assignments to define the unary truth predicate. Cor­
responding to the truth predicate we have the unary de dicto predicate 
for necessity; and corresponding to the binary satisfaction predicate, 
applying to formulae and variable assignments, we have the binary de 
re necessity predicate applying to formulae (or universals) and variable 
assignments. 
A language with such a binary modal predicate is expressively richer 
than one with modal predicates for each arity. By quantifying over for­
mulae (or corresponding universals) and variable assignments we are 
not restricted to a fixed arity. For instance, we can express essentialist 
claims in the style of (E) above in a more cautious way by saying 
that some objects necessarily stand in some relation. With this formula­
tion we do not commit ourselves to a relation of a specific arity. By using 
a binary predicate applying to predicates of arbitrary arity and sequences 
of objects, this can be expressed with the formula 9x 9y Nec(x, y) or  
9x 9y (For(x) ^ As(y) ^ Nec(x, y)), where For(x) expresses that x is a 
formula (relation) and As(y) that y is a variable assignment. 
Using a predicate like Nec we can also express de re factivity. This is 
the claim that if a formula (or relation) is necessary of some objects, then 
it is true of those objects. This can be parsed as follows: If a formula x 
is necessary of a string y of objects, then x is satisfied by y, or formally 
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8x 8y (Nec(x, y) ! Sat(x, y)). Again the quantifiers may be restricted to 
formulae and assignments as above. The factivity of de re knowledge can 
be expressed by replacing the binary predicate for necessity with a corre­
sponding binary predicate for de re knowledge. De re factivity implies de 
dicto factivity, that is, the claim that whatever is necessary is true, but the 
converse implication does not hold. 
At this point it is worth emphasizing the following: I am far from 
claiming that binary modal predicates of the kind described above are 
close to the methods of expressing the fourth degree of modal involve­
ment in natural languages. A linguistic analysis is not the target of the 
present paper, although there are clearly some very interesting differ­
ences between modalities in the natural languages. For instance, tempo­
ral notions are usually expressed in the languages with which I am 
familiar by modifying the verb, either directly or with an auxiliary 
verb. The tense of a verb is probably most faithfully represented in a 
formal language by a tense operator, that is, a sentence operator in 
Quine’s sense, not by a primitive predicate for future or past truth. 
Moreover, in many cases modalities can be expressed in many different 
ways in natural languages. We have modal operators such as necessarily 
as well as predicate phrases such as is necessary in English. I aim to 
provide a formal framework that allows us to analyze philosophical 
modal discourse in its full strength; this requires quantification over uni­
versals or formulae and variable assignments without fixed arity. If pos­
sible, I prefer to be parsimonious and not introduce devices that are 
reducible to binary predicate for de re modalities, even if there are ana­
logues of these devices in natural languages. 
All my claims so far about the strength of various devices for express­
ing modalities rely on appeals to some informal semantics. Of course, a 
plethora of various semantic systems exists for modal logics; but they are 
largely missing for corresponding binary predicates. Therefore, to sub­
stantiate my claims and to assess the prospects of analyzing de re modal­
ities using binary predicates of the kind described, a formal semantics for 
languages with such predicates are needed. 
9.3 Possible Worlds Semantics 
In this section I extend and adapt the possible worlds semantics for a 
unary modal predicate developed by Asher and Kamp (1989), Halbach 
et al. (2003), Halbach and Welch (2009), and Halbach and Leigh 
(2021) to a semantics for the binary predicate Nec(x,y). I think of the 
semantics given below as a starting point. Several assumptions may be 
tweaked. Moreover, the account below can be generalized in many 
ways to different modalities and multimodal settings. 
As pointed out at the end of the previous section, a formal semantics is 
needed in order to substantiate various claims about the strength of 
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modal devices such as the binary modal predicate Nec, unary semantic 
predicates, the operator □ of modal logic as sentence and statement oper­
ators, and perhaps further expressions. This requires a certain degree of 
adequacy of the semantics for which I will not argue. 
There are further reasons for developing possible worlds semantics for 
Nec. In particular, I would like to transfer insights that have been 
obtained using possible worlds semantics for the modal operator □. 
Giving up possible worlds semantics together with the operator concep­
tion of modality would be a huge loss. I do not intend to reject sentence 
and statement operators. My complaint is that they cannot capture the 
full force of modal talk; but as long as this force is not required, 
modal operators and their accompanying possible worlds semantics 
can shed light on many questions and puzzles. 
The aim of this section is to define possible worlds models such that the 
formula Nec(⌜φ(x1, .  . . ,  xn)⌝, a) holds at a world w iff φ(x1, . . . ,  xn) holds 
at all worlds v with wRv, if the free variables x1, . . . ,  xn are assigned 
values a(x1), . . . ,  a(xn). Here ⌜φ(x1, . . . ,  xn)⌝ is a name for the formula 
φ(x1, .  . . ,  xn), and a(xk) the value assigned to the variable xk by a. I will 
be sloppy with notation and, for instance, use a in the object language, 
even though we might lack a name for it. 
When setting up possible worlds semantics for Nec, the same choices 
as for quantified operator modal logic have to be faced, and, as is well-
known, there are many (see, for instance, Garson, 2001). In particular, 
we have to decide whether to opt for a possibilist treatment of quantifiers 
with a fixed domain for all worlds or for actualism with domains that 
can vary between world. 
There are also decisions that do not arise in quantified operator 
modal logic. On the predicate approach, we can quantify over the 
objects that can be necessary and they can inhabit possible worlds 
along with other objects (unlike propositions conceived as sets of pos­
sible worlds, which cannot themselves be elements of a world). Which 
of these objects exist would differ from world to world, if we decided 
to ascribe necessity to sentence tokens. I think of them as types and 
assume that they exist in all worlds. Metaphysical questions and deci­
sions of this kind are suppressed in the usual variants of quantified 
modal logic; on the predicate approach they can be addressed in the 
object language. 
Finite sequences of objects are needed as variable assignments for de re 
modalities. I assume that all worlds are closed under the formation of 
sequences. This is again a strong ontological assumption, which I 
endorse for metaphysical necessity, but not for other modalities. Only 
objects existing in the world can form part of a sequence in that 
world. I discuss potential problems arising from this assumption after 
having introduced formal possible worlds semantics for languages with 
modal predicates. 
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For my purposes here there is no need to be very specific about the lan­
guage. The language should contain vocabulary that allows one to talk 
about either expression in the language or corresponding ‘universals’. I 
have a preference for expansions of languages described in Halbach and 
Leigh (2021), but expansions of arithmetic or set theory are equally sui­
table. The language should provide vocabulary for talking about syntax 
or universals, finite sequences of objects, and possibly other ‘ordinary’ 
objects. I use the syntactic approach and terminology. The reader prefer­
ring universals will have to replace ‘sentence’ with ‘proposition’, ‘formula 
with one free variable’ with ‘property’, and so on. Given that we need 
arbitrarily long finite sequences of arbitrary objects as variable assign­
ments anyway, we can understand expressions as a specific kind of 
such sequences, namely those with symbols as members of the sequence. 
Each expression in the non-logical vocabulary falls into at least one of 
three groups: 
1.	 The syntactic vocabulary contains at least a unary predicate that 
applies exactly to all expressions of the language. Quantifiers rela­
tivized to this predicate range exactly over all syntactic objects. The 
other syntactic vocabulary may express operations such as concate­
nation and substitution and allow one to define grammatical cate­
gories such as variables, predicate expressions, connectives, etc. 
2.	 The sequence vocabulary includes again a relativizing predicate that 
applies exactly to finite sequences. Further vocabulary may express 
concatenation of finite sequences, projections, etc. 
3.	 The ‘contingent’ vocabulary contains all remaining non-logical 
expressions. A relativizing predicate is not required, because ‘con­
tingent’ objects are exactly those that are not syntactic or sequences. 
As mentioned above, it is not assumed that finite sequences and expres­
sions do not overlap. However, the contingent objects are exactly those 
that are neither expressions nor sequences. The use of the term ‘contin­
gent’ may be somewhat misleading. It only means that no assumptions 
about the interpretation of the contingent vocabulary are made in pos­
sible worlds semantics. This does not rule out that the contingent 
vocabulary is interpreted at all worlds in the same way in a given model. 
For instance, some vocabulary of pure mathematics may form part of the 
contingent vocabulary, and we may confine our attention to interpreta­
tions that assign the same extensions to these expressions at all possible 
worlds. But this restriction is not imposed by possible worlds semantics, 
but rather by other considerations. 
The following definition of a pre-model is close to the definition of a 
possible worlds model in modal logic, the main difference being that it is 
assumed that all expressions exist in every world and that worlds are 
closed under the formation of finite sequences. 
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DEFINITION 9.3.1. A triple hW; R; Ii is a pre-model iff 
1.	 W is a non-empty set. 
2.	 R is a binary relation on W. 
3.	 I is a function that assigns each world w 2 W a domain Dw. Dw 
contains (codes of) all strings of LN -symbols, possibly further 
‘contingent’ objects and all finite sequences of all objects in Dw. 
Moreover I provides interpretations of the contingent vocabulary 
over the domain Dw. 
Of course hW; Ri is a frame in the usual sense in modal logic. Each 
world contains contains all LN -expressions and therefore infinitely 
many objects. Moreover, finite sequences can be formed from all 
objects in the world. Sequences themselves can be elements of 
sequences. Therefore each domain Dw is closed recursively under the 
formation of sequences. I do not make any assumption on whether 
expressions conceived as sequences of symbols are identical with these 
finite sequences. 
Consequently, the domain Dw of each world w 2 W consists of three 
types of objects: 
1.	 Dw contains all strings of symbols. 
2.	 Dw contains arbitrarily many further ‘contingent’ objects. 
3.	 Dw contains all finite sequences of objects from 1, 2, and 3. This 
includes mixed sequences that have syntactic, contingent, and finite 
sequences as entries. Thus the domain of each world is defined 
recursively. 
A pre-model provides interpretations for the entire language at each 
world w 2 W, except for the binary necessity predicate Nec. At any 
world the syntactic and sequence vocabulary is interpreted in the stan­
dard way. This means that the syntactic vocabulary is interpreted in 
the same way at all worlds. However, worlds differ with respect to the 
objects that exist in them and consequently also with respect to the 
sequences that exist in them. Thus the interpretation of the vocabulary 
about sequences at a world depends only on the domain Dw of that 
world, because only sequences whose ultimate components exist at 
that world also exist at that world. 
If φ is a formula not containing the modal predicate Nec and a a vari­
able assignment over Dw, I write hW; R; Ii ⊨w φ[a] to indicate that the 
formula φ is satisfied by the variable assignment a at world w. As men­
tioned above, variable assignments are conceived as finite sequences and 
thus the question arises about situations where φ contains variables 
outside the domain of a. I could rule this out without real loss of general­
ity, but prefer to stipulate that a(x) is always a certain expression, say ¬ 
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and thus effectively make every variable assignment a total function from 
the set of variables. By our stipulations, ¬ is in the domain of every world. 
What is missing from this account is an interpretation of the de re 
modal predicate Nec. The interpretation B of the binary predicate 
symbol Nec is provided separately from I: B is a function that assigns 
to each world a binary relation (set of ordered pairs) on the set of 
objects that exist at w. I write hW, R, I, Bi ⊨w φ[a] iff  φ holds at world 
w under the variable assignment a if Nec is interpreted according to 
B(w). I now define what a possible worlds model (‘pw-model’ for short) is. 
DEFINITION 9.3.2. hW; R; I; Bi is a pw-model iff hW; R; Ii is a pre-model 
and B a function satisfying the following properties: 
(i)	 B is a function assigning to each world w 2W a set of pairs hφ, ai such 
that φ is a formula and a is a finite sequence in Dw. 
(ii)	 hφ, ai 2 B(w) iff for all v (if wRv then hW; R; I; Bi ⊨v φ[a]). 
In (ii) the variable assignment a in [a] belongs to the metatheory, while 
pair hφ, ai is a possible element of the extension B(w) of  Nec at w and 
thus a an element of Dw. That is, variable assignments belong to both, 
the object and metatheory. 
Condition (ii) of Definition 9.3.2 forces the interpretation of Nec as 
truth in all accessible worlds. Suppressing the variable assignment, it 
means that a sentence φ is in the extension of Nec at a world w iff φ 
is true in all worlds accessible from w. By condition (i), if hφ, ai 2 B(w), 
then a 2 Dw and therefore aðxÞ 2 Dw for all variables x. That is, a vari­
able assignment in a world w assigns variables only values that exist in 
w. But of course a(x) need not exist in another world, that is, we may 
2 Dv ¼ w.have aðxÞ = for some other world v 6 In particular, when we 
pass from a world w to all worlds v that can be seen by w, a variable 
assignment with hφ, ai 2 B(w) might assign a value to the variable x 
that is not in Dv. Thus we need to make a stipulation about how to 
understand the right-hand-side of (ii), that is, hW; R; I; Bi ⊨v φ[a] if  φ 
contains a free variable x such that aðxÞ 2= Dv. The situation is similar 
to free logic and individual constants that do not denote. There are 
various options. Here I adopt the policy of negative free logic. If φ is an 
atomic formula with a free variable x such that aðxÞ 2= Dv, then 
hW; R; I; Bi ⊭v φ[a]. For instance we have hW; R; I; Bi ⊭v x = x [a]. Of 
course, we still have hW; R; I; Bi ⊨v 8x x  = x [a] as quantifiers range 
over objects in Dv. 
The situation is different from ordinary quantified modal logic, 
because we have variable assignments not only in the metatheory (as 
in quantified modal logic), but we are also talking about variable assign­
ments in the object language. In hW; R; I; Bi ⊨v φ[a] the variable assign­
ment a is in the metatheory of course, while in 9y Nec(x, y) we are 
quantifying over variable assignments in the object language. The 
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metatheory is extensional. Every variable assignment that exists at some 
world is also available in the metatheory. But of course not every vari­
able assignment in our metatheory exists in every world: only if all 
values exist in w, the variable assignment exists in w. 
In the usual possible worlds semantics for modal operators, one 
defines recursively the semantics for □ from the interpretation of the 
other vocabulary at each world. Definition 9.3.2, in contrast, does not 
imply that for every pre-model hW; R; Ii there is exactly one B such 
that hW; R; I; Bi is a pw-model. In fact, both, existence uniqueness fail. 
Halbach et al. (2003) and Halbach and Leigh (2021) provide more infor­
mation on existence and uniqueness conditions. I mention only some 
observations that apply to the present framework. 
A relation R is converse wellfounded iff there is no infinitely ascending 
sequence w1Rw2Rw3 . . . of objects. 
LEMMA 9.3.3. If the accessibility relation R of a pre-model hW; R; Ii 
is converse wellfounded on W, then there is a unique B such that 
hW; R; I; Bi is a pw-model. 
The lemma is proved by defining B on all w 2W inductively on the con­
verse of R, starting from the dead ends of R, that is, worlds w 2 W 
such that there is no v 2 W with wRv. At a dead end w 2 W, we have 
hφ, ai 2  B(w) for all formulae φ and variable assignments a 2 Dw, 
because trivially hW; R; I; Bi ⊨v φ[a] for all worlds v with wRv, as  
there are no such worlds. Once B(v) has been defined for all worlds v 
with wRv, we can set \ 
BðwÞ :¼ fhφ; ai : hW; R; I; Bi.v φ½a.g\Dw 
wRv 
The intersection with Dw ensures that we only include variable assign­
ments that exist at world w. If  R is converse wellfounded, this definition 
fixes B(w) for all w 2 W. 
Lemma 9.3.3 gives us a sufficient condition for the existence of a pw­
model hW; R; I; Bi based on a given pre-model hW; R; Ii. I turn now to 
necessary conditions. 
Under fairly general circumstances, there cannot be a pw-model hW; R; I; Bi 
with a reflexive or symmetric accessibility relation R. This is a direct 
consequence of the paradoxes. Since φ is a sentence, the variable assign­
ment a is irrelevant and 8a Nec(⌜φ⌝, a) expresses de dicto necessity of φ 
in the same way the unary truth predicate can be defined as the satisfac­
tion of a sentence by all variable assignments. If R is reflexive, we have 
the following for all sentences φ and worlds w 2W, as in operator modal 
logic: 
hW; R; I; Bi.w 8a Necð⌜φ⌝; aÞ !  φ ð9:1Þ 
Using the diagonal lemma, a sentence λ can be obtained such that 
λ $ ¬8a Nec(⌜λ⌝, a) holds at all worlds. Of course, this is the liar 
220 Volker Halbach 
sentence for the ‘truth predicate’ 8a Nec(x, a). Combining this with (9.1) 
for λ yields the following for all w 2 W: 
hW; R; I; Bi.w l ð9:2Þ 
Since λ holds at all worlds, 8a Nec(⌜λ⌝, a) holds at all worlds. This 
clashes with following consequence of the diagonal property of λ: 
hW; R; I; Bi.w :8a Necð⌜l⌝; aÞ 
This contradiction is only a variant of Montague’s (1963) theorem, as 
explained in Halbach and Leigh (2021). This can be generalized as follows: 
THEOREM 9.3.4. If the relation R is converse illfounded on W, the syntactic 
vocabulary sufficiently expressive, and the contingent vocabulary contains 
at least one sentential parameter, then there is a I such that hW; R; Ii is a 
pre-model, but there is no B such that hW; R; I; Bi is a pw-model. 
For a detailed proof the reader is referred to Halbach and Leigh 
(2021). First it is shown that one can define the modal predicate Nec* 
associated with the transitive closure of R. Using the diagonal lemma 
one proves that Löb’s theorem holds for this predicate Nec*. Löb’s 
theorem is of course a principle of transfinite induction that may fail 
if R* is not converse wellfounded. To show this, one can choose an 
interpretation I that makes the sentential parameter true at all converse 
wellfounded worlds, but false at the converse illfounded worlds. If there 
is no contingent vocabulary (the sentential parameter in the theorem), 
there can be a converse illfounded R such that hW; R; I; Bi is a pw­
model and the situation becomes complicated. See Halbach et al. 
(2003). 
9.4 The Challenge of the Paradoxes 
Theorem 9.3.4 means that the accessibility relation cannot be total on all 
worlds; and we cannot expect modal predicates to satisfy the schemata 
of the modal systems T, B, S4, or  S5 for all sentences (especially those 
sentences without equivalent in ordinary modal operator logic such as 
sentences obtained by Gö del’s diagonal lemma). If we are confined to 
converse wellfounded frames for possible worlds semantics of predicates, 
then one might suspect that we cannot have a reasonable semantics for 
Nec as metaphysical necessity. Perhaps the accessibility relation need 
not be total and, perhaps, not even transitive for metaphysical necessity; 
but at last it should be reflexive. This is ruled out by Theorem 9.3.4. 
The reader may wonder whether this shows that the predicate 
approach is to be rejected. In the light of the paradoxes Montague 
(1963) rejected ‘syntactic’ treatments of modality, that is, treatments 
of modality as predicates of sentences. The restrictions in Theorem 
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9.3.4 only spell out the consequences of the paradoxes as restrictions on 
the accessibility relations and they thereby systematize them. Should one 
agree with Montague, abandon predicate approaches, and resort to oper­
ator modal logic? The price for this move will be a significant reduction 
in expressive power of our language. This matters most to philosophers, 
who are interested in the quantified claims mentioned in the first section. 
The situation can be compared with that for truth: We can reject the 
predicate conception of truth and opt for an operator treatment. This 
will result the trivial modal logic with □φ $ φ as characteristic axiom. 
Although this move immediately blocks the paradoxes, it has not been 
very popular. What saved truth from the fate of metaphysical necessity 
and other modalities is that the truth predicate becomes trivial and 
boring, once it is stripped of its ability to express generalizations. 
When metaphysical necessity is treated in the same way, there are still 
many interesting things to say. But that is not a good justification for 
accepting the weakening of expressive power caused by the transition 
from □ to Nec. 
Rejecting modal predicates because of the paradoxes is as sensible as 
rejecting the theory of distances because of Zeno’s paradoxes and reject­
ing set theory because of Russell’s and Burali–Forti’s paradox. We may 
have to revise or refine some of our naive expectation, but we will gain 
expressive strength in return. This strength is needed for general claims 
in philosophy. If we give it up in favour of modal operators, the way phi­
losophy is done will have to be changed profoundly. Therefore, we 
should seek solutions to the paradoxes of modal predicates in the same 
spirit as in the case of truth. 
Unless we are prepared to restrict ourselves to converse wellfounded 
accessibility relations, we need to adapt and tweak possible worlds 
semantics. Stern (2016) discussed various strategies. First, one can 
apply the usual techniques known from the semantic paradoxes. In par­
ticular, classical logic can be abandoned. Halbach and Welch (2009) 
employed Kripke’s (1975) fixed-point semantics for their possible 
worlds semantics without really defending it as a real solution. 
Alternatively, condition (ii) of Definition 9.3.2 can be weakened: We do 
no longer stipulate for all sentences that Nec⌜φ⌝ holds at w iff φ holds in 
all accessible worlds; we merely stipulate this for certain sentences. Condi­
tion (ii) should be satisfied at least for all those sentences φ that are 
expressible with an operator □. This guarantees that the possible worlds 
semantics for predicates is not ‘worse’ than possible worlds semantics 
for the operator □. The class of sentences expressible with an operator □ 
can be defined as follows using a recursively defined mapping I from the 
language with the operator □ to the language with the corresponding pred­
icate Nec. Since we deal with de re modality, we need to take care of the 
free variables in the scope of □. Pick some fixed variable assignment a0. 
The operation that changes the assignment of a given variable vn, so  
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that the object x is assigned to vn can be expressed in the object language 
and I write a0(x/⌜vn⌝) for this operation. 
(i) If φ does not contain □, then I(φ) =  φ. 
(ii)	 I(φ ^ ψ) =  I(φ) ^ I(ψ), I(¬φ) =  ¬I(φ), I(8x φ) =  8x I(φ), and so on. 
(iii)	 I(□φ(x1, .  . . ,  xn)) = Nec(⌜I(φ)⌝, a0(x1/⌜x1⌝, . . . ,  xn /⌜xn⌝)), where the 
assignment a0(x1/⌜x1⌝, . . . ,  xn /⌜xn⌝) is obtained by iterated appli­
cation of the operation mentioned above. Only finitely many such 
applications are required, because φ contains only finitely many 
variables. 
This embedding of the operator languages into the language with a pred­
icate is well-known, and its origin can be traced back at least to Carnap 
(1934, IV.B.e).6 Here I have only added the free variables. The class of 
formulae expressible with an operator □ is now simply the set of all 
I(φ) such that φ is a formula of the language with the operator □ only. 
If condition (ii) of Definition 9.3.2 is restricted to such sentences, there 
are pw-models for arbitrary frames. 
Sentences and formulae generated with Gö del’s diagonal construction 
cannot be obtained with I from sentences of operator modal logic, but 
also not general formulæ of the form 8x (χ(x) ! Nec x). Some but 
not all formulae of the latter kind can be unproblematic and be included 
as permissible instances of condition (ii) of Definition 9.3.2. 
A more comprehensive class of permissible instances of condition (ii) of 
Definition 9.3.2 can be obtained by singling out the ‘grounded’ formulae 
and sentences, defined along the lines of Kripke’s (1975). If we apply this 
account to formulæ in general, the notion of groundedness relative to a var­
iable assignment will have to be defined. In the brief following comments I 
restrict myself to sentences. The groundedness approach has the disadvan­
tage that the set of such sentences is no longer definable in the object lan­
guage (under fairly general assumptions). Moreover, whether a sentence is 
grounded may depend on contingent factors. If all pw-models with this 
restricted condition (ii) are considered, many general principles such as 
the distribution of necessity over ! in pw-models without dead ends 
have to be abandoned; they will only hold for grounded sentences. This 
flies in the face of the predicate approach: After all, I adopted the predicate 
approach in order to express quantified principles. Not being able to get 
them as quantified generalizations seems odd. At any rate, the desirable 
models may be sought among those that are pw-models in the weaker 
sense of satisfying (ii) only for grounded sentences. A different option 
may be to introduce a new primitive predicate for determinacy or ground­
edness into the language as in Fujimoto and Halbach (2019) for truth. 
An elegant and philosophically useful way to obtain generalization 
without compromising too much on the expected properties of possible 
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worlds semantics is given by Stern (2014a,b, 2016). The idea is to state at 
least quantified principles with a truth predicate, as we routinely do in 
informal philosophical discourse. For this strategy, however, a sophisti­
cated theory of truth will be required that avoids the paradoxes. 
The challenge of the paradoxes arises for de dicto and de re modalities, 
although some paradoxes require quantification. In particular, McGee’s 
ω-inconsistency (1985) and the Yablo–Visser paradox are of this kind 
(Visser, 1989; Yablo, 1985, 1993). A binary predicate may lend itself 
to the study of these paradoxes. Finally, the move to a binary predicate 
can be used to recover diagonalization and other syntactic operations 
without any explicit syntax-theoretic axioms (Halbach and Zhang, 
2016; Halbach and Leigh, 2021). I will not pursue this topic here, but 
rather turn to the application of the fourth grade of modal involvement 
to an issue in metaphysics. 
9.5 A Problem for Actualism 
In this section I illustrate my claim that using the fourth grade of modal 
involvement can shed new light on topics and discussions in metaphysics, 
using an argument by Bealer (1993). In many ways the predicate concep­
tion of modalities is a more versatile framework for modal metaphysics 
than first-order quantified modal logic. The ontology of the objects to 
which the modalities are ascribed is not hidden away in the metatheory. 
The expressive power generated by the predicate conception permits an 
analysis of many questions in the object theory instead of the metathe­
ory, which is usually set-theoretic and extensional. 
For instance, it has become common to assume that propositions, as 
the objects that can be necessary, do not exist in a possible world; as 
sets of possible worlds, they live in the ‘modal æther’ (Forster, 2005) 
and are thereby incomparable to other normal objects. On the predicate 
conception, we talk about the objects that can be necessary in the object 
language, and we have to decide whether they exist in a world, as sets of 
worlds, or wherever. In the outline above they exist in all worlds. But 
this is only one option; moreover, they are assumed to have the structure 
of formulae. A metaphysician more serious about proposition may struc­
ture them in a different way. Of course, the ontology of propositions has 
received much attention, and I will not pursue this topic here. Instead I 
focus on the second argument place of the binary modal predicate Nec, 
the variable assignments. When they are discussed in the usual set-
theoretic metatheory, they receive little attention. If they can be talked 
about in the object language, they become interesting and puzzling. 
In particular, they can shed new light on the discussion between actual-
ism and possibilism (or possibilism and necessitism in Williamson’s 2013 
terminology). The semantics outlined above is actualist in the sense that 
the domains Dw can vary between worlds w; at each w the quantifiers 
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range only over Dw. Possibilist semantics is a special case: Nothing rules 
out that Dv ¼ Dw for all v, w 2 W, that is, constant domain semantics is a 
special case of the actualist semantics. 
The argument in this section is not intended as a definitive argument in 
favour of possibilism or some other position; the section merely demon­
strates the effects of injecting objects, in particular, variable assignments 
from the metalanguage into the object language and how this move can 
shed light on metaphysical questions. 
Bealer (1982, 1993) and others have used arguments of the kind dis­
cussed in this section to argue for an ante rem conception of universals. 
I could follow Bealer here, but in the present setting—which is different 
from Bealer’s—it would mean that variable assignments exist prior to 
their elements. There would be variable assignments that assign non­
existing objects to some variables, which is hardly acceptable. 
What is going to follow is a partial recantation of Halbach and Sturm 
(2004). The discussions there and Bealer’s (1993) paper suffer from the 
absence of formal semantics. With a framework such as the one outlined 
above this family of puzzles can now be discussed in a more rigorous 
way. 
As I mentioned already, in quantified modal logic variable assignments 
are used only in the set-theoretic, extensional metatheory, where ques­
tions about possibilism and actualism cannot arise. In our semantics 
the variable assignments are pushed into the object language that con­
tains modalities. In the presence of modality, the theory of sequences 
(and sets) becomes more complicated in actualist semantics: Sequences 
exist only at a world, if all its members exist at that world. This assump­
tion is built into our semantics. In the following example our semantics 
may yield an unexpected result because of this assumption. 
There is a planet, and instead of this planet another planet could 
have existed which could have coexisted with the first. (PLA) 
There may be more than one reading of this sentence. The reading I have 
in mind, can be made explicit using possible worlds: In our world w1 
there is a planet A and there is a possible world w2 accessible from 
our world where A does not exist, but planet B does; moreover, there 
is another world w3 accessible from w2 where both planets A and B 
exist. The reading is captured by the following formalization in quanti­
fied modal logic: 
. . . . 9x Pla x ^ . :9z z¼x ^ 9y ðPla y ^ .ð9z z¼ x ^ 9z z¼ yÞÞ ðpla□Þ 
The formula 9z z  = x expresses that x exists. That is, 9z z  = x becomes 
false at a world w under a variable assignment a if aðxÞ 2= Dw. This is 
1 3 
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the case for our semantics for Nec, and we assume that the same holds 
for the possible worlds semantics for the operator □. 
A minimal possible worlds model M of (PLA□) looks as follows: 
Mars Mars, Venus 
Venus 2 
The three worlds of the model are related by the accessibility relation as 
in the diagram. The domain of w1 is {Mars}, and so on for the other 
worlds. The unary predicate Pla x applies at a world to all objects that 
exist in that world. It is easily seen that then (PLA□) is true at w1 in 
this model. 
The crucial feature of the example is that the first quantifier 9x binds an 
occurrence of x in the scope of two possibility operators .. The witness of 
the existentially quantified sentence (PLA□) at  w1 is Mars, which exists at 
w1, but not in the next world w2; it exists again in the third world w3. In  
operator modal logic this does not pose a problem; it is not required that x 
exists in the intermediate world w2 for the existential quantifier 9x to bind 
an occurrence of x in the scope of two modal operators. As I will show, 
however, it does cause a problem if a modal predicate is used. The formal­
ization of (PLA) with a binary predicate Nec instead of the modal operator 
□ is false at w1 in the pw-model corresponding to the model M above, 
while (PLA□) is  true  at  w1, as pointed out above. 
To substantiate my claim that the predicate formalization gives a dif­
ferent truth value, I specify the predicate formalization of PLA and the 
(predicate) pw-model corresponding to the operator model M above. 
First, I sketch how to transform M into a pw-model hW; R; I; Bi for the 
language with Nec instead of □. W and R stay the same. The domain Dw for 
one of the three worlds w 2 W is obtained by adding all syntactic objects to 
the domain of w in M and then closing under the formation of sequences. 
Thus Dw1 contains Mars, but not Venus, Dw2 only Venus, while Dw3 con­
tains both. Consequently, Dw2 does not contain any sequences involving 
Mars. Pla applies at w exactly to all planets in w. The existence of such 
a model is guaranteed by lemma 9.3.3 above, because the accessibility rela­
tion is converse wellfounded. 
The formalization of (PLA) with the model predicate Nec looks as 
follows, if Pos(x, y) is an abbreviation for  ¬Nec(¬x, y) where  ¬ represents 
˙ ˙
the function of negating a sentence. Thus, Pos stands for possibility. 
. .x y x 9x Pla x ^ Pos ð⌜:9z z¼x ^ 9yðPla y ^ Posð⌜9z z¼ x ^ 9z z¼ y⌝;h ; iÞÞ⌝;h iÞ ðNÞ 
⌜x⌝ ⌜y⌝ ⌜x⌝ |------------------------------------------------------------{z------------------------------------------------------------} 
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x⌝i require an explanation. I assume that the vocabulary 
permits to describe the variable assignment assigning an object to a spe­
cific variable. Here I have treated h x ; y i like a function expression with x1 y1 
four free variables x, x1, y, and  y1 expressing the function that gives 
applied to objects x and y and variables x1 and y1 the relevant variable 
assignment; but this may have to circumscribed if no suitable function 
symbol is available. In addition, we need the quotation function sending 
an expression (here a variable) to a name for that expression. In arithmet­
ical contexts the numeral function serves this purpose. 
Since there are no further free variables, a variable assignment of 
length 2 in the underbraced name suffices. As mentioned above, ¬ is stip­




x⌝i has only length 1, because the preceding formula in corners 
has only x free. In 
⌜
x
x⌝ the upper occurrence of x is used, while ⌜x⌝ is 
only a mentioning of the same variable; of course, different variables 
could be used. If the bound variable x in the formula above is 
renamed as v and the relativization to planets is omitted for readability, 
the following formula is obtained: . .x y v 9vPos ⌜:9z z¼x ^ 9yPosð⌜9z z¼x ^ 9z z¼y⌝; h ; iÞ⌝; h i 
⌜x⌝ ⌜y⌝ ⌜x⌝ 
Of course, any occurrences in the quotation name are not affected by the 
renaming and x is retained. 
In a nutshell, the reason why (N) fails at w1 is the following: If (N) 
were true at w1, there would have to be a variable assignment in Dw2 
that assigns Mars to x and Venus to y. But there is no such variable 
assignment in Dw2 , because Mars does not exist in w2, that is Mars is 
not an element of Dw2 . In fact, such a variable assignment exists only 
at w3 where both, Mars and Venus exist. 
A more explicit version of this argument can be given as follows. Let 
hW; R; I; Bi be the pw-model described above. To show that (N) fails at 
w1, assume to the contrary that it is true at w1. Since Mars is the 
only potential witness of the existential quantifier, also the following 
must hold: . 
hW; R; I; Bi.w1 Pos ⌜:9z z¼ x ^ 9y ðPla y^ .x y x MarsPosð⌜9z z¼x ^ 9z z¼ y⌝; h ; iÞÞ⌝; h i ½h i. 
⌜x⌝ ⌜y⌝ ⌜x⌝ ⌜x⌝ 
That is, we assume that the formula Pos(. . .) holds at world  w1 under the var­
iable assignment that assigns Mars to x. The expression in square brackets is 
the variable assignment in the metalanguage, for which we conveniently use 
the same notation as in the object language. It follows from the assumption 
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that the formula denoted by the quotation name must be satisfied by Mars for 
x at the world accessible from w1: . 
hW; R; I; Bi.w2 :9z z¼x ^ 9y Pla y^ .x y ½hMarsPosð⌜9z z¼ x ^ 9z z¼y⌝; h ; iÞ i. 
⌜x⌝ ⌜y⌝ ⌜x⌝ 
Hence both conjuncts must hold at w2. The first conjunct expresses that x 
does not exist. Because Mars fails to be in Dw2 , the first conjunct does hold 
indeed. 
The second conjunct is an existentially quantified sentence. The only 
witness that cold make the second conjunct true is Venus, because the 
witness must be a planet and Venus is the only planet that exists in 
Dw2 . Therefore the following must obtain: 
x y Mars VenushW; R; I; Bi.w2 Pla y ^ Posð⌜9z z¼ x ^ 9z z¼y⌝; h ; iÞ ½h ; i. ⌜x⌝ ⌜y⌝ ⌜x⌝ ⌜y⌝ 
This implies the following: 
x y i ½hMars VenushW; R; I; Bi.w2 9z z  ¼ h  ; ; i. ⌜x⌝ ⌜y⌝ ⌜x⌝ ⌜y⌝ 
That is, at w2 there is a finite sequence containing Mars and Venus, con­
trary to our assumption that finite sequences in a world can contain only 
objects existing in that world. Therefore, the initial assumption is refuted 
and, therefore, (N) fails at w1, while the operator version (PLA□) 
holds at w1 in the corresponding operator model M. Intuitively, the 
operator version yields the expected result, while the predicate version 
does not. 
The problem for actualism is not caused by any restrictions on the 
accessibility relation. It cannot be avoided by replacing the accessibility 
relation R above with its transitive closure. We cannot have a total acces­
sibility relation because of Theorem 9.3.4; but even if diagonalization 
were banned and total accessibility relations permitted, the problem 
for actualism would remain. 
Various strategies to address the problem were discussed by Bealer 
(1993) and Halbach and Sturm (2004). I do not provide a thorough dis­
cussion, but only sketch some of them. 
First, an actuality operator or predicate cannot overcome the problem: 
The variable assignment assigning Mars to x and Venus to y could be 
claimed to exist in the actual world w1 instead of the world w2; but 
the variable assignment cannot exist at w1 either, because Venus is not 
in w1. Bealer (1993) made this observation already for universals 
rather than variable assignments. 
The second strategy sounds desperate: Variable assignment assigning 
non-existing objects to variables could be permitted; variable assignments 
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would exist ante rem. Such entities would be true creatures of darkness. I 
certainly could not think of them as functions from the set of variables 
into the domain of the world or as any mathematical entities. 
However, stranger entities have been dreamt in philosophy. If the point 
argument is made about universals instead of variable assignment, as 
Bealer (1993) does, an argument for ante rem universals is obtained. 
Thirdly, actualism could be rejected in favour of possibilism, that is, 
constant domain semantics. The same objects exist in all worlds, but 
only some are ‘instantiated’. Variable assignments could be formed 
using uninstantiated objects. 
Finally, one could use a proxy b in w for an object a that does not exist 
at w and form variable assignments with proxies. All the worlds of a pw­
model have an infinite domain, so this is not obviously ruled by cardinal­
ity constraints.7 
I do not take a stance here. The problem just outlined is supposed to 
demonstrate how the additional expressive strength permits a discussion 
of issues of metaphysics in the object language. In first-order quantified 
modal logic the problem does not arise, because it is moved entirely 
into the metalanguage and there problems are solved by using a purely 
extensional, non-modal metatheory. One may even consider replacing 
modal talk with purely extensional discourse about possible worlds, as 
Lewis (1968, 1986) did. Of course, I cannot analyze such alternative 
approaches here, but one of the criteria would be whether they reach 
the expressive strength of the fourth grade of modal involvement. 
9.6 The Road Ahead 
I have outlined one way to capture the strength of the fourth grade of 
modal involvement in a formal language containing a binary predicate 
Nec and with a possible worlds semantics. But this is only one way to 
capture the full strength of the fourth grade of modal involvement. 
There are various ways to deviate from the approach in this chapter, 
and I have only briefly sketched some reasons for my choices. However, 
I hope I have succeeded in conveying a taste of how the fourth grade of 
modal involvement can help to shed light on issues such as the discussion 
between actualists and possibilists. The fourth grade of modal involve­
ment may not open a Cantorian paradise, but at least it provides an 
expansive playground not only for metaphysics, but also for the analyses 
of various epistemic, alethic, logical, and further modalities. 
Acknowledgments 
I am grateful to Beau Mount, Simon Nagler, Carlo Nicolai, Johannes 
Stern, Philip Welch, and Timothy Williamson for useful hints and 
suggestions. 
The Fourth Grade of Modal Involvement 229 
Notes 
1. Quine used ‘Nec’ (uppercase) for the predicate and ‘nec’ (lowercase) for the 
operator. Here the latter is replaced with the more familiar □. 
2. For a recent detailed discussion of modal predicates see Stern (2016). It has been 
argued that the full force of modal discourse can be restored by using proposi­
tional or ‘substitutional’ quantification or truth predicates (Halbach and Welch, 
2009). Some remarks on such extensions are given in the next section. 
3. Here I refer to “Three Grades of Modal Involvement” only. Later, in Word 
and Object (1960, §41) he considers de re modalities as predicates; and 
earlier in §35 and in (1956) he discusses propositional attitudes de re. 
4. Instead of predicates of sentences we could use predicates of Russellian prop­
ositions. If we are able to express the operation of applying the property P to 
the object o, we can use a predicate to say that there is a property P and an 
object o such that the proposition resulting of applying P to o is necessary. 
This approach has its own problems, because now de dicto modalities are 
not directly expressible. I will not pursue this strategy any further without 
claiming that it is not viable. A more detailed discussion would require a for­
malized theory of Russellian propositions. 
5. When Quine talks about a ordering of grades of modal involvement, he does not 
have an ordering according to reducibility in our sense in mind. As mentioned 
above, a semantic predicate is the lowest form of modal involvement for Quine. 
6. Carnap’s	 translations is different and there are several variations. What 
caused problems especially in early variants were problems with the iteration 
of Nec. 
7. I thank Beau Mount for bringing this point to my attention. 
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Kaplan, D. (1970). S5 with quantifiable propositional variables. Journal of Sym­
bolic Logic, 35: 355. Abstract. 
Kripke, S. A. (1959). A completeness theorem in modal logic. Journal of Sym­
bolic Logic, 24: 1–14. 
Kripke, S. A. (1975). Outline of a theory of truth. Journal of Philosophy, 72: 
690–716. reprinted in Martin (1984). 
Lewis, D. (1968). Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic. Journal of Phi­
losophy, 65: 113–126. 
Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers. Malden, MA. 
Martin, R. L., editor (1984). Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox. Clar­
endon Press and Oxford University Press. 
McGee, V. (1985). How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result. Journal 
of Philosophical Logic, 14: 399–410. 
Montague, R. (1963). Syntactical treatments of modality, with corollaries on 
reflexion principles and finite axiomatizability. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 
16: 153–167. Reprinted in (Montague, 1974, 286–302). 
Montague, R. (1974). Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague. 
Yale University Press. Edited and with an introduction by Richmond H. 
Thomason. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1956). Quantifiers and propositional attitudes. Journal of Phi­
losophy, 53: 177–187. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press. Cambridge, MA. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1976). Three grades of modal involvement. In The Ways of 
Paradox, pages 158–176. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, revised 
and enlarged edition. 
Stern, J. (2014a). Modality and axiomatic theories of truth I: Friedman-Sheard. 
Review of Symbolic Logic, 7: 273–298. 
Stern, J. (2014b). Modality and axiomatic theories of truth II: Kripke-Feferman. 
Review of Symbolic Logic, 7: 299–318. 
Stern, J. (2016). Toward Predicate Approaches to Modality, volume 44 of Trend 
in Logic. Springer. 
Tarski, A. (1935). Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen. Studia 
Philosophica Commentarii Societatis Philosophicae Polonorum, 1: 261–405. 
Translated as ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’ in (Tarski, 
1956, 152–278); page references are given for the translation. 
Tarski, A. (1956). Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 
1938. Clarendon Press. 
Visser, A. (1989). Semantics and the liar paradox. In Gabbay, D. and Gü nthner, 
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10 Opacity and Paradox 
Andrew Bacon 
In 1961 Prior proved a theorem that places surprising constraints on the 
logic of intentional attitudes, like ‘thinks that’, ‘hopes that’, ‘says that’ 
and ‘fears that’. Paraphrasing it in English, and applying it to ‘thinks’, 
it states: If, at t, I thought that I didn’t think a truth at t, then there is 
both a truth and a falsehood I thought at t. 
In this paper I explore a response to this paradox that exploits the 
opacity of attitude verbs, exemplified in this case by the operator ‘I 
thought at t that’, to block Prior’s derivation. According to this 
picture, both Leibniz’s law and existential generalization fail in opaque 
contexts. In particular, one cannot infer from the fact that I’m thinking 
at t that I’m not thinking a truth at t, that there is a particular proposi­
tion such that I am thinking it at t. Moreover, unlike some approaches to 
this paradox (see Bacon et al. [4]) the failure of existential generalization 
is not motivated by the idea that certain paradoxical propositions do not 
exist, for this view maintains that there is a proposition that I’m not 
thinking a truth at t. Several advantages of this approach over the non­
existence approach are discussed, and models demonstrating the consis­
tency of this theory are provided. Finally, the resulting considerations are 
applied to the liar paradox, and are used to provide a non-standard jus­
tification of a classical gap theory of truth. One of the main challenges 
for this sort of theory—to explain the point of assertion, if not to 
assert truths—can be met within this framework. 
10.1 Prior’s Paradox 
Prior’s result may be formalized as follows. Let Q represent a unary 
propositional operator and X be a sentential variable: 
Prior’s Theorem Q8X(QX ! ¬X)!9X(X ^ QX) ^ 9X(¬X ^ QX) 
The result is general, in that no special principles about the operator Q 
are assumed in its proof. Thus it has instances in which Q is replaced 
with negation or metaphysical necessity. But these instances are 
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unsurprising. Prior is primarily concerned with instances in which Q is 
substituted for various intentional attitudinal verbs, such as ‘S fears 
that’, ‘S hopes that’, ‘S said that’, and so on. Reading Q as ‘Simon 
said at t that’, Prior would paraphrase his theorem as follows: 
If Simon said at t that Simon didn’t say anything true at t, then 
Simon has said a truth and a falsehood at t. 
The puzzle is this: it seems evident that Simon could have said, at t, that 
he didn’t say anything true at t, and not have said anything else. In which 
case he would not have said both a truth and a falsehood, he would have 
said at most one thing, contradicting the theorem. 
Prior’s proof follows reasoning that should by now be familiar from 
the liar, and related paradoxes. Suppose Simon had said, at t, that he 
didn’t say anything true at t. Then either he didn’t say anything true at 
t, or he did. Suppose the former. Then, since the proposition that he 
didn’t say anything true at t is a proposition he said at t, it must be 
false. So it’s not the case that he didn’t say a truth at t. Contradiction. 
Suppose the latter: he did say a truth at t. Then the proposition that 
he didn’t say a truth at t, is itself false, and thus a falsehood he said at 
t. So he has said a truth and a falsehood at t. 
The informal reasoning above belies the inevitability of Prior’s result. In 
order to appreciate this, some points about the relation between Prior’s 
theorem, and the subsequent paraphrase in English, are in order. (Prior’s 
formal proof will be stated in the next section.) First, Prior’s theorem is 
stated in propositionally quantified logic: a language containing the famil­
iar truth functional connectives, propositional letters, the unary operator 
Q, but also variables that can occupy the position of sentences, and quan­
tifiers that can bind them. The English paraphrase replaces quantification 
into sentence position with singular quantification over propositions. Since 
a first-order variable cannot grammatically occupy the position of a sen­
tence, occurrences of bound sentential variables are replaced by first-
order variables as arguments to a propositional truth predicate. 
Second, because of the use of the propositional truth and falsity pred­
icates, certain avenues for resisting Prior’s theorem that are suggested 
from inspection of the informal argument, are really illusory. This 
includes, for example, co-opting any of the familiar non-disquotational 
accounts of sentential truth to play the role of propositional truth, allow­
ing propositions to be neither true nor false, or both true and false, but 
without relinquishing classical logic. For Prior’s paradox is not really 
stated in terms of propositional truth or falsity. Where, in the para­
phrase, we would assert that the proposition that P is true, the target 
of the paraphrase would simply assert P. And where, in the informal 
argument, we seem to move freely between ‘the proposition that P is 
true’ and ‘P’, no such move is made in Prior’s official argument. 
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Other familiar responses to the liar paradox are also of no use here. 
For example, after proving that a given language L, that can talk 
about its own sentences, does not contain a predicate that is true of all 
and only the true sentences in L, some will emphasize that the matter 
is not hopeless, since there might be another, more expressive language, 
L+, that can express truth in L. This goes along with the general idea that 
everything is in principle expressible, but not all at once in the same lan­
guage. Yet Prior’s theorem purports to tell us that there is a particular 
proposition—that Simon didn’t say anything true at t—that Simon 
cannot say uniquely at t. The theorem doesn’t have qualifications— 
that he can’t say the proposition in this particular language or that—it 
says that he can’t say it uniquely at t at all. Thus he can’t say it with a 
sentence of English, of Russian, a more expressive extension of these lan­
guages, or with an elaborate round of charades, unless he also says some­
thing else along with it. 
Of course, the paraphrase in terms of first-order quantification is nec­
essary because we do not have the equivalent of pronouns for sentences, 
or quantifiers that can bind them in ordinary English. But quantification 
into other grammatical positions, aside from first-order quantification, is 
possible in English, including the positions of plural and prepositional 
phrases, suggesting this restriction is only accidental to English (Prior, 
1971; Rayo and Yablo, 2001; Boolos, 1984). And even if not, why 
think that quantification into sentence position is intelligible only if it 
can be translated into a language that already has it? As children we 
are evidently able to learn first-order quantification in our native 
tongue, without first translating it into an already understood language, 
so why should these other modes of quantification be any different (Wil­
liamson, 2003)? 
Might one nonetheless try to resist Prior’s theorem by denying the 
intelligibility of quantification into sentence position? Those who do 
so will find the first-order paraphrases on better footing, but might 
reject the reasoning as illicit, since it involves principles concerning prop­
ositional truth that are extremely contentious in the context of sentential 
truth. For instance, we have freely moved between ‘the proposition that 
P is true’ and ‘P’, in order to be faithful to Prior’s reasoning, and this 
looks similar to the move, that is illicit given classical logic, between 
‘the sentence ‘P’ is true’ and ‘P’. But unlike sentential truth, these infer­
ences are unproblematic in the propositional setting (and only become 
problematic when combined with a structured theory of propositions, 
or some other theory of propositional granularity in which propositions 
behave enough like sentences to define things like substitution and diag­
onalization).1 Indeed, a minimal theory of first-order propositions and 
truth can be consistently formulated in which all of Prior’s reasoning 
may be faithfully represented.2 It is most naturally formulated in a 
type theory, à la Church, that contains the type of first-order predicates 
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e ! t, expressions that combine with names to form sentences, and a 
converse type t ! e of expressions that combine with sentences to 
form names. Given two primitives, true of type e ! t, and that of type 
t ! e, a minimal theory of first-order propositions can be formalized 
by an axiom stating that true is a left-inverse of that (in the type 
theory, λX.true(that X) X = λX.X). The consistency of such a theory 
roughly amounts to there not being ‘more things’ of type t than of 
type e, as in a full model of type theory that can be interpreted by 
any injection in type t ! e, and true by any of its left-inverses.3 
Despite being exceedingly minimal—the theory does not prove that 
Julius Caesar and the proposition that grass is green are distinct, 
for example—I think the theory is suitable for almost all of the things 
one might want from a first-order theory of propositions. In particular, 
it licenses the intersubstitutivity of ‘the proposition that P is true’ 
with ‘P’.4 
10.2 Possible Responses to Prior’s Paradox 
Having accepted the intelligibility of Prior’s language, here, finally, is 
Prior’s proof. It has two assumptions: 
Classical Propositional Logic All classical tautologies, Modus 
Ponens. 
Universal Instantiation 8 XA ! A[B/X], provided B is substituta­
ble for X in A. 
Propositionally quantified logic has further axioms beyond Universal 
Instantiation, but it is the only principle appealed to in Prior’s proof. 
We also take 8, ¬ and ! as primitive, and define 9X A  as ¬8X¬A and 
^ as ¬(A ! ¬B).5 Here is Prior’s proof, translated from Polish notation, 
and annotated so as to use only the assumptions above. 
1.	 8X(QX ! ¬X) ! (Q8X(QX ! ¬X) ! ¬8X(QX ! ¬X)) (UI) 
2.	 Q8X(QX ! ¬X) ! (8X(QX ! ¬X) ! ¬8X(QX ! ¬X)) (1, CL) 
3.	 Q8X(QX ! ¬X) ! ¬8X(QX ! ¬X) (2, CL) 
4.	 Q8X(QX ! ¬X) ! 9X(QX ^ X) (3, CL, 9Def) 
5.	 Q8X(QX ! ¬X) ! (Q8X(QX ! ¬X) ^ ¬8X(QX ! ¬X)) (3, CL) 
6.	 (Q8X(QX ! ¬X) ^ ¬8X(QX ! ¬X)) ! 9X(QX ^ ¬X) (CL, 9Def, 
^ Def) 
7.	 Q8X(QX ! ¬X) ! 9X(QX^ ¬X) (5, 6, CL) 
8.	 Q8X(QX ! ¬X) ! (9X(QX^X)^9X(QX^ ¬X)) (4, 7, CL) 
If we are to avoid Prior’s conclusion, then we must reject one of the two 
assumptions. That is, one must either weaken classical propositional 
logic, or reject the principle of Universal Instantiation. (Given the 
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duality of the quantifiers and the first assumption, Universal Instantia­
tion is equivalent to Existential Generalization: A[B/X]!9X A  provided 
B is substitutable for X in A. We will treat these two equivalent formula­
tions interchangeably.) 
Both options have precedents. Weakening classical logic is a common 
response to other paradoxes, including the semantic and set theoretic 
paradoxes.6 And there is a tradition of rejecting Universal Instantiation 
going back to Russell’s ban on impredicativity: a quantified proposition 
cannot belong to the domain over which it quantifies.7 Since proposi­
tional quantification is thus necessarily restricted, and since the logic 
of restricted quantification does not include Universal Instantiation, Uni­
versal Instantiation is not valid. 
Of course, another option is to simply accept the logic of Prior’s argu­
ment and follow it where it leads. Indeed, this is where my own sympa­
thies lie (Bacon, 2019). A radical interpretation of Prior’s theorem along 
these lines is that when Simon attempts to utter the sentence ‘Simon 
didn’t say anything true at t’, a mysterious force prevents him from com­
pleting his utterance. But this seems like a far-fetched moral to draw, and 
luckily one can accept Prior’s logic without drawing it. Rather, it is per­
fectly possible for Simon to make the utterance of the sentence ‘Simon 
didn’t say anything true at t’, but in doing so he doesn’t succeed in 
saying that Simon didn’t say anything true at t. According to Prior’s 
own interpretation, he doesn’t succeed in saying anything at all. This 
interpretation is not that radical, for few people would wish to identify 
saying that P with making the sounds that constitute uttering the sen­
tence ‘P’. As a way of warming up to this idea, note that one might 
cough in a way that, by fluke, sounds exactly like how one would say 
that snow is white in Farsi. But few would regard this as a way of 
saying that snow is white. More realistically, one might utter the sen­
tence ‘that dog looks funny’ while failing to point out a dog, or even any­
thing, and thus fail to say something with a sentence that, in other 
circumstances, could be used to say something. But Prior’s theorem, as 
we have noted already, is quite general and there are many other 
instances for which the costs are higher. For instance, consider: 
If Simon tried to say, at t, that Simon didn’t try to say anything true 
at t, then he tried to say a truth and a falsehood at t. 
Suppose that at t Simon utters the sentence ‘I didn’t try to say anything 
true at t’ (with full understanding of English, the intentions to assert, 
etc), and does nothing else. If we apply Prior’s diagnosis here, we 
should say that when Simon utters the sentence ‘I didn’t try to say any­
thing true at t’ he fails to say anything at all. But this response is of no 
avail: one must deny that Simon even tried to say something. For if we 
concede that he tried to say that he didn’t try to say anything true at t, 
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then we must accept the absurd conclusion that there were two things he 
tried to say at t.8 
In fact, accepting Prior’s theorem at face value commits us to one of 
the following (whether we follow Prior’s diagnosis of the original 
paradox or not): (i) that Simon didn’t even try to say that he didn’t try 
to say anything true at t, despite strong appearances to the contrary, 
or (ii) that Simon tried to say two things, one false one true, again, 
despite strong appearances to the contrary. So the cost of accepting 
Prior’s theorem is high, and a thorough examination of the logic that 
ensures it seems like the responsible course of action, even if we ulti­
mately choose to accept the conclusion. 
10.3 Non-Existent Propositions 
What should the Universal Instantiation denier say about Simon’s utter­
ance? According to the most plausible theories that accept Prior’s 
theorem, uttering the sentence ‘P’ is not sufficient for having said that 
P. Indeed, we have argued that it cannot be sufficient for having even 
tried to say that P. 
To distance themselves from the pathological results of the fully clas­
sical view, a denier of Universal Instantiation ought to endeavour to 
uphold what I will call the naı̈ve model of speech. According to this 
view, there is an action one can perform freely to a sentence ‘P’, 
which I shall call uttering ‘P’, which does suffice for saying that P, and 
moreover when one utters nothing else beyond ‘P’, one says nothing 
apart from that P, in normal circumstances.9 Of course, the naı̈ve view 
will have to be qualified in various ways to take into account context 
sensitivity; but we will set that aside by restricting attention to the 
pared down language described in Section 10.2, and by imposing the 
working assumption that its expressions are context insensitive.10 Such 
a view can accept all of the following: that uttering ‘P’ typically suffices 
for one having tried to say that P (bracketing context sensitivity), and 
that typically, when one tries to say that P one says that P. 
What does this amount to with respect to Prior’s paradox? According 
to the naı̈ve model, when Simon utters the sentence ‘I didn’t say 
anything true at t’ he succeeds in saying that he didn’t say anything 
true at t. But we cannot apply Existential Generalization (an equivalent 
of Universal Instantiation) to conclude that there is something that 
Simon has said: 
1. Simon said, at t, that Simon didn’t say anything true at t. 
2. For no X did Simon say that X. 
This, of course, blocks the argument. For instance, at one point of the 
argument we had supposed that Simon didn’t say anything true at t, and 
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attempted to show, contrary to the assumption, that this proposition is 
itself a truth that Simon said. Given 2 we should indeed accept this 
supposition: it is vacuously true, because Simon hasn’t said anything. We 
can also maintain 1, that Simon said that Simon didn’t say anything true 
at t; we just can’t conclude from this that Simon said a truth—this is an 
instance of Existential Generalization that is rejected. 
One way of understanding 2 is as an instance of a no-proposition 
view. Like the fully classical logician, this theorist accepts that Simon 
uttered the sentence ‘I didn’t say anything true at t’ but that he didn’t 
succeed in saying anything. But it is a different kind of no-proposition 
view, because despite this he did succeed in saying that he didn’t say any­
thing true at t. 
There are a couple of precedents for this sort of view. One, mentioned 
already, stems from Russell’s ban on vicious circles, according to which a 
quantified proposition cannot belong to the domain over which it quan­
tifies.11 A consequence of this ban is that all quantification into sentence 
position is restricted quantification, for the range of the quantifier in a 
quantificational claim like 8X A, must be restricted in such a way 
that it does not range over 8X A  itself. Thus an instance of Universal 
Instantiation that instantiates X with 8X A  is not legitimate (the 
instance: 8X A  ! A[8X A/X]). More generally, we know that the 
logic of restricted quantification does not include the principle of Univer­
sal Instantiation, as, after all, the following inference concerning the 
restricted quantifier ‘every F’ is clearly invalid: 
Every F is G  
Therefore; a is G  
Theorists sympathetic to Russell’s ban on impredicativity generally 
pursue ramified approaches to propositional quantification, in which 
there is a hierarchy of different quantifiers, each quantifier restricted 
to ranging over propositions involving quantifiers from lower in the hier­
archy. Each quantifier is restricted, but each proposition is in the range 
of some quantifier or other.12 
Another precedent for rejecting Universal Instantiation arises in the 
treatment of empty names within free logic.13 According to common 
sense, there is no such thing as Pegasus, the winged horse-god of 
Greek mythology. But we still want to maintain that Pegasus is a myth­
ical winged horse, or that the ancient Greeks told stories about Pegasus. 
One can also look (unsuccessfully) for Pegasus, and believe (mistakenly) 
that Pegasus is a horse, or that he would have been a horse-god had the 
mythology been true. We seem to want to assert that there are no myth­
ological horse-gods, but at the same time assert that Pegasus is a myth­
ological horse-god, that there is nothing you are in fact looking for when 
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you are looking for Pegasus, and so on. But these are counterexamples to 
Existential Generalization (and thus Universal Instantiation). 
On this interpretation we do not conceive of the failures of Universal 
Instantiation arising because the quantifiers are restricted in some way. 
For according to a view that takes the above judgments at face value, 
there is not some more expansive quantifier that ranges more widely 
over things like Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes, Vulcan, and so on. The coun­
terexamples to Universal Instantiation, from this perspective, involve the 
unrestricted quantifiers.14 
This perspective on Universal Instantiation can be applied to Prior’s 
paradox. For instance, verbs like says, hopes, fears, and so on, create 
the sorts of contexts from which one cannot existentially generalize. 
They are not existence entailing: to illustrate, being a horse is existence 
entailing, since we may infer from the (false) assumption that Pegasus 
is a horse that he exists, whereas being a mythical horse is not, for the 
analogous entailment seems false. It seems like Simon could hope that 
Pegasus was real, but we wouldn’t want to infer that there is something 
that Simon hopes is real. Similarly, he could have said that Pegasus is 
real, without there being anything that he said is real. One might there­
fore postulate things that stand to the grammatical category of sentences 
as empty names stand to the category of singular terms, and have the 
same attitude towards them as the free logician has towards empty 
names. Thus, one can say that P without there being anything that one 
has said. The proposition that Simon didn’t say a truth at t must be 
like Pegasus in the sense that it can have certain non-existence entailing 
properties, like being said or being hoped (or, in the latter case, being 
said/hoped to be real) without existing. 
The former view is less naturally classified as a no-proposition 
view. For each level of the quantifier hierarchy, i, there is a paradoxical 
sentence Simon can utter for which he can truthfully report, of his 
paradoxical utterance, both ‘Simon hasn’t said anythingi ’ and ‘there is 
somethingi+1 that Simon said’.
15 And both views should be distinguished, 
as noted above, from the classical no-proposition view which maintains 
that, in addition to not saying anything at t, Simon hasn’t said that he 
didn’t say anything true at t. 
Do these views avoid the trappings of the classical no-proposition view? 
A common problem for adherents of the classical no-proposition theory is 
that they have trouble stating their own view. For instance, someone like 
Prior might wish to communicate their view about Simon’s utterance at t 
by making their own utterance of the following: ‘Simon didn’t say any­
thing true at t’, perhaps by clarifying ‘because he didn’t say anything at 
all’. But of course, this is an utterance of the very sentence Simon failed 
to say anything with. Prior’s response is that, while one utterance of a sen­
tence might fail to say anything, another can. Thus it is utterances, not sen­
tences, that are the true couriers of successful assertion. But this response is 
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insufficiently general, as variants can be formulated that do not fair so 
well: D = ‘no utterance of D can be used to say a truth and only 
truths’. A routine argument, mimicking Prior’s, shows that no utterance 
of D can be used to say truths and only truths. But the theorist might 
want to communicate this result as well, by uttering the sentence ‘no utter­
ance of D can be used to say a truth and only truths’. In virtue of being an 
utterance of the problematic sentence itself, they will not succeed in saying 
anything.16 
In this regard the non-classical no-proposition views do better. For they 
can maintain that, even though an utterance of ‘no utterance of D can be 
used to say a truth and only truths’ will not result in you saying anything, 
one might still end up saying, with such an utterance, that no utterance of 
D can be used to say a truth and only truths. What good is this, if one 
hasn’t said anything? Well, the purpose of assertion is presumably to 
pass on beliefs and knowledge to others which can inform their actions, 
and so forth. But intentional verbs like belief and knowledge are para­
digm instances of the sorts of words that create non-existence entailing 
contexts: for example, Alice may believe that Pegasus is real, even 
though there isn’t anything that she believes is real.17 Thus in saying 
that P one may pass on knowledge that P, or a belief that P, even if  
there is no proposition you’ve said and which your intended audience 
thereby knows or believes. One might worry that the intentionality will 
eventually peter out. For instance, if the beliefs and knowledge acquired 
are to be efficacious, they had better inform our actions, but whether one 
has done something seems to be an existence entailing context, as it 
appears to be objective and not tangled up with our attitudes. Call a 
belief existent if, for some P it is a belief that P, and non-existent other­
wise. Non-existent beliefs, by impacting your credences, might raise the 
value of existing propositions which you are in a position to make true. 
So non-existent beliefs can be efficacious, even if we assume that 
making true is an existence entailing context. That said, the notion of 
making a proposition true is arguably also a propositional attitude, 
albeit a factive one. It is not simply a matter of certain things happening, 
but of them happening as a result of the agent’s intentions, and is thus like 
knowledge, belief, and saying in the relevant respects. For instance, given 
the naı̈ve model of saying, Simon appears to be in control of what he says 
and doesn’t say, as he is certainly in control of his utterances. When 
Simon utters the sentence ‘nothing I’ve said at t is true’ he doesn’t say any­
thing true. Since he was responsible for this, we should maintain that 
Simon has made it the case that nothing he said at t is true. Thus 
making true is not existence entailing, given the assumption, currently 
being explored, that there does not exist a P identical to the proposition 
that nothing Simon said at t is true.18 
In order to uphold the naı̈ve model of speech in full generality, we 
need not only to accommodate the case in which Simon utters 
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‘nothing I said at t is false’. For he could have said any other sentence at 
t. For instance, if he uttered ‘snow is white’ then he would have said, 
instead, that snow is white. Indeed, for any sentence A, ‘it is possible 
that Simon said that A’ should be true given the naı̈ve model of 
saying, since it’s possible that Simon utter ‘A’. Augmenting the language 
in Section 10.2 with an operator ., representing possibility, we may for­
mulate this as a schema: 
Possible Saying .QA 
Note, however, that the naı̈ve model of saying motivates something 
stronger: for given that it’s possible that Simon utter ‘snow is white’ 
and nothing else, it should be possible that Simon say that snow is 
white without saying anything else. If we add a propositional identity 
connective, =, we might try to formulate this as follows:19 
.(QA ^ 8X(QX ! X = A)) 
But this seems insufficiently strong without Universal Instantiation. For 
instance, this principle is consistent with the hypothesis that Simon can’t 
say at t that snow is white, without also saying that nothing he said at t is 
true. 8X(QX ! X = A) entails that any existing proposition which 
Simon has said at t must be identical to the proposition that snow is 
white. But this is satisfied when Simon says both that snow is white 
and that nothing Simon said at t is true, since the latter is not an existing 
proposition. In Bacon et al. (2016) a primitive notion of saying uniquely, 
Q! is introduced to deal with this: it is not defined in terms of Q, the 
quantifiers and an identity connective, but is taken as basic, and charac­
terized by a model theoretic stipulation (more on this below), and more­
over subject to the laws: 
Subsumption □(Q!A ! QA) 
Uniqueness □(Q!A^Q!B ! A = B) 
We may thus articulate the desired component of the naı̈ve model as 
follows:20 
Possible Saying! .Q!A 
It is important to this project to know that Possible Saying!, Subsump­
tion, and Uniqueness are indeed consistent with a free version of propo­
sitionally quantified logic that does not contain Universal Instantiation. 
This is undertaken in Bacon et al. (2016), where various models of this, 
and related theories, are constructed. 
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10.4 Opacity 
In this section I will be exploring another view that responds to Prior’s 
paradox by rejecting Universal Instantiation. But it is a non-standard 
version of this response: it is not motivated by any general logical con­
straint, such as Russell’s ban on impredicative quantification. Nor 
does it follow from considerations of non-existence, as the counterexam­
ples involving names like Pegasus. In fact, our quantifications will in 
general be interpreted as ranging unrestrictedly, and we will accept a 
schema, 9X(X = A), to the effect that all sentences express existing prop­
ositions: there are no sentences that stand to the propositional quantifiers 
as empty names stand to the first-order quantifiers. 
The key observation is that the problematic instances of Prior’s 
theorem all involve intentional attitudes—attitudes like saying, fearing, 
hoping, and so forth—that are commonly supposed to create opaque 
contexts. We have already noted that intentional attitudes create con­
texts which are not existence entailing. I will argue that opacity also 
creates contexts in which existential generalization is not permissible, 
albeit for fundamentally different reasons than in the cases involving 
non-existence, and restricted quantification. 
Suppose that Simon knows that Hesperus is visible in the evening and 
Phosphorus is visible in the morning, but does not realize that Hesperus 
and Phosphorus are the same. He is looking at the sky in the evening and 
forms the belief that Hesperus is bright: 
1. Simon believes that Hesperus is bright. 
Because he does not realize they are the same, he forms no such belief 
about Phosphorus: 
2. Simon does not believe that Phosphorus is bright. 
But, of course, they are the very same planet: 
3. Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
This seems to be a counterexample to Leibniz’s law: 
L() a = b ! A ! A[a/b] 
There are many different replies to this puzzle. Most assimilate it to some 
sort of equivocation. According to one version of this idea, words like 
‘believes’ are context sensitive, and the attitude being ascribed by the 
word ‘believes’ are different in 1 and 2.21 According to another, the 
equivocation is due to the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’: in 
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embedded contexts names refer not to their customary referents, but to 
their customary senses (Frege, 2010). 
In Bacon and Russell (2019), Jeff Russell and I have investigated the 
suggestion that we take the judgments 1–3 at face value, as counterexam­
ples to Leibniz’s law. But this is entirely consistent with various quanti­
fied variants of Leibniz’s law, including: 
L(xy) 8x8y(x = y ! A ! A[x/y]) 
(Sometimes principles like L() and L(xy) are restricted to instances involving 
direct predications; in this case, for instance, 8xy(x = y ! Fx ! Fy). 
Following Bacon and Russell (2019) I shall treat these principles inter­
changeably in the presence of a device of λ-abstraction that allows 
one to turn a term t occurring in an arbitrary context A[t/x], into a direct 
predication (λx A)t.22 In our discussion of first-order logic, where λ is 
not present, the unrestricted principles are stronger, and will be our 
focus.) 
L(xy) has been thought to be plausible, even by those who reject L() on 
broadly Fregean grounds. For while names may be associated with inter­
esting senses, which can have interestingly different cognitive import, 
bound variables refer directly to the things they denote. Let Bx represent 
the open sentence ‘Simon believes x to be bright’.23 Then we should 
accept: 
a = b ^ Ba ^ ¬Bb 
But given Existential Generalization we would be able to infer: 
9x9y(x = y ^ Bx ^ ¬By) 
But this directly contradicts an instance of L(xy). So Existential General­
ization cannot be valid, and thus neither can Universal Instantiation. 
Indeed, this is evident when one observes that L() can be derived from 
L(xy) by two applications of Universal Instantiation (instatiating x 
with a and y with b). 
It has long been suggested that opaque contexts generate failures of 
Existential Generalization (Quine, 1956; Kaplan, 1968). For instance, 
many people believe that a single person, who has since been dubbed 
‘Jack the Ripper’, terrorized Whitechapel with a series of murders in 
the 1888. Thus we believe that Jack the Ripper committed the White-
chapel murders. But we don’t know who committed the murders, so 
there is no person such that we believe that they committed the White-
chapel murders. 
It is worth emphasizing how these failures of Existential Generalization 
differ from the failures due to non-existence. For in the first case, there is 
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something, namely the planet Venus, that is identical to both Hesperus 
and Phosphorus. Hesperus and Phosphorus exist. So, too, does Jack the 
Ripper, assuming, as commonly supposed, that there was a single individ­
ual who committed the murders in 1888. So the failures of Existential 
Generalization are fundamentally different from the failures instanced in 
inference from ‘Pegasus is a mythical winged horse’ to ‘something is a 
mythical winged horse’, since in that case there is no such thing as 
Pegasus. That is, we have a counterexample to a principle, weaker than 
Existential Generalization, that is validated in the free logics designed to 
deal with empty-names (see, e.g., Nolt, 2018): 
Unrestricted Export 9x a  = x ^ A[a/x] ! 9xA 
Unrestricted Export is derivable given some pretty uncontroversial quan­
tificational logic, and Leibniz’s law, L().24 But since Leibniz’s law is part 
of what is at stake in these cases, this argument has little suasive force. 
Let’s summarize this with an important definition. 
Opacity A context, A, is  transparent, relative to a language, iff every 
instance of the schema a = b! A! A[b/a] in that language is true. It 
is opaque otherwise. 
There are philosophers who will be in verbal agreement with much of 
the foregoing. They will countenance failures of L() (but not L(xy)), and 
will subsequently agree that there are opaque predicates and predicates 
that do not license export. But they do not take opacity ‘seriously’ in 
my sense, for they will maintain that attitude verbs don’t create 
genuine contexts, whose meanings can be computed compositionally, 
any more than quotation marks do. What, on the surface, looks like at 
operator expression—‘Simon believes that . . .’—in reality functions 
like a predicate of sentences, ‘Simon believes “. . .”’, and what looks 
like a context is merely a typographical constituent of a quotation 
name for a sentence. Provided such philosophers can make sense of my 
remarks in their preferred framework, it will not matter much, but I 
will not make systematic attempts to accommodate them. 
Putting all this together, what might a first-order logic of opacity look like? 
We will assume a first-order language with non-logical predicates and oper­
ators that may be opaque. Let’s start with the quantificational fragment: 
Quantified Instantiation 8x(8yA ! A[x/y]) 
Normality 8x(A ! B)!8xA ! 8xB 
Quantifier Exchange 8x8yA ! 8y8xA 
Vacuous Quantification A ! 8xA when x does not occur free in A 
Notice that in place of the principle of Universal Instantiation, 8xA ! A[t/x], 
we have its universal closure, Quantified Instantiation.25 This 
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corresponds to the idea, implicit in our discussion of L(xy), that bound 
variables, unlike names, are not susceptible to identity confusions. Thus 
one ought to be able to instantiate bound variables.26 
Besides Quantified Instantiation, one should also think that instantia­
tion of arbitrary terms is legitimate provided it is not in an intentional 
context. The distinction between intentional and non-intentional contexts 
is not a distinction that can be made prior to the interpretation of the non­
logical constants. But we may assume purely logical contexts are transpar­
ent, independently of how the non-logical constants are interpreted, and so 
we should be able to instantiate into purely logical contexts. More gener­
ally, we should be able to instantiate even in non-logical contexts, pro­
vided the variable is not within the scope of a non-logical operation:27 
Logical Instantiation 8yA ! A[t/y] provided y is not in the scope of a 
non-logical operation. 
To this we must add principles governing identity: 
L(xy) 8xy(x = y ! A ! A[y/x]) 
Reflexivity 8xx = x 
Existence 9xt = x 
From Logical Instantiation and identity we can derive the reflexivity 
schema, a = a. And  from  L(xy) and Logical Instantiation we can 
derive every instance of Leibniz’s law in which the substituted terms 
do not occur in non-logical contexts. This allows one to derive the 
symmetry and transitivity schemas in the usual way: a = b ! b = a 
and a = b ! b = c ! a = c.28 Existence corresponds to the idea that 
failures of Universal Instantiation are not due to non-existence. I will 
not adjudicate on the more general issue of Existence when there are 
empty names in the language. For now we may simply treat it as a sti­
pulation that the language does not contain any empty names. 
It is worth pausing, for a minute, to consider whether the existence of 
opacity forces one to reject Existential Generalization, and Unrestricted 
Export. Part of our argument for these failures rested on the assumption 
of L(xy), which someone taking opacity at face value may wish to deny. 
A more theoretical argument for L(xy) is given in Bacon and Russell 
(2019) from a higher-order generalization, where X is a variable 
taking predicate position: 
L(xyX) 8X8x8y(x = y ! Xx ! Xy) 
L(xyX) can be justified as follows: if it were false, one could find x and y 
that are identical, but are distinguished by a property. In which case, 
there would be a relation that did guarantee that x and y shared the same 
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properties, namely the relation of sharing the same properties (defined: 
λxy8X(Xx $ Xy)). This relation satisfies the logical role that identity is 
customarily thought to satisfy, given Universal Instantiation. For if a and 
b stand in this relation, then Ba $ Bb, instantiating X with B.29 So this 
relation satisfies L(), whereas identity proper does not, according to this 
view, making conspicuous the charge that one is simply talking about the 
wrong relation. If there is a relation that satisfies the logical role of 
identity, then it is hard to see any other relation having a better claim to 
being the notion of identity appropriate to logic and metaphysics. Of 
course, some metaphysicians have postulated notions of ‘loose identity’ 
by which we sometimes count and individuate objects in natural lan­
guage, whilst distinguishing it from the proper identity of logic and 
metaphysics (see, e.g., Chisholm, 1969 and Lewis, 1976). But to object 
to the logicians use of Leibniz’s law on these grounds seems like an 
overreach.30 
With L(xyX) so justified we may may infer L(xy) by universally instan­
tiating X with A in the logical context λX8x8y(x = y ! Xx ! Xy).31 The 
critical observation here is that, while Universal Instantiation is not in 
general valid, one can make such instantiations in logical contexts. For 
while words like ‘belief’, ‘hope’, ‘says’, and so forth create opaque con­
texts, words like ‘not’, ‘and’, and ‘all’ appear not to. A similar justifica­
tion may be made of another quantified version of Leibniz’s law, 
namely:32 
L(X) 8X(a = b ! Xa ! Xb) 
since one can also infer it from L(xyX) by instantiation into a logical 
context. 
Caie et al. (forthcoming) follow Bacon and Russell (2019) in rejecting 
the orthodoxy regarding Leibniz’s law, but develop a classical account of 
opacity that keeps Universal Instantiation. Consequently L(xyX), L(xy), 
and L(X) are all rejected along with L().33 But in addition to the worries 
above, these sorts of views are ontologically wild in ways that the non­
classical versions are not. For instance, in order to accommodate 1–3, 
there exists a property that Hesperus has which Phosphorus doesn’t 
(namely, being believed by Simon to be bright). Call the relation of 
sharing the same properties, strict identity, and its negation strict dis­
tinctness: thus Hesperus and Phosphorus are strictly distinct. Just as 
we talk about there being multiple planets satisfying some criteria 
when there exist a distinct x and y that are planets with the criteria, 
we say there are strictly multiple planets when there are strictly distinct 
planets, x and y, satisfying the criteria. We will follow similar conven­
tions for words like ‘lots’, ‘several’, ‘more’, ‘most’, and so on. Since Hes­
perus and Phosphorus are strictly distinct, there are at least two planets, 
in the strict sense, colocated with Venus. Of course, there’s nothing 
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special about the name ‘Venus’ either, so we should expect there to be 
strictly more than the strict two: there should be a ‘strict lot’ of them, 
one for each possible identity confusion.34 So there is a sense in which 
the view inflates the ontology, even if all these strictly distinct planets 
are all identical in the loose sense. But there is also an internal worry. 
Clearly Hesperus is a planet between Mercury and Earth, similarly for 
Phosphorus. Indeed, given their identity, they must share many 
properties—all the transparent properties, including the property of 
being colocated with Venus, being visible in the evening and being 
visible in the morning, orbiting the Sun, and presumably any properties 
definable in the language of physics. But why is it, then, that Simon has 
the belief that Hesperus is bright, but not Phosphorus? After all, there are 
two strictly distinct planets colocated with one another, sharing all the 
same physical properties: it’s not like one can be invisible in the 
evening while the other isn’t—they occupy the same region of space­
time, have the same reflective properties, and so on. What is it about 
Hesperus, and not the physically indistinguishable Phosphorus, that 
allows Simon to attach his belief to it, and not a strictly different 
planet?35 
The view raises other metaphysical concerns. For instance, many phi­
losophers are attracted to physicalism, according to which every prop­
erty can be defined from physical properties. The strongest version of 
this thesis is that every property is strictly identical to a logical combina­
tion of physical properties. But all physical and logical properties are 
plausibly transparent, as, plausibly, are things you can create by combin­
ing logical and physical operations. In which case belief must be strictly 
identical to a transparent property, and thus transparent itself (since 
strict identity obeys Leibniz’s law). 
The non-classical opacity theorist, by contrast, avoids the excesses of 
its classical cousin. It draws no distinction beween identity and strict 
identity: indeed, according to it one cannot define binary predicates 
that satisfy Leibniz’s law. They can accept that belief is strictly identical 
to a transparent property, without inferring that belief is transparent, 
since being transparent is itself an opaque property.36 And they may 
deny that there are two strictly distinct colocated planets. 
10.5 Prior’s Paradox and Opacity 
We have argued that opaque contexts create a distinctive cluster of coun­
terexamples to Existential Generalization (and Universal Instantiation). 
We have focused on the case of first-order quantification, for the sake 
of familiarity, but the considerations generalize to other semantic 
types. For instance, it seems plausible that the property of being a 
lawyer, and the property of being an attorney are the very same, but 
Simon might believe that Susan is a lawyer, without believing that she 
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is an attorney. Similar considerations compel us to reject Existential Gen­
eralization for quantification into predicate position. 
Of special interest is the case of quantification into sentence position. 
A solution to Prior’s paradox along these lines, would accept the follow­
ing (with similar things being said about the variants of Prior’s paradox 
stated in terms of hope, fear, and so forth): 
1.	 Simon said, at t, that nothing he said at t is true. 
2.	 For no P did Simon say that P at t. 
3.	 For some P, the proposition that P just is the proposition that 
nothing Simon said at t is true. 
It is 3, in particular, that distinguishes this solution from the solutions 
based on non-existence, and bans on impredicativity. 
But despite this difference, many of the goodmaking features of the 
non-existence approach apply here too. For instance, unlike the classical 
no-proposition view, there is a point to uttering sentences that do not 
result in you saying anything. For one can maintain that Simon didn’t 
say anything true at t, even if one hasn’t thereby said anything,. 
According to the non-existence view, the reason Simon hasn’t said 
anything with his utterance is that the proposition that nothing Simon 
said at t is true simply doesn’t exist. Thus no one can say anything by 
uttering the sentence ‘nothing Simon said at t is true’ (even though one 
will nonetheless say that nothing Simon said at t is true). This non­
existence makes general theorizing difficult. For instance, the symmetry 
of disjunction is sometimes captured with a generalization: 
8XY(X _ Y = Y _ X) 
But according to the view under consideration, this is insufficiently 
general. It will not entail the instance in which X is instantiated with 
‘nothing Simon said at t is true’ and Y with ‘snow is white’. 
By contrast, even though we have established that there is no P such 
that Simon said at t that P, we have not established that someone else 
couldn’t say that nothing Simon said t is true and thereby have said 
something. Nor have we established that Simon couldn’t say something 
with the same utterance at another time. By analogy with the first-order 
case, while there’s no-one who I know to have committed the White-
chapel murders, there might be someone else for which there is 
someone they know to have committed the Whitechapel murders (Jack 
the Ripper himself, for instance). Whereas, there can’t be anything that 
that is believed (by anybody) to be a winged horse-god on the basis of 
believing that Pegasus is a winged horse-god. 
Similarly, our generalization above is sufficient to prove all its 
instances, given the sentential analogue of Logical Instantiation. 
Since we can instantiate X with P into a purely logical context to get 
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8Y P  _ Y = Y _ P. And we may then instantiate again to get P _Q = Q _ P, 
as Y was not in the scope of a non-logical operation. 
Of course, not all theorizing is insulated from opacity. For instance, 
Bacon et al. (2016) object that the universal generalization 8X(KX ! X), 
expressing the factivity of knowledge, is not general enough. An 
appeal to Logical Instantiation is of no avail here, since X is in the 
scope of an intentional operator, K. One must instead be content with 
a schema: KA ! A. But there is an extent to which schemas are unavoid­
able. For instance, in classical propositionally quantified logic, to ensure 
the that the quantified claim 8X(KX ! X) really does imply all of its 
instances, one needs a different schema, namely Universal Instantiation, 
8XA ! A[B/X]. It cannot be substituted with its universally quantified 
variant, 8Y(8XA ! A[Y/X]), what we earlier called Quantified Instanti­
ation, because it doesn’t imply its instances. See note 26. 
Another issue raised in Bacon et al. (2016) is that in some of the 
models of Prior’s paradox considered there (motivated by the free 
logic approach to empty names, and not opacity), the domain of existing 
propositions weren’t closed under certain logical operations. In some 
models, negations, conjunctions, and disjunctions of existing proposi­
tions didn’t exist. In the most plausible models, propositions were 
closed under the finitary Boolean operations, but you would either 
have a proposition P that existed, without the proposition that Simon 
said that P existing, or you would have a context such that the proposi­
tion defined by A[P] existed for each P, but 8X A  didn’t. These limita­
tions were no accident, as one could show in that context that the 
following closure principles would lead to contradiction: 
CL> 9p(p = >) 
CL? 9p(p = ?) 
CL¬ 8p9q(q = ¬p) 
CL□ 8p9q(q = □p) 
CLQ 8p9q(q = Qp) 
CL^ 8p8q9r(r = (p ^ q)) 
CL = 8p8q9r(r = (p = q)) 
CL8 8p8q9r(q = φ ! (r = 8pφ)) 
That derivation made essential use, however, of Unrestricted Export: 
(9X(X = B) ^ A[B/X]) ! 9X A. The informal idea was to show, on the 
basis of these closure conditions, that Prior’s proposition, 8X(QX ! ¬X), 
existed. Unrestricted Export tells us we may universally instantiate and 
existentially generalize on propositions we know to exist—in effect, 
classical reasoning is legitimate provided the relevant propositions exist.37 
But the logic of opacity, in propositionally quantified logic, should 
include analogues of all of the principles we discussed in Section 10.4, 
including the schema Existence: 
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Existence 9X(X = A) 
Thus each of the closure principles listed above is thus trivially secured. 
And as for the derivation in Bacon et al. (2016), Unrestricted Export must 
be relinquished. But inspection of the argument reveals that one must 
apply Unrestricted Export to variables under the scope of Q, a move we 
have rejected on independent grounds, from considerations of opacity. 
So an opacity-inspired response to Prior’s paradox is desirable. But is 
it consistent? That is to say, can we have a model of Possible Saying 
within the logic of opacity. For clarity, I will restate all the principles 
we wish to show to be jointly consistent, converting the first-order 
logic of opacity of Section 10.4 to the context of propositionally quanti­
fied logic (the principles from Quantified Instantiation onwards)38 
Possible Saying! .Q!A 
Subsumption □(Q!A ! QA) 
Uniqueness □(Q!A ^ Q!B ! (C $ C[A/B]) 
Quantified Instantiation 8X (8Y A  ! A[X/Y]) 
Normality 8X (A ! B)! 8X A  ! 8X B  
Quantifier Exchange 8X8Y A  ! 8Y8X A  
Vacuous Quantification A ! 8X A  when X does not occur free in A 
Logical Instantiation 8Y A  ! A[B/Y] provided Y is not in the scope 
of a non-logical operation (i.e. Q or Q!)
 
Reflexivity 8X (X = X)
 
L(xy) 8XY (X = Y ! A ! A[Y/X])
 
Existence 9X (X = A)
 
For the sake of simciterplicity, we shall assume that propositions are 
individuated by necessary equivalence. Thus we may alternatively take □ 
as primitive, and defined A = B by □(A $ B), or take = as primitive, and 
define □A as A = >. I will take the latter option, as it strikes me that 
identity is the more basic notion. Our language will thus be that of 
propositionally quantified logic, with a binary connective, =, and two 
unary connectives Q and Q!. 
On this last point, one thing that should be emphasized is that our 
approach to opacity, despite capitulating much to the thought that atti­
tudes are capable of drawing fine distinctions, does not take sides on 
propositional granularity. Indeed, everything we have said so far is con­
sistent with Booleanism, the thesis that propositions are governed by the 
Boolean identity, as encoded by generalizations, statable in our proposi­
tionally quantified language with identity, like the commutativity of dis­
junction discussed earlier. 
THEOREM 10.5.1. The listed principles are consistent, and indeed have a 
possible worlds model securing Booleanism. 
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The full proof of this may be found in the appendix. But here is an 
informal explanation of the construction. Firstly, following Bacon et al. 
(2016), a model will consist of: 
. A set of worlds, W. 
. An accessibility relation, R, on  W, for interpreting = (and conse­
quently □). It will be an equivalence relation. 
. A mapping, |Q|:W ! P(P(W)), that provides the extension of Q at 
each world w. |Q|(w) is the set of propositions Qed at w. 
. A mapping D : W ! P(P(W)) where D(w) represents the domain of 
the propositional quantifiers at w. 
A sentence of the form A = B is true at a world w iff A and B are true at 
the same worlds accessible to w. Provided R is not the universal relation, 
an identity like this can be true even when A and B are true at different 
worlds. QA is true at a world w if the set of worlds where A is true is in 
the extension of Q at w (i.e. in |Q|(w)). Q!A is true at w if, moreover, 
that set is the unique member of |Q|(w). The remaining clauses are the 
obvious ones, and may be found in the appendix. 
In our specific model, W will consist of two copies of the natural 
numbers, where worlds in the first copy see only worlds in the first 
copy (along the accessibility relation R), and similarly, worlds in the 
second copy see only worlds in the second copy. 
The domain of quantification in a world in the first copy will consist 
of finite and cofinite sets of worlds in the first copy. Likewise the domain 
of a world in the second copy will consist of finite and cofinite sets of 
worlds from the second copy. (Cofiniteness is being computed relative 
to the copy in question, not relative the whole set of worlds.) To inter­
pret Q we fix a bijection σ between the naturals, N, and the finite and 
cofinite subsets of N. The interpretation of Q at the world n, in either 
copy, is the same. It contains exactly one set of worlds—the union of 
the two copies of σ(n). Note that this proposition is not in the domain 
of any world, either in the first or the second copy. But it is nonetheless 
necessarily equivalent to a proposition that is in the domain, in either 
case, for it coincides with a finite or cofinite set from the first (or 
second) copy respectively on the accessible worlds at that copy. Given 
the coincidence of identity with necessary equivalence in this model, 
this secures Existence. 
Say that a set of worlds is symmetric if it is the same in both copies. 
Given the symmetry of the way the semantics is set up, a world in the 
first copy is indistinguishable from its sibling in the second copy, and 
vice versa. Thus one ought to expect a closed sentence could only be 
true at a world in the first copy if it was also true in its sibling in the 
second copy, and vice versa. Thus every closed sentence expresses a sym­
metric proposition. Moreover, if things work out nicely, every closed 
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sentence should express a symmetric proposition that is finite or cofinite 
relative to either (and thus both) copies. In which case, for any closed 
sentence A, the proposition it expresses in the model is the unique prop­
osition in the extension of Q at the two sibling worlds the bijection σ 
associates to that proposition. Thus, .Q!A will be true at any world 
in the first or second copy. The tricky part of this argument is establish­
ing that every closed sentence expresses a finite or cofinite set, relative to 
both copies; the full details are in the appendix. 
10.6 Truth and Meaning 
The liar paradox poses familiar problems for many attempts at systema­
tic semantic theorizing. Could these considerations on intentionality and 
opacity shed any light on it? In this section I will attempt to leverage our 
remarks on opacity and Prior’s paradox to motivate a novel theory of 
truth and a diagnosis of the liar paradox. 
While much work on the liar has focused on the notion of truth, there 
is a large amount of work in semantics that is best thought of as charac­
terizing the notion of a sentence meaning a proposition. According to 
this paradigm, lexical items more generally are assigned meanings, and 
the meanings of complex phrases are a computed in terms of the mean­
ings of their constituents, in accordance with the principle of composi­
tionality. The meaning of a sentence is a proposition. The notion of 
sentential truth is then a derivative notion, to be understood as 
meaning a true proposition. We might formalize this by introducing a 
device, M, formalizing ‘means that’, that combines with the name of a 
sentence and a sentence to form a sentence, just as verbs like ‘says 
that’, ‘hopes that’, or ‘fears that’ combine with the name of a person 
and a sentence to form a sentence. 
We can then introduce truth, in propositionally quantified first-order 
logic, via a definition: 
Truth Tx : =  9Z (M x Z  ^ Z) 
Falsehood Fx : =  9Z (M x Z  ̂  ¬ Z) 
Suppose, moreover, that for each sentence of the language in question, A, 
there is a name hAi, that on its intended interpretation denotes the 
sentence A. A  prima facie compelling disquotational principle says: 
The Meaning Schema The sentence ‘P’ means that P 
which we may formalize: 
M hAi A 
252 Andrew Bacon 
But now suppose that there is a name, c, identical to the representative 
name for the sentence, 8X (M c X ! ¬X), i.e. c = h8X (M c X ! ¬X)i. 
An instance of the Meaning Schema is: 
M h8X (M c X ! ¬X)i 8X (M c X ! ¬X) 
Replacing h8X (M c X ! ¬X)i for c, we get: 
M c 8X (M c X ! ¬X) 
Now interpret QX in Prior’s theorem M c X. Applying Modus Ponens to 
Prior’s theorem we get: 
9X (M c X ^ X) ^ 9X (M c X ^ ¬X) 
In other words c means a truth and a falsehood. According to our defi­
nitions this means c is both true and false. Note that this is not strictly 
speaking inconsistent. But it contradicts the assumption, seemingly just 
as important for doing semantics compositionally, that a sentence 
means at most one thing. For if A meant several propositions, and B 
meant several propositions, how would we compute the meaning of 
A _ B? The obvious choice of letting it mean any proposition you can 
get by disjoining something A means with something B means doesn’t 
work, for otherwise A _ ¬A can mean falsehoods. We need some way 
of coordinating the meanings of the two disjuncts, and we can’t do 
this with M as our only primitive.39 
What about the more traditional liar sentence? Suppose we had a 
name, c such that c = h¬Tci. Observe that expanding out the definition 
of ¬Tc you get ¬9X (M c X ^ X), and applying some logic this is equiv­
alent to 8X (M c X  ! ¬X). Thus there is a straightforward sense in 
which our paradox considered above is just another version of the liar, 
modulo our definition of truth. 
How might opacity shed light on this paradox? I have suggested in the 
previous section that ‘says that’ is opaque. What things sentences mean 
supervenes in large part, on what propositions people have said. One 
could take this to suggest that ‘means’ is opaque. According to one 
theory, to say that P is just to utter a sentence that means that P. If  
‘means’ was not opaque, then neither would ‘says’ be. But this does not 
seem like a plausible account of saying to me. Merely uttering a sentence 
is not usually sufficient for saying anything. And it seems plausible that 
one can say things using ad hoc conventions, as when one is in a 
foreign country and doesn’t speak the language. Indeed, the fact that 
one can say things in the absence of a language suggests a very appealing 
theory of how sentences can acquire meanings in the first place: that one 
uses certain sentences when saying things to establish the the more general 
Opacity and Paradox 253 
convention that the sentence be used to say that thing.40 On this view, 
saying is a primitive propositional attitude, and meaning is to be explained 
in terms of it. In this case too, we should expect meaning to be opaque, for 
it is explained in terms of an opaque attitude. This appears to be no acci­
dent: other reductive theories of meaning reduce meaning to other inten­
tional attitudes. For example, Lewis, in his book Convention (1969), 
attempts to reduce meaning to the desires and beliefs of the language 
speakers. Davidson’s account of radical interpretation involves the atti­
tude of belief in a similarly central way (Davidson, 1973). 
Even if we do not make this reductive move, there are independent 
reasons for thinking that meaning is opaque. In Bacon and Russell 
(2019) we are, among other things, concerned with upholding the 
Millian theory of names. According to this theory, the meanings of ‘Hes­
perus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are the same: the planet Venus. We might for­
malize this [hai] = [hbi]. But a principle of compositionality then 
appears to entail that the meaning of ‘Hesperus is believed to be 
bright’ is the same as the meaning of ‘Phosphorus is believed to be 
bright’, i.e. that [hBai ] = [hBbi]. For the principle of compositionality 
says: [hBai] = [hBi] [hai], and [hBbi] = [hBi] [hbi]. Leibniz’s law 
allows us to derive the undesired conclusion. Undesired, because these 
sentences appeared to have different truth values in ancient times, and 
so, presumably different semantic values. We draw the following 
moral: opacity exists in the metalanguage—meaning is opaque. 
Many consistent theories of truth have been proposed that avoid the 
liar paradox: the logical landscape is pretty well-explored at this 
point.41 However, much work is still needed in the interpretation of 
these theories. In the following I want to motivate a theory of truth 
that falls under the umbrella of the so-called classical gap theories of 
truth, of which prominent proponents include Feferman (1991) and 
Maudlin (2004). These theories say of the liar sentence, c = h¬Tci, that 
it is neither true nor false. But many have argued that such theories 
are self-undermining. For in virtue of the liar being neither true nor 
false, it follows that the liar isn’t true. But this is exactly the liar sentence. 
Such theorists have to make seemingly absurd speeches like: 
1. c is not true. 
2. The sentence I just uttered, 1, is not true. 
Scharp (2013), for instance, calls this the ‘self-refutation problem’. Priest 
(2005) puts it forcefully as follows: ‘truth is the aim of assertion. Once 
this connection is broken, the notion of assertion comes free from its 
mooring, and it is not clear why we should assert anything’ (p. 485). 
Thus, we must do something to explain what we are doing when we 
assert, if the aim is no longer to assert truths. I think an opacity friendly 
theory of meaning can meet this demand. 
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Let us rehearse what we must say about the liar paradox, drawing on 
our solution to Prior’s paradox in the logic of opacity. 
. c means that nothing c means is true. 
. For no X is it the case that c means that X. 
Given our definition of truth, as meaning a truth, it follows that c is not 
true: there is no proposition it means, and so no truth it means. Similarly, 
it is not false either, as there is no false proposition it means. Thus we 
have a version of the classical gap theory.42 In particular, we must 
make the seemingly absurd sequence of assertions listed in 1 and 2. 
We began by suggesting that it is meaning, not truth, that is the more 
theoretically central notion. This opens up the option, not available to 
someone just theorizing in terms of truth, of giving a meaning-theoretic 
explanation of why we might assertively utter c—the sentence ‘c is not 
true’—even though it is not itself true. The explanation is this: because 
by uttering that sentence, one thereby says that c is not true. And by 
saying that c is not true, one may pass on the knowledge that c is not 
true to ones audience, and they can act accordingly. Of course, these 
sayings and knowledge are opacity laden: there is no proposition one 
has thereby said, or that ones audience thereby knows. But, as we 
argued in Section 10.3, in the context of the non-existence approach, 
this is no barrier to the knowledge playing the relevant role in informing 
your actions. 
10.7 Logic First or Semantics First? 
Let me end by discussing one aspect of the our general approach to 
opacity that bears special emphasis. The explanation of opacity — fail­
ures of Leibniz’s law—is often thought to be a burden of the philosophy 
of language. It is usually given a semantic explanation. Perhaps ‘Hes­
perus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ do not refer to a single planet, but to a pair 
of distinct individual concepts, or perhaps the identity symbol or attitude 
verbs semantically behave differently than we might otherwise have 
thought. By contrast, on the present view the opacity of attitude verbs 
is not explained semantically—any putative explanation along these 
lines would be dizzying at best given the opacity of semantic words 
themselves. 
As one might expect from a disquotational theory, the semantic facts 
here are uncomplicated. ‘Hesperus’ straightforwardly means Hesperus, 
‘Phosphorus’ straightforwardly means Phosphorus, ‘is identical to’ 
straightforwardly means is identical to, and so on. A false instance of 
Leibniz’s law, such as ‘if Hesperus is Phosphorus and Hesperus was 
believed to be bright then Phosphorus was too’ simply means that if Hes­
perus is Phosphorus and Hesperus was believed to be bright then 
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Phosphorus was too. The semantic facts provide no clue as to the reason 
for the falsity of this last sentence. It is false, rather, because of the fol­
lowing fact about planets and our past astronomical beliefs: that Hes­
perus is Phospherus, Hesperus was believed to be bright, and 
Phosphorus wasn’t. Further explanation of this fact might be achieved 
by examining the astronomy of the time, the psychology of the relevant 
astronomers, and so on; someone looking for a more profound explana­
tion will be disappointed. 
Our preceding example also highlights the fact that failures of Leib­
niz’s law in the object language give rise to failures of Leibniz’s law in 
the metalanguage. It is hardly surprising, given a disquotational theory 
of meaning, that the logic of the metalanguage and object language coin­
cide. But it’s also worth emphasizing that a failure of the object and 
metalanguage harmonize in this way is puzzling. The semantics-first 
approach to opacity, for instance, purports to have its cake and eat it 
too: although one can accommodate failures of Leibniz’s law in the 
object language using their semantic apparatus, they claim they aren’t 
really denying Leibniz’s law. By which they mean, presumably, that 
they uphold Leibniz’s law in the metalanguage in which their semantics 
is formulated. Apart from precluding disquotational accounts of identity 
and names43, this line of reasoning rests on a spurious distinction 
between the logic of the object language and metalanguage. It would 
be surprising if one could formulate an adequate semantic account of 
words like ‘belief’ without having, in the metalanguage, the means to 
express the attitude of believing. (Indeed, most papers on the semantics 
of belief are written in English, which evidently does have this word.) 
And if the metalanguage has opaque words—perhaps even invoking 
them when formulating the semantics of words like ‘belief’—then we 
shouldn’t expect Leibniz’s law to hold when reasoning about the seman­
tics of propositional attitudes than when reasoning directly about prop­
ositional attitudes. 
10.8 Conclusion 
We have argued that by taking opacity seriously one may provide a phil­
osophically appealing solution to Prior’s paradox. The resulting account 
of intentionality naturally extends to an opacity-laden theory of meaning 
that vindicates a classical gap theory of truth that is able to meet the 
challenges usually directed at that account. 
10.A Appendix  
We shall work in the language of propositionally quantified logic. 
The wffs consist of an infinite stock of propositional variables, 
X1, X2,  . . .  , a wff  ¬A, QA, Q!A, A ^ B, A = B, and 8XA, whenever 
A and B are wffs, and X a propositional variable. 
Following Bacon et al. (2016), a model of this language consists of: 
. A set W 
. An equivalence relation R on W 
. A map |Q| :  W ! P(P(W)) 
. A map D : W ! P(P(W)) such that D(w) . P(P(R(w))) 
Here we follow the usual convention of writing R(w) for {x 2 W j Rwx}. 
A variable assignment is a function g : Var ! P(W), assigning each 
propositional variable to a set of worlds. Write g * Xh iff g and h agree 
on every variable except, possibly, X. We may interpret an arbitrary wff 
relative to an assignment as follows: 
[X]g = g(X) 
[A ^ B]g = [A]g \ [B]g 
[¬A]g = W \ [A]g 
[8XA]g = {w j w 2 [A ]h for every h such that h(X) 2 D (w) and g 
* X h} 
[QA]g = {w j [A]g 2 |Q|(w)} 
[Q!A ]g = {w j [A]g is the only member of |Q| (w)} 
[A = B]g = {wj [A]g \ R(w) =  [B ]g \ R(w)} 
This model theory is sound for the logic of opacity, except for Existence 
and Logical Instantiation: for any w 2 W of such a model, and any closed 
theorem of the logic of opacity without Existence and Logical Instanti­
ation, A, w 2 [A].44 In order to validate both Existence and Logical 
Instantiation a model must satisfy the further constraint: 
For any wff, A, w 2 W and assignment g whose range contained in D 
(w), [A ]g \ R(w) 2 D(w). 
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I’ll now spell out the model described in Section 10.5 in a little more 
precision. Let σ be a bijection between N and the finite/cofinite subsets of 
N. We define a model as follows: 
. W ¼ N . 2 
. R ¼ ðN . f0gÞ2 [ ðN . f1gÞ2 
.	 |Q|(n,i) = {σ(n) × 2} 
.	 Dððn; iÞÞ ¼ Pf =cf ðN . figÞ 
Here are some useful definitions. In what follows X denotes a subset 
of W 
DEFINITION 10.A.1. A left set is a finite or cofinite subset of N . f0g, and 
a right set is a finite or cofinite subset of N . f1g. Denote the set of left 
sets L, and the set of sets R. 
Note: a left (right) set must be finite or relative to N . f0g
(N. f1g). A cofinite subset of N. f0g will not be co
cofinite
finite relative to W. 
DEFINITION 10.A.2. The set X .W is left finite or cofinite iff X \N . f0g
is a left set (it is right finite or cofinite iff X \N . f1g is a right set). 
DEFINITION 10.A.3. The set X is symmetric iff (n, 0)  2 X , (n, 1)  2 X for 
every n 2 N. 
Recall that our conjecture was that all closed sentences express sets 
that are both (i) symmetric and (ii) finite or cofinite (in W). We will 
call the set of subsets of W satisfying both (i) and (ii), S. 
DEFINITION 10.A.4. A left assignment is a function g from propositional 
variables to left sets (a right assignment maps variables to right sets). 
Call the set of all left and right assignments AL and AR respectively. 
Suppose that As free variables lie in some finite set V of size n. Then
〚A〛 : Ln ! PðWÞ defines an n-ary function from left sets to subsets 
of W (and similarly defines a function from right sets). 
DEFINITION 10.A.5. An n-ary function f : Ln ! PðWÞ is well behaved if 
and only if 
a.	 f only takes right finite or cofinite sets as values. 
b.	 ff ðx-Þ\N . f1g j x- 2 Lng is finite. In other words, as we run 
through the set of possible values for x-, the right half of f ðx-Þ takes 
at most finitely many different values. 
A function from f : Rn ! PðWÞ is well behaved if the natural parallel 
conditions obtain. 
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Fix V to be a finite set of variables, and A a formula whose variables 
all lie in V. I will write [A], without the assignment superscript, 
to denote the n-ary function on left sets, that takes P1, . . .  Pn 2 L to 
[A]g[X1 7 Xn! P1 . . .  7! Pn] (for any assignment g). 
THEOREM 10.A.6. Let V be a finite set of variables, and A a formula 
whose variables all lie in V. Then [A] defines an n-ary function on left 
sets that is well-behaved. 
Proof. For Xi 2 V, [Xi] is constant if we vary Xj for j 6¼ i. If we vary the 





. f1g takes on is Ø.
condition
If [A] and [B] are well-behaved, so are [¬A] and [A ^ B] 
(straightforward). 
□ maps every intension to either Ø, N . f0g; N . f1g or W so [□A] is 
clearly well-behaved. 
Q and Q! behave the same way: they map every member of S to a 
symmetric pair of the form fðn; 0Þ; ðn; 1Þg 2 S, and maps every other 
set to Ø. Thus: 
1.	 [QA] takes only the emptyset and symmetric pairs as values, so it 
satisfies condition (a) for well-behavedness. 
2.	 If [A] \ N . f1g takes only k many different values, then [A] can 
take at most k different values in S. So  [QA] can take on the 
emptyset and at most k different symmetric pairs as values, thus it 
satisfies condition (b). 
Suppose [A] is well-behaved. Note by assumption all As variables lie 
in V, so if  Xi 2= V [8XiA] = [A] which is well-behaved. 
If Xi 2 V then [8XiA] \ N . f1g maps a tuple to a finite intersection 
of the different values of [A] \ N . f1g (we know [A] \ N . f1g














\ N . f1g are all right finite/cofinite so are
Note that if f(x0,  . . . ,  xn) takes on finitely many different set values as 
we vary xi the function hðx1; ::: ; xnÞ ¼ \ x0 f ðx0; ::: ; xnÞ can only take on 
finitely many different values. Thus [8XiA] satisfies condition (b) if [A] 
does. 
THEOREM 10.A.7. The logic of opacity, Possible Saying!, Subsumption, 
and Uniqueness are all true in this model at any world in the left half 
of W. (And by a symmetrical argument, also true at any world in the 
right half of W.) 
Here is a proof sketch. 
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Proof. Evidently every closed formula expresses a symmetric set (by the 
symmetry of the semantics). Closed sentences express constant functions 
from Ln ! PðWÞ. By Theorem 10.A.6, every closed sentence expresses 
(constantly) a right-finite/cofinite set. 
Putting 1 and 2 together, closed sentences express sets in S, and every 
member of S is in the extension of Q and Q! at some world. This secures 
the validity of Possible Saying! 
Also, since every closed formula expresses a left finite/cofinite set, 
every proposition expresses a proposition necessarily equivalent to a 
left set securing Existence and Logical Instantiation.□ 
Notes 
1. The	 sentential T-schema is problematic because there is a direct Gö del-
Tarski style argument against it resting on the fact that substitution (and 
hence diagonalization) are clearly in good-standing for sentences. The 
notion of substituting one thing for another in a proposition is not so 
clearly in good-standing—it is ill-defined if you thought propositions were 
sets of worlds, for instance. One might thus consider the inconsistency of 
the propositional T-schema in conjunction with the notion of substitution 
and the accompanying laws of substitution to be an argument against prop­
ositional structure. Those antecedently committed to a structured theory of 
propositions that permits diagonalization cannot accept the propositional 
T-schema. But such views face hard questions of their own. For instance, 
while one might hope to explain the failure of the sentential T-schema in 
terms of some failure of sentences and propositions to interface properly 
(failure to express a proposition being one such explanation), no similar 
explanation could be given for the failure of the propositional T-schema. 
2. See Bacon (2019, Section 2.1). 
3. I do not make the assumption, sometimes made, there are only two elements in 
the domain of type t, the truth values, or even that the domain of type t con­
sists of sets of worlds. A suitably general class of models free of these assump­
tions is described in Benzmüller et al. (2004). The matter is slightly more subtle 
in non-full Henkin models of type theory, as it turns out that having a left-
inverse and being injective are not provably equivalent in standard axiomati­
zations of higher-order logic: see the appendix of Bacon (2018). 
4. In type theory one may define a binary connective, =, that takes two sentences, 
A and B, and produces another sentence informally corresponding to the iden­
tity of A and B. The principle of β-equivalence, that (λp.M)N = M[N/p] pro­
vided N is substitutable for P, ensures the following identities: 
1. true that P = (λX.true that X)P by β. 
2. (λX.true that X)P = (λX.X)P by the minimal theory. 
3. (λX.X)P = P by β. 
5. In order for the proof to go through on these assumptions, the choice of 
primitives matters. Since neither assumption involves existential quantifica­
tion, for example, it cannot be taken as primitive, or we would not be able to 
prove sentences involving it (such as Prior’s theorem). 
6. Priest,	 for example, recommends weaking classical propositional logic in 
response to Prior’s paradox in Priest (1991). 
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7. Ramification is spelled out as a response to Prior’s paradox in Tucker and 
Thomason (2011), and Kaplan (1995) and Kripke (2011) express sympathy 
to this line of response in the context of some related paradoxes. See Tucker 
(2018) for a non-standard approach to the ban on impredicativity, that does 
not involve explicit ramification. 
8. Cases related to this are discussed in Bacon (2019), and explained in the 
context of a different interpretation of Prior’s result. 
9. Thus, according	 to our understanding of utterance, a cough that sounds 
like a sentence in Farsi does not count as an utterance of that sentence, 
but the noise Simon makes in our envisioned situation, does count as an 
utterance. 
10. Of course,	 many people have argued that attitude verbs like ‘say that’ are 
context sensitive, and that quantifiers, including the propositional quantifiers 
appearing in Prior’s language, are context sensitive. Some have even sug­
gested that the context sensitivity of these things are key to understanding 
the paradoxes, and so should not be bracketed (for instance, Parsons, 
1974; Glanzberg, 2001; Burge, 1979; Simmons, 1993). But we are exploring 
these views, we are exploring the idea that the paradoxes can be solved 
without postulating context sensitivity, so bracketing the context sensitivity 
of these expressions is indeed the proper methodology. 
11. There	 are some substantial assumptions that must be taken on in order to 
even formulate this sort of ban. For instance, one cannot accept a theory 
of propositional granularity, such as the possible worlds theory, in which 
a quantified proposition, like 8x x  = x, and a non-quantified claim, like 
F a  ! F a, are identified, for otherwise one would not be able to make the 
distinction between quantified and non-quantified propositions. 
12. Although	 my remark here is representative of what a ramified theorist 
would like to say, it is strictly speaking nonsense. For in order for it to 
express a truth, I must have quantified over quantifiers unrestrictedly. But 
if I could do that, I could introduce an unrestricted quantifier: everythingU 
is F if and only if, for every quantifier, everythingi, everythingi is F. 
Whether this is the sort of Wittgensteinian nonsense one can simply kick 
away is a contentious matter, as is the status of heuristically useful nonsense 
more generally, and I will not attempt to adjudicate here. But see Williamson 
(2003). 
13. This motivation	 is explored in Bacon et al. (2016), alongside the ramifica­
tionist response. 
14. Free logicians take failures of Existential Generalization with varying degrees 
of seriousness. For instance, some explain the failures by saying that atomic 
sentences involving empty names are by default false, and that empty names 
do not in general make an important semantic contribution to a sentence in 
which they occur. In the cases where they appear to, such as in intentional 
verbs, special mechanisms are invoked (see, for instance, Sainsbury, 2005). 
I have defended a view that takes failures of Existential Generalization seri­
ously, indeed, which takes them as primitive and not to be explained by any 
general property of the name ‘Pegasus’, but in terms of what properties 
Pegasus in fact has (see Bacon, 2013). 
15. The slightly awkward metalinguistic formulation here is to avoid the Witt­
gensteinian nonsense alluded to in note 12. 
16. Variants of this paradox are discussed in Hazen (1987), Zardini (2008), and 
Bacon (2019). 
17. And while Alice cannot know that Pegasus is real, she can know that Pegasus 
isn’t real, from which one still can’t infer that there’s something Alice knows 
isn’t real (or else one could infer that there’s something that isn’t real). 
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18. Similarly, Simon	 can make it true that he said that Pegasus is real, even if 
there is nothing such that he made it true that he said that it is real. 
19. This is the principle called K2 in Bacon et al. (2016). 
20. This is called K2+ in Bacon et al. (2016). 
21. See, e.g., Crimmins and Perry (1989). 
22. In doing	 so, I am thus setting aside approaches that treat restrictions of L() 
involving direct predications as special. Such approaches typically deny the 
equivalence between (λx A)t and A[t/x] (see Kripke, 2005 and Salmon, 2010). 
23. Some philosophers place special significance on simple predications, and will 
therefore object to this sort of terminological shorthand. They will think that 
‘Hesperus is believed by Simon to be bright’ to be different from ‘Simon 
believes that Hesperus is bright’. By simply replacing the former formula­
tions with the latter in the following discussion, we may satisfy those who 
object to these manipulations, but at the cost of readability. 
24. See Bacon and Russell (2019). 
25. Note, also, that our axiomatization includes Quantifier Exchange—a princi­
ple that is usually derivable with the help of Universal Instantiation. It is 
provable, even in free logic, from L(). But without either L() or Universal 
Instantiation it is not, and must be put in by hand: see Fine (1983). 
26. One might	 have thought that the quantified version is stronger, but one 
quickly sees that to derive Universal Instantiation from Quantified Instanti­
ation, you have to already have Universal Instantiation in order to instantiate 
y with t. 
27. This is where I depart from Bacon and Russell (2019). They restrict instanti­
ation to purely logical contexts, but run into trouble making seemingly 
unproblematic instantiations in non-logical contexts. For instance, one 
cannot straightforwardly infer P _ Q = Q _ P from 8XY (X _ Y = Y _ X). 
Instantiating X with P yields 8Y (P _ Y = Y _ P), but the result is no 
longer logical, and we thus cannot instantiate Y with Q. The notion of 
scope is a little tricky in higher-order logic with λ-terms, as we do not want 
to count X as in the scope of a non-logical operation in the context ^ PX 
(even though P is non-logical), but we do want to count it as in the scope 
of the operator B in (λYY) BX, as it is  β-equivalent to BX. One must 
instead define the scope for things in β-normal form, which is the smallest 
set of terms that contain (i) the variables and constants, (ii) QM1 . . .  Mn (pro­
vided this is well-typed) whenever it contains M1 . . .  Mn and Q is a variable or 
constant, and (iii) λx M  whenever it contains M. The free variables in the 
scope of P in a β-normal form term M, S(P, M), may then be defined 
inductively: 
1.	 S(P, Q) =  ; when Q is a variable or constant. S 
2.	 S(P, PM1 . . .  Mn) =  i FV (Mi) when Mi are in β-normal form. S 
3.	 S(P, QM1 . . .  Mn) =  i S (P, Mi) when Mi are in β-normal form, Q a 
variable or constant, P 6¼. Q. 
4.	 S(P, λxM) =  S (P, M) \ {x} when M is in β-normal form. 
here FV(M) denotes the free variables of M. 
28.	 L(xy) allows us to derive the quantified versions of these, but without Uni­
versal Instantiation we can’t derive the instances. 
29. This	 ensures that L() holds for direct predications. One can show that L() 
holds for an arbitrary context A, in higher-order logic, by using the device 
of λ abstraction, which can turn an arbitrary context into a predication. Spe­
cifically, one must appeal to the principle (λ x A)t = A[t/x], which states that 
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substituting a (substitutable) term t into an arbitrary context, A (i.e. a 
formula with one free variable) is equivalent to a direct predication. Philos­
ophers who have rejected this principle tend to insist that it was only the 
instances of L() involving direct predications that we should have cared 
about in the first place. My remarks to follow about the logical role of iden­
tity, then, should be acceptable to these philosophers as well. 
30. Caie et al. (forthcoming), for instance, accept the existence of a strict identity 
relation that satisfies L(), but respond to our argument on the grounds that 
basic judgments about English seem to directly support the idea that identity 
does not satisfy L(). But if there is indeed a relation that satisfies the logical 
role that identity is supposed to, then it seems to me the primary matter of 
substance has been settled. What remains is a question concerning which 
role takes priority, and whose occupant deserves the name ‘identity’: the 
logical role of satisfying L(), and another role more closely connected to 
judgments about identity in English. But this is less substantial than it 
might seem. Consider, for instance, the dynamic semanticist who takes the 
fact that ‘A and B’ and ‘B and A’ are not always equivalent in English to 
mean that the principle of commutativity of conjunction is not valid. They 
might concede that there is a connective satisfying the classical laws of con­
junction, but that this connective is not really conjunction. I think classical 
logicians can acknowledge this, but go about their usual business unabated, 
so long as they are explicit that it is the classical connective that is the target 
of their logical theorizing. 
31. Again, the assumption made at the outset that arbitrary contexts are equiv­
alent to direct predications. 
32. There is a complication in deriving this second principle: after instantiating x 
with a, the context is no longer logical since it contains a. Thus second 
instantiation of y for b is not in a purely logical context. This can be circum­
vented as in Bacon and Russell (2019) by a slightly more complicated argu­
ment. However, in the present context, it is straightforwardly derivable given 
Logical Instantiation, since although the context is no longer logical, it is a 
context in which y doesn’t appear in a non-logical context. 
33. Clearly, any of L(xyX), L(xy), and L(X) can be used to derive L() given Uni­
versal Instantiation. 
34. Presumably one for every identity confusion formulable in some possible lan­
guage. Alternatively, one might think that there are only as many strictly dis­
tinct planets as actual identity confusions, but this either means that the strict 
number of planets depends on the practices language speakers in surprising 
ways, or else means there are surprising coincidences between these practices 
and the strict number of planets. 
35. Might one attempt to turn this into an argument against opacity tout court? 
How can Simon believe that Hesperus is bright, but not Phosphorus, while 
both Hesperus and Phosphorus are plainly visible to him and bright (irre­
spective of whether they are strictly identical or not)? The initial reason 
for believing in opacity is that one can fail to believe that Phosphorus is 
bright, even when it is plainly visible to you, because believing that Phospho­
rus is bright is more demanding. You must also think about Venus in the 
right way—presumably in a different way than is required to have the 
belief that Hesperus is bright. None of this is explained by the fact that 
there’s a thing out there in the world, Phosphorus, which you have failed 
to believe to be bright. The thought that opacity is all in the head and not 
in the world is born out in the theory of Bacon and Russell: there simply 
isn’t a plainly visible planet which Simon fails to believe to be bright on 
the basis of his observations. By contrast, Caie et al. maintain that there 
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is. According to them, there are two (identical, but strictly distinct) planets, 
which are both plainly visible to Simon, but of which he believes one to be 
bright, and not the other. 
36. See the discussion in Bacon and Russell (2019) at the end of Section 4. 
37. Actually	 Bacon et al. (2016) do not appeal explicitly to Unrestricted 
Export—rather they are implicitly assuming L() which allows them to 
derive it from Quantified Instantiation. Omitting the assumption of L() 
seems like an oversight. 
38. Observe that, in the present setting, the schema C $ C[B/A] is strictly stron­
ger than the identity A = B. The schema includes the instance A = B$ B = B, 
which straightforwardly entails A = B. But A = B does not entail QA $ QB, 
an instance of the schema. Thus Uniqueness in the present setting is stated as 
it is, and not as in Section 10.3. 
39. Cian Dorr is developing a view with this form, but the coordination problem 
is solved by having more complicated primitives. 
40. This account is obviously extremely crude as it stands, but see Schiffer (1972) 
for more elaborate theory along these lines. 
41. For an early classification of the options in classical logic, see Friedman and 
Sheard (1987). 
42. That we have ended up with a classical gap theory, and not a classical glut 
theory, follows from our choice to define truth as ‘means a true proposition’, 
as opposed to ‘means only true propositions’, and falsehood as ‘means a 
false proposition’, instead of ‘means only falsehoods’. In symbols, the alter­
native definition of truth would be T x  : =  8X(M x X  ! X), and falsehood 
F x  : =  8X(M x X  ! ¬ X). The alternative definitions would vindicate a clas­
sical glut theory—c would be both true and false—subject to the dual worry 
that to endorse it one must assert falsehoods, instead of untruths. The choice 
to pursue this as a gap or glut theory strikes me as a matter of taste, and not a 
matter of substance, as it is meaning, not truth and falsehood, that is the the­
oretically central notion. 
43. See the discussion of opaque semantics in §2 of Bacon and Russell (2019). 
44. One has to be a little more careful with open theorems, by restricting atten­
tion to assignments that assign variables to propositions in the domain of the 
relevant world. 
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11 Infinite Types and the 
Principle of Union 
J. P. Studd 
The theoretical need for objects is well established. Hardly any systema­
tic theorizing avoids the need to deploy first-order quantification ranging 
over this type of entity. But should we also countenance other types of 
quantification? 
Let us assign type 0 to anything that falls in the domain of a first-order 
quantifier. Following Frege, we reserve the term ‘object’ for entities of 
this type. The question is then whether we should admit into our ideol­
ogy quantification over entities of types other than type 0? For example, 
is the intended semantic value of ‘object’ itself an object? Or is it an 
entity of some other type? To employ some Fregean loose-talk:1 
should we take predicates to refer to type 1 concepts (under which fall 
the objects that satisfy the predicate). And should we countenance 
second-order quantification over type 1 concepts. Or should we alterna­
tively draw on plural quantification? Is an arbitrary extension to be 
encoded as multiple objects—abusing grammar: as a plurality? What  
about other types? Should we accept third-order quantification over 
type 2 concepts under which type 1 concepts fall? Or superplural quan­
tification over superpluralities, each comprising multiple pluralities? 
What about type 3, or type 4, and so on? Should we countenance quan­
tification over type ω concepts under which entities of any finite type 
fall? Or type ω + 1? Where does the type hierarchy give out? 
Øystein Linnebo and Agustı́n Rayo (2012) argue that ‘plausible’ 
assumptions lead to a surprising conclusion: one should countenance a 
proper-class-sized infinity of sui generis types (p. 276).2 This chapter 
takes up their argument for this thesis—Infinite Types—and argues 
that one of its assumptions is rather less plausible than Linnebo and 
Rayo suggest. The assumption that one should countenance any lan­
guage which ‘pools together’ the expressive resources drawn from any 
set of languages already deemed legitimate—the Principle of Union—is 
the subject of Section 11.5. Before we come to that, Section 11.4 
attends to a technical glitch in Linnebo and Rayo’s argument, which is 
regimented in Section 11.3. First of all, two preliminaries are in order: 
Section 11.1 elaborates on the infinite type hierarchy and lays out 
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Linnebo and Rayo’s assumptions more fully; and Section 11.2 introduces 
the languages of very high order with which Infinite Types is concerned. 
11.1 An Infinite Type Hierarchy 
The type hierarchy that Infinite Types demands should be sharply distin­
guished from the cumulative hierarchy of sets, described by Zermelo– 
Fraenkel set theory. Set theory posits the familiar ‘V’-shaped hierarchy 
comprising proper-class-many ranks of sets. Unlike concepts or plurali­
ties, however, sets fall within the range of first-order quantifiers. Set 
theory’s extensive ontology may be twinned with an austere Quinean 
ideology, which is unprepared to countenance any type of quantification 
other than first-order. 
The distinction, roughly carved, is between what objects there are 
(ontology) and what expressive resources are legitimate (ideology). To 
briefly elaborate, consider the different attitudes a typical pluralist and 
singularist may take to the following sentences: 
(1) Gö del often worked alone. 
(2) Linnebo and Rayo collaborate. 
The pluralist characteristically takes plural resources seriously.3 She may 
maintain, for instance, that the subject terms in (1) and (2) exhibit dif­
ferent types of reference. The singular term ‘Gö del’ singularly refers to 
exactly one object (i.e. Kurt Gö del); the plural term ‘Linnebo and Rayo’ 
plurally refers to multiple objects (i.e. Øystein Linnebo and Agustı́n 
Rayo). The singularist, on the other hand, rejects the idea of sui generis 
plural reference as an expressive resource distinct from—and irreducible 
to—singular reference. On one version of her view, the plural term 
‘Linnebo and Rayo’ functions semantically as a singular term, singularly 
referring to exactly one object (e.g. the set {Linnebo, Rayo}, or some 
other plurality-encoding object). 
Similarly, the singularist takes the singular quantifier ‘some logician’ 
and the plural quantifier ‘some logicians’ to express the same type of 
quantification, albeit over different kinds of object (logicians and 
objects encoding pluralities of logicians). In contrast, a pluralist may typ­
ically maintain that the singular and plural quantifiers express different 
types of quantification—singular and plural—over the same kind of 
objects (logicians); on this view, once again, plural quantification is irre­
ducibly plural and not a disguised form of singular quantification. 
Pluralism posits two types of quantification. Linnebo and Rayo argue 
that a sober-seeming package of assumptions should lead their advocates 
to accept a transfinite ideological hierarchy of types in addition to—or 
instead of—an ontological hierarchy of sets. The conclusion of their 
argument may be provisionally stated as follows (p. 276):4 
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Infinite Types. For every ordinal α, finite or transfinite, one should 
countenance a language of at least order α, equipped with 
quantifiers ranging over type β entities, for each β < α. 
Notwithstanding the ‘entity’-talk, each type in the hierarchy is to be 
understood as a further sui generis expressive resource distinct from, and 
irreducible to, lower types. 
The argument for Infinite Types draws on three main assumptions (pp. 
274, 276, 294): 
Absolute Generality. First-order quantifiers may range over an 
absolutely comprehensive domain (i.e. a domain comprising 
absolutely everything whatsoever). 
Semantic Optimism. For any legitimate object language, one should 
countenance a metalanguage that permits one to frame a generalized 
semantic theory for the object language (i.e. a theory which gener­
alizes over every possible interpretation of the object language). 
Principle of Union (Set Version). For any set-sized collection of 
legitimate languages, one should countenance its union language 
(i.e. the language which results from ‘pooling together’ the 
resources of every language in the collection).5 
The first assumption has received extensive discussion elsewhere. 
Absolute Generality has clear prima facie appeal. Not least since theories 
such as the first-order theory of identity, Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory 
with urelements, physicalism, mereological nihilism, and atheism—to 
name just a few—seem to cry out for an absolutely general formulation. 
This assumption, however, remains controversial.6 Here, we shall simply 
set this debate aside, and follow Linnebo and Rayo in accepting Absolute 
Generality as a working assumption; we suppose henceforth that there is 
an absolutely comprehensive domain. 
The second assumption—Semantic Optimism—calls for a slightly 
longer explanation. It’s a familiar point that generalizing over possible 
interpretations of an object language plays a central role in Tarski’s 
account of logical validity and its model-theoretic descendants.7 
Suppose, for example, that the object language is the first-order language 
of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with urelements (whose non-logical 
predicates are the set-predicate ß, and the membership-predicate 2). 
Then, in standard model theory, a possible interpretation of this lan­
guage is encoded as a set-interpretation—typically, for example, as a 
pair hM,ii, comprising a (non-empty) set M to serve as the domain, 
together with an interpretation-function i, which maps the language’s 
non-logical predicates to their extensions, such that i(ß) is a set of 
members of M and i(2) is a set of pairs of members of M. 
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Of course, this is not the only way to capture interpretations of the 
object language in set theory. A minor variant of this implementation, 
which will be useful below, instead encodes the structure hM,ii as a 
single function—〚 .〛—which extends i to map the quantifier-symbol 
8 to the domain:







〚 〛 〚〛2 —and indeed the function itself—is a type 0 entity (i.e. an.
Whatever encoding we choose, however, standard model theory does 
qualify a generalized semantic theory in the operative in not as sense 
Semantic Optimism—at least, if we Absolute Generality. not assume 
For given this assumption, not every possible interpretation is encoded 
set-interpretation of the relevant kind. Take, for instance, the inter-as a 
pretation of the object language, where ß and 2 receive their intended 
extensions based on the absolutely comprehensive domain. This interpre­
0
The superscripts here serve 
0




tation is not encoded as a set-interpretation hM,ii or〚.〛. For, according 
to standard set theory, no set-domain M comprises everything whatso­
ever, and no set-extension〚b〛or〚2〛comprises every set or every 
element–set pair (i.e. every pair whose first coordinate is an element of 
its second).8 
In order to generalize about every possible interpretation—including 
ones with non-set-sized domains—we may instead appeal to further ide­
ology in the metatheory. For example, Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano 
(1999) show how to frame a generalized semantic theory for a first-
order object language in a metalanguage with two types of quantifier, 
singular and plural. Assuming pluralism, any first-order quantifier’s 
domain may be encoded simply as the one or more objects that the quan­
tifier ranges over—speaking loosely: as a plurality-domain or type 1 







guage’s predicates may be captured with a plurality-extension 〚b〛 or
〚2〛, comprising zero or more items, or zero or more pairs of items, 
drawn from the domain. 
Moreover, with a little more coding, Rayo and Uzquiano show that 
these three pluralities may, in turn, be encoded within a single plurality-
interpretation—〚 .〛—that captures an interpretation of the whole lan­
guage. More generally, any function〚 .〛mapping each expression e in 
a given set E to a corresponding plurality〚e〛may be encoded as the 
plurality comprising every pair of the form he,oi where e 2 E and o is 
a member of〚e〛. On this basis, they show that a plural metalanguage 
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suffices to frame a generalized semantic theory for a standard (non­
plural) first-order language, with each possible interpretation of the 
object language captured with a plurality-interpretation〚 .〛1 (Rayo 
and Uzquiano, 1999, pp. 319–320). 
As we shall see in Section 11.3, Linnebo and Rayo’s case for Infinite 
Types goes one step further and argues that, given Absolute Generality, 
a generalized semantic theory for a first-order object language must 
employ an additional tier of ideology. And this is just the beginning. 
With further applications of Semantic Optimism, they aim to lead us 
to any ordinal level of their type hierarchy. 
But must we accept Semantic Optimism in the first place? Kreisel’s 
famous ‘squeezing’ argument provides grounds to think that, for a 
first-order object language, model-theoretic validity (i.e. truth under all 
set-interpretations) coincides with true validity (i.e. truth under all pos­
sible interpretations).10 And Linnebo and Rayo concede that they have 
not offered a ‘systematic defence’ of Semantic Optimism in their 2012 
paper (p. 277). 
Nonetheless, two motivations for this assumption have been forth­
coming.11 First, Rayo and Timothy Williamson (2003) argue that Krei­
sel’s argument breaks down for richer object languages, such as those 
that contain Vann McGee’s quantifier 9AI (formalizing ‘there are abso­
lutely infinitely many’ or ‘there are more than set-many’).12 
Second, a widely accepted approach to natural language semantics 
effectively calls for a generalized semantic theory in order to systemati­
cally describe the intended interpretation of the object language.13 The 
Mostowski–Barwise–Cooper approach to quantifier-semantics imple­
ments a model-theoretic version of Frege’s idea that quantifiers denote 
type 2 concepts (under which fall type 1 predicate-denotations). Assum­
ing a set-domain M, a first-order metatheory permits us to encode an 
arbitrary predicate-extension based on M as a subset of M and an arbi­
trary quantifier-extension as a set of predicate-extensions based on M— 
for example:14
〚some sets〛¼ fA . M : j〚set〛 \Aj > 0g
〚most sets〛¼ fA . M : j〚set〛 \Aj > j〚set〛 . Ajg 
But, if we are to extend this approach to object languages that achieve 
absolute generality, we need a metatheory that is equipped to generalize 
about arbitrary predicate- and quantifier-extensions based on the abso­
lutely comprehensive domain. And adapting Rayo and Uzquiano’s 
trick for encoding interpretation-functions, this is tantamount to a gen­
eralized semantic theory for the object language. 
Having briefly outlined these motivations, we shall henceforth assume 
Semantic Optimism, without further argument. My main interest in the 
remainder of this chapter concerns the ideological commitments of the 
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package that combines Absolute Generality and Semantic Optimism. In 
particular, should optimistic absolutists, as we shall call those who accept 
these two assumptions, accept Infinite Types, as Linnebo and Rayo argue? 
To answer this question calls for us to examine the Principle of Union. 
This assumption has so far received comparatively little attention,15 in 
part, perhaps, because it has every appearance of being a near-truism. 
After all, following Linnebo and Rayo, we may argue as follows: assum­
ing that one countenances each language in a given set, as per the ante­
cedent of the Principle of Union, one should also countenance the union 
language on the grounds that it ‘would be made up entirely of vocabu­
lary that had been previously deemed legitimate’ (p. 276). On closer 
examination, however, the Principle of Union is far from trivial. First 
let’s see how we can get from Linnebo and Rayo’s three assumptions 
to the conclusion Infinite Types. This calls for one more preliminary. 
11.2 Languages: Simply and Ordinally Typed 
Infinite Types calls for optimistic absolutists to countenance languages of 
very high order. This section introduces these languages. For the sake of 
concreteness, we shall follow Linnebo and Rayo in defaulting to a hier­
archy of types of higher-order quantification into predicate position 
(glossed in broadly Fregean terms). But the demands made by Infinite 
Types may equally be met by countenancing other types of ideology. 
For instance, one may instead adopt a generalized version of pluralism 
that, in addition to singular quantification, also takes seriously plural 
quantification, superplural quantification, and so on.16 
The languages that concern us differ from more familiar typed languages 
in various ways. Let’s begin with a brief review of an example of the latter. 
A well-known relational formulation of the simple theory of types takes the 
set of simple types to be the least inclusive set that contains 0 and contains 
(τ1, . . . ,  τk) for  any finite  sequence of its  members  τ1, . . . ,  τk. The  simple  
types may be recursively divided into levels: the level of type 0 is 0; the 
level of type (τ1,  . . .  ,  τk) is the least ordinal to exceed the level of each 
of τ1, . . .  ,  τk (i.e. the maximum level plus one). A small sample of 
simple types from the first few levels is displayed in Table 11.1. 
For example, within this type structure, the types of expression avail­
able in a standard first-order language (with no function symbols) belong 
at levels 0 and 1: individual constants and variables correspond to type 0 
constants and variables (written with explicit type indices: a0, b0,  . . . and  
x0, y0, . . .); similarly a first-order language’s monadic predicates corre­
(0), b(0)spond to type (0) constants (now written: a , . . . ); its dyadic pred­
(0,0)icates to type (0,0) constants (a , b(0,0), . . .); and so on. 
More generally, what we may call simply typed or ST-languages may 
include type τ variables and constants for any simple type τ (written: 
xτ , yτ, . . . and aτ , bτ, . . .). An atomic ST-formula is then a string of the 
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Table 11.1 Some simple types 
monadic dyadic triadic . . .  
level 1 (0) (0,0) (0,0,0) 
level 2 ((0)) 
((0,0)) 
. . . 
((0),(0)) 
((0,0,0),0)
. . . 
((0),(0),(0)) 
. . . 
level 3 (((0))) (((0)),((0))) 
(((0,0,0),0))
. . . 
. . . 
form t(t1,  . . .  ,  tk) where each ti is a term (i.e. a variable or a constant) 
with simple type τi, for i = 1,  . . .  ,  k, and t is a term with simple type 
(τ1,  . . .  ,  τk). Complex ST-formulas are then finite strings formed in the 
standard way using the usual connectives (¬, !, etc.) and the usual quan­
tifiers (8 and 9), which may bind variables of any simple type. 
At lower levels, the formulas thus obtained are simply notational var­
iants of their more familiar counterparts. For example, the second-order 
formula on the left is written in the type-indexed notation as displayed 
on the right: 
að0;0Þðx08XðXa ^ 9xAxbÞ 8xð0Þðxð0Þða0Þ ^ 9x0 ; b0ÞÞ 
We may outline a standard Fregean interpretation for an ST-language 
as follows. A type 0 constant denotes a type 0 entity (i.e. an object). 
For a simple type τ = (τ1,  . . .  ,  τk), a type τ constant denotes a type τ 
entity (i.e. an extensional relational-concept in which stand zero or 
more sequences comprising a type τ1 entity and . . .  and a type τk 
entity, related in that order). For any simple type τ, a type τ variable 
then ranges over type τ entities.17 
The typed languages that Linnebo and Rayo consider differ from ST-
languages in three main respects. First, for ‘reasons of simplicity’, 
Linnebo and Rayo officially do not ‘consider types for functions or 
polyadic relations’ (p. 272).18 In the context of the simple theory of 
types, this leaves us with a linear type structure, with just one simple 
type at each level (permitting us to relabel simple types with finite ordi­
nals in the obvious way): 
level or type 0: 0 
level or type 1: (0) 
level or type 2: ((0)) 
level or type 3: (((0))) 
... 
... 
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This very simple type structure, however, retains the ability to encode 
polyadic level 1 relations provided we have the resources to encode as 
a single object each pair, and thus each n-tuple, of objects (e.g. in the 
Kuratowski-fashion). Equipped with pairing resources, each n-adic 
level 1 relation may be encoded as a monadic type 1 concept under 
which fall n-tuples of objects. This familiar trick may be extended to 
higher level polyadic relations by encoding each n-tuple of level p entities 
p p ip 19e1; . . . ; enp as a single type p entity: he1; . . . ; enp . 
The second departure from ST-languages is that Linnebo and Rayo 
extend the type structure into the transfinite. The class of types is 
taken to be the class of all ordinals. The languages based on this type 
structure—which we may call ordinally typed or OT-languages—may 
then include (monadic) variables and constants of any ordinal type β 
(xβ , yβ ,  . . .  and  aβ , bβ, . . .).20 
Third, OT-languages liberalize the formation rule for atomic formulas. 
An ST-language is non-cumulative in the sense that when s and t are 
monadic terms with simple types n and m respectively, the string s(t) is  
a well-formed atomic ST-formula just in case m is the greatest finite 
ordinal with m < n (i.e. m = n − 1). An OT-language is permitted to be 
cumulative in the sense that when s and t are monadic terms with 
ordinal types β and γ, the string s(t) is a well-formed atomic OT-
formula just in case γ is any ordinal with γ < β (greatest or otherwise).21 
Complex OT-formulas are then finite strings formed in the standard way 
using the usual connectives and quantifiers, which may bind variables of 
any ordinal type. 
Cumulative OT-languages also admit of a broadly Fregean interpreta­
tion. Type 0 constants and variables are interpreted as before. When β 
is a successor ordinal (i.e. β = γ + 1), a type β constant denotes a (cumu­
lative) type β entity (i.e. an extensional concept under which fall zero or 
more entities with type γ, or lower).22 When λ is a limit ordinal, a type λ 
constant denotes a type λ entity (i.e. an entity with type γ < λ). For any 
ordinal β, a type β variable then ranges over type β entities.23 
Note that the ordinal types are cumulative in the sense that an entity of 
one ordinal type also qualifies as an entity of all higher ordinal types. 
Moreover, in the case of a limit ordinal λ, the type λ only comprises enti­
ties which also have a lower type.24 
The order of an OT-language is then measured according to the types of 
its variables and constants. The argument for Infinite Types is sensitive 
to the exact characterization of this notion. And we shall later find 
reason to amend Linnebo and Rayo’s official definition.25 But, provi­
sionally, here is how order is characterized in the main text of their 
article: ‘a language is of order α when all of its variables have type-
indices below α’ (p. 272); moreover ‘a language of order α may 
contain constants of type less than or equal to α’ (p. 273). For 
example: ‘The language of the [monadic fragment of the] simple 
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theory of types is a language of order ω, as it has variables of all types 
below ω’ (p. 273). 
One last comment is in order: although they officially eschew non-
monadic types, Linnebo and Rayo do in practice permit OT-languages 
to contain a limited stock of polyadic predicate-constants. In order 
to encode pairs in the context of a generalized semantic theory, 
for instance, they deploy atomic formulas such as OPbþ1ðx0; yb; zbÞ 
(‘zβ encodes the pair hx0,yβiβ’).26 If polyadic constants are to be included 
in OT-languages, however, it’s important to keep track of their level. This 
is readily achieved by taking the unofficial types to enrich the ordinal 
types with the type (β1,  . . .  ,  βk) for any finite sequence of ordinal 
types β1,  . . .  ,  βk, with k > 1. The level of ordinal type β may then be 
defined to be β; and the level of an unofficial type (β1,  . . .  ,  βk) to  be  
the least ordinal to exceed each of β1,  . . .  ,  βk. For example, OP
bþ1 is a 
constant with unofficial type (0, β, β) and level β + 1 (as indicated by 
its superscript). The syntax and the Fregean interpretation for OT-
languages may be naturally extended to encompass these polyadic con­
stants.27 Following Linnebo and Rayo, however, OT-languages still 
lack polyadic variables. 
11.3 Linnebo and Rayo’s Argument 
Preliminaries dealt with, turn now to Linnebo and Rayo’s argument.28 
As we noted in Section 11.1, their argument proceeds from the assump­
tions Absolute Generality, Semantic Optimism, and the Principle of 
Union, and ends with the conclusion Infinite Types, which we shall 
henceforth regiment as follows: 
Infinite Types. For every ordinal α, finite or transfinite, one should 
countenance an OT-language of order α, or higher. 
The argument for Infinite Types takes the form of a transfinite 
induction. It’s helpful to think of the argument taking place in two 
stages. First, on the basis of their three assumptions, Linnebo and Rayo 
offer sub-arguments in favour of three intermediate premisses, which 
we shall label Base, Successor, and Limit. Infinite Types then follows 
from the three premisses (assuming a suitable background theory of 
ordinals that sustains transfinite induction).29 This section regiments the 
overarching argument. We shall then return to critically assess the details 
of the non-straightforward sub-arguments in Sections 11.4 and 11.5. 
The first premiss concerns OT-languages of order 1: 
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Base. One should countenance an OT-language of order 1, or higher. 
This premiss should be uncontroversial given that standard first-order 
languages count as OT-languages of order 1.30 
The second premiss is more contentious: 
Successor. If one should countenance an OT-language of order α, or  
higher, one should also countenance an OT-language of order α + 1,  
or higher. 
Linnebo and Rayo’s case for Successor deploys two auxiliary theses, the 
second of which draws on Absolute Generality: 
Positive Thesis. It is possible to give a generalized semantics for an OT-
language of order α in an OT-metalanguage of order α + 1, or  α + 2  
in the case when α is a limit ordinal. 
Negative Thesis. It is impossible to give a generalized semantics for an 
OT-language of order α in an OT-metalanguage of order α. 
Granted these two theses (which we return to in Section 11.4), Linnebo 
and Rayo argue that Semantic Optimism ‘motivates ascent’ from order α 
to order α + 1, or higher (p. 276). For assuming one should accept an 
object language with order α, Semantic Optimism requires that one 
should also accept a metalanguage capable of framing its generalized 
semantics, and an OT-language can only do so if it has higher order. 
The premisses Base and Successor (in conjunction with the principle of 
mathematical induction for finite ordinals) suffice to establish a weaker 
version of Linnebo and Rayo’s eventual conclusion:31 
Finite Types. For every finite ordinal n, one should countenance an OT-
language of order n, or higher. 
This is already a very substantial ideological commitment. Quineans may 
blanch at the thought of countenancing languages of order 2, let alone 
admitting into their ideology infinitely many further types of sui generis, 
irreducibly type n, quantification. 
With the help of the third and final premiss, however, Linnebo and 
Rayo aim to push the absolutist’s ideological commitments arbitrarily 
high up the sequence of transfinite orders: 
Limit. If one should countenance an OT-language of order α, or higher, 
for each ordinal α less than a limit ordinal λ, one should also 
countenance an OT-language of order λ, or higher. 
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Linnebo and Rayo appear to take Limit to be a variant of the Principle of 
Union, requiring no further motivation beyond the motivation already 
given for that assumption.32 And with this premiss, the argument is 
complete: Infinite Types straightforwardly follows from Base, Successor, 
and Limit (in conjunction with the principle of transfinite induction). 
Aside of the staggering ideological commitment, Linnebo and Rayo 
show that the resulting transfinite hierarchy of types has some marked 
similarities with the cumulative hierarchy of sets. The cumulative 
nature of predication in OT-languages permits them to define a ‘type­
unrestricted notion of predication’: the defined formula tg ε sb is equiva­
lent to sβ(tγ) whenever β > γ, but remains a well-formed formula for any β 
and γ.33 Drawing on the work of Degen and Johannsen (2000), Linnebo 
and Rayo further observe that ε can take over much of the work of 2: for 
sufficiently large α, OT-languages with order α—equipped with a suitable 
infinitary logic:34 the pure cumulative logic of order α—recover a fairly 
substantial subtheory of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (namely ZF less 
Replacement).35 
This leads Linnebo and Rayo to conclude that ‘there is no deep math­
ematical difference between the ideological hierarchy of type theory and 
the ontological hierarchy of set theory’ (p. 289). They suggest further 
that this may lend support to an anti-absolutist position they call liber­
alism.36 This view rejects Absolute Generality in favour of an open-
ended, potentialist conception of the cumulative hierarchy. According 
to liberalism, given any plurality-domain of quantification, the cumula­
tive hierarchy can always be extended to encode the domain as a set-
domain (which must then lie outside the initial plurality-domain). 
Linnebo and Rayo write: 
The non-liberalist might come to see the connection between type 
theory and set theory as a reason for moving in the liberalist direc­
tion. For one might have thought that a big selling point of non-
liberalism was its tidy ontology: there is no need to countenance 
an open-ended hierarchy of sets, and no reason to doubt the truth 
of Absolute Generality. But once one notices that Absolute General­
ity can be used to motivate ascent into higher and higher levels of the 
ideological hierarchy, one might come to see the supposed tidiness of 
non-liberalism as an illusion. 
(p. 293) 
11.4 Order: Generic, Full, and Cofinal 
Of course, how illusory the supposed tidiness of non-liberalism really is 
depends on the extent to which there is no deep mathematical difference 
between the ontological and ideological hierarchies, as Linnebo and 
Rayo claim.37 And this claim, in turn, relies on the types extending 
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into the transfinite. The non-availability of infinite types would mark a 
clear and substantive mathematical difference between the two hierar­
chies and would block the mooted interpretation of set theory. Optimis­
tic absolutists may seek to hold on to their tidy world-view by rejecting 
one or more of the premisses that lead to Infinite Types. 
As we noted, we have no grounds to doubt the good standing of first-
order languages, as affirmed in the premiss Base. But that still leaves the 
other two premisses. What should we make of Successor and Limit? The 
answer to this question depends on how we understand two of the key 
terms of art Linnebo and Rayo deploy. A proper assessment of the Prin­
ciple of Union calls for a closer examination of what it is to countenance 
a language. But first we need to iron out a technical glitch with Linnebo 
and Rayo’s definition of order. 
The characterization of order that Linnebo and Rayo provide in the 
main text of their article (quoted in Section 11.2) leaves open whether 
the operative notion is what we may call full order or a less demanding 
notion of generic order:38 
.  An  OT-language is said to be a generic language of order α, or to  have  
generic order α, iff (i) each of its variables is a monadic variable 
of ordinal type β, with  β < α; (ii) for each β < α, it has a countable 
stock of variables of type β; and (iii) each of its constants has level γ 
with γ . α. 
.  An  OT-language is said to be a full language of order α, or to have full 
order α, iff it is a generic language of order α, as per (i)–(iii), and 
moreover (iv) for each γ . α, it has at least one constant of type γ. 
For example, an OT-version of a monadic fragment of the language of the 
simple theory of types, with countably many variables vn of each finite 
ordinal type n (with n < ω) attains generic order ω; but this language does 
not attain full order ω unless—unlike typical formulations—it also has 
constants of all finite ordinal types, and at least one constant tω with 
transfinite type ω. 
In Appendix B, however, Linnebo and Rayo make clear that the relevant 
notion of order is full order.39 The importance of not deploying the weaker 
notion of generic order becomes plain when we attend to the details of their 
Semantic-Optimism-based case for the premiss Successor. Recall that the 
ascent from α to α + 1 demanded by Successor flows from two theses: 
Positive Thesis. It is possible to give a generalized semantics for an OT-
language of order α in an OT-metalanguage of order α + 1, or  α + 2  
in the case when α is a limit ordinal. 
Negative Thesis. It is impossible to give a generalized semantics for an 
OT-language of order α in an OT-metalanguage of order α. 
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The Positive Thesis holds for both generic and full order. Linnebo 
and Rayo build on the Rayo–Uzquiano strategy of encoding the interpre­
tation of a first-order language as a plurality of pairs—〚 .〛1 —lifting this 
encoding to higher types, and replacing pluralities with concepts. Suppose 
the object language is an OT-language of order α (full or generic). Then any 
constant tγ in the object language has level γ . α (by (iii)). Consequently, 
any possible denotation of tγ may be encoded as a monadic concept of type 
γ (exploiting higher-level pairing in the polyadic case). Moreover, for γ . α, 
an (α + 1)-order OT-metalanguage is equipped with type γ variables vγ (by 
(ii)); and these variables range over all concepts of this type. 
As before, we may then further exploit the metatheory’s ability to code 
n-tuples of type γ entities as further type γ entities, in order to capture an 
arbitrary interpretation of the whole object language as a single entity of 
sufficiently high type. Linnebo and Rayo show that, when α is a succes­
sor ordinal, each interpretation of the object language may be encoded 
as a type α entity—〚 .〛α —with the help of type α + 1 constants to 
express semantic notions in the metalanguage. Similarly, when α is 
a limit ordinal, each interpretation may be encoded as a type α + 1  
entity—〚 .〛αþ1—with the help of type α + 2 constants. Consequently, 
a metalanguage of either full order α + 1 or full order α + 2 permits us 
to frame a generalized semantics for the object language.40 
It is the Negative Thesis where Linnebo and Rayo make use of the fact 
that the object language is a full language of order α.41 For then (by (iv)) 
the object language must contain a constant tα of type α, which denotes a  
type α entity. In order to generalize about interpretations, however, an 
order α metalanguage must use a bound variable with type below α (by 
(i)). Suppose, then, that for some β < α interpretations of the object lan­
guage are implemented as type β entities—iβ—and write iβ(tα) for the 
type α denotation that is (encoded by) the semantic value of the constant 
under iβ. In order to attain a generalized semantic theory, every possible 
denotation for tα must be equal to iβ(tα) for at least one interpretation 
iβ; in other words, the function iβ 7! iβ(tα) maps the type β interpretations 
onto every type α entity. The Negative Thesis may then be established by 
proving a higher-order version of Cantor’s theorem which states, on the 
contrary, that there is no function mapping the entities of type β onto 
every entity of type α, whenever  β < α.42 
The same argument cannot be made when the object language in ques­
tion is a non-full language of generic order α. For in this case there is no 
guarantee that it contains a type α constant tα . Indeed, Rayo and 
Uzquiano show that a generic OT-language of order 2 with no type 2 con­
stants (namely, a second-order version of the language of set theory) can 
have its generalized semantics framed in a metalanguage of generic order 
2 which enriches the object language with a suitable level 2 satisfaction 
predicate.43 This provides a counterexample to the Negative Thesis 
when order is taken to be generic order. 
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So far, then, so straightforward. The argument for the Negative Thesis 
reaffirms what Linnebo and Rayo had already made clear in their char­
acterization of order in Appendix B: the notion of order in play is full 
order and not generic order. The trouble is that their argument in 
favour of the premiss Limit pulls in the opposite direction. 
Recall that Limit states that one should countenance a language of 
limit order whenever one should countenance languages of all lower 
orders. Linnebo and Rayo’s considerations about ‘pooling together’ 
resources deemed legitimate (outlined in Section 11.1) provide support 
for the following thesis: 
Limit-1. If one should countenance an OT-language Lα of order α for 
each α < λ, one should also countenance the corresponding union 
language—Ll—the OT-language whose constants and variables 
comprise each term available in any of the previously countenanced 
languages Lα, with α < λ. 
This thesis is a straightforward consequence of the Principle of Union.44 
But the Principle of Union does not imply Limit unless we draw on 
further assumptions, such as the following:45 
Limit-2. The union language Ll is an OT-language with order λ. 
Should we accept Limit-2? The question is again sensitive to the notion 
of order. Limit-2 is in good standing for generic order, but not for full 
order. Consider, for instance, a sequence of full OT-languages of finite 
order n—Ln—for each n < ω. Each full language Ln is equipped with 
countably many variables (xp, yp, . . .) for each p < n, together with the 
constants c0,  . . .  ,  cn (but no other variables or constants). Merging the 
languages together, the union language—Lo—is an OT-language which 
contains countably many variables and a constant cq for each finite type 
q < ω. But it fails to attain full order ω because it lacks constants of type 
ω. The full-order version of Limit-2 fails. 
To briefly take stock: neither notion of order is fit for purpose. To 
sustain Limit-2 we must opt for generic order, which undermines the 
Negative Thesis used in the argument for Successor. On the other 
hand, if we switch to full order, the Negative Thesis is restored to 
good standing at the expense of undermining Limit-2. The argument 
for Infinite Types teeters on the brink of equivocation. 
One response is to tweak Linnebo and Rayo’s definition of order. A 
notion of order between full and generic sustains both Limit-2 and the 
Positive and Negative Theses: 
. 	  An  OT-language is said to be a cofinally full language of order α or 
to have cofinal order α iff it is a generic language of order α, as per 
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(i)–(iii), and meets the following condition: (iv
0
) for each γ < α, it has 
at least one constant whose type exceeds γ. 
In other words, (iv
0
) requires that the types exemplified by constants in a 
cofinally full language be cofinal with the ordinals less than its order. For 
example, Lo is a cofinally full language of order ω even though it fails to 
attain full order ω. 
When order is taken to be cofinal order, it is straightforward to verify 
that Limit-2 holds. The Positive Thesis also remains in good standing.46 
Linnebo and Rayo’s argument for the Negative Thesis may then be 
adapted as follows. When α is a successor ordinal, we may apply the 
same argument as before to show that an object language with cofinal 
order α—which, in the successor case, is still equipped with at least 
one level α constant, (by (iv0))—cannot have its generalized semantics 
framed in another OT-language with cofinal order α. When α is a limit 
ordinal λ, the argument may be adapted as follows. In order to generalize 
over interpretations, the metalanguage (with cofinal order λ) must 
deploy a bound variable vβ of some type β, with β < λ. But the type β 
interpretations that vβ ranges over are unable to encode every possible 
interpretation of the object language (also assumed to have cofinal 
order λ). This is because the object language is equipped with a constant 
tγ with type γ > β (by (iv0 )). In order to attain a generalized semantics in 
this way, every type γ denotation for tγ needs to be encoded within a type 
β interpretation. And, as before, this conflicts with the version of 
Cantor’s theorem that states that, for β < γ, there is no way to map 
the type β entities onto every type γ entity.47 
Linnebo and Rayo’s argument for Successor may then proceed as 
before: an optimistic absolutist who countenances an OT-language with 
cofinal order α can frame its generalized semantics in an OT-language 
with cofinal order α + 1, or higher, but not in an OT-language with 
cofinal order α. And presumably, as before, this ‘motivates’ ascent to a 
cofinally full OT-language of order α + 1.  
But do the Positive and Negative Theses demand that the optimistic 
absolutist countenance a metalanguage of this kind, as called for by Suc­
cessor? The proposed technical patch highlights a more philosophical 
concern facing Linnebo and Rayo’s argument for Successor. For even 
once the good standing of the Positive and Negative Theses is secure, 
the absolutist may wonder why he is required to frame the generalized 
semantics for the cofinally full ordinally typed object language in 
another cofinally full OT-language of some order or other.48 Indeed, 
why must the metalanguage be an extensional, polyadic-variable-free 
OT-language at all? 
Linnebo and Rayo present their (official) eschewal of types for polya­
dic relations as a simplifying assumption. But without further argument, 
the absolutist may suspect that by setting aside all types of variable other 
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than those monadic ones which fit neatly into the linear hierarchy of 
ordinal types, Linnebo and Rayo lay down the rails to infinity which 
they use to drive him up the type hierarchy. Can the argument for Suc­
cessor, or something like it, go through without a ban on non-OT­
metalanguages? 
For a polyadic language whose variable types divide into ordinally 
indexed levels, such as a simply typed ST-language, the analogue of Suc­
cessor would call for ascent up the levels of the hierarchy. The obvious 
way to develop a Linnebo-and-Rayo-style cardinality argument for an 
analogue of the Negative Thesis would then be to deploy something 
like the following thesis: 
Successor-1. There are more type τ entities (encoding the semantic 
values of a type τ constant with level α + 1) than there are entities 
of any type of level α, or lower. 
In the case of an ST-language (for α < ω), some elementary cardinal arith­
metic shows that Successor-1 holds provided we assume that the underly­
ing domain of type 0 entities has cardinality κ for some infinite set-cardinal 
κ. Given Absolute Generality, the assumption that the object language’s 
domain may contain infinitely many objects, while essential,49 seems 
reasonable. Although to develop the argument in good conscience, it 
needs to be shown further that Successor-1 also applies to non-set­
sized domains. 
On the other hand, OT-languages are not the only way to extend 
simply typed languages to transfinite levels. Rather than play down 
polyadic relation types, we might embrace types of infinite adicity. As 
usual, let a γ-sequence be a sequence whose members are indexed by 
the ordinals less than γ.50 Then the class of what we may call infinite 
polyadic types is the least inclusive class that contains 0 and contains 
(τβ)β<γ for any γ-sequence of its members (finite or infinite). The notion 
of level and the extensional Fregean interpretation for simple types 
may both be generalized to infinite polyadic types in the natural way, 
allowing for relational-concepts in which infinite sequences of entities 
are related. 
Allowing for infinite polyadic types, Successor-1 fails. Consider, for 
instance, a level 2 constant t with type ((0)) and a level 1 variable v 
whose infinite polyadic type is formed from a γ-sequence of 0s:51 
ð0; 0; . . .Þ |-----{z-----}
g times 
In this case, when the underlying domain has infinite cardinality κ and 
|γ| . κ, the number of type ((0)) entities that serve as possible denotations 
for the constant t does not exceed the number of level 1 entities ranged 
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over by the variable v.52 In this case, Linnebo-and-Rayo-style cardinality 
considerations do not permit us to show that a generalized semantics 
calls for us to ascend the levels of the type hierarchy. 
Linnebo and Rayo briefly consider the possibility of infinite polyadic 
types. They argue that ‘strong pragmatic reasons’ speak in favour of 
linearly-ordered ordinal types: infinite polyadic types represent a ‘major 
complication’ of type theory, calling in particular for a system that 
admits infinitely long strings of quantifiers (p. 281). 
This makes clear the kind of motivation that Successor is supposed to 
enjoy. Linnebo and Rayo’s intention is not to force the optimistic abso­
lutist up the levels of the type hierarchy on pain of renouncing either 
Absolute Generality or Semantic Optimism. Instead, it seems, he is to 
be enticed to countenance OT-languages of higher and higher order on 
the grounds that this provides an attractive way to make good on 
these assumptions. Of course, how strong this enticement is depends 
on how attractive competing non-OT-metalanguages may be. And it’s 
not clear how this is to be judged, except on a case-by-case basis. 
11.5 The Principle of Union 
Let’s set aside concerns about Successor and return to the Principle of 
Union, which lies behind Limit (and, in particular, Limit-1). The assump­
tion may be restated as follows:53 
Principle of Union (Set Version). For any collection of legitimate 
languages fLi : i 2 Sg, indexed by a set S, one should countenance 
the union language—LS—the language obtained by ‘pooling 
together’ the expressive resources in each Li with i 2 S.54 
As we noted in Section 11.1, Linnebo and Rayo take the principle to be 
‘plausible’ (p. 276): assuming the antecedent of the Principle of Union is 
met, they argue, one should also countenance the union language LS on 
the grounds that it ‘would be made up entirely of vocabulary that had 
been previously deemed legitimate’ (p. 276). But they also acknowledge 
that the Principle of Union is ‘non-trivial’ (p. 276). This final section 
argues (with Linnebo and Rayo) that this assumption is indeed far from 
trivial and (against them) that it is either highly implausible or dialecti­
cally ineffective, depending on how the Principle of Union is understood. 
To begin with, it’s important to distinguish two versions of Linnebo 
and Rayo’s argument. The status of Infinite Types, and its various sup­
porting premisses and assumptions, depends on what it is to countenance 
or to accept the legitimacy of a language.55 The theses deployed in the 
argument admit of thick and thin readings corresponding to thick and 
thin interpretations of these locutions. 
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The relevant distinction is related to David Lewis’s (1975) well-known 
distinction between languages (count noun) and language (mass term). In 
the former case, an (interpreted) language is nothing more than a suitable 
correlation between its expressions and their meanings. The thin sense of 
‘legitimate’ (and the correlative sense of ‘countenance’) only concerns the 
existence of the relevant correlation. A language is thinly legitimate if 
there is a (suitably encoded) interpretation-function—〚 .〛—which 
maps the (non-logical) expressions in its lexicon to their (intended) 
semantic values. 
The legitimacy of a language in the thin sense need not have any con­
nection with language in Lewis’s mass-term sense. In this case, language 
is something we engage in, ‘a form of rational, convention-governed 
human social activity’ (Lewis, 1975, p. 7). The thick sense of legitimate 
demands that the language’s interpretation be suitably related to this 
kind of human activity. A thinly legitimate language is also thickly legit­
imate provided it is a language that we or moderately idealized versions 
of ourselves—finite beings free from some of the limitative accidents of 
our biology—are capable of using and understanding. 
The difference between thick and thin legitimacy may be illustrated by 
adapting Jorge Luis Borges’s fantastical tale of the Library of Babel. In 
our version,56 the library is infinite in extent, and comprises one or 
more copies of every possible book that can be written with a single 
English sentence of no more than 80 characters (with a well-defined 
semantic value). The books are haphazardly arranged but each is shelf-
marked with a unique finite ordinal. 
The library induces a Babellian language—Bo—whose only expres­
sions are sentence letters (s0, s1, . . .), each of which we stipulate to be 
interpreted with the semantic value of the corresponding English sen­
tence (ordered according to shelf-mark). The thin legitimacy of this lan­
guage is witnessed by a type 0 object, the set of pairs 〚 .〛o that encodes 
the function that maps each Babellian sentence letter to its stipulated 
semantic value. However, this language is clearly not thickly legitimate. 
Finite beings like us are able to use and understand a language with an 
infinite number of sentences if, for example, their semantic values are 
compositionally generated from a finite lexicon. But, in the case of the 
Babellian language, even allowing for moderate idealization, we are 
unable to learn the infinitely many arbitrary correlations that would 
be required to use and understand the full language.57 
With this distinction in hand, let’s return to the argument for Infinite 
Types. Does Linnebo and Rayo’s conclusion call for us to countenance 
languages of very high order in the thick sense or merely in the thin 
one? Some of their formulations suggest that the operative sense of 
‘countenance’ is the thick one (where to countenance a language is to 
accept its thick legitimacy). For example, they state Infinite Types by 
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writing that ‘one should admit use of α-level languages in one’s theoriz­
ing, for arbitrary α’ (p. 276, my emphasis). A thick reading is required 
moreover for Semantic Optimism to truly deserve its label. If we are to 
engage in generalized semantic theorizing, the metalanguage needs to 
be a thickly legitimate one that we can use and understand. 
However, the Principle of Union has very little plausibility on the thick 
reading. Consider again the Babellian language. Assuming we’re willing 
to go along with the thick version of the argument as far as Finite Types, 
it seems hard not to also grant the thick legitimacy of any finite fragment 
of the Babellian language—Bn—whose vocabulary comprises the first n 
Babellian sentence letters. After all, a moderately idealized speaker 
capable of mastering the n different types of sui generis higher-order 
quantifier, 8x0,  . . .  ,  8xn−1, required to use and understand an n-th 
order language would seem to be equally capable of learning how 
to use and understand the first n sentences of the Babellian language, 
s0, . . . ,  sn−1, via their English translations. According to the Principle 
of Union, read thickly, we should also therefore thickly countenance 
the union language whose vocabulary comprises the sentence letters 
available in each Bn, with n < ω. But the union language is just the full 
Babellian language Bo, which is not thickly legitimate. 
In any case, Linnebo and Rayo ultimately shy away from a thick 
reading of their argument. Notwithstanding their thick-sounding formu­
lation of Infinite Types, they go on to concede that languages of infinite 
order—governed by an infinitary logic—are ‘very different from the sorts 
of languages that humans are actually capable of using’ (p. 277). This 
leaves us with the thin interpretation of the argument. On this interpre­
tation, its conclusion is substantially weakened: the thin version of Infi­
nite Types calls only for us to accept that there are suitably encoded 
interpretation-functions for very high order languages. 
The thin Principle of Union likewise need not have any connection 
with language as a social practice in which we engage. The thin legiti­
macy of the union language is simply a question of whether there is a 
function that specifies its interpretation. The thin Principle of Union is 
consequently reminiscent of the kind of union principle available in stan­
dard set theory: 
Set-Theoretic Union. Suppose that I is a set of indices, and Ai a set S 
for each i 2 I. Then there is also the union set— i2I Ai—whose 
elements are each element of any Ai with i 2 I. 
Read thinly, some instances of the Principle of Union are unwritten by 
Set-Theoretic Union. Imagine for example that the thin legitimacy of 
each finite fragment Bn of the Babellian language is witnessed by a 
(type 0) interpretation-function〚 .〛n (encoded as a set of expression– 
semantic-value pairs hsi〚; si〛n i, with i < n). In this case, the union 
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set— n<o〚 .〛n —also qualifies as a (type 0) interpretation-function and 
witnesses the thin legitimacy of the full language Bo. 
But it should now be an all too familiar point that interpretations 
cannot always be encoded as set-functions or type 0 entities. 
Consider again the languages Ln of full order n, equipped with the con­
stants c0,  . . .  ,  cn, and their cofinally full union language Lo (introduced 
in Section 11.4). In light of the Positive and Negative Theses, an arbitrary 
interpretation of Ln is always encoded as a type n entity—〚 .〛n —but 
may fail to be realized at lower types. Consequently, Set-Theoretic 
Union, which deals only with type 0 sets, says nothing at all about 
whether we may merge together interpretations of higher types. 
How, then, are Linnebo and Rayo to persuade their opponent to 
accept the thin Principle of Union? Suppose, for instance, that she 
endorses Finite Types, and accepts the legitimacy (thick and thin) of 
each language Ln (n < ω), but has yet to see a good reason to admit 
type α quantification into her ideology (for α . ω). Should Linnebo 
and Rayo’s opponent accept the legitimacy of Lo on the grounds that 
it is made up entirely of vocabulary already deemed legitimate, as they 
argue? 
We’ve already seen that this provides no grounds for thick legitimacy. 
When it comes to thin legitimacy, it’s true that Linnebo and Rayo’s 
opponent accepts that each expression of Lo is part of a language Ln 
whose thin legitimacy is witnessed by a type n interpretation-function
〚 .〛n . Suppose for concreteness (following the Rayo–Uzquiano coding 
outlined in Section 11.1) that 〚 .〛n is implemented as a type n entity 
under which fall the following:58 
(i)	 one pair of the form he,o0i0 (where e is c0 and o0 is the constant’s 
intended denotation); 
(ii)	 zero or more pairs of the form he,opip, for each p < n (where e is 
cp+1 and op is an entity that falls under the constant’s intended 
denotation). 
The availability of type n entities of this kind, however, is not yet enough 
for Lo to be thinly legitimate. For this we need something further, 
namely an interpretation for the whole language, a function which 
assigns a semantic value to every Lo-constant (c0, c1,  . . . ,  cn + 1, . . .). And 
this is not provided by any interpretation-function 〚 .〛n , which only 
encodes semantic values for the Ln-constants (c0,  . . .  ,  cn). 
All the same, might Linnebo and Rayo simply ‘pool together’ the 
various interpretations previously deemed legitimate to obtain an inter-S 
pretation for Lo — n<o〚 .〛n —under which falls every pair he,opip 
that falls under any 〚 .〛n , for p < n < ω? The difficulty is that since 
he, opip may only become available at type p, such a ‘union’-entity is 
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liable to have falling under it entities with arbitrarily high finite type. In S 
this case, n<o〚 .〛n is available at type ω + 1 since every item falling 
under it has finite type n and thus type ω (which, recall, comprises 
every entity with finite type). But it is not itself a type n entity, for any 
n < ω, since some type p entities, with p . n, fall under the ‘union’­S 
entity. Nor, therefore, is n<o〚 .〛n a type ω entity. 
Consequently, the union principle we require to merge together each 
interpretation 〚 .〛n is something along the following lines: 
Type-Theoretic Union. Suppose that I is a set of indices, and oni ani 
entity with ordinal type ni < ω for each i 2 I. Then there is also a 
type ω + 1 entity— 
S 
i2I oi
ni —under which falls each entity that falls 
under any o
ni with i 2 I.i 
But what reason has Linnebo and Rayo’s opponent to accept a principle 
of this kind? After all, Type-Theoretic Union baldly asserts that there 
are entities of exactly the infinite types of which she is sceptical. To 
attempt to persuade their opponent to accept Infinite Types on the basis 
of Type-Theoretic Union is little better than attempting to argue against 
a sceptic about sets with infinite rank by simply assuming the Axiom of 
Infinity. 
To briefly take stock, deeming each language Ln thinly legitimate may 
well call for Linnebo and Rayo’s opponent to admit into her ideology 
entities of arbitrarily high finite type. But she certainly does not 
thereby countenance any type ω + 1 union-entity witnessing the 
thin legitimacy of the union language. Nor have we yet seen a non­
question-begging argument in favour of her doing so. 
In fact, when we reflect on the would-be argument’s conclusion, it’s 
hard to see how Linnebo and Rayo could give such an argument. 
Sooner or later, we must dispense with loose ‘entity’-talk. But if we S 
are genuinely to state that there is a type ω + 1 entity n<o〚 .〛n — 
rather than hoping to pragmatically convey this higher-order thesis 
with metaphorical ‘entity’-talk—we need to use a language equipped 
with type ω + 1 variables. And no argument Linnebo and Rayo might 
frame in a language of infinite order is apt to persuade their opponent 
of this conclusion. For their ability to give such an argument for the 
thin legitimacy of an infinite-order language presupposes the thick legit­
imacy of the language in which it is framed. However, to repeat, Linnebo 
and Rayo acknowledge that finite beings like us are unable to use 
infinite-order languages of this kind. 
Where does this leave the optimistic absolutist? We saw some reasons 
to contest Linnebo and Rayo’s argument for the thesis Finite Types in 
Section 11.4. Even if we follow them this far, however, their argument 
for Infinite Types makes essential use of the Principle of Union, and 
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despite its truistic-seeming appearance I’ve argued that it’s far from 
trivial, in both its thick and thin versions. 
Notes 
1. Notoriously, talk of ‘concepts’ in English, if it speaks about anything, speaks 
about objects of a certain kind. This loose-talk must consequently be taken 
as elliptical for a suitable paraphrase in a higher-order language. See, for 
instance, Williamson (2003, pp. 458–459). Analogous remarks apply to 
‘plurality’-talk. See, for instance, Studd (2019, pp. 77–79). 
2. Page references are to Linnebo and Rayo (2012) unless indicated otherwise. 
3. Pluralist and singularist attitudes may be implemented in various different 
ways. Compare, for instance, Yi (2006), McKay (2006), and Oliver and 
Smiley (2013). 
4. A more precise regimentation follows in Section 11.3. 
5. This	 assumption weakens the ‘Principle of Union (Strengthened Version)’ 
stated on p. 294 of Linnebo and Rayo’s (2012) article, taking the ‘definite 
collection’ it mentions to be a set-sized collection. Linnebo and Rayo’s 
strengthened version also envisages larger definite collections encoded as 
entities higher up the type hierarchy (e.g. pluralities, superpluralities, and 
so on). But here we focus exclusively on the weaker set-sized version. As 
will become clear in Section 11.4, it’s important to distinguish both the set 
and strengthened versions of the Principle of Union from the thesis given 
this name on p. 276, which we relabel ‘Limit’. We henceforth reserve the 
label ‘Principle of Union’ for the set version stated here. 
6. See, for instance, Williamson (2003), and the chapters collected in Rayo and 
Uzquiano (2006); Studd (2019) makes an extended case against Absolute 
Generality. 
7. See Williamson (2003 pp. 425–426). 
8. Compare, for instance, Linnebo and Rayo (2012, p. 275) and Studd (2019, 
pp. 69–72). 
9. We use the prefix ‘plurality-’ to indicate the need for a plural paraphrase. 
10. See Kreisel (1967). 
11. Opponents	 of Absolute Generality often take arguments against an abso­
lutely comprehensive domain to also rule out a domain comprising abso­
lutely every set or absolutely every interpretation. But they may still 
endorse a suitably restricted version of Semantic Optimism. See Studd 
(2019, pp. 80–81). 
12. Rayo and Williamson (2003, pp. 337–338), Rayo (2006, p. 245); see Studd 
(2019, pp. 83–84) for critical discussion. 
13. See Studd (2019, pp. 84–85). 
14. See Barwise and Cooper (1981). 
15. Florio and Shapiro (2014) offer critical discussion (especially of the strength­
ened version of the Principle of Union mentioned in note 5); Linnebo and 
Rayo (2014) reply. 
16. Linnebo and Rayo outline this hierarchy in an appendix to their article, pp. 
297–299. 
17. The term ‘type’ is ambiguous between expression type and entity type. The 
intended disambiguation is usually obvious from the context. Occasionally 
it will be important to remember that constant-symbols and variables (of 
any expression type) are standardly themselves taken to be objects (with 
entity type 0). 
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18. Linnebo	 and Rayo add that ‘with one possible exception’ the inclusion of 
these types would ‘not substantially change’ their philosophical arguments 
(p. 272). We return to the exception in Section 11.4. 
19. Linnebo and Rayo outline such an encoding in Appendix B, pp. 304–306. 
20. See p. 272. 
21. See p. 273. 
22. When β is a finite ordinal, and τ is the monadic simple type of level β, (cumu­
lative) ordinal type β entities should not be confused with the (non­
cumulative) simple type τ entities (deployed in the context of simple type 
theory). Terms such as ‘type β entity’ are henceforth used in the cumulative 
way. And ‘type’ henceforth means ‘ordinal type’ unless indicated otherwise. 
23. Compare pp. 273, 297. 
24. The fact that type λ variables consequently range only over entities with type 
γ < λ is important in light of the ‘limit rule’ deployed in the logic Linnebo and 
Rayo take to govern OT-languages. See note 34. 
25. See Section 11.4. 
26. See Appendix B, for instance p. 304. 
27. Linnebo and Rayo also treat these cumulatively: for instance, the predicate 
OPbþ1, with unofficial type (0, β, β), yields a well-formed atomic formula 
when combined with (monadic) terms of respective ordinal types γ0, γ1, 
and γ2 where γ0 . 0 and γ1, γ2 . β. See, for instance, p. 304. 
28. See pp. 275–276. 
29. Throughout	 we assume a background theory which includes at least 
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with Choice (ZFC). 
30. Compare p. 275. 
31. Compare p. 275. 
32. Indeed, Linnebo and Rayo employ the label ‘The Principle of Union’ for a 
minor variant of Limit on p. 276, providing the brief motivating argument 
outlined in Section 11.1. For the present use of this label, see note 5. We 
return to Limit in Section 11.4. 
33. See pp. 281–283. 
34. In addition to extensionality axioms for all ordinals below α and impredica­
tive comprehension axioms for successor ordinals below α, the system 
includes an infinitary ‘limit rule’, which permits us to infer 8xλφ(xλ) from 
{8xγφ(xγ) :  γ < λ} for any limit ordinal λ below α. See pp. 288–289 for details. 
35. See Proposition 2, p. 289. 
36. See pp. 290–293. 
37. The absence of Replacement in Linnebo and Rayo’s target set theory is also 
noteworthy here. See p. 289, note 28. 
38. Linnebo and Rayo leave clause (ii) tacit on pp. 272–273, but their statement 
of the ‘Principle of Union’ (on p. 276) makes it clear that it is intended. 
Clause (ii) is necessary to avoid trivializing Infinite Types. Unlike Linnebo 
and Rayo’s characterization, moreover, clause (iii) makes explicit provision 
for polyadic predicate-constants. The constraint on their level is important 
when we come to argue in favour of the Positive Thesis. 
39. See p. 299. 
40. Compare pp. 300–308.	 The Positive Thesis for generic order immediately 
follows since the metalanguage also has generic order equal to its full order. 
41. The	 argument is intended to be understood with first-order quantifiers 
ranging over the absolutely comprehensive domain, and higher-order quan­
tifiers ranging unrestrictedly over all suitably typed entities based on this 
underlying first-order domain. This appeal to Absolute Generality prevents 
type α entities based on one first-order domain being encoded as lower-
typed entities based on a larger first-order domain. 
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42. This is a straightforward generalization	 of the version of Cantor’s theorem 
whose proof is outlined by Linnebo and Rayo on pp. 299–300. In addition 
to the pure cumulative logic of order α, the proof makes use of the pairing 
resources they outline in Appendix B.2, pp. 304–306. 
43. See Rayo and Uzquiano (1999, pp. 320–322). Compare Rayo and Uzquiano 
(2006, p. 244). 
44. In the ambient background theory—see note 29. 
45. We also assume that sublanguages of legitimate languages are legitimate. 
46. This is a corollary of the Positive Thesis for full order since the generalized 
semantics for a full language of order α induces a generalized semantics 
for any of its cofinally full sublanguages (and the full metalanguage also 
qualifies as cofinally full). 
47. The argument here relies on the fact that Semantic Optimism calls for us to 
generalize over interpretations of the whole language. A more limited optimism 
fails to motivate Successor. For example, the cofinally full language Lo is able 
to generalize over arbitrary interpretations of any finite set of Lo-sentences 
(since this is also a set of Ln-sentences for sufficiently large n < ω). 
48. An exactly analogous question arises, of course, if order is taken to be full 
order, as on Linnebo and Rayo’s official characterization in Appendix B. 
49. When the underlying domain has cardinality 2, for example, there are sixteen 
(extensional) level 2 entities of type ((0)) and the same number of level 1 enti­
ties of type (0,0). 
50. As usual,	 we may identify a γ-sequence with a function whose domain is 
{β : β < γ} and which maps each ordinal less than γ to the member of the 
sequence it indexes. 
51. In other words, the variable has type (τβ)β < γ where τβ = 0 for each β < γ. 
52. Working in ZFC, let μ = |γ|. Then the number of (extensional) type ((0)) enti­
ties is 22
k 
and the number of level 1 entities of the type (0, 0, . . .) formed from 
a γ-sequence of 0s is 2k
m 
. Moreover, when ω . κ . μ, we have that 22k . 2km . 
53. This is equivalent	 to the formulation from Section 11.1 in our background 
theory (which, recall, includes ZFC). 
54. How are we to pool together languages which differ on the interpretation of 
a common expression? One option would be to include both disambigua­
tions in the union language. Here we shall sidestep this question by focusing 
on cases where the languages to be pooled-together agree on the interpreta­
tion of their common expressions. 
55. We use these terms interchangeably. 
56. Borges’s library	 has a more stringent book format and allows nonsense 
strings. 
57. We assume here that the haphazard arrangement of books is such that there 
is no effective method—so long as we remain ignorant of the contents of the 
library—for us to read off the English sentence (or its semantic value) from 
the corresponding Babellian sentence letter. 
58. These pairs are always available at a type below n (as indicated by their type 
indices). The first coordinate is an expression, and therefore an object with 
entity type 0 (notwithstanding its expression type—see note 17). The 
second coordinate has (entity) type below n. 
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